SEC. I.-Of election, admission to, and duration

in Office.

In the absence of provision or covenant in an How far original trust, or of special agreement or understand- usage is to be regarded. ing between the parties, the usage of Protestant Dissenters, in their respective communions, furnishes the rule of proceeding for the election of ministers, their admission, and duration in office. And the principle of public policy does not extend to the case of Dissenters, so as to prevent a court of Equity from sanctioning the appointment of a minister to a congregation for a limited period, and not for life, provided such is the usage of the members, or the provision of the original trust (a).

sion is

But where there is an original trust, or a special Where exagreement or understanding between the parties, the press proviprovisions respectively contained therein, so far as the made. same can be collected by inference and fair presumption, supply the only rule by which the courts will regulate the nature and extent of their interposition (b).

If a minister has been duly elected, or claims a Mandamus right which is litigated by another without colour of to admit, title to an endowed pastorship, or a function with emoluments, and there is no specific legal remedy, the court of King's Bench, on a proper case previously shewn, but without requiring a title to be established, will grant a mandamus to the trustees to admit, even though the other party is in possession: the

(a) Attorney General v. Pearson and others, 3 Meriv. 402. R. v. Jotham, 3 T. R.

577.

V.

(b) Attorney General Pearson and others, 409. Attorney General v. Fletcher and others, M. S.

How far usage obtains.

election and appointment constitute a legal right, which a mandamus to admit enables him to try, and the use of the meeting-house and pulpit is incident to the clerical function. But an affidavit of the registering of the meeting-house would probably be required of the party making the application (a).

SEC. II. Of Suspension, Removal, and Restoration.

In the absence of an original trust, a special agreement, or an understanding between the parties, it is presumed, on the authority of the cases already quoted (b), that usage determines in whom the power of suspending, removing, and restoring resides, as well as the mode in which it must be exercised.

But in a case of endowment, where the minister has a certain interest in his office not depending on the voluntary contributions of the congregation, it is doubtful how far usage would justify a removal Mandamus without reasonable cause. A mandamus to restore to restore. an endowed minister who has been expelled by the majority of his congregation, has been granted in order to enable him to try their right of dispossessing him; but in such case, the party applying must make out a prima facie title to the office, and shew that he has complied with all the ceremonies and forms necessary to constitute his right, according to the practice of the particular community to which he 100, 259.

(a) R. v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1265, 1043. The mandamus was grounded on an affidavit of pastorship, the election of claimant by a majority, and the subsequent act of trustees. 3 T. R. 577. 1 T. R. 398. 1 W. Bl. 300, 352. 2. T. R.

(b) Vide supra, p. 77. Where a power of removal is not given to any particular part of a body, it rests with the society at large. 8 T. R. 356; 2 Str. 819.

belongs, and he would, probably, be expected to produce an affidavit of the registry of the meetinghouse (a).

trustees

But where a trust-deed invests certain individuals Power of with an authority, quasi visitors, to dismiss or sus- under a pend a regularly appointed minister at their own will deed. and pleasure, the courts cannot interfere, however improper the dismissal or suspension may be; if, however, it is provided, that the same shall be done according to certain rules, constitutions, and regulations specified in the deed, it must be made to appear that they are applicable to the particular case; and before the courts will lend their assistance to enforce the sentence, they will be satisfied that those rules, constitutions, and regulations have been complied with. It is doubtful whether the courts of justice in this kingdom will, under any circumstances, enforce the rules of a community established in a sister kingdom, which in that kingdom are not entitled to similar assistance (b).

SEC. III.-Of Devises and Legacies.

THE religious persuasion of Protestant Dissenters being tolerated by law, affords no pretext for invalidating a devise or legacy; and certain devises may be valid as appointments under the statute of Elizabeth, which could not be sustained under the Statutes of Mortmain.

Hence, a devise to a person nominatim, but de- Devise to scribed as the preacher of a certain meeting-house, a preacher. of an estate for life, on condition of settling to certain

77.

(a) R. v. Jotham, supra, p.

(b) Attorney General v. Fletcher and others, M. S.

charitable uses after his death, is a good devise to the party for his life, though void as to the remainTo Dissent- der (a); and a devise in trust, "for those persons ing minis- that are commonly called Dissenting ministers," naming some of them, is also good as it regards the ministers, notwithstanding the Statutes of Mortmain (b).

ters.

Bequest to fund of

Dissenting

So a bequest in augmentation of a fund for poor Dissenting ministers living in any county in England, ministers. is held good, notwithstanding its uncertainty; and it being proved that there were three distinct societies of Dissenters in England, the bequest was ordered to be distributed among the poor of each society (c).

For nonconforming ministers.

То а Вар

A bequest in trust for "nonconforming ministers and Dissenters" is good, it being no longer considered a dedication to a superstitious use; and even though it has lapsed in law, it will survive in equity, where there is sufficient to sustain it as an appointment under the statute of Elizabeth; but a court of Equity will sometimes divert the use (d).

On the same principle, an annuity to the minister tist minister. of a Baptist meeting-house and his successors, has been held to be good (e); and in another case of a similar character, the court went still further; for some of the lands devised being copyhold, and not

(a) Doe dem. Phillips v. Aldridge, 4 T. R. 265; Duke, 82; Poph. 139.

(b) Lloyd v. Spillet, M. 1734; 3 P. W. 346. A legacy to Baptists generally, 2 Ves. 275; to Presbyterians, 15 Ves. jun. 234; and to Quakers, Highmore, 146, are respective

ly good.

(c) Walters v. Childs, M. 1765; Amb. 524.

(d) Attorney General v. Hickman, 1732; 2 Keb. 34, p.

24.

(e) Attorney General v. Cock, 2 Ves. 273.

having been surrendered to the use of the will, the surrender was supplied by ordering the trustees to be admitted (a).

So a bequest to maintain a preaching minister (b), A preachand a legacy to ejected ministers, being respectively ing minister and ejected Protestant Dissenters, have been severally held to ministers. be good (c). But a court of Equity regards with a

out in land.

jealous eye, bequests for the encouragement of itine- Itinerant rant preachers (d). And a bequest of money to be preachers. laid out in land, for the benefit of two preachers at a To be laid chapel, although it is to be invested till an eligible purchase can be made, is void under the Statute of Mortmain; and not supported by supposing a discretion in the trustees not to lay it out in land, the directions being imperative. And a gift of part of the fund to certain persons the then preachers is also void (e).

Protestant

Foreign Protestant ministors domiciled l this Foreign country, it seems, are entitled on the same terms, to ministers. the privileges of Dissenting ministers (f).

SEC. IV. Of Votes for Members of Parliament.

COMMITTEES have in general disallowed the votes Votes for of Dissenting ministers (g); but where it can be dis- freeholds. tinctly shewn, that they hold their situations for life, and have a sufficient freehold interest in land in respect thereof, it is presumed their votes are equally valid with those of the Established clergy.

(a) Attorney General v. Andrews, 1 Ves. 225.

(b) Duke, 82; Poph. 139. (c) 1 Vernon, 248; 2 Vern. 1 Vesey, jun. 469; sed quære as to the use.

105;

(d) T. 1804; 10 Ves. 22; 7 Ves. 50 (n).

(e) Grieves v. Case, 1 Ves.

548.

(f) R. v. Hube, Peake, 181.

(g) Heywood, 2d ed. 130, 133; Gloucestershire Ca. 176; Tewksbury, ibid, 193; Bedfordshire Ca., 2 Ludl. 433; Yorkshire Ca., 1807; Male Elect. 272.