most instances to dispose of the questions raised on certiorari because it is necessary to have the evidence, and this court has decided already that the writ of certiorari must require a return including the conviction and the evidence, and there is no provision in the Act which directs the evidence to be filed with the clerk of the court. It turns out that the evidence is here, but how did it get here, and what record or certificate have we that this is the evidence taken before the magistrates? Now the departing from this rule, I think, has the effect of doing away with some express enactments and decisions affecting the question. For instance, if the writ of certiorari is applied for, before the writ can be issued at all the justices have the right to a notice, that is by virtue of an Imperial statutory enactment of binding force in these territories. Now how is it possible for us by creating procedure of our own, entirely original, to avoid the provisions of that Act? In this case it was attempted to be done by giving notice to the justices that an application would be made to a judge, not for a writ of certiorari, but for a rule nisi to quash. The act does not provide for a notice to be given to the justices of an application for an order to quash, but of an application for a writ of certiorari, and when a notice is given as has been given in this case of an intention to apply for an order to quash the conviction, the provisions of the statute are not being carried out at all, but it is a doing something entirely different to what the statute contemplates. Then again as to the consequences; under the prescribed practice whereby a writ of certiorari is issued, the justices may at any time before the return of the writ of certiorari, before they send back into court the conviction under the writ, amend it, and they may do that even after it is lodged with the officer of the court. Here a statutory appeal has been given, and the justice cannot do that if he is made to return the conviction without a writ of certiorari, his power is gone if this practice is allowable, it simply means that a procedure can be taken under which he is liable to the same consequences as if the conviction had been returned to the writ of certiorari. Now, if this is so, it must follow that the very moment that under section 888 the conviction is filed, the justice has no longer a power to amend, if it is in the same position as if filed with a return to a writ of certiorari, because the moment he has filed the record in court it is But the authorities open to any person to move to quash it. run the contrary to that, they say he can amend it before it is returned with the return to the writ of certiorari. It seems to me, therefore, that establishing a practice such as is sought to be carried out here is flying in the teeth of the practice of the court and the Imperial Statute to which I have referred and the decisions I have mentioned. I think, therefore, with my brother Richardson that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this application until a writ of certiorari has been issued and the return made to the court; but I concur with the latter part of my brother Scott's judgment, that the defendant having elected to take the case stated before a single judge as he had done, and having got the decision of that judge, he cannot come before this court now and attack the conviction upon the very same grounds on which he attacked it before the single judge. The powers of both are identical. Suppose instead of electing to have this case heard before the single judge he had elected to have it heard before this court and got its decision, could he turn around then and apply to this court to quash this conviction just as if it had been brought to this court by writ of certiorari? I think it is a case of res judicata, and no appeal seems to be given to this court from the decision of a single judge, and I do not think we should allow it to be taken in a side way. Note: Res judicata in criminal matters. Rule discharged. It is a general principle that a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction, of matters put in issue by the pleadings, is binding and conclusive upon all other courts of concurrent power in the same jurisdiction, and between parties and their privies. Note-Continued. When a competent tribunal, having had a case before them, have given a final judgment, it is res judicata. The object of the rule is always put upon two grounds- the one, public policy, that it is the interest of the State that there should be an end of litigation; and the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. Lockyer v. Ferryman (1877) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 519, 528, 530, per Lord Blackburn. A judicial decision is conclusive until reversed, and its verity cannot be contradicted; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. But the prior decision does not prevent the court from considering matters which have arisen subsequently. Heath v. Overseers of Weaverham (1894) 2 Q.B. 108. There must in civil actions be a concurrence of the four conditions following: (1) Identity in the thing sued for. (2) Identity of the cause of action. (3) Identity of persons and of parties to the action. (4) Identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made. The same rules are adhered to in criminal proceedings as in civil suits so far as they are applicable. The issue must be the same to create a bar; a charge of doing an act with criminal intent is not considered the same as committing the same act without such intent; Com. v. Bakeman, 105 Mass. 53. There may be great similarity in the facts where there is a substantial legal difference in the nature of the crime; and on the contrary, there may be considerable diversity of circumstances where the legal character of the offence is the same; as where most of the facts are identical but, by adding withdrawing or changing some one fact, the nature of the crime is changed, as where one burglary is charged as a burglariously breaking and stealing certain goods, and another as a burglarious breaking with intent to steal; these are distinct offences. So, on the other hand, where there is a diversity Note-Continued. of circumstances such as time and place, where time and place are not necessary ingredients in the crime, still the offences are to be regarded as the same. Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 503, per Shaw, C.J. For the operation of the rule of res judicata it is not necessary that the charges in the two indictments should be precisely the same; it is sufficient if an acquittal from the offence charged in the first indictment virtually includes an acquittal from that set forth in the second, however they may differ in degree. Thus, an acquittal on an indictment for murder will be a good bar to an indictment for manslaughter, and, e converso, an acquittal on an indictment for manslaughter will be a bar to a prosecution for murder, for, in the first instance, had the defendant been guilty not of murder but of manslaughter, he might be found guilty of the latter offence upon that indictment; and, in the second instance, since the defendant is not guilty of manslaughter, he cannot be guilty of manslaughter under circumstances of aggravation which enlarged into murder. State v. Wister, 62 Mo. 592; Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 503. [SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA.] BEFORE GRAHAM, E.J., THE QUEEN v. CORBETT. Warrant of commitment-Stating costs of conveying to gaol— 1. Where a conviction is made under the Inland Revenue Act (Can.), and a money penalty is imposed and in default imprisonment for a fixed term unless the penalty and the costs and charges of conveying the accused to gaol are sooner paid, it is necessary that the amount of the latter costs and charges should be stated in the warrant of commitment (Inland Revenue Act s. 113); and where not so stated the prisoner is entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. DECIDED: June 17, 1899. The prisoner was in custody under a warrant issued on a conviction for violation of the Inland Revenue Act, R.S.C. 1886, Ch. 34, sec. 159, sub-sec. (e). The conviction as set out in the warrant of commitment, after reciting the offence in the language of the section, adjudged that the accused for his offence forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred dollars to be paid and applied according to law and also adjudged that he be imprisoned in the common gaol of the county for the term of one month without hard labor, and that he pay M. A. McDonald (who was not designated the prosecutor) the sum of ten dollars for his costs in that behalf, and if the said several sums were not paid forthwith that he be imprisoned for a term of four months to commence at the expiration of the first term, unless the said sums and "the costs and charges of conveying the accused to gaol were sooner paid." Section 113 of the Inland Revenue Act provides as follows: "Every penalty or forfeiture incurred for any offence against the provisions of this Act or any other law relating to excise, may be sued for and recovered or may be enforced before any court of Vice-Admiralty, or any court of record having |