for which the defendant can be extradited. If it does, the Court can remand the prisoner for extradition. The evidence is the substance, the statement in the warrant is merely a matter of form. Here the evidence clearly discloses an offence which renders the defendant liable to extradition. There was here, however, a supplementary return made by. the gaoler, and both these returns are before the Court, and the Court can act on the later return. The Court has also the power to allow the return to be amended, so as to have the proper warrant sent up. The prisoner is being held on the new warrant, and nothing would be gained by his discharge for any defect in the first warrant, as he would be immediately brought up on the new warrant: Re Martin, 4 Can. Law Jour. 199, 200; Re Parker, 19 Ont. R.612; Re Smith, 3 H. & N. 227; Re Swire, 30 Ch. D. 239; Re Anderson, 20 U.C.R. 124, 11 U.C.C.P. 9, at pp. 65, 68. The fact of the defendant being a British subject is no answer to proceedings for extradition. This is laid down in Re Burley, 1 Can. Law Jour. 34, where it is said that the Act extends to British subjects committing the offence named in the treaty in the territory of the United States, and then becoming fugitives to Canada. It is not necessary to prove the foreign law; all that the Acts require is that the offence should be forgery according to the law of this country: Re Smith, 4 Ont. Pr. 215; Regina v. Hovey, 8 Ont. Pr. 345; Re Caldwell, 5 Ont. Pr. 217; Re Burley, I Can. Law Jour. at p. 45; Regina v. Morton, 19 U.C.C. P. 9, 25; Moore on Extradition, p. 646, sec. 429; Re Phipps, 1 Ont. R. 586, 8 Ont. App. 77; Act of 1890, article 1. The evidence returned clearly disclosed the offence of forgery. It shows that the name of Osborne was a fictitious name, and that it was used with intent to defraud. This is all that is necessary to constitute the charge of forgery, and distinguishes the case from Regina v. Martin, 5 Q.B.D. 34. There was clear evidence of the identity of the prisoner.

TORONTO, December 5, 1894.

MEREDITH, C.J.

The prisoner has been, under the provisions of the Extradition Act, committed by the Judge of the County Court of the County of Wentworth for the extradition crime of uttering a forged instrument, the forged instrument being a cheque purporting to be drawn by Robert Osborne on the Bank of Commerce of Chicago for $1,350.

It is objected for the prisoner on the motion for his discharge

1. That in the warrant of commitment the ground of the determination of the judge is stated to be that the prisoner had been "convicted," while the evidence shows that he had not been convicted, but only "accused" of the extradition crime.

2. That no evidence was given to show that the offence with which the prisoner is charged amounts to uttering a forged instument according to the law of the State of Illinois, in which State the offence is alleged to have been committed (but the contrary is shown).

3. That the evidence did not disclose the commission by the prisoner of the extradition crime of which he is accused.

I am of opinion that none of these objections ought to prevail.

The first objection is a purely formal one, and we ought not to give effect to it unless it appears clearly that we are bound to do so according to law and the practice of the Court.

I do not think that if the warrant of commitment be defective we can, in such a case as this, look at the depositions returned, and if we find from them that an extradition crime has been committed remand the prisoner, as was done by the Court of Queen's Bench in Re Anderson, 20 U.C.R. 124.

The power of the Court to do this was fully considered by the Court of Common Pleas in the case of the same

prisoner: Re Anderson, 11 U.C.C.P. 9; and the decision. was against the existence of such a power.

The Court of Queen's Bench had, in the case before it, assumed to exercise the power of remanding, but it was pointed out by the Court of Common Pleas that in doing so it had acted upon a rule which, though applicable to cases where the court was acting with reference to a crime committed in the province and therefore by reason of its jurisdiction as a court over the offence it had inherent power to remand, was not applicable to the case of a commitment for extradition, because in such a case there was no jurisdiction over the individual, except such as was given by the Act of Parliament, and the warrant was the only authority for the detention of the prisoner.

There is, however, in my opinion, no doubt that the court has power to permit the return to the writ to be amended, and to allow it to be taken off the files in order that the amendment may be made: Leonard Watson's case, 9 A. & E. 731; Regina v. Reno and Anderson, 4 Ont. Pr. 281; and if in this case the supplementary return made by the gaoler is not properly before us we should now give leave to take the return off the files in order that it may be amended by returning the second warrant, to which I shall afterwards refer, as one of the causes of the prisoner's detention.

I do not think, however, that any amendment of the return is necessary.

The gaoler has returned the original warrant of commitment, and, by a supplementary return, a second warrant proper in form, and both of these returns were before the Court when the motion for the discharge of the prisoner was made.

The proper practice on the return of a writ of habeas corpus appears to be to bring into Court and read the return, whereupon, and not before, it is to be filed by the proper officer: Re Reno and Anderson, 4 Ont. Pr. 281, at p. 291.

If that practice had been followed here, the writ, with the return and the supplementary return, would have been

brought into Court and read together, and we must, I think, deal with this case as if that had been done; and I can see no reason, therefore, why the return and the supplementary return may not be treated as one, and as the return to the writ.

The first objection, therefore, in my opinion, cannot be sustained.

It will be more convenient to consider the third objection before dealing with the second.

The question raised by the third objection is substantially this-Was the evidence produced, as the 11th section of the Act requires, such as would, according to the law of Canada, subject to the provisions of the Act, have justified the committal of the prisoner for trial if the crime had been committed in Canada?

There was, in my opinion, evidence to go to a jury to support the following conclusions of fact:

1. That the prisoner on the 19th September, 1894, obtained from the First National Bank of Chicago $1,350, upon a cheque for that amount purporting to have been drawn by Robert Osborne on the Bank of Commerce of Chicago payable to the prisoner's order.

2. That no such person as Robert Osborne had any existence in fact, and that this was known to the prisoner.

3. That there were to the knowledge of the prisoner no funds to meet the cheque, and that his purpose in negotiating it was to defraud the First National Bank of Chicago.

4. That the cheque was signed by Frederick Murphy, a brother of the prisoner, with the name of Robert Osborne, he knowing of the fraudulent use to which it was intended to put it, and for the purpose of carrying out the fraud.

5. That the making and negotiating of the cheque were the result of a fraudulent conspiracy entered into between the prisoner and his brother Frederick, in pursuance of which the brother opened an account with the Bank of Commerce in the name of Robert Osborne; and that at the time he assumed the false name he did so to the knowledge of the prisoner for the purpose of carrying out the fraud

which was ultimately perpetrated upon the First National Bank, or some fraud of a like nature.

6. That the Bank of Commerce was induced by the representations of the prisoner to believe, and did believe, that the person with whom the account with them was opened was known to the prisoner; that his real name was Robert Osborne, and that he had been well and favourably known to the prisoner in Toronto, the last two of which statements were untrue.

7. That the payments and withdrawals from the Bank of Commerce in connection with the Robert Osborne account were made to appear to be the result of real transactions between Osborne and other persons, but were, in fact, fictitious transactions, and that this was done in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, and to enable the parties more surely to accomplish their fraudulent purpose.

I do not say that these conclusions must necessarily be drawn from the facts proved, but it is sufficient for the purposes of the present inquiry that a jury on the trial of the prisoner may draw them.

The next question is :-Such evidence having been given, does it justify the committal of the prisoner for the "extradition crime" with which he is charged, viz., uttering a forged instrument ?—and I have no doubt that it does.

Section 422 of the Criminal Code, 1892, defines "forgery" to be the making of a false document, knowing it to be false, with the intention that it shall in any way be used or acted upon as genuine, to the prejudice of any one, whether within Canada or not, or that some person should be induced by the belief that it is genuine to do or refrain from doing anything whether within Canada or not.

Section 421 declares that the expression "false document" means :-(a) a document the whole or some material part of which purports to be made by or on behalf of any person who did not make or authorize the making thereof, or which, though made by, or by the authority of, the