wise and worthy, which can be applied to the same person at the same time, are called COMPATIBLE.

10. A term or name which expresses an object of simple apprehension is called a SIMPLE TERM; as, A man, a tree. See $ 464.

11. A term made up of a combination of words which expresses a complex apprehension is called a COMPLEX TERM; as, A man with a sword; a tree covered with snow. A term may be made up of several words, still it expresses but one thing. See § 464.

12. A term used in only one sense is called UNIVOCAL. A term used in more senses than one is EQUIVOCAL. Take, for example, the word "Case," used to signify a kind of covering; and, again, an inflection of a noun, as John's, in the possessive "case;" and, again, a "case" such as is laid before a lawyer. This word is, in sense, three words; and in each of the three senses it may be applied "univocally" to several things which are, in that sense, signified by it. But when applied indiscriminately to a "covering" and to a grammatical case, it is used "equivocally."

2. Name the terms in the following sentence: "It was believed that reality and truth were limited to experience, and experience was limited to the sphere of sense; while the very highest faculties of the mind were deemed adequately explained when recalled to perceptions elaborated, purified, sublimated, and transformed. From the mechanical relations of sense with its object, it was attempted to solve the mysteries of will and intelligence; the philosophy of mind was soon viewed as correlative to the physiology of organization. The moral nature of man was at last formally abolished in its identification with his phys

ical; mind became a reflex of matter; thought a secretion of the brain."-Sir WM. HAMILTON's Review of Cousin's Lectures.

PREDICABLES.

§ 443. In the language of the schools there were FIVE PREDICABLES, i. e., Five things, one or other of which must be affirmed, i. e., predicated, wherever any thing is affirmed concerning another thing, as in the following example :

1. Wine is the SPECIES, or subordinate Class.

1

2

3

4

2. Juice is the GENUS, or Class in which wine is included. 3. The quality which distinguishes "wine" from all other "species" of juice is its being "extracted from grapes ;" the Logical name for such a quality is the DIFFERENTIA difference= characteristic. This is something joined to the essence.

=

4. A quality which belongs universally to the species, as that of " inebriating" to wine, without being its distinguishing quality, is termed a PROPERTY of it.

5. A quality which does not belong universally to a species, but is present only in some of the individuals which compose it, as that of being "sweet" to "wine," is termed an ACCIDENT.

A common term, we have seen, is so called from its expressing what is common to several things, and thence called also a "predicable," inasmuch as it can be affirmatively predicated in the same sense ("univocally") of certain other terms.

1. When you are asked concerning any individual thing, "What is it?" the answer you would give, if strictly correct, would be what is strictly called its SPECIES; as, "This is a pin," “that is a pencil;" "this is wine." This predicable, namely, the species of any thing, is usually described in technical language as expressing its whole Essence, meaning the whole that can be expressed by a common term.

2. When the same question, "What is this?" is asked respecting a species, the term by which you answer is that predicable which is technically called the GENUS of that Species; as,

"What is a pen ?" The answer is, "An Instrument."

is wine?" "A Juice."

"What

3. When you are asked, "What kind of instrument is a pen?" the answer would be, "One designed for writing;" or, "What kind of juice is wine?" "One extracted from grapes," This predicable is technically called the DIFFERENTIA, or difference. The difference and the genus are technically described as making up or constituting the species.

4. When any quality invariably and peculiarly belongs to a certain Species, but which yet is not that which we fix on as characterizing the Species, it is technically called the PROPERTY. Thus, inebriating is a "property" of wine, as we have seen; risibility is a "property" of man.

5. A predicable which belongs to some individuals of a Species, but not to others, is called an ACCIDENT; as a military dress is an accident of man, sweetness an accident of wine.

EXERCISE.

Mention which of these five relations the lower terms of the subjoined pairs sustain to the upper :

Ex. g., is flower the species, genus, differentia, property, or accident of Rose?

GENUS AND SPECIES.

§ 444. GENUS and Difference make up the SPECIES. Thus "animal" (the genus) and "rational" (the difference) constitute the "man." The Species, in reality, contains the Genus (i. e., implies it); and when the Genus is called a whole, and is said to contain the Species, this is only a metaphorical expression, signifying that it comprehends the Species in its more extensive,

but less full (intensive) signification: e. g., if I predicate of Cæsar that he is an animal, I say the truth, indeed, but not the whole truth; for he is not only an animal, but a man, so that "man" is a more full and complete expression than "animal;" while "animal" is more extensive, as it comprehends several other species; as, Beast, bird, etc. In the same manner, the name of a species is a more extensive, but less full and complete term than that of an individual (viz., a singular term).

A Genus which is also a species is called a SUBALTERNUM Genus or species, as "bird," which is the genus of "pigeon,” a species, is itself a species of "animal." There may be more than one Subalternum.

A Genus which is not considered as a species of any thing is called SUMMUM (the highest) Genus.

A Species which is not considered as genus of any thing, but is regarded as containing under it only individuals, is called INFIMA, the lowest species.

In enumerations it is illogical to rank higher and lower species together: thus, e. g., to speak of "Flowers" as being roses, lilies, water-lilies, would be illogical, the third article being manifestly included in the second.

Genus, {

Name.

Summum . . . Body
Subalternum. Living body.
Subalternum. Animal.

Species, Infima. . . Man

...

A. Intension.

B. Extension.
Body
Stone, plant, brute, man.
Body with life.
Plant, brute, man.
Body with life and sensation . . . Brute, man.

Body with life, sensation, and reason. . Man.

In the Summum Genus the Intension is least, the Extension greatest. In the Infima Species the Intension is greatest, the Extension least.

In the following enumeration, specify the Illogical items:
Animals are, Horses, Lions, Dogs, Spaniels, Hares.
Colors are, White, Red, Crimson, Black, Green.

Compositions are, Histories, Poems, Odes, Orations, Essays.
Citizens are, Artisans, Manufacturers, Seamen, Sailors.

ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZATION.

§ 445. ABSTRACTION is the process by which we notice some part or parts of the nature of an individual thing or object of perception and reflection, without considering for the time any other part or circumstance of its nature. Abstraction may also be described by a reference to its office as an instrument of reason, which is to notice those parts of several things in which they agree with one another. The word means a drawing away of their marks of agreement from all the distinctive marks which the single objects have.

Thus we may abstract from all the houses which come in our way certain points of agreement (as that they are covered buildings, and fit for the habitation of men), and fix the attention upon these without regard to the points of difference (namely, the height, length, position, convenience, decoration). Thus, too, we may contemplate in the mind several different "Kings," putting out of our thoughts the name and individual character of each, and the terms and places of their reigns, and considering only the regal office which belongs to all and each of them; and we are thus enabled to designate any or every one of them by the common (or general) term "king," or, again, by the term Royalty we can express the circumstance which is common to them.

It is by this drawing off that generalization is effected. But abstraction and generalization have not the same meaning. We can not "Generalize" without "abstracting," but we may perform Abstraction without Generalization.

If, for instance, in the language of WHATELY, any one is thinking of the "sun" without having any notion that there is more than one such body in the universe, he may consider it without any reference to its place in the sky, whether rising or setting, or any other situation; or, again, he may be considering its heat alone, without thinking of its light; or of its light alone; or of its apparent magnitude, without any reference either to its light or heat. Now in each of these cases there would be Abstraction, though there would be no Generalization, as long as he was contemplating a single individual, that which we call the "Sun."