The questions raised in the case were (1) whether or not the portion of the regulations which required eight hundred cubic feet of free air-space for each cow, and under which the appellant was convicted was validly made; and (2) whether or not the Dairies, Cowsheds, and Milkshops Order of 1885, in so far as, if at all, it imposed any restrictions as to air-space or free air-space, or purported to authorise the making of any regulations by the local authority as to airspace or free air-space was validly made.

Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 74):

ventilation

of

Sect. 34. The Privy Council (now the Board of Agriculture, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 74) may from time to time make such general or special orders as they think fit, subject and according to the provisions of this Act for the following purposes or any of them: (2) For prescribing and regulating the dairies and cowsheds in the occupation of persons following the trade of cowkeepers or dairymen. (5) For authorising a local authority to make regulations for the purposes aforesaid, or any of them, subject to such conditions (if any) as the council prescribe.

Sect. 58. (2.) Every Order of Council shall have effect as if it had been enacted by this Act.

Order in Council, made under sect. 34 on the 15th June 1885, and intituled the Dairies, Cowsheds, and Milkshops Order of 1885:

Art. 7. It shall not be lawful for any person following the trade of cowkeeper or dairyman to begin to occupy as a dairy or cowshed any building not so occupied at the commencement of the Order (i.e., the 30th June 1885), unless and until he first makes provision to the reasonable satisfaction of the local authority for the lighting and ventilation including air-space .

the same.

of

Art. 8. It shall not be lawful for any person following the trade of cowkeeper or dairyman to occupy as a dairy or cowshed any building, whether so occupied at the commencement of this Order or not, if and as long as the lighting and the ventilation, including air-space thereof, are not such as are necessary or proper (a) for the health and good condition of the

cattle therein. Art. 13. A local authority may from time to time make regulations (b) for prescribing and regulating the lighting, ventilation, cleansing, drainage, and water supply of dairies and cowsheds in the occupation of persons following the trade of cowkeepers or dairymen.

The regulation made under art. 13 by the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of Southport (who are the local authority of the borough for the purposes of the Act and Order) under which the appellant was convicted was as follows:

Every person following the trade of a cowkeeper

shall not cause or suffer any greater number of cattle to be at any time kept in a building used as a Cowshed than will admit of the provision of eight hundred cubic feet of free air-space for each cow.

Moulton, Q.C. (Pickford, Q.C. and Horridge with him) for the appellant. Both the Order of Council and the regulation made by the local authority, in so far as they deal with airspace are invalid. Sect. 34 of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1878 refers only to ventilation. Ventilation is an entirely distinct thing from free-air space. Ventilation depends on the construction of the building used; air-space depends on the user of the building. Parliament has given powers to make regulations insuring

[Q.B. DIV.

the proper construction of cowhouses and these powers are held to cover regulations to prevent overcrowding cowhouses. But by sect. 58 of the Act the Order of Council is to have effect as if enacted by the Act, and so, in view of The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (71 L. T. Rep. 205: (1894) A. C. 347) the court may be inclined to hold that the Order, even though not a proper carrying out of the Act in the opinion of the court, is, nevertheless, binding. In that case I submit that the regulation of the local authority is ultra vires of the powers delegated to it by the Order itself. Arts. 7 and 8 of the Order specifically include air-space under the term ventilation. Art. 13, under which the regulation is made, does not so include it. It merely delegates the power to make regulation as to ventilation and ventilation only. I submit if it had been intended that the power to make regulation as to air-space too should be delegated, air-space would be mentioned in art. 13 as it is in arts. 7 and 8.

Macmorran, Q.C. (Pollard with him.-The Act gives the Privy Council powers as to regulating ventilation. The Privy Council has interpreted ventilation as including air-space. The court, I submit, will not dissent from such interpretation unless it considers it altogether inconsistent with the statute, and surely in the ordinary sense ventilation is taken as including due provision as to air-space. The Order, therefore, I submit, is valid. It is certainly strange that in arts. 7 and 8 ventilation is made expressly to include air-space, and in art. 13 it is not; but I submit that the express reference to air-space in arts. 7 and 8 was meant to point out that for the purposes of the Order ventilation was to be taken as including air-space, and this being done at the commencement of the Order it was not thought necessary to refer to air-space every time ventilation was mentioned. Besides, to hold that air-space is included in arts. 7 and 8, but not in art. 13, would not be for the advantage of cowkeepers. The object of the regulation here impeached is to give cowkeepers notice as to the requirements of the law. If no such notice can be legally given they are liable to be summoned under arts. 7 and 8 whenever, in the opinion of any inspector, the air-space provided is insufficient, and if the justices happen to share the inspector's opinion they may be convicted.

Moulton, Q.C., in reply, referred to

Reed v. Harvey, 42 L. T. Rep. 511; 5 Q. B. Div. 184;

Ex parte Freeman, 55 L. T. Rep. 820: 18 Q. B. Div. 393;

Ex parte Kingstown Town

L. Rep. Ir. 509.

Commissioners, 18

Nov. 1.-WRIGHT, J.-By sect. 34 of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1878 it is provided that the Privy Council may from time to time make such general or special orders as they thought fit, subject and according to the provisions of the Act for certain purposes or any of them. Among these purposes is the regulation of the "ventilation of dairies and cowsheds." By the same Act the Privy Council have power to authorise the local authorities to make regulations for "the purposes aforesaid or any of them." Then it is further provided, by sect. 58, that every order of the Privy Council hall have effect as

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if it had been enacted by this Act." Under the powers so given the Privy Council in 1885 made an Order, by art. 7 of which regulations were made as to ventilation including air-space" of one class of dairies and cowsheds, and by art. 8 of which regulations were made as to "ventilation including air-space" of another class of dairies and cowsheds. Art. 13 delegates to the local authority powers to make regulations as to the "ventilation" of dairies and cowsheds. The whole question in the case is whether the power delegated by the Privy Council to the local authority to make regulations includes the power to make regulations as to "ventilation including air-space." It is certainly strange that in arts. 7 and 8 of the Order the words "including air-space" are expressly inserted after the word "ventilation" as explanatory of the meaning of that word, whereas in art. 13 the word "ventilation" occurs without this explanatory addition. It may be that the omission of the addition is intended to have the effect of excluding the question of air-space from the purview of the local authority. On the other band, it may be that the addition of the words "including air-space" after "ventilation" in the earlier articles is intended to fix the meaning of the word "ventilation" throughout the whole order. Now, under these powers given to the local authority the corporation of Southport have made regulations, and in one of these it is prescribed that no cowkeeper or dairyman should cause or suffer any greater number of cattle to be at any time kept in a shed or dairy than would allow for each cow an air-space of 800 cubic feet. The point was, whether this regulation was ultra vires or not. As I have already said, the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act provides that an Order of Council made under it shall have effect as if enacted in the Act. The first thing to be considered is the effect of this provision. The court has been referred to The Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (71 L. T. Rep. 205"; (1894) A. C. 347), where the House of Lords held that the proper course of construction in such cases was to hold that the original Act, which authorised the subordinate legislation and the subordinate legislation itself should be read together as if they together constituted an Act of Parliament, and then that the court should apply the ordinary rules of construction, and see what the two meant. It seems to me that this is the principle of construction we should now adopt. The principal enactment authorises regulations as to ventilation, the subordinate enactment in two sections authorises regulations as to ventilation including air space, and in another section as to ventilation simply. I think that no objection can be taken that the e provisions of the subordinate enactment can be considered as going beyond the principal enactment itself. If then art. 13 authorises the local authority to make regulations for ventilation including air-space, that article is good and not inconsistent with the statute. But does it? There is a great deal of doubt about it, but I have come to the conclusion that the reasonable contruction is that arts. 7 and 8 enacted and intended that the provisions of the Order as to ventilation should mean also provisions as to air-space. The two things are intimately connected. Everybody knows that the quantity of air-space makes all the difference!

[Q.B. DIV.

in any scheme of ventilation. Therefore, I think that art. 13 of the Privy Council Order should be taken as giving the local authority power to make regulations as to ventilation including under that term, air-space. No real case of hardship can arise under the Order, since under art. 14 there is an appeal to the Privy Council-now the Board of Agriculture--in case it is considered that the regulations made by a local authority are too severe. Under all the circumstances I am of opinion that the regulations made by the local authority here are good, and the appeal must be dismissed.

KENNEDY, J.-I concur. There is nothing which could be or has been said that at all satisfies me that there is anything wrong in the Order made in pursuance of the Act of Parliament by the Privy Council. It is said, however, that, granting this the local authority has in this case gone beyond the power entrusted to it, because in art. 13, under which they had made their regulations, the word ventilation alone occurs, and nothing is said about free air-space. But as

these words have been used in the earlier articles as being associated with ventilation, it appears to me unreasonable to hold that they are not intended to be included in the 13th article, and that they have been intentionally omitted from it. It seems to me that it was right to hold that in giving powers to local authorities to make regu. lations as to the ventilation of works in all respects identical with those referred to in arts. 7 and 8, it was intended that ventilation should have the same meaning-that is, that it should include free air-space in both cases. As to the argument of convenience, surely it is much better for the parties concerned that the local authorities of a district should set down a definite minimum standard of free air-space to be provided than that the dairy-keeper or cowkeeper should be liable to be brought up from time to time accord. ing to the varying views as to free air-space entertained by inspectors and the magistrates who heard the complaints. For seven years the regulation which it is now sought to have declared ultra vires has existed in this district; I think it is justified both on legal grounds and on considerations of convenience.

Conviction affirmed.

Solicitors for the appellant, Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., for Arthur S. Mather, Liverpool. Solicitor for the respondent, J. Davies Williams, Southport.

Tuesday, Nov. 2. 1897.

(Before WRIGHT and KENNEDY, JJ.) REG. v. MEAD; Ex parte THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL. (a)

Mandamus - Hear and determine-Service of summons- -Refusal to proceed-Summary Juris diction Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), s. 1— London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 188 (1).

The procedure for the service of a summons under sect. 188 (1) of the London Building Act 1894 is only available where, after ordinary inquiry the person cannot be found or identified. When by such inquiry the person on whom the summons (4) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Q.B. Div.]

On the 23rd Sept. 1887 the London County Council made a complaint to a magistrate and applied for a summons under the London Building Act 1894.

On the 1st Oct. 1897 this summons was returnable. It was addressed "To the Owner" merely, and when the owner was called on to appear in the ordinary way there was no response.

The complainants thereupon proposed to proceed in the absence of the defendant, and upon the magistrate calling for proof of service of the summons, a constable gave evidence that he had affixed a copy on the premises, which were unoccupied.

They stated that the owner was unknown, but no evidence was given that any steps had been taken to discover him. There was no evidence even that the valuation list or rate had been examined, or the rate collector int-rrogated, or other obvious means taken, with a view to discover who the last owner or occupier was, although such inquiries would in all probability have led to the identity of the owner being established.

owner,

was a

66

The complainants further contended that the service was sufficient under sect. 188 (1) of the London Building Act 1894, but the magistrate was of the opinion that the service of any şummons, if anonymously addressed. i.e., "To the notice," the service of which is provided for by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, and must therefore be served under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. 1, personally, or at the last known place of abode. He also considered that, even if a summons addressed "To the owner," in a case where the owner could not be found, was not provided for by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, there should be evidence that reasonable diligence had been exercised by the complainants to discover the owner of the property in question. For these reasons he refused to hear the summons. By the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1818 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), s. 1:

every such summons shall be served by a constable or other peace officer, or other person to whom the same shall be delivered, upon the person to whom it is so directed, by delivering the same to the party personally, or by leaving the same with some person for him at his last or most usual place of abode; and the constable, peace officer, or person who shall serve the same in manner aforesaid, shall attend at the time and place in the said summons mentioned, to depose, if necessary, to the service of the said summons.

By the London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 188:

(1.) Any notice, order, or other document required or authorised to be served under this Act, the service of which is not provided for by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, the Lands Clauses Acts, or the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 may be served by delivering a copy thereof at, or by sending a copy thereof by post in a registered letter to the usual or last known residence in the United Kingdom of the person to whom it is addressed, or by delivering the same to some person on the premises to which it relates, or if no person be found

[Q.B. DIV.

on the premises, then by fixing a copy thereof on some conspicuous part of the building to which it relates, and in the case of a railway company, by delivering a copy thereof to the secretary at the principal offices of the said company.

Sutton showed cause against the rule.-The two points raised by the other side are (1) that the service was sufficient, and (2) that this case is covered by Reg. v. Mead (70 L. T. Rep. 766 ; (1894) 2 Q. B. 125). As to (1) under the sections of the Building Act 1894 the service of the summons must be under sect. 1 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848. As to (2), that decision was under a different Act; if it had been under the Building Act of 1894, the decision of the court in that case would have been the other way. It was under the Public Health Act 1891, s. 120 (1). In the present Act there is no section like sect. 120 (1), and no form of summons as in that Act.

Avory for the London County Council.

WRIGHT, J.-I think that this application for a rule against the magistrate fails on two grounds. The first is the narrow ground that, supposing the procedure under sect. 188 applicable, the evidence was not sufficient under that section because it does not appear that there was evidence given to the effect that no person was to be found on the premises. But the wider and more important ground is on the general construction of sect. 188. It seems to me that the true construction is, that where the person can be identified by reason of an inquiry, not a prolonged or expensive inquiry, but by ordinary inquiry, then it is right that the procedure under Jervis's Act should be followed, because that is the procedure most likely to bring the matter to his attention. But if, after reasonable inquiry such as every constable knows how to make in the course of a few minutes, it cannot be discovered who the owner is, then it seems to me that sect. 188 is applicable. In the present case I think that the magistrate was right in saying that there had not been quite enough inquiry on the part of the officer of the London County Council. We have nothing to show that he would not have been satisfied by a very moderate amount of inquiry indeed, but there is no evidence before us that there was any. KENNEDY, J.-I agree.

Rule discharged.

Solicitor for the magistrate, The Solicitor to the Treasury. Solicitor to the London County Council, W. A. Blaxland.

Oct. 26 and Nov. 12, 1897.
(Before WILLS, J.)

THE MAYOR, &C., OF THETFORD V. THE
NORFOLK COUNTY COUNCIL. (a)

Local government-Borough rate-Costs of quarter and petty sessions-Borough with population under 10,000-Separate court of quarter sessions -Municipal Corporation Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), 169-Local Government Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 45), 88. 35, 38, 68, 84.

The expenses of borough quarter sessions, including the salaries of the recorder and clerk of the peace, must be borne by the borough, where the popula(a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Q.B. Div.]

tion does not exceed 10,000, and not by the county council. But the salary of the clerk to the borough justices must be paid by the county council.

Re The County Council of Kent and the Borough of Sandwich, (1891) 1 Q. B. 389) not followed. THE plaintiffs are a corporate body intrusted with the duties of the regulation, administration, and government of the borough of Thetford, which was a municipal borough incorporated by charter about 1573, and is regulated, administered, and governed by the statutes passed for the government of municipal corporations now in force.

The defendants are a body corporate under and by virtue of the Local Government Act 1888. and are intrusted with all the rights and duties of administration and government created by that Act for the county of Norfolk. The borough of Thetford is situated partly within the county of Norfolk and partly within the county of Suffolk, but for the purposes of administration and government is deemed to be within the county of Norfolk, and so is within the district administered by the defendants. By the census taken in 1881 and 1891 the population of the borough was declared at 4032 and 4244 respectively. For the purposes of administration within the borough there has existed since 1839, and there still exists, a court of quarter sessions. Such court is presided over by a recorder who is paid a salary pur suant to the Municipal Corporation Act 1882 of 401. per annum. Such salary was, prior to the Local Government Act of 1888 coming into force on the 1st April 1889, and since that date, been paid by the plaintiffs to the recorder out of the moneys in their hands, and levied and obtained by them for the purpose of the administration and government of the borough under the Municipal Corporation Acts. Such moneys are known as the borough fund. In connection with this court of quarter sessions there is a clerk of the peace who has been and is now paid by fees for the work and services done by him, Prior to the Local Government Act 1888 those fees were paid by the plaintiffs out of the borough fund. But since that Act the defendants have paid him the fees due and payable to him by prosecutors at quarter sessions in respect of work done at those sessions, but all the other fees except those have been paid by the plaintiffs out of the borough

fund.

There is also in the borough a court of petty sessions, presided over by borough justices to which is attached a clerk. That clerk has been and is now paid a salary out of the borough fund for his work and services amounting to 841. 98. 8d., and also a further allowance of 21. 2s. for his services as clerk to the visitors and magistrates under the Lunacy Act 1890.

These quarter and petty sessions have been always and are now held at the Guildhall of the borough, and the plaintiffs have always paid the costs and expenses incurred for such use whenever it has been required and used for such

[Q.B. DIV.

defendants are under an obligation to bear and pay in the future the costs of these quarter and petty sessions, including the salaries of the recorder, clerk of the pace, and clerk to the borough justices.

By the Local Government Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 45), s. 35:

In the case of a quarter sessions borough, not being one of the boroughs named in the Third Schedule to this Act, but contaiuing, according to the census of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, a population of one thousand or upwards, the following provisions shall on and after the appointed day apply: (5) The payment of the costs of assizes and sessions shall be a general county purpose for which the parishes in the borough may be assessed to county contributions, and all costs of prosecutions mentioned in section one hundred and sixty-nine of the Municipal Corporation Act 1882 shall be paid out of the county fund.

By sect. 38:

Where a borough having a separate court of quarter sessions contained, according to the census of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, a population of less than ten thousand, the following provisions shall after the appointed day apply: (5) The area of the borough shall, for the purposes of the above mentioned acts and all other administrative purposes of the county council, be included in the county as if the borough had not a separate court of quarter sessions, and accordingly shall be subject to the authority of the county council and the county coroners, and may be annexed by the county council to a coroner's district of the county and the parishes of the borough, and shall be liable to be assessed to all county contributions.

By sect. 68:

All receipts of the county council, whether for general or special county purposes, shall be carried to the county fund, and all payments for general or special county purposes shall be made in the first instance out of that fund: (9) County contributions may be retrospective, in order to raise money for the payment of costs incurred, or having become payable at any time within six months before the demand of the contributions.

By sect. 84:

(1.) The salaried clerk of every petty sessional division shall be from time to time appointed and removed as heretofore. (2) The county council shall pay to the salaried clerks of petty sessional divisions such salaries as may be fixed under the enactment relating to those clerks, and all fees and costs payable to such clerks which are not excluded in the fixing of their salaries shall be paid into the county fund; and in the enactments relating to such salaries and fees the standing joint committee shall be substituted for the quarter sessions justices and the local authority respectively.

Crump, Q.C. and Rufus Isaacs for the borough of Thetford.

Channell, Q.C. and W. Wills for the Norfolk County Council.

Nov. 12.-WILLS, J.-This case raises the questions whether the salary of the recorder of Thetford, the salary of the clerk of the peace of Thetford, and the salary of the clerk to the justices in petty sessions of Thetford, or either of them, should be paid by the borough of Thetford or by the County Council of Norfolk, and it raises another very small question, which I will deal with when I have disposed of these. Thetford is a borough which has quarter sessions, but which has less than 10,000 inhabitants, and the

Q.B. Div.]

questions arise under the Local Government Act 1888, the main object of which was, speaking roughly, the transference of administrative county business to the justices in quarter sessions and the county council, and it necessarily dealt with the relations which were proposed to be established between the authorities of the boroughs which were situated within the area of the county and the county council. The matter depends, of course, entirely upon the legislation which is contained in the Act. Those relations are provided for chiefly by a group of sections, which begins with sect. 34 and ends with sect. 39, and it divides boroughs for the purpose of dealing with these matters into three categories. There are a certain number of large and important boroughs which are scheduled in the third schedule to the Act, which are called county boroughs, and they, roughly speaking, are put substantially pon the same footing as the counties themselves for most of the purposes of local administration. The sections which relate to that are sect. 31, which defines what is called a county borough, which is one of the boroughs in the schedule, and sects. 32 and 33, which contain general provisions; but the one which specifically deals with the matters which are involved in the present inquiry is sect. 34. The provisions are somewhat complicated, but substantially, as far as these matters are concerned, they exempt parishes as parishes from rating by the county council, and require the borough to make certain contributions to the county fund, and in return for that arrangement the borough substantially manage their own affairs. There is no doubt that in these boroughs these salaries, at least, the salary of the recorder and the clerk of the peace are paid for by the borough out of their own rates, but, of course, anything that relates to these County boroughs is merely introductory for the purpose of giving an outline of the scheme of the Act. The second category is that of boroughs which have a separate court of quarter sessions, and which have a population of over 10,000, and by sub-sect. 5, the payment of the costs of sessions -I drop that which relates to assizes-is defined to be a general county purpose for which the parishes in the borough may be assessed to county contributions, and it is added that all costs of the prosecutions mentioned in sect. 169 of the Municipal Corporation Act, which consists of the prosecutions arising out of offences committed within the borough, shall be paid out of the county fund. Here, therefore, the payment of the salary of the clerk of the peace is specially provided for, because, by sect. 100, the costs of quarter sessions include the costs of the clerk of assize, and of course the costs of quarter sessions, must include the salary of the recorder. It is not provided for by the interpretation clause, but the interpretation clause is not an exhaustive one, and only says the costs of sessions shall include certain things. As far as they are concerned, it seems to me that in boroughs containing a population of above 10,000, it is quite clear how they are dealt with, and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, s. 169, is altered in respect of boroughs with this larger population-you may call it an alteration or amendment, or a partial repeal, but it is quite indifferent what language we use the result is that in these boroughs the provisions which

[Q.B. DIV.

are contained in that section do not apply, and instead of giving these costs out of the borough fund, they are paid out of the county fund. Now we come to sect. 38 which is the section which deals with the boroughs which are on the footing of Thetford, and which have a population of less than 10,000. It seems to me that the law must stand thus, that up to this time there is no doubt these costs of the salary of the recorder and the salary of the clerk of the peace fell upon the borough and were paid for by the borough and it seems to me they must still be paid for by the borough unless there is something in this Act which alters the incidence and transfer it to the county council. This section is the only one, so far as I can see, that can be invoked to say that there has been any such transference, and I confess that neither in this section nor in any other part of the Act can I find anything which either expressly or impliedly says that these salaries are to be paid by anybody else than the body which has paid them up to that time. If there is no alteration, it seems to me the law stands where it did, and therefore this section contains no provision analogous to sub-s-ct. 5 of sect. 35 which relates to larger boroughs not scheduled, and which provides for an alteration of the law as to the incidence of the costs. The mere fact that in one section there is an express provision, and in the other there is none, seems to me to be a strong indication of the intention of Parliament not to interfere with the law as it then stood. It is said that this involves a hardship, because there is no provision for casting any part of the costs of prosecut ons arising within the borough upon the county council and there is no relief given to the boroughs, although they are in express terms a-sessable to the general county rates which will include by sect. 100 a liability to pay the salaries of the officers of the county sessions. All that I can say is, if it is a hardship, it is a hardship which the Legislature has created and not I, and I cannot help it. It seems to me it it is quite possible, I am not here to explain it, I am here simply to say whether I can find in the Act of Parliament any transfer of liability, and that I cannot discover, I have lo ked for it with great patience (and it certainly is not an easy Act to find one's way through) and I fail to find it. The explanation possibly may be, as was suggested by Mr. Channell that, where there is a very small population and a small jurisdiction and separate courts kept up to serve very small purposes Parliament thought that was a luxury which those who could get rid of it by availing themselves of sub-sect. 7 of sect. 38 and petitioning Her Majesty to revoke the grant of quarter sessions on the ground that it was unnecessary, and who still wished to maintain their ancient institutions, it was a luxury for which they might very well be called upon to pay. That may be the explanation of it, but it is not for me to trouble myself very much about that. The short ground upon which I have come to this conclusion is that I can find nothing in the Act which effects the transference which is suggested. The answer to the questions proposed seems to be apart from authority clear enough. I confess on looking into the Act alone I did not feel any serious doubt on the subject. A difficulty is created by the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, given in the year 1891 by a court con