upon the legal owner to convey as he (the cestui que use) directs, and to have the benefit of the protection of the legal estate. This notion was introduced into England before the end of the thirteenth century by means of the feoffment to uses. X. enfeoffed A. of lands to the use of (or in trust or confidence for (2)) B. A. thus became the legal owner of the estate, B. the beneficial owner. In the eye of the law, A. was the tenant of the land, subject to all the burdens and liabilities of tenure; B. was unrecognized, except, perhaps, by the Church courts, as in any way connected with the land. In other words, B. had no remedy against A., except on the ground of conscience. [As regards the religious houses themselves, this evasive contrivance of Uses proved to be of little avail, being crushed in its infancy by the Mortmain Statute of 1391 (a), whereby it was enacted that, for the future, Uses should be subject to the Statutes of Mortmain, and forfeitable like the lands themselves, unless the licence of the Crown was first duly obtained. Yet the idea, being once introduced, took root in our system of jurisprudence, being chiefly recommended by two considerations:-one, that Uses were, as to the manner of their creation and transfer, and the modifications of interest to which they might be subjected, free from the restrictive rules which applied to the old feudal estates; the other, that Uses were not, in general, liable, like the feudal estates, to forfeiture for treason or felony. It was owing to this latter exemption in particular, that, during the wars in France and the subsequent civil commotions between the houses of York and Lancaster, Uses grew almost universal, through the desire that men had of securing their estates from forfeiture, when each of the contending parties, as they became uppermost, alternately attainted the other. And, () It cannot be too early impressed upon the student, that no special words are necessary to create an Use. Any expressions which [from the beginning of the fifteenth century, we notice a gradual development and elaboration of the practice of Uses, under the care of the Court of Chancery, then rising into great importance.] Uses were, as we have said, originally created by feoffment, accompanied by an express oral agreement of the feoffee, to hold the legal estate subject to the terms of the Use. But they might also be created by implication. Thus, if a man made a feoffment in fee to another, without any consideration, Chancery presumed that he meant it to be to the use of himself, and therefore raised an implied Use for his benefit; unless, indeed, the feoffor expressly declared that the feoffment was to the use of another, and then, of course, nothing was presumed contrary to such express declaration. Uses which thus returned by way of implication to the grantor himself, were called resulting Uses. An Use might also be raised upon a mere contract or covenant, without the formality of any conveyance (b). For if a man, in consideration of natural affection, covenanted to stand seised of his land to the use of some near relative named, or to the use of a wife, actual or intended, a court of equity, even though no valuable consideration passed, would enforce the Use, treating the covenantor thereafter as a mere trustee for the cestui que use. And if a man bargained and sold (i.e., agreed to sell) his land to another for a pecuniary consideration, but made no actual feoffment or conveyance, Chancery would consider the estate as belonging to the party who had paid the money; and would consequently hold the bargainor to be seised of the land from thenceforth to the use of the bargainee. [In general, all persons were capable of holding to an Use. But persons attainted and aliens were disqualified from doing so; and the doctrine was also established, that neither the king nor the queen, on account of their dignity royal, nor any corporation aggregate, on account (b) Chudleigh's Case, (1589) 1 Rep. 139 b. [of its artificial character, could be seised to any Use but their own. And the capacity of becoming a cestui que use was even more extensive; all persons who had capacity to accept a conveyance of land being also capable of accepting an Use. As the person seised to Uses was considered by the common law as the absolute owner, his interest was of course subject originally to all the incidents which attached to the legal estate in ordinary cases. And therefore it devolved to his legal representative at his death, and might be alienated or forfeited by his act while living, or become subject to his debts, or escheat for want of his heir. The wife of the legal owner was also entitled to her dower out of the estate; and when the person seised to Uses was a married woman, her husband was entitled to his estate by the curtsey. Moreover, it was but very gradually that the cestui que use received protection against persons who purchased the legal estate from the feoffee to Uses; for the Court of Chancery originally gave relief only against the person himself in whom the trust was first reposed, and not against his alienees.] And a purchaser for value without notice, if he obtain the legal estate, still is, of course, entitled to hold it, regardless of the claims of the equitable owner (c). The Use was in its nature so exclusively equitable, that the courts of common law accounted the cestui que use, if out of possession, a mere stranger, and if in possession, a mere tenant at sufferance. And they allowed no effect to an alienation or demise of the land, if made by the cestui que use without the consent of the trustee; nor was the Use liable to forfeiture for the default of the cestui que use, nor to execution for his debts. And though, in a court of equity, the properties or incidents of the Use were in great measure assimilated to those of the legal estate; yet, even there, the Use long retained marks of its peculiar origin. (c) Pilcher v. Rawlins, (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. App. 259. [The state of things above described was, however, attended with many inconveniences. For, in the words. of Lord Bacon, "a man that had cause to sue for his "land, knew not against whom to bring his action, nor "who was the owner of it; the wife was of her thirds "defrauded, the husband of being tenant by the curtesey, "the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot and escheat; the "creditor of his extent for his debt; the poor tenant of "his lease" (d). To remedy these inconveniences. abundance of statutes were provided; which made the land liable to be extended by the creditors of the cestui que use (e), allowed action for the freehold to be brought against him if in the actual pernancy or enjoyment of the profits (f), made him liable for waste (g), established his conveyances and leases made without the concurrence of the feoffees (h), and gave the lord the wardship of his heir, with certain other feudal perquisites (i). These statutes all tended to make the cestui que use the real owner of the estate; and at length that idea was carried into full effect by the celebrated Act passed in the year 1535, in the reign of Henry the Eighth, which is commonly called the Statute of Uses (). Which statute, after reciting the inconveniences before mentioned, enacts that, where any person or persons shall be seised of lands (1) to the Use, confidence, or trust of any other person or persons, or body politic, by any means whatsoever, (whether the Use, confidence, or trust were in fee simple or in fee tail, for life or for years, or otherwise, and whether in (d) Bac. Use of the Law (ed. Spedding), vii. 497. (e) 50 Edw. 3, (1376) c. 6; 19 Hen. 7, (1503) c. 15. (f) 1 Ric. 2, (1377) c. 9; 4 Hen. 4, (1402) c. 7; 11 Hen. 6, (1433) c. 3. (g) 11 Hen. 6, (1433) c. 5. (h) 1 Ric. 3, (1483) c. 1. (i) 4 Hen. 7, (1488) c. 17; 19 Hen. 7, (1503) c. 15. (k) 27 Hen. 8, c. 10. (2) The words in the Act are "honours, castles, manors, lands, "tenements, rents, services, re"versions, remainders, or other "hereditaments." (27 Hen. 8, c. 10, s. 1.) [possession, remainder or reverter,) the estate of the person or persons so seised to Uses shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the Use, trust, or confidence; and that he or they shall thenceforth stand and be seised or possessed of the said lands or other hereditaments, of and for the like estates as he or they had in the Use, trust, or confidence. The effect of the statute is, therefore, to execute the Use; that is, it instantaneously, and as "by a kind of "parliamentary magic," transmutes the equitable interest of the cestui que use into a legal estate of the same nature, and makes the cestui que use the legal tenant, in lieu of the feoffee to Uses, whose estate is annihilated.] And thus under the statute the Use is transmuted into possession—not that the cestui que use really obtains actual possession (m), but that, the legal estate conferred on the cestui que use being considered as an estate in seisin, it requires no further ceremony for its completion. Thus, if a conveyance be made to A. and his heirs, to the use of B. and his heirs, an estate in fee simple in possession is eo instanti vested by force of the statute, and without livery of the seisin, in B.; and A. takes nothing (n). But, it must be carefully noted that, in order to bring the statute into operation, it is essential that there should not only be an Use, but a person seised to the Use, the statute speaking of "one person seised to the Use of any other person." Therefore, where an existing term of years is limited to an Use, as where a term of 1,000 years is assigned to B. to the use of C., the provisions of the statute do not apply, and the Use will consequently remain unexecuted. For of such estates as these (being mere chattels), the termor is not seised, but only possessed; and therefore there is no person "seised to an Use" as the statute requires. Upon the same principle of close adherence to the words of the statute, (m) Lutwich v. Mitton (1620) Cro. Jac. 604. (n) James v. Plant, (1836) 4 A. & E. 766, |