as the objects of sects. 10, 11, and 12 were, to preserve covenants and rights of re-entry for breach, so the object of these enactments was to relieve the tenant from their effect, and, just as the earlier sections extended a protection, which was previously given only to conditions of re-entry for non-payment of rent, to all conditions of re-entry; so the enactments we are now dealing with extended the relief previously given only on breaches of condition of re-entry for non-payment of rent (Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (n)), to breaches of all conditions of re-entry save an excepted few.

The joint effect of sect. 14 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and sects. 2, 4, and 5 of the Conveyancing Act, 1892, may be summed up thus. The right of re-entry for breach of a condition in a lease (which for this purpose includes an underlease, and also agreements for leases or underleases which are specifically enforceable by the intended lessees (Con. Act, 1882, s. 5) and also fee farm grants), is not to be enforceable by action or otherwise (0), unless and until the lessor serves on the lessee a notice specifying (with considerable exactness) (p) the particular breach complained of, and requiring the lessee to remedythe breach (if and so far as remediable), and in any case requiring him to make compensation in money for the breach. The lessee is to have a reasonable time thereafter to remedy the breach, and in any case to make compensation to the lessor for the breach. Subject to that notice being first given, however, the lessor is entitled to enforce the forfeiture by ejectment in the usual way, receiving, in general, the rent which shall have accrued due during the currency of the notice (q). But where a lessor is proceeding by action or otherwise to enforce the forfeiture, the lessee may in the lessor's action,— (n) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, ss. 210,

212.

(0) Re Riggs; Ex parte Lovell, [1901] 2 K. B. 16.

(p) Fletcher v. Nokes, [1897] 1 Ch. 271; Gregory v. Serle, [1898] 1 Ch. 652.

(q) Penton v. Barnett, [1898] 1 Q. B. 276.

or, if the lessor shall not yet have actually entered for the forfeiture (r), the lessee may in any action brought by himself,-apply to the court for relief; and the court may in its discretion grant or refuse the relief, on such terms as to costs, expenses, damages, compensation, penalty, or otherwise, as the circumstances of the case may require, the lessee paying in all cases the lessor's expenses, including his valuer or surveyor's charges (Con. Act, 1892, s. 2). These provisions for the relief of lessees against the forfeiture of their own leases have been (in substance) made applicable also to their relief against the loss of their leases through or consequent upon the forfeiture of the superior lease, if any (Con. Act, 1892, s. 4). An exception to this power to grant relief is made as to covenants against assigning (s) and sub-letting, and as to covenants for the inspection of mines or the books or weighing machines of mines (Con. Act, 1881, s. 14). At first, conditions of re-entry on the leasehold being taken in execution or the lessee becoming bankrupt were also excepted from the Court's power to relieve; but now this is not so until the year after the execution or bankruptcy, and then only if the lessee's interest is not disposed of (Con. Act, 1892, s. 2). This provision, however, does not extend to forfeitures in the case of leases of agricultural land, furnished and licensed houses, mines, or other property, where the personal qualification of the tenant is important (Con. Act, 1892, s. 2).

A third provision is made with regard to leases by sect. 3 of the Conveyancing Act, 1892, which prohibits lessors, where leases require the lessor's consent to an assignment, exacting fines for giving such consent. 3. Enlargement of long terms:

Formerly long terms-that is, terms for a thousand

(r) Roger Cholmeley's School v. Sewell, [1893] 2 Q. B. 254; Howard v. Fanshawe, [1895] 2 Ch.

581.

(s) Barrow v. Isaacs, [1891] 1 Q. B. 417.

years or so at a nominal or at no rent-were commonly created for several purposes. They were created by way of mortgage of fee simples, in order that, on the death of the mortgagee, the mortgaged land, and the right to receive the mortgage money might both-as they now do under sect. 30 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881-vest in the mortgagee's executors or administrators. They were also created by way of settlement for the purpose of securing the payment of annual sums-such as pin money and jointures-charged on the settled land. Owing to sect. 44 of the same Act that is no longer necessary either, but that section refers only to annual sums; and so, when a lump sum is charged, as for portions, it is still necessary to create a long term, to enable the trustees of the settlement to raise it conveniently.

It was also at one time customary when the money which these terms were created to secure was duly paid, not to surrender them to the freeholder, and so let them merge and determine in the freehold. The practice rather was to keep them alive, in order, on the sale of the freehold, to assign them to trustees in trust to attend the inheritance. The object of this proceeding was, to give to the purchaser of the freehold a protection against any incumbrances on the freehold, created after the term and before the purchase, of which he had no notice at the time he purchased. If such incumbrances were discovered after the purchase, the purchaser could rely on his term, which took precedence of them, and which the trustees held in trust for him.

Like some other expedients for safeguarding title, terms attending the inheritance, from being a protection, became an expense to the purchaser and a danger to other persons. Accordingly, the legislature resolved to abolish them. This was accomplished by the Satisfied Terms Act, 1845 (t), which enacted that such long terms as should (either by express declaration or by construction of law)

(t) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112.

be, on the 31st December, 1845, attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, should on that day absolutely cease and determine, as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof they should be so attendant, subject only to this, that every such term of years made so attendant by express declaration (although by the Act made to cease and determine), should afford to every person the same protection as it would have afforded him if it had continued to subsist, but had not been assigned or dealt with after the 31st of December, 1845, and should, for the purpose of such protection, be considered both at law and in equity to be a subsisting term; and further, that such terms as should become satisfied (u) after the 31st December, 1845, and should, either by express declaration or by construction of law, become attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, should, immediately on the same becoming so attendant, absolutely cease and determine, as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such terms should become so attendant.

Many long terms, of course, were never satisfied. In the case of those arising under settlements, the trustees may have had to sell them to raise the portions. In the case of those created for mortgage purposes, the mortgagee, having failed to secure repayments, may have foreclosed. And under sect. 44 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, many may be created now by the statutory power given to secure annual sums charged on land. Now, when a long term ceases to be a mere security, and becomes an absolute term for a thousand years not subject to any rent, it is for all practical purposes the fee simple in the land; and the Conveyancing Acts of 1881 and 1882 recognise this fact, by enabling its owner to turn it into a fee simple, provided it satisfies certain conditions.

These are (1) that the term was originally for not less than 300 years, of which 200 are unexpired; (2) that it

(u) Anderson v. Pignet, (1872) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 180.

is subject to no trust or equity of redemption or right of re-entry for condition broken in favour of the freeholder or other reversioner; (3) that it is either not subject to any rent, or subject merely to a peppercorn rent or other rent of no money value; and (4) that, if a sub-lease, the superior lease also satisfies these conditions (x). If the term satisfies these conditions, it may be enlarged into a fee simple by a mere declaration by deed by the person beneficially entitled, or entitled as trustee or personal representative of a deceased person. Such fee simple is subject to the trusts and limitations which affected the term; and it entitles the owner of it to the mines and minerals, unless these have already become separate in ownership from the soil.

PART II.-THE SETTLED LAND ACTS.

INTRODUCTORY.-As has already been said, the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890 (y), were passed for the purpose of promoting "free trade" in land. Though, as we have seen, the rule of limitation permitted land to be tied up only for a life or lives in being and twenty-one years at the utmost, yet, by the system of resettlement which became customary, no sooner had living persons become capable of alienating the fee than a new settlement was made, which left no greater interest in any living person than a life estate. Thus, A. on his marriage would settle his property on himself for life, then, subject to a jointure to his wife if she survived him, upon his eldest and other

(a) Con. Act, 1881, s. 65; Con. Act, 1882, s. 11.

(y) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, amended by the Settled Land Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 18); the Settled Land Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 30); the Settled Land Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 36); sect. 2 of the 52 & 53 Vict. c. 30 (Board of Agriculture Act, 1889); sect. 74,

sub-s. (1), of the 53 & 54 Vict. c. 70 (Housing of Working Classes Act, 1890); and the Settled Land Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Viet. c. 69), which last-mentioned Act (sect. 17, as to the appointment and retirement of trustees) has in its turn also been amended by the Trustee Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53).