[regalia within the district, whereby he exercised a jurisdiction over all causes as well criminal as civil (t).] By the Liberties Act, 1836, this secular authority of the bishop was taken from him, and vested in the Crown. [There are certain counties corporate, otherwise called counties of cities or towns, to which, out of special grace. and favour, the kings of England have from time to time granted the privilege to be counties of themselves, and to be governed by their own sheriffs and other magistrates, so that no officers of the county at large have any power to intermeddle therein.] As such counties corporate constitute no part of the counties in which they are locally situate, so they had formerly, in general, no share in voting for the members to serve for those counties in Parliament; nor were they included within their respective counties, so far as regards the trial of offenders. But these exemptions have now been very largely abolished (u). In addition to these ancient civil divisions of townships, hundreds, and counties, England is now, for the purposes of local government, divided into many other units, such as Poor Law Unions, Petty Sessional Divisions, Urban and Rural Districts. But an account of these will more properly be given in that part of the work which deals with the Social Economy of the Realm (x). (t) 4 Inst. 220; Cotton v. Johnson, (1619) Carth. 109; Grant v. Bagge, (1802) 3 East, 128. (u) See Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885, and Local Government (x) See post, bk. iv., pt. iii. NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. BOOK I. OF PERSONAL RIGHTS. THE whole law may be said to be concerned with rights and wrongs, these terms being in a sense correlatives; and in our exposition of the law, we shall adopt (as other writers have done) (a), that fundamental distinction. Now rights, when analyzed, are found to consist of several kinds,—regarding either, first, a man's own person; or secondly, his dominion over things; or thirdly, his private relations; or fourthly, his condition as a member of the community. And of these varieties of rights, the first are called personal rights; the second, rights of property; the third, rights in private relations; and the fourth, public rights. Also, rights imply duties. For whatever is due to one man is necessarily due from another. For example, the right of one man to receive from another the price of a commodity sold, casts upon the latter the duty of paying that price; and the general right of each individual to live in personal security, implies the converse duty on the part of others not to subject him to any violence. In the discussion of rights, therefore, it is often necessary to speak also of duties; and it is under the aspect of duties principally, that certain rights require to be considered. (a) Hale's Analysis (Preface); 1 Bl. Com. p. 122. Wrongs also may be subdivided; but the leading distinction here depends not on the character of the right violated, but on the party who is supposed to sustain injury from its violation. That is to say, when the violation is left to be redressed by a particular individual only, it is called a civil injury; but when it may be the subject of a prosecution by the Crown in the interests of the public, it is called a crime (b). Thus, the withholding of a debt is a wrong to the individual, and consequently a civil injury; but to deprive a man of his money by theft or robbery, is held to be a wrong also to the public, and therefore a crime. It is, however, necessary to remember, that the same act, e.g., an assault, may be both a civil injury and a crime. The method, or order of discussion, we shall adopt, will therefore be as follows: Book I. Of Personal Rights. II. Of Rights of Property. III. Of Rights in Private Relations. IV. Of Public Rights. V. Of Civil Injuries; including also the modes of Personal Rights consist of two principal varieties, namely, Personal Security and Personal Liberty. I. And first, the right of Personal Security. Personal Security extends to and includes the enjoyment of a man's life and limbs; and of his body, health, and reputation. [Life is a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins, in contemplation of law, as soon as an infant is able to stir in the womb. Indeed, an infant (b) See 4 Bl. Com. pp. 5, 6. [en ventre sa mère is, for many purposes, deemed in law to be already born, and may, e.g., take as legatee or devisee (c), or even as next-of-kin or heir, but (in the latter case), the presumptive heir will be entitled until the actual birth (d). Also, if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise designedly killeth it in her womb,-or if any one beat her, with the like design, whereby the child dieth in her womb, and she is delivered of a dead child,-this, though not murder, was by the antient law considered manslaughter (e).] And although, by the modern law, the offence is no longer homicide in either case, still to procure a miscarriage is, in all cases, a heinous crime; and if means be used, with intent to kill a child in the womb, and the child is born alive, and afterwards dies by reason of the means so used, the case amounts to murder (f). [A man's limbs-by which we intend his fighting members, being given to him for his protection in a state of nature, the deprivation of a man thereof is mayhem by the common law; for to his limbs, as to life itself, a man has a natural inherent right. A man's life and limbs are held of such high value in the law, that even homicide is pardonable, if committed se defendendo; and, whatever a man does to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion. Therefore, if a man, through fear of death or mayhem, is prevailed upon to execute a deed, or to do any other legal act, such deed or act, although accompanied with all the requisite solemnities, may be afterwards avoided by him, on the ground of duress to life or limb, he having been in fact forced into (c) Reeve v. Long (1694), 4 Mod. Rep. 282; Pearce v. Carrington (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 969. (d) Burdet v. Hopegood (1718), 1 P. Wms. 468; Wallis v. Hodson (1740), 2 Atk. 115; Goodtitle v. (f) 3 Inst. 50; R. V. West (1818), 1 C. & K. 784. |