communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has III. Communications made by a person in the conduct of his 267 concerned. Communications of this sort have also frequently been held Where muto be privileged, when made bona fide with a view to the inte- tual interest rests of both the writer and the persons addressed, for if a communication of this sort, which was not meant to go beyond those immediately interested in it, were the subject of an action for damages, it would be impossible for the affairs of mankind to be conducted. Upon this ground a letter written by the M'Doug defendant to Messrs. W., bankers, charging the plaintiff, who Claridge. was a solicitor, with improper conduct in the management of their affairs, in which the defendant was himself interested, was held to be privileged (f). Robinson. So a letter written by one part owner of a brig to another Wilson v. part owner, who had recommended the plaintiff as master, reflecting upon the master's conduct, was held to be privileged (g). But words spoken by one subscriber to a charity, in answer Martin v. to inquiries by another subscriber respecting the conduct of a Strong. medical officer of the charity, have been held not to be privileged; and in an action for slander the plaintiff recovered a verdict and damages (h). In that case, however, there did not appear to be a sufficient reason for the conversation between the parties to constitute a privileged communication. And in a subsequent case Lord Wensleydale said that if those observations had been made in a matter of contest, and the contest was whether the person slandered should be elected, it appeared to him that it would have been a privileged communication. The case alluded Kine v. to is Kine v. Sewell (i), in which the defendant, having been requested by A. to recommend a person to value some work done for him by the plaintiff's master under contract, told A. that the plaintiff had stolen some of the materials, and afterwards repeated the charge to the plaintiff's master; but it was held that the defendant was not liable to an action without proof of express malice on his part; for although the charge appeared to be untrue, yet the communication having been made bona fide to a person interested in discovering a wrongdoer, and who made inquiries, and believed to be true by the defendant, was privileged. Sewell. Where a person having ground or supposed ground of com- Complaints (f) M'Dougal v. Claridge, 1 Camp. 267; see Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R. 573; Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680. In the latter case Tindal, C. J., in summing up to the jury said, "There can be no doubt that a man has a right to communicate to any other any information he N 2 is possessed of in a matter in (g) Wilson v. Robinson, 7 Q. (h) Martin v. Strong, 5 A. & E. 535. (i) 3 M. & W. 303; see Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exc. 743. a made to plaint against a servant or public officer, makes a representation master with of his conduct to his master or superior officer with a view to a view to redress. Lake v. Fairman v. obtaining redress, the communication has been held to be privileged on the ground of interest in the party making it, if boná fide and honestly made, although the person addressed has not in reality the supposed power. In Lake v. King (k) a petition presented to a committee of the House of Commons, containing criminatory matter, was held privileged, the committee having power to inquire, although no power to give redress to the petitioner. So where a person (1), having a just claim against an officer in the army, and who therefore in some measure is subject to the control of the Secretary at War, applied by petition to the latter, in order to obtain through his interference the payment of his debt; it was held that the petition having been published for the purpose of obtaining redress and not for the purpose of slander, could not R. v. Bayley, be made the subject of an action. And Best, J., cited The King v. Bayley (m), in which a letter addressed to General Willes and the four principal officers of the Guards, to be by them presented to the king, stating that the prosecutor had obtained from the defendant a warrant for the payment of money due to him from government, under a promise of paying the defendant such money, and that the prosecutor had received the money, and had not paid it over to the defendant, was held to be no libel, but a representation of an injury drawn up in a proper way for redress, and added: "That case is like the present. Neither the officers nor the king could give the defendant direct assistance in receiving the money wrongfully withheld. But the king had authority to dismiss an officer from his service, and most probably would dismiss any one who hesitated to do what honour and justice required. In the present case there was at least probable cause for thinking that the Secretary at War would advise his Majesty that the plaintiff was not worthy to remain in the army unless he did the defendant immediate justice." Blake v. Pinfold. So in an action (n) for libel upon the plaintiff, in his situation of guard of the Exeter mail, by reason of which he was dismissed from his situation. The libel complained of was a letter written to Sir Francis Freeling, chief secretary to her Majesty's postmaster-general, by the defendant, who was unconnected with the post-office, complaining of some misconduct of the plaintiff towards the defendant's wife in a journey by the mail. It was held by Taunton, J., that the letter was clearly not privileged, on the ground of its being an official communication (o). But that learned judge also expressed an opinion, that the occasion on which the letter was published, rendered its publication excusable, in the absence of express malice. And in another similar case (p), Alderson, B., laid down similar law. (k) 1 Wms. Saund. 131 b. (m) Bac. Abr. Libel, A. 2. & Rob. 198. (o) Within the cases of Horne v. Bentinck, 2 B. & B. 130; Wyatt v. Gore, Holt, 299. (p) Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548. cus customer re customer's Upon similar principles, a letter written by a discharged Letter by butcher to his customer, reflecting on the honesty of the tradesman to tomer's housekeeper, was held a privileged communication (p). flecting on And a memorial, transmitted to the Home Secretary, com- character of plaining of the conduct of the plaintiff, who was a county servant. magistrate, during an election of an M.P. for a borough in the Harrison v. county, has been held to be privileged, although in practice the Bush. advice of the Keeper of the Great Seal is generally acted upon as Memorial to to the removal of justices; as the memorial might be considered Home Secreas addressed to the Queen through the Home Secretary, who tary complaining of might himself have caused an inquiry to be made, have com- a magistrate. municated with the Keeper of the Great Seal, and have in effect recommended the removal of the plaintiff (q). his master Upon similar principles a letter from a servant to his master, Letter from reflecting upon the character of a third person, who had either servant to complained, or threatened to complain, to the master about the about third servant, would be privileged (r). person. will not take witness ma Where a communication is privileged, the mere fact that a Presence of third person was present at the time it was made, will not render third person it less so, though, if an opportunity of publishing the libel in the away privipresence of a third person is sought out, that may be evidence of lege, though malice. Thus, were (s) it appeared that the plaintiff was a seeking a journeyman carpenter, and had been in the employ of B., a be evidence master carpenter, in the constant employ of the Earl of Devon of malice. at Powderbam. The defendant was tenant to the Earl, and Toogood v. required some repairs at his farm, and plaintiff, pursuant to B.'s Spyring. orders, went with another workman to the defendant's house for the purpose of doing them. The work was done in a negligent manner, and not to the satisfaction of B. During the progress of the work the plaintiff got drunk, and circumstances occurred which induced the defendant to believe that the plaintiff had broken open the cellar and obtained access to his cyder. B. had requested the defendant to inspect the work; and afterwards, whilst the plaintiff and one T. were at work at Powderham, the defendant came up, and in his presence, charged the plaintiff with breaking open the cellar, getting drunk, and spoiling his job. The plaintiff denied the charge, but defendant said he would swear it, and so would his men. In a subsequent conversation, in the plaintiff's absence, the defendant, in answer to a question by T., whether he really thought the plaintiff had broken open his cellar, said he was sure of it, and his people would swear to it. Defendant then went away in search of B., whom he saw, and to whom he repeated that the plaintiff had broken open the door, got drunk, and spoiled his job. B. thereupon went to the plaintiff, and told him that until his character was cleared he could not remain in the employ of the (p) Coward v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. (q) Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344, overruling, to a certain extent, Blagg v. Sturt, 10 Q. B. 899, in which case, however, there was express malice. (r) See Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R. 573. (s) Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. M. & R. 181; and see Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 380; Taylor v. Hawkins, 20 L. J., N. S., Q. B. 313, ante, p. 263. Toogood v. Spyring. Earl. The next day B. investigated the charge, and told the plaintiff he considered it not made out, and his character was cleared, and he might go to work again, but the plaintiff refused to work, saying his character was not cleared, and brought his action against the defendant. It was held, that the communication to B. was privileged, and that the statement made to T. upon the second meeting in the plaintiff's absence was not, but that the statement made to the plaintiff, though in the presence of T., was privileged. And in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, Lord Wensleydale, after laying down the principles which have been already cited (t), said, "Among the many cases which have been reported on this subject, one precisely in point has not I believe occurred; but one of the most ordinary and common instances in which the principle has been applied in practice, is that of a former master giving the character of a discharged servant; and I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential to the protection of such a communication, that it should be made to some person interested in the inquiry, alone, and not in the presence of a third person. If made with honesty of purpose to a party who has any interest in the inquiry (and that has been very liberally construed) (u), the simple fact that there has been some casual byestander cannot alter the nature of the transaction. The business of life could not be well carried on if such restraints were imposed upon this and similar communications, and if on every occasion in which they were made, they were not protected unless strictly private. In this class of communication is no doubt comprehended the right of a master bona fide to charge his servant for any supposed misconduct in his service, and to give him admonition and blame; and we think that the simple circumstance of the master exercising that right in the presence of another, does by no means of necessity take away from it the protection which the law would otherwise afford. Where, indeed, an opportunity is sought for making such a charge before third persons, which might have been made in private, it would afford strong evidence of a malicious intention, and thus deprive it of that immunity which the law allows to such a statement, when made with honesty of purpose; but the mere fact of a third person being present does not render the communication absolutely unauthorized, though it may be a circumstance to be left with others, including the style and character of the language used, to the consideration of the jury, who are to determine whether the defendant has acted bona fide in making the charge, or been influenced by malicious motives.. In the present case the defendant stood in such a relation with respect to the plaintiff, though not strictly that of master, as to authorize him to impute blame to him, provided it was done fairly and honestly for any supposed misconduct in the course of his employment, and we think that the fact, that the imputation was made in T.'s presence, does not of itself render the communication unwarranted and officious, but at most is a (t) Ante, p. 260. (u) Child v. Affleck, 9 B. & C. 403. See this case, ante, p. 258. circumstance to be left to the consideration of the jury. We agree with the learned judge, that the statement to T. in the plaintiff's absence was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of its truth, if it were, in point of fact, false." tion not Where communications made with reference to the character Rules, where of servants do not come within the class of privileged communi- communicacations, they are, of course, subject to the ordinary rules which privileged. govern actions for defamation. It is not, however, necessary here to enter into a full examination of those rules which have been already treated of in the work before referred to (x): it is sufficient to state, that in actions for slander, the general rule is, that where the natural consequence of the words is a damage; as if they import a charge of having been guilty of a crime, or of having a contagious distemper, or if they are prejudicial to a person in an office, or to a person of a profession or trade, they are in themselves actionable; in other cases the party who brings an action for words, must show the damage which he has received from them (y). vant in his From hence, it appears that an action for slander may be Imputation maintained by a servant without proof of special damage, where affecting serthe imputation affects him in his situation of servant, that is, character of where it is made with reference to his character or conduct as servant. such, and imputes to him the want of some qualification for or misconduct in his situation. Thus, in Seaman v. Bigg (z), in the time of Charles I., it was seaman v. held that the words, "Thou are a cozening knave, and hast Bigg. cozened thy master of a bushel of barley," spoken of a bailiff and servant in husbandry, were actionable; for, said the court, though "true it is generally an action will not lie for calling one cozening knave,' yet where the words are (a) Starkie on Slander. Neither is it necessary to enter into a discussion of what expressions are, and what are not, actionable. It may, however, be remarked, that where the expressions used are capable of a harmless and also of an injurious meaning, the plaintiff is at liberty to point them by innuendo to the latter, if in their ordinary sense they are capable of such a construction. Thus, in Clegg v. Laffer, 10 Bing. 250, where the defendant, in writing to one of his friends, said of the plaintiff, "He is so inflated with 2007. or 3007. which he has made in my service-God only knows whether honestly or otherwise that," &c., and the plaintiff in his declaration explained the words by innuendo thus"Meaning to insinuate that the plaintiff had conducted himself in a dishonest manner in the de- (y) Bac. Abr. Slander, A; 1 (z) Cro. Car. 480; and see Reignald's Case, Cro. Car. 563, where similar words were held actionable when spoken of a deputy clerk to a register. See also Wright v. Moorhouse, Cro. Eliz. 358. |