Must be connected with character. Lumby v. Allday. Manner of James v. Special damage; of the words spoken. spoken of one who is a servant and accomptant, and whose credit and maintenance depends upon his faithful dealing, and he by such disgraceful words is deprived of his livelihood and means of maintenance, there is good reason it should bear an action, that be might have recompense for loss of his credit and means." But unless the imputation be connected with the servant's occupation, or show the want of some general requisite, no action can be maintained in respect of it. "Every authority which I have been able to find," said Bayley, B., in Lumby v. Allday (a), "either shows the want of some general requisite, as honesty, capacity, fidelity, &c., or connects the imputation with the plaintiff's office, trade or business." In that case, therefore, where the defendant said of the plaintiff, who was clerk to the Birmingham and Staffordshire Gas Light Company, "You are a fellow, a disgrace to the town, unfit to hold your situation for your conduct with whores. I will have you in the Argus. You have bought up all the copies of the Argus, knowing you have been exposed. You may drown yourself, for you are not fit to live, and are a disgrace to the situation you hold," Bayley, B., intimated a strong opinion that the char proved was not actionable; because the imputation it contained did not imply the want of any of those qualities which a clerk ought to possess, and because the imputation had no reference to his conduct as clerk. And where the plaintiff complains of the imputation of scandalous conduct in his occupation, it is necessary for him to set forth in the declaration, in what manner it was connected with his occupation by the defendant (b). And, therefore, in an action for slander of a salaried superintendent of police, at Leeds, where the declaration did not show how the slander was connected by the defendant with the plaintiff's office, judgment was arrested (c). Where the words complained of by the plaintiff are not actionable per se, it becomes necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove what is called special damage, i. e., some actual specific injury resulting from the use of the words. And it is also necessary for the plaintiff to prove special damage where it is alleged in a declaration for words which are actionable per se. must be legal But in either of those cases, it is said not to be sufficient for the Consequence plaintiff to prove a mere wrongful act of a third person induced by the slander, but that the special damage complained of must be the legal and natural consequence of the words spoken. Therefore (d), in an action for slander, where the special damage alleged was, that in consequence of words used by the defendant, J. Õ. had discharged the plaintiff, and R. P. had refused to hire him and it appeared that the plaintiff had been retained by J. O. as a journeyman for a year at certain wages, and that before the expiration of the year his master had discharged him in consequence of certain words spoken by the defendant, who Thorn, 8 C. B. 293. Vicars v. (a) 1 Cr. & J. 305. (b) See Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. 8; Doyley v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; Southee v. Denny, 1 Exc. 196; Hopwood v. (c) James v. Brook, 9 Q. B. 7. (d) Vicars V. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. accused the plaintiff of cutting his cordage: and it also appeared that the plaintiff afterwards applied to R. P. for employment, but he refused to employ him in consequence of the words, and because his former master had discharged him for the offence imputed to him: it was held that the action could not be maintained, as the special damage alleged was not the legal and natural consequence of the words spoken. And Lord Ellenborough added, "Here it was an illegal consequence; a mere wrongful act of the master, for which the defendant was no more answerable than if, in consequence of the words, other persons had afterwards assembled and seized the plaintiff and thrown him into a horse-pond, by way of punishment for his supposed transgression. Upon the second ground, non liquet that the refusal by R. P. to employ the plaintiff was in consequence of the words spoken as it is alleged to be, there was at least a concurrent cause, the act of his former master in refusing to continue him in his employ, which was more likely to weigh with R. P. than the mere words themselves of the defendant." Upon similar principles in an action for slander by a shop- Kelly v. woman and servant for saying of her, "She secreted 1s. 6d. Partington. under the till, stating, these are not times to be robbed " (e): in consequence of which it was alleged one S. refused to engage her in his service, judgment was arrested on the ground that the special damage alleged was not the natural result of the words used; and Patteson, J., observed: "It is said that the words are actionable because a person after hearing them chose in his caprice to reject the plaintiff as a servant. But if the matter was not in its nature defamatory, the rejection of the plaintiff cannot be considered the natural result of the speaking of the words. To make the speaking of the words wrongful, they must in their nature be defamatory." But these cases have not been altogether approved of (f); Not approved and in a subsequent case it was held that the discharge of the of. plaintiff by her employer, in consequence of words used by the defendant was not too remote an injury to entitle the plaintiff to recover damages in respect of it; the court distinguishing that case from Vicars v. Wilcocks. The case alluded to is Knight v. Knight v. Gibbs (g), in which it appeared that the plaintiff and Gibbs. another young woman lodged in the house of E., whose wife was a straw-bonnet maker, and employed them in the way of her business. The defendant, who was landlord of the house, and lived next door but one, came to Mrs. E., and spoke of the plaintiff and her fellow-lodger thus: "I am ashamed of their conduct; they were singing and making a noise, and tabouring (e) Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645; and see Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48; Taylor v. Neri, 1 Esp. 386, ante, p. 86. (f) See 1 Starkie on Slander, 206, note r. That learned author considers Vicars v. Wilcocks inconsistent with the cases in which the special damage has consisted of loss of marriage, where the party, who by reason Knight v. Action for Hurrell v. Action will not lie for endorsing servant's written character. Taylor v. the windows (i. e., tapping them with their fingers); it is no use their denying it; their conduct is shameful and disgraceful, more like a bawdy-house than anything else, and no moral person would like to have such people in his house." After this Mrs. E. dismissed them, which was the special damage complained of. She gave the following evidence as to her motives: "I dismissed them because I thought it would offend the defendant to keep her longer; it was in consequence of what he had said. It was not because I believed the words, but because I was afraid that it would offend the defendant to keep her; he was my landlord, and came to complain of the conduct of my lodgers." The plaintiff recovered a verdict, with which the court refused to interfere, Parke, J., observing: "It is said that the witness would have turned the plaintiff away on the defendant's wish to that effect being intimated, although no slanderous words had been used. But it is clear that if the words in question had not been used, the plaintiff would not have been dismissed; and it is sufficient for this action to show that she was turned out in consequence of such words of the defendant. The effect of the evidence may be that the witness would have turned the plaintiff away if different words had been used, but different words were not used, and she was sent away in consequence of these. In Vicars v. Wilcocks, supposing the point there to have been rightly decided, there were two distinct causes of the special damage-the words used and an act done by a third person; and the damage might have resulted from either." And Patteson, J., added: "The case is not like Vicars v. Wilcocks, because here the whole cause of the special damage proceeds from the defendant himself; nothing is done by any other person." Before quitting this part of our subject it may be noticed that it has been held (h) that an action lies by a cab-driver against his master for wrongfully and unjustly defacing his licence as a driver under the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86 (i) (which by sect. 21 of that statute the proprietor of every hackney carriage is required to retain in his possession whilst the driver remains in his service), and which licence the defendant had defaced by writing upon it a bad character of the plaintiff as a driver. And it was held, after verdict, to be not necessary to aver that it was maliciously done. But in a previous case (k) Lord Abinger had stated his opinion that if a servant enter into a service and bring a written character with him, his master could not be considered to do wrong if he wrote upon it that the person to whose character it related had afterwards been in his service and was dismissed for ill-behaviour. (h) Hurrell v. Ellis, 2 C. B. 295; acc. Rogers v. Macnamara, 14 C. B. 27, where it was held to be no justification that the matter, indorsed on the licence, was true. (i) For regulating hackney and stage carriages in and near London. (k) Taylor v. Rowan, 7 C. & P. 70; S. C. 1 Mood. & Rob. 490. FALSE AND FORGED CHARACTERS-STAT. 32 GEO. 3, c. 56. master to person to If a master knowingly give a false character of a servant to Liability of a person about to hire him, and the servant afterwards rob or injure his new master, he may, in an action for the deceit, whom false recover from the former master the damages he has sustained in character consequence of such false character having been given (1). given. Moreover in such cases a criminal responsibility is sometimes incurred by a person giving a false character (m)." of servant By the statute 32 Geo. 3, c. 56, after reciting that "whereas 32 Geo. 3, many false and counterfeit characters of servants have either c. 56. been given personally or in writing by evil-disposed persons being or pretending to be the master, mistress, retainer or superintendent of such servants, or by persons who have actually retained such servants in their respective service, contrary to truth and justice and to the peace and security of his Majesty's subjects; and whereas the evil herein complained of is not only difficult to be guarded against, but is also of great magnitude and continually increasing, and no sufficient remedy has hitherto been applied:" it is enacted that, after 1st July, 1792:— master or "If any person or persons shall falsely personate any master or Sect. 1. mistress, or the executor, administrator, wife, relation, house- Any person keeper, steward, agent or servant of any such master or mis- personating tress, and shall either personally or in writing give any false, giving false forged or counterfeited character to any person offering him or character; herself to be hired as a servant into the service of any person or persons, then and in such case every such person or persons so offending shall forfeit and undergo the penalty or punishment thereinafter mentioned." (1) Wilkin v. Read, 15 C. B. 192. See Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51; S. C. 2 Smith's L. C. 56, in a note to which will be found a discussion of the interesting question, how far legal, without moral, fraud furnishes a ground of action. It is conceived that Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 6, which provides" that no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon, or by reason of any representation or assurance made or given, concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any other person to the intent or purpose that such other person may obtain credit, monies or goods upon, unless such representation or assurance be made in writing signed by the party to be charged therewith"-would not apply to characters given to servants to enable them to obtain situations, (m) Knowingly uttering a Sect. 2. that a servant has been hired "If any person or persons shall knowingly and wilfully or asserting pretend or falsely assert in writing that any servant has been hired or retained for any period of time whatsoever, or in any station or capacity whatsoever other than that for which or in which he, she or they shall have hired or retained such servant in his, her or their service or employment, or for the service of any other person or persons, that then, and in either of the said cases such person or persons so offending as aforesaid shall forfeit and undergo the penalty or punishment thereinafter mentioned." for a period in a station; of time, or Sect. 3. or was discharged at any other time, or had not been hired in any previous ser vice, contrary to the fact; Sect. 4. gray per son offering himself as a servant pre tending to have served where he has not served, or with a false certificate, or altering any cer tificate; Sect. 5. or who hav ing been before in service shall pretend not to have been in such ser vice; Sect. 6. viction, forfeit 201. "If any person or persons shall knowingly and wilfully pretend, or falsely assert in writing, that any servant was discharged, or left his, her or their service at any other time than that at which he or she was discharged, or actually left such service; or that any such servant had not been hired or employed in any previous service contrary to truth, that then, and in either of the said cases, such person or persons shall forfeit and undergo the penalty or punishment thereinafter mentioned." "If any person shall offer himself or herself as a servant, asserting or pretending that he or she hath served in any service in which such servant shall not actually have served; or with a false, forged or counterfeit certificate, of his or her character; or shall in anywise add to or alter, efface or erase any word, date, matter or thing contained in or referred to, in any certificate given to him or her by his or her last or former master or mistress, or by any other person or persons duly authorized by such master or mistress to give the same, that then, and in either of the said cases, such person or persons shall forfeit and undergo the penalty or punishment thereinafter mentioned." "If any person or persons having before been in service shall, when offering to hire himself, herself or themselves as a servant or servants in any service whatsoever, falsely and wilfully pretend not to have been hired or retained in any previous service as a servant, that then, and in such case, such person or persons shall forfeit and undergo the penalty or punishment thereinafter mentioned. "If any person or persons shall be convicted of any or shall, on con- either of the offence or offences aforesaid by his, her or their confession, or by the oath of one or more credible witness or witnesses before two or more justices of the peace for the county, riding, division, city, liberty, town or place where the offence or offences shall have been committed (which oath such justices are hereby empowered and required to administer), every such Application offender or offenders shall forfeit the sum of twenty pounds, one of forfeiture. moiety whereof shall be paid to the person or persons on whose information the party or parties offending shall have been convicted, and the other moiety thereof shall go and be applied for the use of the poor of the parish wherein the offence shall have Persons not been committed; and if the party who shall have been so conpaying the victed shall not immediately pay the said sum of twenty pounds so forfeited, together with the sum of ten shillings for the costs and charges attending such conviction, or shall not give notice of appeal, and enter into recognizance in the manner therein penalty with costs, or not giving notice of appeal, |