Evidence of acting as servant sufficient.

ceived for postage, it is usual (c) to indict and proceed against persons in the employ of the Post Office who commit that offence under the provisions of the 2 Will. 4, c. 4, ante, p. 316. To convict a person under the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 36, evidence of acting in the employ of the Post Office would be sufficient evidence of such employment, without proof of any formal appointment (d), though, in an Irish case, it was held that some proof of acting with the sanction of the Post Office But prisoner authorities was necessary (e). Moreover, the prisoner must have been a servant in the employ of the Post Office when he committed the offence imputed to him (f). And therefore it was held, under the old Post Office Act, 52 Geo. 3, c. 143, that a servant employed at a receiving house to clean boots, &c., and who used to assist in tying up and sealing the post office bag, was not a servant of the post office (g).

must have

been a servant of the

Post Office. Servant employed in receivinghouse not such a ser vant.

Aliter, per

to carry letters. Meaning of person em

But a man employed by the post-mistress to carry letters from one place to another at a weekly salary paid to him by the postson hired by mistress, but which was repaid to her by the Post Office, was post-mistress held to be a person employed by the post office within that act (h). And now, by the interpretation clause of 7 Will. 4 & ] Viet. c. 36, the expression "persons employed by or under the Post Office" shall include every person employed in any business of the Post Office, according to the interpretation given to the expression "officer of the Post Office," and that expression shall include the postmaster-general and every deputy postmaster, agent, officer, clerk, letter-carrier, guard, post-boy, rider or any other person employed in any business of the Post Office, whether employed by the postmaster-general, or by any person under him, or on behalf of the Post Office.

ployed by or

under the Post Office.'

"Officer

of the Post Office."

R. v. Reason.

What is a

The prisoner was employed under the Post Office as letter carrier from C. to F. The letters were delivered to him in a sealed bag, which it was his duty to deliver, as he received it, to the postmaster at F., and, on such delivery, his duty was completed. One day he brought from C. the sealed bag containing letters, and delivered it safely at F. post office, to the F. postmaster, whose duty it was to sort the letters in time to make up the bags for the mail passing through F. The prisoner, at the request of the F. postmaster, assisted in sorting, and while so doing, stole a letter containing 17. It was held that he was a person employed under the Post Office within the meaning of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 36, s. 26 (i).

By sect. 47 of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 36, the term post letter "post letter." shall mean any letter or packet transmitted by the post under the authority of the postmaster-general, and a letter shall be deemed a post letter from the time of its being delivered to

(c) R. v. Townsend, Carr. & M. 178, ante, p. 317, note (n).

(d) R. v. Rees, 6 C. & P. 606; R. v. Borrett, 6 C. & P. 124; R. v. Townsend, Carr. & M. 178.

(e) R. v. Trenwyth, Ir. Circ. Rep. 172, sed quære.

(f) But he need not have embezzled it whilst in the employ,

R. v. Lovell, 2 Moo. & Rob. 236. (g) R. v. Pearson, 4 C. & P. 572.

(h) R. v. Salisbury, 5 C. & P.

155.

(i) R. v. Reason, 23 L. J., M. C. 11; S. C. Jurist (1853), 1014; Dears. C. C. 226.

bone.

a post office to the time of its being delivered to the person to whom it is addressed; and the delivery to a letter-carrier or other person authorized to receive letters for the post shall be a delivery to the post office, and a delivery at the house or office of the person to whom the letter is addressed, or to him, or to his servant, or agent, or other person considered to be authorized to receive the letter, according to the usual manner of delivering that person's letters shall be a delivery to the person addressed. Under this act it has been held that a post letter means a letter put in the ordinary way into the post-office. And, there- R. v. Rathfore, where (k) a letter-carrier was suspected, and, for the purpose of trying his honesty, an assistant inspector of letter- Trap letter. carriers enclosed a marked sovereign in a letter addressed to Mr. M., then sealed the letter, and marked it, as if it had been put into the post in the regular way as a paid letter, but it never was posted on the following day, whilst the prisoner was not attending, the letter was put amongst a heap which he had to deliver, and the prisoner was seen to take the letter into his possession, but never delivered it, and the marked sovereign was found in his pocket: it was held, by all the judges, that he could not be convicted of stealing a 66 post letter." And a Fictitious similar decision was made, under similar circumstances, where address. such a letter had an entirely fictitious address (7). In both the R. v. Gardabove cases, however, the prisoners were convicted of larceny. And, in a subsequent case, where such a letter was posted, R. v. Young. although with a fictitious address, the prisoner was convicted (m).

ner.

A servant was sent to the post with a letter and a penny to R. v. Mence. prepay the postage, but finding the shop-door of the receiving house shut, she put the penny inside the letter, fastened it in with a pin, and dropped it into the letter-box, intending that the penny should be applied to the payment of the postage. A messenger, in the General Post Office, stole this letter, with the money in it, and Lord Denman held, that it came within the description of the Act of Parliament, viz., a letter containing money, although the money was not put in for the purpose of being conveyed in the letter (n).

S.. post-m stress at G., received a letter from D., with 11. for R. v. Bickera post-office order, to be obtained at L., 3d. for the poundage,

(k) R. v. Rathbone, Carr. & M. 220; S. C. 2 Moo. C. C. 242; acc. R. v. Shepherd, Dears. C. C. 606; S. C. 25 L. J., M. C. 52. In this case the prisoner was a suspected sub-sorter at the General Post Office. A letter was made up, cash enclosed, and the usual stamp put on the letter. The usual course of posting a letter at the outer hall of the General Post Office is to place it in receiving box. In this case, however, an inspector delivered the letter at the window in the outer hall to another inspector,

staff.

R. v. Glass.

R. v. Harley.

11 & 12 Vict. c. 88.

Penalty on officers of Post Office issuing

1d. for the postage, and 1d. for the messenger, who was to get the order. The letter when received by S. was unsealed, but addressed; she in due course delivered it to the prisoner, who was the post-office messenger, with the money, and instructed him to obtain the order at L., inclose it in the letter and post the letter at L. He pocketed the money, and never delivered the letter at L., and it was held by Cresswell, J., that under these circumstances the letter must be considered as a postletter, and the prisoner in the employ of the post-office; and he was convicted under the statute (o).

But in another case (p), where a person delivered two 51. notes to the wife of the postmaster at C. (where money orders were not granted), and asked her to send them by the lettercarrier from C. to W., in order that he might get two 5l. money orders at the W. post-office: she gave instructions accordingly to the letter-carrier, and by his desire put the notes into his bag; but he afterwards took them out, and pretended he had lost them (having had no intention of stealing them at the time he received them): it was held by the fifteen judges that this was not larceny, the notes not being in the possession of the prisoner in the course of his duty as a post-office servant.

A post-office being at an inn, a person was sent to put a letter containing promissory notes into the post. He took it to the inn with money to prepay the postage: he did not put it into the letter-box, but laid the letter with the money upon it upon a table in the passage of the inn, in which passage the letter-box was, and pointed out the letter to the prisoner, who was a female servant in the inn, who said "she would give it to them." The prisoner, who was not authorized by the innkeeper, her master, to receive letters for him, stole the letter and its contents and Patteson, J., held, that this was not a postletter within the meaning of the act; so the prisoner was convicted of larceny (q).

By the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 88, s. 4, it is enacted, that every officer of the post-office who shall grant or issue any moneyorder with a fraudulent intent shall, in England and Ireland, be guilty of felony, and in Scotland, of a high crime and offence, and shall, at the discretion of the court, either be transported (r) fraudulently. beyond the seas for the term of seven years, or be imprisoned for any term not exceeding three years.

money orders

By sect. 5, the property in anything stolen from the Post Office may be laid, in indictments &c., as in " Her Majesty's Postmaster-General," without any further or other description whatsoever.

(0) R. v. Bickerstaff, 2 C. & K. 761.

(p) R. v. Glass, 2 C. & K. 395.

89.

(q) R. v. Harley, 1 C. & K.

(r) See now 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3, substituting penal servitude.

JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES GENERALLY. THE general jurisdiction of justices in disputes arising between masters and servants is derived from three Acts of Parliament, the provisions of which are so intermixed with each other, in the various decisions upon the subject, that the author is compelled in the first instance to give the statutes and then the decisions upon them; no other and more satisfactory arrangement of the subject being attainable under the circumstances. By construction of law upon the statute 5 Eliz. c. 4 (which enabled justices to fix the rate of wages) justices of the peace were held (a) to have the power of ordering and enforcing the payment of wages to servants in husbandry. But the statute of Eliz. being found deficient as it extended only to such wages as should be rated by the justices, and to servants in husbandry (b), and contained no power to admit the servant's

(a) R. v. Gouche, 2 Salk. 441; S. C. 2 Lord Raym. 820; Shergold v. Holloway, 2 Str. 1002.

(b) The jurisdiction of justices in disputes between masters and servants in trades is conferred by various Acts of Parliament relating to particular trades, which, for the convenience of reference, have been arranged alphabetically in a table printed at the commencement of this volume. The principal of those acts (viz. 20 Geo. 2, c. 19; 6 Geo. 3, c. 25; 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, and 5 Geo. 4, c. 96) are given in the text, together with the cases decided upon them, as

they are applicable to almost all trades; the operation of the three first having been extended by 10 Geo. 4, c. 52, to the several manufactures, trades and occupations mentioned in 17 Geo. 3, c. 56. Most of the other acts will be found in the Appendix. In proceedings under these statutes the provisions of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 must be attended to, as the case of master and servant is not within the list of excepted cases, sect. 35; see 16 Q. B. 71. But that act does not extend to proceedings under the Factory Acts, see sect. 36.

20 Geo. 2, c. 19.

Differences between

masters and certain serdetermined by a justice of peace where the master resides.

vants to be

oath in evidence, the 20 Geo. 2, c. 19 was passed. That act, after reciting that the laws then in being for the better regulation of servants, and for the payment of wages to them, and to artificers, handicraftsmen and labourers, were insufficient and defective, enacted sect. 1, that after 25th March, 1747 "all complaints, differences and disputes which shall happen or arise between masters or mistresses and servants in husbandry who shall be hired for one year or longer (c), or which shall happen or arise between masters and mistresses, and artificers (d), handicraftsmen, miners, colliers, keelmen, pitmen(e), glassmen, potters and other labourers (f) employed for any certain time or in any other manner (g), shall be heard and determined by one or more justice or justices of the peace of the county, riding, city, liberty, town corporate or place where such master or mistress shall inhabit (h) (although no rate or assessment of wages has been made that year by the justices of the peace of the shire, riding or liberty, or by the mayor, bailiffs or other head officer, where such complaints shall be made, or where such differences or disputes shall arise) (i), which said justice or justices is and are hereby empowered to examine upon oath any such servant, upon oath; artificer, handicraftsman, miner, collier, keelman, pitman, glass

Justices to examine

servants, &c.,

(c) See note (g), infra.

(d) By 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4, and 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, "calico printers" are added.

(e) In the Stannaries in Devon and Cornwall, 27 Geo. 2, c. 6, s. 2.

(f) In Lowther v. Earl of Radnor, 8 East, 113, a labourer, who contracted to dig and stean a well, was held within this act. That case, however, proceeded upon the facts laid in the information before the justice. In order to give a magistrate jurisdiction now, there must either be an actual service, or a contract of service. See Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603; Lancaster v. Greaves, 9 B. & C. 628. In Wiles v. Cooper, 3 A. & E. 524, it was considered doubtful whether under this act and 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, justices had power to order payment on an information "for wages for labour as a carpenter." And see Riley v. Warden, 2 Exc. 59; Sharman v. Saunders, 13 C. B. 166; Ingram v. Barnes, 26 L. J., Q. B. 82, as to the meaning of the word "labourer" in the Truck Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37; and R. v. Wortley, 21 L. J., M. C. 44; S. C. 2 Den. C. C. 333, ante, p. 40, as to the meaning of that word in the Stamp Act.

(g) Doubts having arisen whether the words "other labourers employed for any certain time, or in any other manner," extended the act to servants in husbandry hired for a less time than one year, it was enacted by 31 Geo. 2, c. 11, s. 3, that 20 Geo. 2, c. 19, and all and every clause and matter therein contained, should be construed to extend to all servants employed in husbandry, though hired for a less time than one year.

serve

(h) By 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, post, p. 333, the complaint is to be made to "any justice of the peace of the county or place where such servant, &c., shall have so contracted "to or be employed or be found.” And the commitment must show that the magistrate had jurisdiction, Johnson v. Reid, 6 M. & W. 124; Lindsay v. Leigh, 11 Q. B. 455; Askew's Case, 2 L. M. & P. 429.

(i) In Branwell v. Penneck, 7 B. & C. 539, Bayley, J., said, "These words imply that the legislature did not contemplate all labourers, but those only with reference to whom the justices had power to make a rate of wages" under 5 Eliz. c. 4, s. 15.