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Congress indeed has begun to turn its attention to this issue. Many of these same petitions call for a constitutional convention only if the Congress should not act.

At issue, I think, with respect to additional States, the remaining four, would be the reaction in the land should Congress indeed not address this issue and not submit to the State legislatures for ratification an amendment that does speak to the concerns of the people.

If this Congress doesn't do it, then many more State legislatures may well realize that they are indeed left with only one alternative, and that is a constitutional convention.

The Congress can avoid that by meeting its responsibility. There is nothing small about 30 of the 50 States.

Now, do we have to wait for another four States before the Congress will take it seriously?

Senator HEFLIN. Well, in my judgment, if you get 67 votes, you are going to have to have pressure and the pressure is the fear of a Constitutional Convention and all of its implications. That my own personal judgment in that regard. Thank you, gentlemen.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(Mr. Stubblebine's prepared statement, Mr. Friedman's letter and prepared statement, and additional material follow :)

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF W». CRAIG STUBBLEBINE

Introduction

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I am wm. Craig Stubblebine, Von Tobel Professor of Political Economy at the Claremont Men's College and at the Claremont Graduate School, and, as well, Director of the Center for the Study of Law Structures at the Claremont Men's College, Claremont, California. Under a grant from the Tax Limitation Research Foundation, the Center at Claremont has maintained a continuing research effort in constitutional tax and spending limitations at all levels of government. With many others, including Mr. Lewis K. Uhler with whom I appear today, I also am a founder of the National Tax

Limitation Committee.

My own research and consulting with respect to these limits dates from 1972-73, when I served as a consultant to the (Governor's) Tax

Reduction Task Force. The work of that Task Force culminated in
"Proposition 1" submitted to the voters of California in November 1973.
This submission marked the first attempt to incorporate such limitations
into a constitution. Although Proposition 1 failed by a narrow margin,
the concept spread rapidly to other states, including Michigan, Colorado,

and New Jersey. In March 1978, the first such amendment was adopted by

the voters of Tennessee in March 1978. Subsequently, the States of Arizona, Hawaii, Michigan, and Texas adopted variants in November 1978. Next Tuesday, November 6, similar propositions will be before the voters

of California and Washington. Both are expected to be adopted by substan

tial margins.

In July 1978, a Federal Amendment Drafting Committee was convened under the asupices of the National Tax Limitation Committee. I had the

priviledge of serving the Drafting Committee as chairman or coordinator. Its membership is shown Appendix A. The work of this Committee was concluded on January 29 of this year and released to the public on January 30. Subsequently, with some modification, Senators Heinz (R-Pa) and Stone (D-Fi) introduced the proposed amendment as Senate Joint Resolution 56. A companion measure has been introduced in the House by Congressmen Jenkins (d-Ga) and Conable (R-NY) as House Joint Resolution 395.

On behalf of the Federal Amendment Drafting Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify with respect to Senate Joint Resolution 56, the Federal Spending Limit Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Growing Government and Inflation

Three statements summarize the issues addressed by the Federal

Spending Limit:

(1) American governments have come to spend an increasing

share of American incomes.

As shown in Figure I and Table I, spending by all U.S. Governments Federal, State, and Local represented only twelve percent (12%) of U.S.

personal income in 1929. By 1950, the share had risen to twenty-seven

percent (27%) and to forty percent (40%) by 1978. These data amount to a

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TABLE I

SPENDING BY ALL U.S. GOVERNMENTS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL

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1929 1933 1940 1944 1948 1949 1950

951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

10.3 10.7 18.4 103.0 50.5 59.3 61.0 79.2 93.9 101.6 97.0 98.0 104.5 115.3 127.6 131.0 136.4 149.1 160.5 167.8 176.3 187.8 213.6 242.4 268.8 285.6 311.9 340.5 370.9 404.9 458.2 532.8 570.4 621.8 684.2

12.1 22.8 23.7 62.7 24.2 28.8 27.0 31.2 34.7 35.5 33.7 31.7 31.6 33.0 35.5 34.3 34.1 35.9 36.4 36.2 35.6 35.0 36.5 38.7 39.2 38.3 38.9 39.6 39.4 38.5 39.7 42.4 41.3 40.6 39.8

2.6 4.0 10.0 95.5 34.9 41.3 40.8 57.8 71.1 77.1 69.8 68.1 71.9 79.6 88.9 91.0 93.1 101.9 110.4 114.2 118.2 123.8 143.6 163.7 180.6 188.4 204.2 220.6 244.7 265.0 299.3 356.8 385.2 422.6 461.0

3.1 8.5 12.9 58.1 16.7 20.1 18.0 22.8 26.3 26.9 24.2 22.1 21.7 22.8 24.7 23.8 23.3 24.6 25.1 24.7 23.8 23.1 24.6 26.1 26.4 25.3 25.5 25.7 26.0 25.2 25.9 28.4 27.9 27.6 26.8

Source: Economic Report of the President (January 1979), Tables B-18 and B-72.

Computations by the Center for the Study of Law Structures,
Claremont Men's College, Claremont, California

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