L. C. 1868 GENERAL v. COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. also from the evidence in the case, that everything done in this and L. J. S. asylum is done by agents and servants of the Defendants, and under their order and authority; and the Act of Parliament under ATTORNEY- which they act, although it has authorized them to maintain these pauper lunatics, has given them no authority to take or injure the property or rights of other persons. But if we were to listen to the argument, at all events to the extent to which it was carried by Mr. Schomberg, it would follow that these persons, having authority to establish one or more lunatic asylums, would have the right, acting under that authority, to take other persons' property in any manner they may think necessary for effecting their object, and they might stop an ancient light, or interfere with or divert public or private rights of way at their discretion. But the principle of law applicable to these cases has been very clearly and conclusively established by the opinion of the Judges, which was acted on by the House of Lords in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Blackburn, in the case of the Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs (1). Mr. Justice Blackburn, in delivering the opinion of the Judges, said: "If the Legislature directs or authorizes the doing of a particular thing, the doing of it cannot be wrongful. If damage results from the doing of that thing, it is just and proper that compensation should be made for it, and that is generally provided for in the statutes authorizing the doing of such things. But no action lies for what is damnum sine injuriâ, the remedy is to apply for compensation under the provisions of the statutes legaliz ing what would otherwise be a wrong." Then he proceeds: "But though the Legislature has authorized the execution of the works, it does not thereby exempt those authorized to make them from the obligation to use reasonable care that in making them no unnecessary damage be done." Now that proposition obviously implies these two things-first, that the particular thing complained of must have been authorized by the Legislature; and secondly, that in doing that particular thing reasonable care must be taken that no unnecessary damage be done. In the present case all that has been sanctioned by the Legislature is the erection of a lunatic asylum, or lunatic asylums; they may be made in any place; the patients may be so distributed in (1) Law Rep. 1 H. L. 93, 112. such manageable numbers as that no nuisance may be occasioned at all. Such sites may be chosen, and such ground taken, as to render it impossible that there shall be any nuisance to an adjoining proprietor. But an Act of Parliament merely authorizing the erection of such an asylum cannot justify an interference with the rights of neighbours to the extent contended for on the part of the Defendants, and as the Lord Chancellor has already pointed out in the case of this very asylum, assuming it to be continued as it is now, there are the means-and Captain Galton has pointed out the means by which the nuisance now complained of may be remedied. Captain Galton says, "The asylum lands are 130 acres in extent, of which I am informed seventy acres are applicable to farm purposes. This latter portion is below the level of the asylum, and is so placed that over a great part of it the sewage could be disposed of by gravitation without the necessity of pumping." That plainly shews, that so far from this particular thing which is being done being authorized by the Legislature, the asylum contains in itself the means of remedying the nuisance. But then it has been said that the Informant is to be precluded by the delay in the institution and prosecution of the suit. I think this second point, urged by Sir Roundell Palmer, is, in fact, conclusively answered by the third point of his argument, namely, that which related to the attempts which have been made by the justices to remedy the evil. For in a case of this kind, where we have on each side public officers acting in the exercise of a public duty, I think this Court ought not to look narrowly into the length of time which has been occupied by negotiations or attempts made in good faith on both sides in order, if possible, to remedy the evil. Lastly, it is said that the attempts which have been made by the justices to remedy the evil, even if they do not render it right for the Court to dismiss this information, are sufficient to justify the inquiry the Vice-Chancellor has directed. But I think that objection is answered by the report of Captain Galton. It may not have been the fault, but certainly it has been the misfortune, of the justices that, although they made so many attempts, those attempts have all been made in a wrong direction, and have been unsuccessful, while they had within their own property and their own grounds, as now appears by the report of Captain Galton, the L. C. and L. J. S. 1868 ATTORNEY GENERAL V. COLNEY LUNATIC ASYLUM. L. C. and L. J. S. 1868 means of remedying the evil. Although those attempts may be used by them as a ground for asking further time, they cannot be used to the extent of prejudicing the rights of the Informant to a ATTORNEY decree for an injunction which involves a declaration of his right to put an end to the nuisance. GENERAL V. COLNEY LUNATIC With respect to the reference which has been directed, if the ASYLUM. inquiries were intended as meaning to leave it to Captain Galton to say whether the nuisance has been established or not, then I think it is open to the objection which the Lord Chancellor has pointed out, that that nuisance has been completely and clearly established by the evidence, and therefore that the Informant is entitled to a declaratory decree; but if the inquiry is only meant as to the means to be adopted to prevent or cure the evil, then it is a reference which might possibly be made after the decree. Then the question might arise whether the Defendants have been doing all that was possible in order to carry into execution the terms of the decree, or whether they ought to be allowed further time to do so. In neither of those cases would it be right to make such an inquiry preparatory to, or before, the decree. I think, therefore, the order, so far as relates to that inquiry, is certainly inconsistent with the practice of the Court. The only remaining point that was raised is that which the Lord Chancellor has fully adverted to, and to which I will only add one word, namely, that the Relators are a body who have the power to make sewers, and that they themselves might have remedied the evil. That objection I also think is clearly answered in the report of Captain Galton. Two courses have been suggested: it is said they should have made a sewer, and connected it with the system of the General Metropolitan Sewage discharging itself into the river at Barking, and they might have made another system of sewers, carrying it in the direction of the river Lee. But then, as Captain Galton has pointed out, it is absolutely unlawful to divert any drainage whatever into the river Lee. As respects the alternative plan of carrying it into the metropolitan system, that system was made with reference to one particular area, and has been found, I fear, not more than sufficient for that area; and, as Captain Galton has shewn, that plan would be unlawful, and could not be done without the authority of some subsequent Act of Parliament. L. C. and L. J. S. 1868 w GENERAL Although I have thought it right to say this, I entirely concur with what has fallen from the Lord Chancellor, that it does not lie in the mouths of the Defendants, who have created this nuisance, to say that the Relators and the Attorney-General are not entitled ATTORNEYto a decree, because the Relators might have performed the duty which, in our judgment, is not cast on them at all. I think, therefore, the order must be discharged, and that the decree should be made in the form suggested by the Lord Chancellor. Solicitor for the Relator: Mr. Alfred Cox. Solicitors for the Defendants: Messrs. C. & J. Allen & Sons. r. COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. HERRING v. CLARK. Practice-Trustee Act, 1852, s. 1-Lord Chancellor. Where the legal estate in land sold under the order of the Court is vested in a person of unsound mind, but not found lunatic, an order may be made by the Lord Chancellor on a Petition in Chancery, under the Trustee Acts, appointing a person to convey the legal estate so vested. IN this case a decree had been made by Vice-Chancellor Stuart for the dissolution of a partnership between the Plaintiff and Doubts having been raised, having regard to the authorities (1), (1) Re Ormerod (3 De G. & J. 249); Barber v. Dawson (6 N. R. 346); Jeffryes v. Drysdale (7 Jur. (N.S.) 667). L. C. and L. J. S. 1868 Dec. 22. L. C. and L. J. S. 1868 HERRING v. CLARK. whether this order could be made by a Vice-Chancellor under the Mr. Higgins, for the Petitioner. Mr. Barber, and Mr. Loughborough, for the Respondents. Their Lordships made the order in Chancery. Solicitor: Mr. T. Loughborough. L. C. and L. J. S. 1868 Dec. 18. Ex parte ALSTON. In re HOLLAND. Bankruptcy-Creditors' Deed-Marshalling Securities-Pledge of Bills of Lading by Consignees. A firm in Ceylon employed a firm in England as their agents and factors, the course of business being that the Ceylon firm consigned cargoes to the English firm for sale on their account, and drew bills on the English firm against the consignments. Consignments of coffee having been made in this manner, and bills accepted by the English firm against them, the English firm pledged the coffee, together with certain securities of their own, with T., their broker, to secure a large debt due from them to him. The English firm became insolvent and executed a creditors' deed under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, and then T. sold the coffee (which produced more than sufficient to cover the bills drawn against it) and enough of the other securities to satisfy his debt : Held, that the Ceylon firm were entitled, as against the English firm in liquidation, to have the remaining securities in T.'s hands marshalled, and to have a lien thereon for the balance due to them upon the coffee transaction. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Commissioner Holroyd, made in the winding up of the estate of Holland, Thompson, & Co., under an inspectorship deed. The facts were brought before the Court in a special case, the statements of which were to the following effect: Holland, Thompson, & Co. were, in 1866, merchants carrying on |