CREDITOR HOLDING SECURITY-continued. for sale in England, at the risk of certain specu- lators for whom they acted, and the Liverpool firm applied to an English bank for an advance for that purpose. An arrangement was accordingly made, under which the Charleston firm drew upon an American branch of the bank for the amount required, purchased the cotton, consigned it to the Liverpool firm, drew bills upon that firm, and in- dorsed them to the bank. At the same time the cotton was consigned to the Liverpool firm, who accepted the bills drawn upon them by the Charles- ton firm, and the bills of lading were indorsed by the Charleston firm to the bank as security for their advance. Afterwards the Liverpool and Charleston firms became insolvent. The value of the cotton was insufficient to cover the acceptances of the Liverpool firm :-Held, that the transaction was a joint adventure of the Charleston and Liver- pool firms, and that they were jointly interested in the cotton, and consequently that the bank could prove against the estate of the Liverpool firm for the sum advanced without giving up their security. Ex parte ENGLISH AND AMERICAN BANK FRASER, TRENHOLM, & Co.
2. Inspectorship Deed-Bankruptcy Act, 1861, 88. 192, 197-Execution against Property of the Partners Members of another Firm-Time at which Amount of Debt is to be ascertained-Regis- tration.] A firm in England accepted bills drawn by a firm in Egypt which consisted of the members of the English firm and two other persons. After- wards the English firm executed an inspectorship deed, which was duly registered under the Bank- ruptcy Act, 1861. The deed contained no assign- ment of the assets of the firm, but provided that the partners should get in all their joint and sepa- rate estates under inspection, and that the proceeds should be distributed by the inspectors in like manner as under an adjudication of bankruptcy of the same date as the deed. It was also provided that every creditor should, if required, make a statement of his debt and of any satisfaction or security for the same; and also that no creditor who had obtained execution against any part of the estate of the debtors, or any, or one of them, should be allowed the benefit of the execution and of the deed without bringing the amount received into general division. In the interval between the execution and registration of the deed the holders of some of the bills, amounting to £10,000, ob- tained an execution against the Egyptian firm, as drawers, in an action on one of the bills in the Consular Court, and recovered £3000. For some time after the registration of the deed the holders of the bills refused to come in under the deed, and made no claim; but eventually they claimed a dividend on the whole debt of £10,000. The in- spectors resisted the demand on the grounds :- 1. That the creditors ought to elect either to give up their claim or else bring in the proceeds of their execution. 2. That if any claim was admitted they ought to deduct the £3000 which they had recovered from the drawers :-Held, first, that as there was no bankruptcy of the English firm, and the deed contained no assignment of the estate of the partners, the deed did not affect the joint estate of the Egyptian firm, and that consequently the holders of the bills were entitled to prove under the deed without giving up the benefit of
3. Creditors' Deed-Guarantee-Surety- Dividend on full Amount of Debt.] A bank per- mitted a customer to overdraw his account upon having a guarantee from a surety to the extent of £300, which guarantee provided that all dividends, compositions, and payments received on account of the customer should be applied as payments in gross, and that the guarantee should apply to and due to the bank. The customer gave the surety secure any ultimate balance that should remain nity. Afterwards the customer compounded with a mortgage on part of his estate by way of indem- his creditors by a deed which provided for the ad- ministration of the assets as in bankruptcy. His banking account was overdrawn £410. The mort- gage was realized, and the surety paid the bank the £300 secured by it:-Held (affirming the decree of Malins, V.C), that the bank was not restricted to proof for the balance of £110, but was entitled to receive dividends on the whole £410, not receiving in the whole, including the £300, more than 20s. in the pound. MIDLAND BANKING COMPANY v. CHAMBERS
CUSTOM OF STOCK EXCHANGE Sale of Shares -Jobber's Liability.] The Plaintiff, a holder of 200 shares in a company, by his brokers, contracted on the Stock Exchange for the sale of that number of shares to the Defendants, who were jobbers, for a future day called settling-day. Before the set- tling-day, the jobbers, on a day called the name- day, in accordance with the custom of the Stock Exchange, gave to the vendor's broker the names of seventeen persons as ultimate purchasers, to whom the shares were to be transferred in differ- ent parcels. The brokers of the vendor accordingly prepared seventeen deeds of transfer, got them executed by the vendor, and on settling-day handed them and the share certificates to the jobbers, who thereupon paid the price agreed upon. In the meantime the company had stopped payment and was ordered to be wound up. The seventeen transferees, through their brokers, had paid their purchase-money to the jobbers, and had received but not executed the deeds of transfer, and the Plaintiff, whose name remained on the list of shareholders, was obliged to pay calls of these shares.-The Plaintiff thereupon filed a bill against the jobbers, claiming indemnity against the calls:-Held, that the contract between the Plaintiff and the jobbers must be interpreted according to the rules of the Stock Exchange, and that after the jobbers had paid to the vendor his purchase-money, and given the names of transferees to whom the vendor executed transfers, and after these transferees, through their brokers, had received the transfers and paid their purchase- money to the jobbers, the liability of the jobbers ceased, and the bill was dismissed.-Decree of Malins, V.C., reversed. COLES v. BRISTOWE 3
2. Sale of Shares-Privity-Indemnity The Plaintiff, a holder of forty shares in a public company, agreed, through his brokers on the Stock Exchange, to sell that number to a jobber for £202 108. The Defendant subsequently directed his broker to buy 100 shares; and, in accordance with the custom of the Stock Exchange, the name of the Defendant was passed to the Plaintiff's brokers as the purchaser of the forty shares. The Plaintiff executed a transfer deed of the shares to the Defendant, the consideration afterwards in- serted by the Plaintiff's brokers being £145, which was the price the Defendant had agreed to pay. The Defendant paid to the Plaintiff the £145, and received the deed and the share certificates, the difference between the £145 and 202 108. being paid by the jobber.-The Defendant never executed the deed, or registered the transfer, or repudiated the sale, and the company was ordered to be wound up-Held, that there was a contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, en- titling the Plaintiff to indemnity by the Defen- dant. Decree of the Master of the Rolls affirmed. HAWKINS v. MALTBY 200
3. Sale of Shares-Indemnity-Registra tion guaranteed.] A firm of stock-jobbers agreed on the Stock Exchange to buy 100 shares for a certain day, and on the sale-note were the words "with registration guaranteed." The jobbers, before the day, gave the name of a transferee, who duly paid the purchase-money; the seller exe- cuted the deed of transfer, and delivered it to the transferee. The transferee never registered the
See MISCONDUCT OF DIRECTORS. 2. DEPOSIT OF DEEDS Equitable Mortgage by Trustee without Notice-Delivery up of Deeds- Purchaser for Value without Notice.] Where the Court establishes a prior equitable title to an estate as against a person who took an equitable mortgage by deposit of the title deeds from the legal owner without notice:-Semble, it will go on to order him to deliver up the deeds, though he acquired them for value and without notice from the person who at law was the absolute owner of them.-Joyce v. De Moleyns (2 J. & Lat. 374) con- sidered. NEWTON v. NEWTON DIRECTORS-Amalgamated company
See AMALGAMATION OF COMPANIES. 3. Authority to accept bills of exchange- Conditional authority
See NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. Misconduct of
376, 475, 701 See MISCONDUCT OF DIRECTORS. 1, 2, 3. Refusal to register transfer See TRANSFER OF SHARES. 1. DISCOUNT ON INSTALMENTS -- Mortgage to building society
EASEMENT-Way of necessity
See WAY OF NECESSITY.
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR AWARD-Ar- bitration-Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, ss. 8, 15-Lands Clauses Act, 1845, s. 23.] An award by an umpire under a reference pursuant to the Lands Clauses Act for ascertaining the amount of compensation having, on the application of the landowner, been set aside by the Court, and the matter referred back to the umpire, no proceeding was taken under the reference for nearly seven months from the date of the order, and the land- owner then served the company with notice of his desire to have the compensation settled by a jury. The company applied to have the time for making the award extended:-Held, by James, V.C., that the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, with regard to remitting matters to the re- consideration of the arbitrator, and enlarging the time for making the award, applied to references under the Lands Clauses Act, and that the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time, but that after the delay which had taken place this jurisdiction ought not to be exercised so as to deprive the landowner of a trial by jury.-On appeal this decision was affirmed. In re DARE VALLEY RAIL- WAY COMPANY. 554
See ACCOUNT OF PATENT. EQUITY TO SETTLEMENT-Debts before Mar- riage-Practice-Title of Official Assignee-In- choate Title.] Where a woman before her marriage is indebted, she is not entitled to any equity to a settlement out of her property until her debts incurred before her marriage have been provided for. An official assignee filed a bill to impeach a settlement of part of the bankrupt's property. He was not formally appointed assignee of the bankruptcy until after the filing of the bill: Held, that the official assignee had an inchoate title before the filing of the bill, and it was suffi- cient if he produced the order appointing him assignee at the hearing of the cause. The decree of the Master of the Rolls affirmed. BARNARD v. FORD. CARRICK v. FORD
Form and amount of settlement
See SETTLEMENT BY COURT OF CHANCERY. -Lost by fraud
See FRAUD OF MARRIED WOMAN. 2. EVIDENCE-Unstamped creditors' deed
EXECUTION, LEAVE TO ISSUE-Bankruptcy- Application for leave to issue Execution notwith- standing Creditors' Deed-Delay in impeaching Deed-Proceedings at Law.] A creditor obtained judgment against his debtor on the 1st of August, 1868. On the same day the debtor executed a deed of composition with his creditors whereby he assigned all his property to a trustee by way of security for payment of the composition. The deed was registered under the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861. The creditor refused to assent to the deed, and proceeded to sue out execution; but the sheriff interpleaded, and the issue was tried between the creditor and the trustee of the deed. The Court of Exchequer decided, on the 23rd of January, 1869, that the deed was invalid as a trust deed under the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, as the requi- site number of assents had not been obtained; but that it operated at law as an assignment of the debtor's property to the trustee, and, conse- quently, that the issue must be decided against the creditor. The creditor accordingly, without further delay, proceeded to examine the debtor in bankruptcy in order to impeach the deed, and on the 6th of April applied under the 198th section of the Bankruptcy Act for leave to issue execution notwithstanding the deed:-Held, that as the creditor had throughout the proceedings at law insisted on the invalidity of the deed, he had been guilty of no delay in not sooner impeaching the deed in bankruptcy, and his application was granted. Ex parte ÖSENTON. In re PRIOR EXECUTOR-Payment to one
See PAYMENT TO ONE EXECUTOR. Solicitor paying himself out of assets 616 See TAXATION OF COSTS. 2.
EXECUTORS' ACCOUNTS-Solicitors' charges 616 See TAXATION OF COSTS. 2.
EX PARTE WARING, (19 Ves. 345)-Doctrine of [423
See SECURITIES FOR BILLS OF EXCHANGE. EXPERT-Reference to
See NUISANCE BY PUBLIC BODY.
FIXTURES-Bankruptcy-Part of a Machine- Rolls used in Rolling Mill-Straightening Plates- Weighing Machines-Mortgagor and Mortgagee.] An iron manufacturer made an equitable mort- gage of his rolling mills, of which he held a lease, and shortly afterwards became bankrupt. Besides the fixed machinery, the mills contained the fol lowing chattels used in the manufacture:-(1). A large number of duplicate iron rolls of various sizes made to be fitted into the machine, and used
for different sizes of iron; some of these were fitted to the machine, and had been used, and others had not yet been fitted. (2.) Straightening plates, which were broad iron plates embedded in the floor for straightening the iron when taken out of the furnace. (3). Weighing machines, which were deposited in holes dug in the earth and lined with brickwork, so that the weighing plate was level with the surface of the ground, but which were not fixed to the brickwork:- Held, on a case stated in the bankruptcy between the mortgagees and the assignees.-First: That 690 such of the rolls as had been fitted to the machine were fixtures, and passed to the mortgagees; but
See UNSTAMPED CREDITORS' DEED. EXCEPTIONS-Discovery anticipating the decree [416 See DISCOVERY ANTICIPATING THE DECREE. Partnership accounts 336
See PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTS. EXECUTION - Leave to issue-Void creditors'
See EXECUTION, LEAVE TO ISSUE.
that such of the rolls as had not been fitted to it were not fixtures, and belonged to the assignees. -Secondly: That the straightening plates were fixtures, and passed to the mortgagees.-Thirdly: That the weighing machines were not fixtures, and belonged to the assignees. - Metropolitan Counties Society v. Brown (26 Beav. 454) distin- guished. Ex parte ASTBURY. Ex parte LLOYD'S BANKING COMPANY. In re RICHARDS 630 FOLLOWING TRUST FUND-Bankers' accounts. See BANKERS' ACCOUNT. [764
FORFEITED SHARES-Company-Contributory -Past Members Companies Act, 1862, 8. 38.] Shareholders in a company limited by shares transferred their shares within a year before the commencement of the winding up of the company. Calls were made on the transferees, which they failed to pay, and the shares were duly forfeited by the directors for the benefit of the company :- Held (affirming the decision of Stuart, V.C.), that the transferors were liable to be placed on the list of contributories as past members of the company. In re ACCIDENTAL AND MARINE INSURANCE COR- PORATION. BRIDGER'S CASE AND NEILL'S CASE 266 FORFEITURE CLAUSE-Forfeiture by Marriage Cesser of Life Estate-Acceleration of Remainder.] A testator appointed, under a general power, real estate, and devised other real estate to his wife and her assigns during her life, and after her death 'to his son, with a proviso that if his wife should do, make, or execute any deed, matter, or thing whereby she should be deprived of the rents and profits, or the power or right to receive, or the control over the same, so that her receipt alone should be a sufficient discharge for the same, her life estate should cease and determine as fully and effectually as it would by her actual decease." By a codicil he gave his personal estate to his wife for life for her separate use, indepen- dently of any future husband. The wife married again without making any settlement: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that notwithstanding the limitation to her and "her assigns," and the allusion to a future hus- band in the codicil, the wife's life estate was for- feited by her second marriage; and that the remainder both in the appointed and devised estates was accelerated. CRAVEN V. BRADY FORFEITURE OF SHARES-Bankruptcy-Proof -Secured Creditor.] A. was a shareholder in a joint stock bank, the deed of settlement of which provided that if any shareholder did not, on demand, pay all moneys which he owed to the bank, the directors might declare his shares for- feited for the benefit of the other proprietors, but that he should, notwithstanding such forfeiture, remain liable to pay the full amount of his debt. The directors gave A. a notice on the 25th of November to pay on the 2nd of December a large sum which he owed them, in default of which his shares would be forfeited. On the 28th of November he filed a declaration of insolvency, and was adjudged bankrupt on the following day. On the 3rd of December the directors forfeited his shares. On the bank coming in to prove, the -Commissioner held the forfeiture invalid, and admitted the proof for the amount of the debt less the value of the shares, as in the case of
FORFEITURE OF SHARES continued. a secured creditor:-Held, on appeal, that the validity of the forfeiture, if questioned, must be tried in an independent proceeding, and that the proof must be admitted for the full amount of the debt, without prejudice to the right of the assignees to question the forfeiture. Ex parte RIPPON. In re ANDREW FRAUD OF MARRIED WOMAN-Settlement on Female Infant - Wife's Real Estate - Notice Solicitor for Mortgagor and Mortgagee-Conceal- ment-Priority.] In a settlement made on the marriage of a female infant, the husband cove- nanted that in case his wife attained twenty-one he would concur with her, if she would consent, and would use his utmost endeavours to induce her to concur with him, in settling her real estate. This was never done. In 1862, after the wife had attained her majority, the husband and wife mortgaged the wife's real estate to secure money advanced to the husband. The mortgagee was informed by the husband and wife that there was no settlement, and although the person who acted as solicitor for both parties was aware of its exis- tence, he concealed it with the acquiescence of the husband and wife from the mortgagee. In 1865 the mortgagee discovered the existence of the settlement. The mortgage deed, by mistake, was not effectually acknowledged by the wife till after the mortgagee had received notice of the settlement:-Held, on a bill filed by the mort- gagee, that in the face of the evidence of conceal- ment the mortgagee was not affected by notice to the person who acted as his solicitor:-That although the wife's estate did not pass to the mortgagee till after he had received notice of the settlement, yet the misrepresentations of the wife constituted a fraud, which bound her estate, and prevented her from disappointing the mortgagee, and, consequently, the mortgagee had priority over the persons interested under the settlement.- Decree of Stuart, V.C., affirmed. SHARPE v. Foy 35
2. Coercion by Husband.] A woman, two months after her marriage, wrote and signed in her maiden name a paper dated before the mar- riage, and purporting to give to her husband, in consideration of the marriage, her reversionary interest in a trust fund. She signed this paper for the purpose of enabling him to borrow money on her reversionary interest; he threatening that if she did not sign it he would send her back to her relations, with whom she was on bad terms. The husband sold the reversionary interest, and shortly before completion, he being at the time in prison for debt, she signed and gave to the pur- chaser's solicitor a letter addressed to one of the trustees of the fund, stating that she had before her marriage assigned her interest in the trust fund to her husband. Upon the determination of the life interest she claimed her equity to a settle- ment, on the ground that the paper being signed after marriage did not bind her. Held, by the Master of the Rolls, that though she had been a party to a fraud, yet as she had acted under the coercion of her husband, she was not responsible for it, and was entitled to her equity to a settle- ment:-Held, on appeal, that she had been guilty of a fraud, which prevented her claiming her equity to a settlement against the purchaser. In re LUSH'S TRUSTS
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, s. 8-Agent appointed by ILLEGALITY-Company-Loan-notes-Penalties parol - 548
See AGENT APPOINTED BY PAROL. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-13 Eliz. c. 5- Fraudulent Preference-Bona Fides.] A trader debtor being in expectation that a writ of sequestra- tion would issue against him for non-payment of a sum of money ordered to be paid by him into the Court of Chancery, executed a deed of mortgage, which was registered as a bill of sale, vesting sub- stantially all his property in trustees for the benefit of five of his creditors. The deed contained a proviso that the debtor should remain in posses- sion of his property for six months, but not so as to let in any execution or sequestration, and in case any such should be enforced his possession was to cease. A writ of sequestration was sub- sequently issued :-Held (affirming the decision of Stuart, V.C.), that the deed was not void under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, notwithstanding the fact that it conveyed the whole of the debtor's property for the benefit of some of his creditors, and that it contained a proviso that the debtor should remain in possession for six months. ALTON v. HARRISON. POYSER v. HARRISON 622 FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE-Bona fides 622 See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
[748 IMPROPER INVESTMENT-Breach of Trust- Acquiescence-Unknown Cestui que Trust-Joint and several Debt.] A lady died in 1830, leaving a will by which she gave her personal estate in trust for her sister for life, with remainder to her three trustees and executors, to all appearance beneficially. She also left a codicil, by which she impressed the residue with trusts in favour of other persons after the death of the tenant for life. This codicil was not proved till 1841, but the trustees in the meantime appeared to regard the property as not belonging to themselves, though it was not shewn that they knew of the existence of the codicil. In 1834 the trustees invested part of the estate on an improper security. Two of the trustees were partners in the bank out of which the money was drawn to place it on this security. In 1840 the firm became bankrupt, and after this the security turned out insufficient. The tenant for life died in 1842 :-Held (reversing the decision of the Commissioner), that the persons claiming under the codicil were entitled to prove against the separate estate of one of the bankrupt trustees for the loss occasioned by the improper investment. Ex parte NORRIS. In re BIDDULPH
Stock mortgage -
See WILFUL DEFAULT.
INCHOATE TITLE Official assignee before ap- pointment
See EQUITY TO SETTLEMENT. INCOME-Wilful default as to-Parties See WILFUL DEFAULT.
INDEMNITY-Sale of shares-Custom of Stock Exchange
200, 441 See CUSTOM OF STOCK EXCHANGE. 2, 3. INDIAN REGISTRATION ACTS, 1864 and 1866 Conflict of Laws-Registration-Lex fori-Lex rei site.] The Indian Registration Act, 1866, makes void all instruments relating to real estate in India which ought to have been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1864, but were not so registered, and destroys all equities arising out of them.-A. being resident at Madras, in 1865 exe- cuted a deed by which he conveyed land in India to the Plaintiffs and covenanted for further as- Indian Registration Act, 1864, which provides surance. The deed was not registered under the that if such a deed be not registered it shall not be received in evidence in any Court in India. fendants, who had notice of the Plaintiffs' con- In 1866 A. mortgaged the same land to the De- veyance, and the Defendants registered the mortgage deed under the Indian Registration Act, 1866. The Plaintiffs filed a bill to enforce the covenant for further assurance against the Defen- dants :-Held (affirming the decision of Gigard, V.C.), that the Plaintiffs had no equity against the Defendants, and the bill was dismissed.- Semble, that independently of the operation of the Indian Registration Act, 1866, as the Plaintiffs' deed was forbidden by the Indian Registration Act, 1864, to be received in evidence in India, it could not be sued on in England either as a deed of conveyance or as a deed of covenant for further assurance. HICKS v. POWELL - 741
« EelmineJätka » |