1836. HOOPER V. Defendant made spontaneous statements as to what a servant had done after quitting her service; and yet, the statements being made to persons who had recommended the servant to the Defendant, and therefore TRUSCOTT. might be presumed to take an interest in her welfare, Lord Tenterden held there was no evidence of malice, and nonsuited the Plaintiff. Here, the Defendant in communicating with the Plaintiff's uncle was acting in the discharge of a moral duty; and in Toogood v. Spyring (a) the Court says, "In general an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where his own interest is concerned. In such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the law draws from authorized communications, and affords a qualified defence depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits." The circumstance, that the communication was made to the uncle in the presence of his niece, does not deprive the Plaintiff of the protection afforded him from the nature of the communication; for in the same case Parke J. says, "I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential to the protection of such a communication that it should be made to some person interested in the enquiry alone, and not in the presence of a third person. (a) 1 Cromp. & Mee, 193. 1836. CUMPSTON v. HAIGH. diate absorption, can make no difference in the rights of bailor or bailee. The argument, that the goods in question were in the possession of the bankrupts, is answered by the fact, that the Defendants retained the key of the fulling room, which was the place of deposit. At all events, therefore, the verdict ought to be reduced by the amount of the value of the dyeing wares. TINDAL C. J. I think this rule must be discharged. This is an action of trover for a cask of oil and certain dyeing wares, and the question is, whether the Defendants are entitled to enforce a lien for their general balance. The right to lien depends upon general usage or particular stipulation: in the present case it is not claimed on the ground of usage, and we have, therefore, to see whether it is supported by any express stipulation: that turns entirely on the notice posted up in the mill: "All goods on hand are to be subject to lien for a general balance." The defendants contend that this includes not only goods deposited there for the purpose of being manufactured, but adscititious articles used in the course of the process. In order to justify that construction of the notice, we must give the words on hand two distinct meanings: for cloth and other articles in the progress of manufacture are certainly goods on hand; but in order to satisfy the argument used for the Defendants, we must give a secondary meaning to those words, and apply them also to articles used incidentally in the process of the manufacture. If such had been the intention of the Defendants, they, who themselves made the stipulation, should have made it more distinct, and the rather, as they propose to go beyond what the rule of law allows. They should have said, "All goods on hand, whether goods to be manufactured, or goods to be used in the process." But, Taking it, therefore, on the contract framed by the De- PARK J. I agree that this is a lien depending on particular stipulation only, and if we look at the evidence to see whether these goods were goods on hand within the meaning of the stipulation, we find that a part of them was under the control of the bankrupts' servants, who delivered out portions from time to time. But the goods themselves were not goods on hand within the meaning of the contract, which clearly applies to goods to be manufactured, and not to articles used incidentally in the process. GASELEE J. Concurred. BOSANQUET J. The only question is, what is the I think it is imtrue construction of this notice. possible to apply the words goods on hand to articles used only in the process of manufacturing goods on hand. 1836. CUMPSTON v. HAIGH. Rule discharged. 1836. HOOPER V. TRUSCOTT. the enquiry of others, but seeking to compound a felony, which he afterwards actually compounded, — by inspiring the Plaintiff's relations with terror. That such was his object, appeared from the fact of his communicating with the uncle in the presence of his niece. A rule nisi having been granted, Crowder and Butt shewed cause. The Defendant, having from the testimony of his servant reasonable ground to suspect the Plaintiff, was warranted in communicating his suspicions to the Plaintiff's relations in order to afford them the chance of redeeming the Plaintiff's character. The receipt of the money was a subsequent and separate transaction of which evidence ought not to have been received in this suit. The communication, therefore, being privileged, the Defendant was exonerated unless it could be shewn that he had been actuated by malice, and the existence of malice was under such circumstances a question of fact for the jury. In Blake v. Pilfold (a), it was held that a letter written by a private individual to a public officer, complaining of the misconduct of a person under him, if written bona fide and without malice, was not actionable as libellous, though some of the charges might not be true; and Taunton J. said "There are certain cases in which communications are, what the law terms, privileged, and where the occasion on which the communication is made rebuts the inference of malice. I allude to the occasions where a man, on being applied to, gives a character of a servant, or where he gives confidential advice, or where the occasion of the communication is such as primâ facie affords an excuse for making it. In all these cases a Plaintiff must give evidence of express malice." In Child v. Affleck (b) the (b) 9 B. & C. 403. (a) 1 Moo. & Rob. 198. Defendant made spontaneous statements as to what a servant had done after quitting her service; and yet, the statements being made to persons who had recommended the servant to the Defendant, and therefore might be presumed to take an interest in her welfare, Lord Tenterden held there was no evidence of malice, and nonsuited the Plaintiff. Here, the Defendant in communicating with the Plaintiff's uncle was acting in the discharge of a moral duty; and in Toogood v. Spyring (a) the Court says, "In general an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where his own interest is concerned. In such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the law draws from authorized communications, and affords a qualified defence depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits." The circumstance, that the communication was made to the uncle in the presence of his niece, does not deprive the Plaintiff of the protection afforded him from the nature of the communication; for in the same case Parke J. says, "I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential to the protection of such a communication that it should be made to some person interested in the enquiry alone, and not in the presence of a third person. (a) 1 Cromp. & Mee, 193. 1836. HOOPER V. TRUSCOTT. |