John Arthur. The expression, in case my son shall die before the estates become vested in him, means, in this place, before they become vested in possession. They never became vested in possession because Harriet, the life tenant, survived John Arthur. No doubt the prima facie meaning of the term vested means vested in interest; but it also often means vested in possession-Berkeley v. Swinburne (16 Sim. 275; s. c. 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 416), Taylor v. Frobisher (5 De Gex & Sm. 191; s. c. 21 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 608), Poole v. Bott (11 Hare, 33; s. c. 22 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 1042), Boraston's case (3 Rep. 19). In Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314), the House of Lords held the word vest to mean a vesting in possession. All the grounds for that construction that arose there exist here. The case of Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314) was not cited before the Master of the Rolls. In Re Gregson's Trusts (34 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 41) the words of survivorship there used were referred to the death of the tenant for life. The Master of the Rolls held the expression, my son shall die before the said estates shall have vested in him,' no more than "in case he shall die in my lifetime." This, to say the best of it, would be a very whimsical construction. It is contrary to the usual principle of construing wills to construe an expression as merely containing a provision against lapse, when it is capable of a different constructionWordsworth v. Wood (1 H.L. Cas. 151). in case to mean The Attorney General (Sir R. Palmer) (Pearson with him), for the defendants in error, the plaintiffs below. According to the general rules of construction the decision of the Master of the Rolls was right. The cardinal rule is to construe the will according to the fair and natural meaning of its words, and not to deviate from them on the speculation of some supposed intent not clearly expressed in the will, and not to take the secondary sense of a word, unless the primary sense would render the provision repugnant to other parts of the instrument-Gray v. Pearson (6 Ibid. 61; s. c. 26 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 473). The second rule is, that with respect to technical words the ordinary legal meaning must be applied to them unless the testator shews plainly that he uses them in some practical sense-Roddy v. Fitzgerald (6 H.L. Cas. 1; s. c. 23 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 343). Thirdly, a favourable or large construction is not to be given to words so as to defend an estate already created-Egerton v. Brownlow (4 Ibid. 208). Fourthly, a gift in a will can only be destroyed by something equally clear in a codicil-Doe v. Hicks (8 Bing. 475). By the will in this case the reversion in the estate vested in interest in John Arthur immediately on his father's death. There is nothing in the codicil clearly divesting this estate and rendering it one liable to fail, unless it vested in him in possession. That the word vest" means legally vest in interest, not in possession, is proved by the following authorities -Compart v. Austen (12 Sim. 218), Russell v. Buchanan (7 Ibid. 628; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 122), Thurston's Trusts (17 Ibid. 21; s. c. 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 437), Griffith v. Blunt (4 Beav. 248; s. c. 10 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 372), Blakemore's case (20 Ibid. 214), Morse's Settlement (21 Ibid. 174; s. c. 25 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 192), Thatcher's Trusts (26 Ibid. 363), Rowland v. Tawney (Ibid. 67), Sheffield v. Kennett (27 Ibid. 207), In re Cant's Estate (4 De Gex. & J. 503; s. c. 28 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 641), King v. Cullen (2 De Gex & Sm. 252), Parkin v. Hodgkinson (15 Sim. 293), The Commissioners of Charitable Donations, &c. v. Cotter (2 Dru. & W. 615), and Henderson v. Knight (2 De Gex & Sm. 492; s. c. 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 40). Cadman Jones replied. 66 Cur. adv. vult. CHANNELL, B. (July 10).-There was a case argued before us on a writ of error brought from the Common Pleas. It was argued before the Lord Chief Baron, my Brother Blackburn, my Brother Mellor and my Brother Shee. My Brother Pigott heard only a part of the argument, and he declines taking any part in the judgment. I am now about to deliver the judgment of the Judges who heard the entire argument. This was an action of ejectment brought to recover the possession of a moiety of certain lands at Lilbourne, in the county of Northampton, of which one Harriet Arnold was tenant for life under the will of Richard Arnold. The question in the cause arises on the will and codicil of the said Richard Arnold. This will and codicil were, in the year 1863, the subject of proceedings before the Master of the Rolls with reference to another devise in similar terms to that now to be considered. In the present action of ejectment, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to the Common Law Procedure Act; and the question submitted to that Court was assumed to be in principle the same as the one which had been before the Master of the Rolls in Re Arnold (33 Beav. 163). The Court of Common Pleas ordered judgment in the ejectment to be entered for the plaintiffs below, in accordance with the judgment pronounced by the Master of the Rolls, to enable the defendants below to proceed in error upon the judgment so ordered to be entered. Proceedings in error having been taken and brought before us, we are now called upon to consider the formal decision of the Court of Common Pleas.-[The learned Baron then stated the effect of the will, codicil, and of the deaths of John Arthur and Harriet Arnold, as set out above, and then proceeded]-The question for our consideration is, whether the estate in question devised to Harriet had at the death of John Arthur Arnold become vested in him or not, and it may be taken generally, without more particularly referring to the will of John Arthur Arnold or to the state of the family as set out in the special case, that if the estates had so vested, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas must be affirmed; but if they had not vested, then the judgment must be reversed. Now, by the devise in the will, particular estates, viz. life estates and estates tail, are given to Harriet Arnold and her issue, with an ultimate remainder in fee to John Arthur Arnold, a living person. This remainder in fee devised by the will is, we think, an estate which vests at the death of the testator. We have then to see whether there is anything in the codicil which shews an intention that it shall not so vest. In the course of the argument before us, very many authorities were cited, some of which we do not think it necessary particularly to advert to. It was scarcely disputed, if at all, that if the words in the codicil," in case his said son should die before the said several estates should become vested in him by virtue of the said several limitations aforesaid," were to be construed in their strict technical sense, that then the contest on the part of the plaintiffs below was correct. But it was argued, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that the words in the codicil we have referred to were to be understood not in their strict technical, but in their ordinary and popular sense, and so construed would maintain the view of the plaintiff in error. In support of this view we were pressed with the case of Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314), as an authority directly in point. That case was decided early in the year 1862-was probably not reported at the time of the decision by the Master of the Rolls in Re Arnold's Estate (33 Beav. 163), July, 1863--certainly was not cited in the last-mentioned case. In Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314), words somewhat similar to those in the present codicil were held to shew an intention that the property should vest not à morte testatoris," but at the death of the tenant for life. Now, in the first place, it is to be observed, that, in that case the words upon which the decision proceeded were all in the same instrument, viz. a Scotch trust disposition, for the principle of the decision was not at all affected by the codicil, which only introduced another grand-nephew of the testator or trustee to share in the trust disposition first made. In the present case, the devise in the will, under the circumstances which have arisen, is, we think, clear; and the question is, whether the words of the codicil alter the ordinary period of the vesting of the interest under that devise. It has been decided that a gift in a will can only be destroyed by something equally clear in a codicil. See Doe d. Hearle v. Hicks (8 Bing. 475), acted on recently by the Court of Exchequer, in Robertson v. Powell (2 Hurl. & C. 762; s. c. 3 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 34). So that we cannot say that the period of vesting here is deferred, unless we see from the words of this codicil an intention that the property shall not vest until the death of Harriet, as clearly as we do see from the words of the will an intention to give an estate in remainder to vest at once. It will be well to examine the reason upon which Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314) was decided, with a view of seeing how far any of them are applicable to the present case. The decision proceeds mainly upon two grounds: first, that where words of a survivorship occur in an instrument in which a period for payment or distribution is named, that period is the time to which the surviving is to be referred; and, secondly, that where a testator in a will which is considered to speak from the time of his death uses the words before the share or estate becomes vested," he must primâ facie be taken to mean something more than before my death." Now the first of these reasons cannot in our opinion apply in this case, for there is no period of payment or distribution named distinctly in the clause here in question. The gift over is to such of the daughters then living. If on looking back into the sentence we found that the word "then" referred grammatically to the period of payment, or of obtaining possession of the estate, the reasoning of Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314) would apply; but we find, on looking back for a period of time to which to refer the word "then," that it appears to be the death of John Arthur Arnold, before the estates have vested in him, so that we are still left in uncertainty as to when that vesting is to take place, and cannot determine it by the rule suggested. Then as to the second reason, that also does not so clearly apply here, because the gift over in the codicil comprises not only the estate now in question devised to Harriet, as to which it may be conceded that the period of vesting is either the death of the testator or the death of Harriet, but also other estates which are so devised that it might be a question whether they would vest in J. A. Arnold until he attains the age of twenty-five. Probably, if we were called on to decide that question, we should say that they vested at the testator's death-see Boraston's case (3 Rep. 19), and subsequent decisions. Still it might be doubted, especially as to those estates devised by the codicil, though there could be no doubt if the devise were in the exact terms recited by the codicil. Therefore, although for the purpose of making a gift over of the estates now in question, it would have been simpler to have said "before my death,” instead of "before the estate vests," it would not have been so at all if the testator had intended the gift over to take effect, as to some of the estates comprised in it, on John Arthur Arnold dying before himself, but as to others, on his dying before twenty-five. Probably the form of words used was the shortest which could be used for that purpose, and, if so, the argument deduced from the supposed simplicity of the other expression loses its force, although, doubtless, if the testator had the meaning we have suggested, it would have been well that he should have expressed it more clearly. Besides, the intention of the testator in making the gift over at all is, no doubt, to prevent the property being undisposed of by the will. That will take place only if the devisee dies before his interest vests. Then, if so, it is not at all unnatural that he should in terms make the gift over to take effect on the happening of the event he wishes to guard against, that is, the death of the devisee before the vesting of his interest, instead of in terms making it depend upon the death of the devisee before the actual event upon which the interest would vest and the gift over become unnecessary, although in the particular instance the latter might be a simpler expression. His object being to provide against a particular result, he would say, "I give this over to my daughters if that result happens," rather than name the event which would cause the result; so that, in our opinion, the Notwithstanding the case of Young v. Robertson (4 M'Queen, 314), we We further think that the said moiety did so vest in him in point of We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, given Judgment affirmed. [IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.] Feb. 21, 23, 24, 1865. RALSTON v SMITH. 35 L. J. C. P. 49; 20 C. B. N.S. 28; 11 H.L. C. 223; 11 E. R. 1318; 13 L. T. 1. Referred to, In re Alsop's Patent, [1906] E. R. A.; 75 L. J. Ch. 134; [1906] See Patents and Designs Act, 1907 (7 Edw. VII. c. 29), s. 21. Patent Specification-Disclaimer-Object of a Disclaimer-Subject of a PATENT. A disclaimer cannot be made use of for the purpose of converting a barren and unprofitable generality in a specification into a specific practical description, or to convert that which upon the description in the specification is not applicable to any one definite form into a description applicable to a specific and definite mode of proceeding. The object of the act authorizing disclaimers is, that where a specification containing a sufficient and good description of a useful invention is imperilled by reason of the description having something annexed to it which is capable of being severed, leaving the original description good and sufficient, without the necessity of addition,(except of such slight additions only as may be required to render intelligible that which remains),—the vicious excess may be lopped off by a disclaimer. Therefore, where the specification of a patent for improvements in embossing and finishing woven fabrics alleged the invention to consist in the use of rollers having any design grooved, fluted, engraved, milled or otherwise indented upon them, and the disclaimer which was afterwards filed stated that the effect desired could only be produced by the use of a certain species of roller not particularly described in the specification (namely, a roller of hard metal or other suitable material having circular grooves around its surface), and all other rollers were disclaimed, such disclaimer was held to be bad. The description, "a roller of hard metal or other suitable material," was not too uncertain, on account of the use of the words or other suitable material"; such words would mean any material equally sufficient for the purpose with hard metal-per The Lord Chancellor. It is not every useful discovery that can be made the subject of a patent. It must be shewn that the discovery can be brought within a fair extension of the words "a new manufacture "-per Lord Cranworth. This was an action brought to recover damages against the defendant for the infringement of letters patent granted to the plaintiff on the 23rd of November, 1858, for an invention, intituled, "Improvements in embossing and finishing woven fabrics, and in the machinery or apparatus employed therein "; and which title was, on the 27th of January, 1860, altered by disclaimer and memorandum of alteration," so as to be in these words, Improvements in embossing and finishing woven fabrics." The declaration alleged the granting of the letters patent, the filing of the specification and of a disclaimer, and an infringement of the patent by the defendant. Pleas-first, not guilty; second, that the plaintiff was not the true and first inventor of the supposed invention; third, that the supposed invention was not new; fourth, that the plaintiff did not within the time prescribed file an instrument particularly describing and ascertaining the nature of the supposed invention, and in what manner it was to be performed; fifth, that the disclaimer extended the exclusive right granted by the letters patent; sixth, that the supposed privilege was not a privilege of the sole working or making of any manner of manufacture. The plaintiff joined issue on all the pleas. The plaintiff had obtained a grant of letters patent for improvements in embossing and finishing woven fabrics, and in the machinery and apparatus employed therein." In the specification he particularly described his invention thus: "I employ a roller of metal, wood or other suitable material, and groove, flute, engrave, mill or otherwise indent upon it any desired design, and cause it to revolve with a bowl or bowls of paper or other substance, and by means of gearing, well known to mechanics, I give the circumference of the pattern roller a quicker motion than the circumference of one of the bowls, so as to obtain a frictional action upon the surface of the fabric as well as pressure, so that if the fabric is moved transversely when fed into the machine, an indefinite number of watering patterns may be given to the fabric at one |