Agreement between parties. of course arise as to a summary conviction, inasmuch as the jurisdiction must always exist by express statutory provision. But sometimes it happens, that after an offence has been created and summary jurisdiction over it given by a statute, a second statute is passed relating to the same matter. Upon this point, it has been held, that if a later statute again describes an offence created by a former one, and affixes a different punishment varying the procedure and giving an appeal when there was no appeal before, proceedings must be taken under the later statute, which operates by way of substitution and not cumulatively (d). The same result would, it seems, follow an alteration in the procedure and punishment, without reference to the question of appeal. In strict law no agreement between the complainant and the accused can put an end to criminal proceedings, but it very often happens (as we have before said) that the proceedings, though technically of a criminal nature, are more for the benefit of the injured person than the vindication of public justice, and it is also frequently a difficult matter to decide whether they are criminal or civil. Even if the proceeding be merely civil, and for the benefit of individuals, justices may disregard any agree Pike, 4 M. & G. 421; Couch v. Steel, C. B. 46; 25 L. J., C. P. 184; 10 Jur. N. S. 172; R. v. Crawshaw, 30 L. J., M. C. 58, 64; Vestry of St. Pancras v. Batterbury, 2 C. B., N. S. 477; 26 L. J., C. P. 243; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77; 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, s. 46. (d) Michell v. Brown, 1 El. & El. 267; 28 L. J., M. C. 53, 55, in which Lord Campbell, C. J., said "If the later statute expressly altered the quality of the offence by making it a misdemeanor instead of a felony, or a felony instead of a misdemeanor, the offence could not be proceeded with under the earlier statute, and the same consequence seems to follow from altering the procedure and the punishment." ment set up by way of defence, if it is not between all the parties interested. Thus, where a father of a bastard child had agreed to pay to the mother 58. a week for its maintenance, and had then paid her 107., in consideration of which she agreed to release him from all further payments, it was held that this was no bar to the jurisdiction of a justice to make an order for the support of the child on her subsequent application, under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, as the statute was for the benefit of the child as well as of the mother; but that the justice ought to take it into consideration, together with the other circumstances, and then exercise his discretion as to making an order (e). In a case, where the complainant at the time of entering the defendants' employ, deposited with them the sum of 51., which, together with any wages due, was agreed to be forfeited in case of any breach by him of the defendants' rules; and it was further agreed, that the defendants' manager was to be the sole judge of whether the defendants were entitled to retain the whole of the deposit money and wages due, and that his certificate of the cause of retention should be binding and conclusive evidence between the parties in all Courts of justice and before all stipendiary magistrates, and should bar the complainant of all right to recover under any circumstances the moneys so certified to be retained, it was held that the agreement was not illegal, and the complaint being substantially a civil proceeding, the manager's certificate that the deposit and wages had been forfeited was conclusive evidence of the fact, precluding the magistrate from making any further enquiry (ƒ). (e) Follitt v. Koetzow, 29 L. J., M. C. 128. (f) London Tramways Company v. Bailey, 3 Q. B. D. 217; 47 L. J M. C. 3. Evidence in reply. Observations in reply not allowed. SECT. 10.-Evidence in reply. If the defendant has examined any witnesses, or given any evidence, other than as to his general character, the prosecutor or complainant may examine witnesses in reply (9). The prosecutor or complainant, however, is not entitled to make any observations in reply upon the evidence given by the defendant, nor is the defendant entitled to make any observations in reply upon the evidence given by the prosecutor or complainant in reply (g). The 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 2, which gives the prosecution a right of reply, does not apply to summary proceedings. When the case and evidence have been heard on both sides, it remains for the magistrate to convict the party, or to dismiss the information, according to his judgment upon the circum stances. SECT. 11.-Proceeding with second Information before disposing of first. Where there are two informations containing distinct charges, the justices cannot proceed with the second information before disposing of the first. A defendant was charged by two informations with two offences under sections 3 & 4 of the Indecent Advertisements Act, 1888, at the same time and place, the evidence being substantially the same in both cases. Upon the conclusion of the hearing of the first information the justices reserved their decision until they had heard the charge contained in the second information; and, having done so, proceeded to convict the defendant on both charges, and sentenced him to a separate term of imprisonment on each charge. It was held that the convictions must be quashed, inasmuch as the justices should have disposed of the charge contained in the first information before proceeding to deal with that contained in the second information (h). SECT. 12.-Dismissal of Complaint; Discharge from first Conviction. The general rule is, that if the charge is substantiated and no valid defence proved, the duty of the justices is to convict; whilst, if the case for the prosecution fail, or a valid defence is shown, it becomes their duty to dismiss the charge. This is so obvious, that it would not have been necessary to allude to it, but for the fact that sometimes the statute relating to the offence contains exceptional provisions on this point. Thus, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, enacts, that on certain charges of assault and battery, the Power to justices may dismiss the complaint if they think the discharge offence so trifling as not to merit punishment. Again, without 24 & 25 Vict. cc. 96, 97, though they do not provide for punishment. the dismissal of informations, enact, that where a person is summarily convicted under their provisions, and it is a first conviction, the justice may discharge the offender on his making such satisfaction to the person grieved for damages and costs or either of them, as the justice shall direct. It is enacted by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (i), that "If upon the hearing of a charge for an offence punishable on summary conviction under this act, or under any other act, whether past or future, the court of summary jurisdiction think that though the charge is proved the offence was in the particular case of so trifling a nature that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment, or any other than a nominal punishment,— (1.) The court, without proceeding to conviction, may dismiss the information, and, if the court think fit, may order the person charged to pay such damages, not exceeding forty shillings, and such costs of the proceeding, or either of them, as the court think reasonable; or, (i) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 16; and see the Probation of First Offenders Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. accused Release upon probation. Certificate of dismissal. (2.) The court upon convicting the person charged may discharge him conditionally on his giving security, with or without sureties, to appear for sentence when called upon, or to be of good behaviour, and either without payment of damages and costs, or subject to the payment of such damages and costs, or either of them, as the court think reasonable: Provided that this section shall not apply to an adult convicted in pursuance of this act of an offence of which he has pleaded guilty, and of which he could not, if he had not pleaded guilty, be convicted by a court of summary jurisdiction." In any case in which a person is convicted of larceny or false pretences, or any other offence punishable with not more than two years imprisonment before any court (j), and no previous conviction is proved against him, if it appears to the court before whom he is so convicted that regard being had to the youth, character, and antecedents of the offender, to the trivial nature of the offence, and to any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, it is expedient that the offender be released on probation of good conduct, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into any recognizance, with or without sureties, and during such period as the court may direct, to appear and receive judgment when called upon, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour (k). By 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, it is provided, that whenever the case is dismissed (unless it falls within sect. 35) it shall be lawful for the justices if they think fit, being required so to do, to make an order of dismissal, and give the defendant a certificate thereof (l). And in some other acts (j) This includes a court of summary jurisdiction, s. 4. (k) Probation of First Offenders Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 25), see (7) It is discretionary with the |