case of Peacock v. Bell (b), the rule as to pleading is well expressed, thus:-'The rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior Court but that which specially appears to be so; nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court but that which is so expressly alleged.'" We shall conclude this discussion with one further observation, which is, that the Court will not presume injustice or partiality in magistrates (c); but gives them. credit for the truth of the facts stated, subject to the peril attending the wilful abuse of that credit by a false statement (d).

(b) 1 Saund 74.

(e) Skin. 123.

(d) 10 Mod. 382; Basten V.

Carew, 5 D. & R. 558; 2 D. & R.
Mag. Ca. 563; 3 B. & C. 649.

SECT. 1.-Of the Formal Commencement and the

General form THE general form of conviction given in the schedule to

of conviction.

the Summary Jurisdiction Rules, 1886, is as follows:

A. B., hereinafter called the defendant, is this day convicted for that he, on the

within the

day of

aforesaid did

at

And it is adjudged that the defendant for his said offence do forfeit and pay the sum of

and do also

pay the further sum of

for compensation and

for costs [by instalments of

for every

days, the

first instalment to be paid] forthwith [or on the

day

And in default of payment it is adjudged that [the sums due under this adjudication be levied by distress and sale of the defendant's goods, and in default of sufficient distress that] the defendant be imprisoned in Her Majesty's prison at

space of

and there kept [to hard labour] for the

unless the said sums [and all costs and charges of the [said distress and] commitment and of his conveyance to the said prison] be sooner paid.

J.P.,

Justice of the Peace for the [county] aforesaid.

Seal,

A conviction or order must appear to be made within

the jurisdiction of the magistrate making it (a).

If there be several offenders, each must be named. The Names of the

offender and

Court refused to entertain a conviction, in which the per- person sons charged were described as Messrs. Harrison and Com- aggrieved. pany, and treated it as a nullity, even against the party named. For, though neither the defendant Harrison, nor the other, objected to the conviction on that ground, Lord Kenyon said, the Court were bound to take care that summary proceedings before magistrates were regularly conducted, whether the parties objected to them or not; and, in that case, the Court could not tell upon the face of the proceedings but that the delinquency of Harrison's partners, who were not before the Court, might have been. imputed to him (b).

A provision is, however, sometimes made by statute, where an offender refuses to discover his name. Thus by the General Turnpike Road Act, 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, s. 132, which imposes penalties on the drivers of waggons, &c., misbehaving themselves, if the offender refuses to discover his name, he may be committed to the house of correction

(a) R. v. Newton Ferrers, 9 Q. B. 32; see post, p. 191.

(b) R. v. Harrison and Company, 8 T. R. 508.

Namos and style of justices.

for three months, or proceeded against for the penalty, by a description of his person and the offence only, without adding any name or description, but expressing in the proceedings that he refused to discover his name (c). Apart, however, from statutory provision, no man is to escape because his name is not known, and if he refuses to disclose it, he may be described as a person whose name is unknown to the magistrates, and identified by some fact; for instance, that he is personally brought before them by a certain constable (d).

In like manner the name of the person or persons aggrieved should be accurately stated if known, and if not known it should be so stated (e).

Whilst on the subject of names, it should also be mentioned that several statutes make provisions in certain cases for the description of owners of property where they are partners, companies, trustess, &c. (ƒ).

The justices are not bound by the names contained in the information, but may draw up the conviction with what appear to be the proper ones (g).

The names and style of the magistrates by whom the conviction is made must next be set forth, from which it must appear that they are magistrates of the county, borough or place where the offence is afterwards stated to have happened, in order that their jurisdiction may be shown on the face of the proceedings (h). Magistrates acting judicially must appear to be acting in their jurisdiction as well as for it. "It is a general rule," said Mr. Justice Wightman (i), “that all judicial acts exercised by persons whose judicial authority is limited as to locality,

(h) R. v. Johnson, 1 Str. 261; R. v. Crowan, 14 Q. B. 221.

(i) R. v. Totness, 11 Q. B. 80, 90; and see R. v. Stainforth, Id. 66, 75; 15 L. J., M. C. 4, n. 1; R. v. Milner, 14 Id. 157; R. v. St. George, Bloomsbury, 4 El. & Bl. 520; 24 L. J., M. C. 49; ante, P. 18.

must appear to be done within the locality to which the authority is limited." It is not sufficient therefore, to describe them as justices in the county, without saying for the county (k). So where an order appeared to be made on complaint before two justices "acting in and for the county of Middlesex," and it contained no further statement of the place where it was made, except "Middlesex to wit" in the margin, it was held sufficiently to appear that the complaint and order were made in Middlesex (m). It is no objection, that justices are described as being justices, &c., without the word there being, &c., for that is implied (n). It is necessary that they should call themselves "justices" (o), and also justices of the peace (p).

Where the statute gives cognizance of the offence to the next justice of the county, the convicting magistrate should be so described; for no other but the next have any jurisdiction (q). But if the act only mentions justices in or near the place, it is but directory, and they need not be so described in the conviction (r): nor, if the statute speaks of justices acting for the division, need they be so alleged, for any justice of the county comes within that condition (s); but it should be alleged that the meeting

(k) R. v. Dobbyn, 2 Salk. 474. The form of conviction in the schedule to the Summary Jurisdiction Rules, 1886, describes the justices as "for" the county merely, but it shows that they were acting in the county, both by its commencement and conclusion; see the form, ante, p. 188; and see R. v. Milner, 3 D. & L. 128; 14 L. J., M. C. 137.

(m) R. v. Inhabitants of St. Paul, 7 Q. B. 533, and so in the case of recognizances, R. v. Hodgson, 7 Exch. 915.

(n) R. v. Chipp, 2 Str. 711. So much nicety was formerly thought necessary in the description of the justice's title and office, that a conviction was quashed because the