In what county. Limitation as to time. 1. By the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5, actions against magistrates, for any thing done in the execution of their office, could only be brought in the county in which the fact complained of was done. This act is now repealed, so far as it relates to this subject (m); but by s. 10 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, in every such action the venue shall be laid in the county where the act complained of was committed (n); or in action in the County Court, the action must be brought in the Court within the district of which the act complained of was committed. The right to local venue in actions against justices still survives, notwithstanding the general abolition of local venue by the Judicature Acts (o). 2. There are other provisions made by the legislature for the security of magistrates in the execution of their duty among which is the limitation of time within which actions can be brought against them. By 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 8, no action shall be brought against any justice for any thing done by him in the execution of his office, unless such action be commenced within six calendar months next after the act complained of shall have been committed (p). (0) O. XXXVI. r. 1. See Thorpe v. Adams, L. R., 6 C. P. 128; 40 L. J., M. C. 52. (p) A similar provision was contained in 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 8, now partially repealed by s. 17 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44; and see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 113, and c. 97, s. 71. As to the meaning of the words "act complained of," see Haylock v. Sparke, 1 El. & Bl. 471; 22 L. Upon a similar clause it had been held, that the justice was answerable for such part of an imprisonment under his warrant as was within six calendar months of the commencement of the action, though the commitment was beyond that time (q). In computing the six months, in an action against a justice for false imprisonment, where the imprisonment expired on the 14th December, and the writ was sued out on the 14th June following, it was held, that the former day was to be excluded, and that the action was therefore brought in time (r). Under 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, s. 12, which requires the action for anything done in pursuance of it to be brought within three calendar months after the fact committed, it was held, that an action for taking and selling plaintiff's goods under a warrant of distress for arrears of churchrate, might be brought within three calendar months of the sale (8), Parke, B., there said, "the statute directs the arrears to be levied by distress and sale, and the fact committed' under colour or in pursuance of the statute, is not merely the seizure, but the sale also. The seizure of the goods is made not absolutely, but with a view to their detention only until the amount should be paid, and their subsequent sale if it should not; and the seizure, when the sale has taken place, is but part of the entire act complained of, and which forms the real grievance to the plaintiff: and, in this circumstance, distinguishes the present case from those of Godin v Ferris (2 H. Bl. 14); Saunders v. Saunders (2 East, 254); and Crook v. J., M. C. 71; ante, pp. 65, 298. An action brought against one of the magistrates of the police courts of the Metropolis must be commenced within three calendar months after the act committed; see 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, ss. 52, 53; see Breese v. Jerdein, 4 Q. B. 585. (q) Massey v. Johnson, 12 East, 75, 76; Bull, N. P. 24, on 24 Geo. 2 c. 44, s. 8, ante, p. 65, n. (t). See Eggington v. The Mayor, &c. of (r) Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603; 4 Man. & Ry. 295; 2 Man. & Ry. Mag. Ca. 301, and see ante, p. 65; Collins v. Rose, 5 M. & W. 194. (s) Collins v. Rose, supra; and see Pease v. Chaytor, 3 B. & S. 620; 32 L. J., M. C. 121. Notice of action. M'Tavish (1 Bing. 167); in all which the seizure was for a forfeiture, and was in its nature absolute, and must be considered as intended to deprive the plaintiff of his property immediately." The suing out of the writ is the commencement of the action. But where a writ had been sued out in time, but not served or returned, an alias writ out of time could not, it was held, be connected with the first by continuance, so as to support the action (t). Unless the record shows that the action was brought in proper time, the plaintiff must produce the writ of summons in evidence (u) 3. For the further security of justices, it is provided by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 9, "That no action shall be commenced against any such justice (x) until one calendar month at least after a notice in writing of such intended action shall have been delivered to him, or left for him at his usual place of abode, by the party intending to commence such action, or by his solicitor or agent, in which said notice the cause of action, and the Court in which the same is intended to be brought (y), shall be clearly and explicitly stated; and upon the back thereof shall be indorsed the name and place of abode of the party so intending to sue, and also the name and place of abode or of business of the said solicitor or agent, if such notice have been served by such solicitor or agent" (z). By section 12, this notice must be proved on the trial; and, in default of proof, the plaintiff shall be nonsuit, or the jury shall give a verdict for the defendant. (t) Weston v. Fournier, 14 East, 492; see Mayhew v. Locke, 2 Marsh. 377; 7 Taunt. 63. (u) Johnson v. Smith, 2 Burr. 964; Cox v. Painter, 6 A. & E. 491. The statement of claim now always specifies the date of the issuing of the writ of summons, by which the action was commenced, and subject to amendment, is conclusive as to that date. See Roscoe's N. P. Evidence. (x) I.e. any justice of the peace for anything done by him in the execution of his office; Kirby v. Simpson, 10 Exch. 358. (y) See Tidd's Prac., 9th edition, 30; R. v. Biggs, 3 P. Wms. 419. (z) This is the same in substance as the provisions in the partially repealed act, 24 Geo. 2, c. 44; see also 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 113, and c. 97, s. 71. amends and And by section 11, the justice, at any time after such Tender of notice given, and before the commencement of the action, payment into may tender amends to the party complaining, or his soli- Court. citor or agent, and the justice also at any time before issue joined, if he has not made such tender, or in addition to such tender, may pay money into Court, which tender and payment of money into Court, or either of them, may afterwards be given in evidence by the defendant at the trial under the general issue (a); if the jury at the trial shall be of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages beyond the sum so tendered or paid into Court, or beyond the sums so tendered and paid into Court, they shall give a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff shall not be at liberty to elect to be nonsuit, and the sum of money, if any, so paid into Court, or so much as shall be sufficient to satisfy the defendant's costs, shall thereupon be paid out to him, and the residue, if any, shall be paid to the plaintiff. If, where money is so paid into Court, the plaintiff elect to accept the same in satisfaction, he may obtain from any judge of the Court in which the action is brought, an order for the money to be paid out to him, and the defendant shall pay him his costs, to be taxed, and thereupon the action shall be determined, and the order shall be a bar to any other action for the same cause. The sum tendered need not be paid into Court, and, therefore, unless the plaintiff accepts it at the time of tender (which he may do, and go for more), he may lose the sum tendered altogether (b). By the same section, the justice is allowed to pay money into Court, if he has neglected to tender amends, or has tendered insufficient. (a) See Thompson v. Jackson, 1 M. & S. 246, n. ; Cave v. Mountain, Id. 257, n.; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 113, and c. 97, s. 71. And where payment of money into Court was pleaded specially, justices were not bound to state the character in which they made the payment; (b) Jones v. Gooday, 9 M. & W. Time of notice, how reckoned. When neces sary. The month is to be calculated exclusively both of the day of the notice, and of the day of commencing the action (c); if given on the twenty-eighth of a month, the action may be commenced on the twenty-ninth of the following one, whatever the length of the preceding month (d). The notice may be given before the quashing of the order, the act done being the cause of action; although the action itself cannot be brought until after the order is quashed (e). Wherever the act complained of is one which has been done by a magistrate, intending to act as such, however mistaken, upon a subject-matter within his jurisdiction, he is entitled to a notice under this act (f). And although the subject-matter of complaint may arise out of the local jurisdiction of the justice, yet if he has authority over the subject-matter, he is still entitled to notice (g). The same doctrine was also laid down in the following case of a person convicted of riding on the shafts of his cart on the king's highway. It appeared that at the time the man was on the shafts, his cart was standing still, and consequently the case was not within the statute, inasmuch as the cart was not in motion; but he was nevertheless convicted by the justice; and the question was, whether the justice was entitled to notice of action. The Court said, it was immaterial whether the justice had a right, or not, to act in the way complained of; for if he had a right to act at all, he was clearly entitled to notice (h). was entitled to notice within the 24 Geo. 2, c. 44; Weller v. Toke, 9 East, 364. In Styles v. Cox, Vaughan, 111, justices and officers of peace, however wrong, were held to be within the privilege of 21 Jac. 1, c. 12. (g) Prestidge v. Woodman, 1 B. & C. 13; 2 D. & R. 43; 1 D. & R. Mag. Ca. 502. (h) Bird v. Constable, 2 D. & R. 45, n. (a); S. C. by the name of Bird |