Disqualifica tion from other causes. A justice may not act in granting any licence for a house for the reception of lunatics, if he is, or within one year next preceding has been, interested in a licensed house (i). A justice of the peace, who happens to be sheriff of the county, cannot act as a justice therein during his shrievalty; if he does, his acts are void (k). Where a debtor is adjudged bankrupt, he is disqualified in all parts of the United Kingdom from being appointed or acting as a justice of the peace. Such disqualification is removed and ceases if and when the adjudication of bankruptcy against him is annulled; or he obtains from the court his discharge with a certificate to the effect that his bankruptcy was caused by misfortune without any misconduct on his part (1). No such disqualification is to exceed a period of five years from the date of the order of discharge (m). Where a person who is a justice of the peace is reported by any election court or election commissioners to have been guilty of any corrupt practice in reference to an election whether he has obtained a certificate of indemnity or not, it is the duty of the director of public prosecutions to report the case to the Lord Chancellor with such evidence as may have been given of such corrupt practice, and where any such person acts as a justice of the peace by virtue of his being, or having been, mayor of a borough, the Lord Chancellor has the same power to remove such person from being a justice of the peace as if he was named in a commission of the peace (n). A coroner is a justice of the peace by virtue of his office (o), and a justice of the peace who is elected coroner for a county or ther-in-law, of such owner, agent, of any offence under the act. (i) 53 Vict. c. 5, s. 208. (k) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 55, s. 17. (1) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 32. (m) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 71, s. 9. (n) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 38. (0) Dalt. p. 2; Com. Dig. Justices of Peace (A. 4). division, does not thereby become disqualified from acting as a justice for such county or division (p). Solicitors may be justices for a county unless the same be a county in which they practise or carry on their profession as solicitors (q). SECT. 5.-Priority of Jurisdiction. All the justices of each district are equal in authority; Competition of authority. but, as it would be contrary to the public interest, as well as indecent, that there should be a contest between different justices, it is agreed, that the jurisdiction in any particular case attaches in the first set of magistrates, duly authorized, who have possession and cognizance of the fact, to the exclusion of the separate jurisdiction of all others. So that the acts of any other, except in conjunction with the first, are not only void, but such a breach of the law as subjects them to indictment (r). It is not, however, necessary that the justice hearing the charge should be the same justice before whom the information was laid (8). SECT. 6.-Conditions precedent to exercise of Under 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, s. 2, which authorizes justices at Quarter Sessions to order county bridges to be widened, it is an essential preliminary to the making of such an (p) Davis v. JJ. Pembrokeshire, 7 Q. B. D. 513. (q) 34 Vict. c. 18. (r) R. v. Sainsbury, 4 T. R. 456; R. v. Great Marlow, 2 East, 244. See ante, p. 38. (s) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 29; and see Tarry v. Newman, 15 M. & W. 645. It was held under the Divorce Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21), that no magistrate could discharge an order protecting the order that there should be a presentment of the insufficiency of the bridge (t). No prosecution for the recovery of penalties before justices under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), can be commenced unless the person purchasing any article with the intention. of submitting the same to analysis, shall have notified to the seller his intention to have the same analysed by the public analyst; such notification, which is required by the statute, being a condition precedent to a prosecution under the act (u). In some cases a certain interval must elapse before a prosecution can be commenced (x). Where property, &c., is in question. SECT. 7.-As to the Offence. There is seldom any difficulty in ascertaining the offences liable to summary conviction, since each must be the subject of a special law. It may be proper, however, to mention a rule applicable to this mode of trial in general, that where property or title is in question, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to hear and determine in a summary manner is ousted, and their hands tied from interfering, though the facts be such as they have otherwise authority to take cognizance of (y). It will be sufficient at present to notice this maxim cursorily, reserving its application to particular cases, till we have occasion to against a husband to maintain his (t) Re Newport Bridge, 29 L. J., (u) Barnes v. Chipp, 3 Ex. D. 176. (x) Post, p. 58. (y) R. v. Burnaby, 2 Ld. Raym. 900; 1 Salk. 181; R. v. Speed, 1 Ld. Raym. 583; Kinnersley v. Orpe, Doug. 499; R. v. Cridland, 7 E. & B. 853; 27 L. J., M. C. 32, S. C. ; R. v. Stimpson, 4 B. & S. 301; 32 L. J., M. C. 208, 210; Taylor v. Newman, 4 B. & S. 89; 32 L. J., M. C. 186, 188; Hudson v. M'Rae, 4 B. & S. 585; 33 L. J., M. C. 65. See post, 'Defence," and Index "Title." 66 examine the matters of complaint and defence connected with our subject. of offences. It seems that offences, which are cognizable only before Compromise magistrates, do not come within the operation of the 18 Eliz. c. 5, ss. 3, 4, which prohibits the compounding of offences; that statute being confined to offences cognizable before the Superior Courts (z). But although not within the prohibition of that statute, the policy of the common law does not allow the compromise of offences which are of a public nature. Thus, where a defendant was charged, under the Toleration Act, with having disturbed a dissenting congregation, which rendered him liable to be tried at the sessions, and on conviction to forfeit 20l. to the crown, and he was allowed by the justice to compromise with the prosecutor, this was held to be illegal as stifling a prosecution for a public misdemeanor (a). It has been held that an agreement not to prosecute further a pending indictment for riot and assault upon a constable in the execution of his duty was illegal (b). If, however, the offence involve damages to the injured party, for which he may maintain an action, as in the case of an assault, although the offence is also of a public nature, the damage sustained by the individual may legally form the subject of a compromise. But if criminal proceedings have been commenced in respect of such injury, it is doubtful whether he can enter into any compromise upon the subject before conviction (c). Upon principle, such a course appears to be objectionable, inasmuch as it encourages persons to use (z) Rex v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282. (a) Edgecombe v. Rodd and others, 5 East, 294. Le Blanc, J., there said (p. 303), "This, it must be remembered, was a prosecution for a public misdemeanor, and not for any private injury to the prosecutor. See also Keir v. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 394. (b) Keir v. Leeman, 6 Q. B. 308; S. C. in error, 9 Q. B. 371. See also Goodall v. Lowndes, 6 Q. B. 464; Coppock v. Bower, 4 M. & W. 361; R. v. Allen, 1 Best & S. 850; (c) See Kyd on Awards, p. 66, the process of criminal justice as a means of oppression and extortion. With reference to this branch of the question C. J. Tindal, delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber on the occasion above alluded to, said (d), "There is a class of cases, such as Beeley v. Wingfield (e), and Baker v. Townsend (f), which do not at all break in upon sound principles. These are cases where the private rights of the injured party are made the subject of agreement, and where, by the previous conviction of the defendant, the rights of the public are also preserved inviolate. As Gibbs, C. J., in the latter case, well observes, "The parties have referred nothing but what they have a right to refer. They have referred the several assaults' (by which we understand him to mean their several rights to damages for those assaults); 'these may be referred. They have referred the right of possession; that may be referred. The reference of all matters in dispute refers all other their civil rights,' which words show our previous interpretation to be correct. The case of Beeley v. Wingfield was after conviction, and the promissory note seems merely to have been given for the expenses of the prosecution, and was obviously a part of the punishment inflicted by the Court after conviction of the offence. Indeed it is very remarkable what very little authority there is to be found, rather consisting of dicta than decisions, for the principle that any compromise of a misdemeanor, or indeed of any public offence, can be otherwise than illegal, and any promise founded on such a consideration otherwise than void. If the matter were res integra, we should have no doubt on this point. We have no doubt that, in all offences which involve damages to an injured party for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature, to compromise or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit. It is said, indeed, that in |