sort against persons accepting employment with the plaintiff company, interference with the business of the company or with its employees, and boycotts or attempts to boycott its business. The modification secured allowed the unions to enforce their rules providing for the expulsion of such of their members as might incur the penalties prescribed for the violation of union rules, and it was on this point that the company appealed.

The opinion of the supreme court was delivered by Judge Cockrell, and sustained the views of the lower court, on grounds which appear in the following quotation:

Unquestionably an individual can stop work at any time without cause, being liable only for a breach of contract; and no element of contract as between the complainant and these defendants is alleged. Does the fact that more than one individual has quit work make a difference, under the circumstances above stated? We may assume that it is not universally true that many may do what one may lawfully do, though this must be said with reservation, and that a "conspiracy" may cause a wrong which one man, acting by himself, could not commit. But before the courts can punish or prevent a conspiracy, either the act conspired or the manner of its doing must be unlawful. Are not both alternatives absent in the case of a simple strike? It is certainly lawful to attempt by negotiation, or other peaceable, legitimate ways, to get higher pay for one's labor, and, if the demand is not met, to go elsewhere with one's labor, or to sit idle, if needs be, until satisfactory arrangements are made. Labor unions in and of themselves can not be said to be unlawful, and yet one of the prime objects of their existence is by combinations of the supply to regulate the demand. Some of the cases, particularly the English cases, stress the motive underlying the strike, and apparently hold that if the strike is to better the condition of the workman it is lawful, but if it be to punish the employer it is unlawful. If this be the correct delimitation, this case comes up to the rule. There is nothing personal to the complainant in the strike, but simply and entirely an endeavor to obtain advantage for the defendants.

No mandatory injunction is asked, and nothing can possibly be done as to those laborers who voluntarily left their work and are voluntarily remaining away; but, says the appellant, these various labor unions, under the modification, can use moral suasion, moral coercion, upon their respective members by fines and threats of expulsion. This was a risk voluntarily assumed by the members entering the unions, and if no longer willing to pay the price, if the advantages derived are not equal to the burdens assumed, each member has a perfect right to withdraw from the union, to seek to get back his former employment, and to be protected therein by the injunction still in force.

It can hardly be questioned that the decided weight, if not the universal rule, of the modern American cases, sustains the action of the circuit court in refusing to extend the effects of the injunction so as to include the peaceable enforcement by labor unions of their reasonable rules. [Cases cited.]

Is there any declared policy in this State to force us to put ourselves out of alignment with our sister States? Especially must this

be clear before we would interfere to lay the heavy hand of injunction where the circuit judge, more familiar than ourselves with the conditions confronting the city of Tampa, has refused to do so.

In Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367, this court held that an action would lie in behalf of a discharged employee against one who maliciously procured his discharge, and stress is laid upon the evil intent with which the act was done. That case, so far as it is in point, would tend rather to sustain the modification of the injunction before us. Not only was it there held that the mere attempt to procure a discharge would not be actionable, even though the attempt were accompanied with a malicious intent, but it was clearly intimated that, even as to the consummated act, malice was essential to a cause of action; and, as we have said above, a peaceful strike, accompanied by an enforcement of the rules of a voluntary organization to the extent of expulsion against those members who disobey the rules, does not necessarily show malice.

Chapter 4144, page 69, Laws of 1893, entitled "An act to prohibit wrongful combinations against workmen, and to punish the same," presents some difficulty. As this statute is probably unique, we quote at length.

"Section 1. If two or more persons shall agree, conspire, combine, or confederate together for the purpose of preventing any person or persons from procuring work in any firm or corporation, or to cause the discharge of any person or persons from work in such firm or corporation, or if any person or persons shall verbally or by a written or printed communication, threaten any injury to the life, property or business of any person, for the purpose of procuring the discharge of any workman in any firm or corporation, or to prevent any person or persons from procuring work in such firm or corporation, such person or persons so combining shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction [thereof] shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars each, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year."

Construing the act with reference to its restrictive title, it appears that only wrongful combinations against workmen are denounced, and that the combination must have for its main object or purpose the preventing of a certain person or persons from obtaining work, or causing their discharge. An indictment based upon the act would have to allege the combination to have been for the purpose of preventing certain named persons from securing work with some firm or corporation, or causing their discharge. (For some strange reason, if the employer be an individual, not a firm or corporation, the statute does not purport to denounce the wrongful combination.) This legislation, coming after the decision in Chipley v. Atkinson, supra, should be read in the light of that decision; and, so read, it seems to us that it does not come up to the facts before us. Upon the facts before the circuit judge he might well have found that the purpose of the combination was not to prevent particular individuals obtaining work, but the purpose was to secure the work for themselves. It is not the duty of courts of equity to decide upon nice questions of criminal law, and, resolving them against the defendants, impose its injunction against the commission of the acts out of which such nice questions arise. If a combination of workmen for their own benefit operate an injury

to the property of others, and that combination is clearly against the criminal laws of the State, a court of equity may intervene to protect the property right, even though the criminal courts may also be resorted to for enforcing the penalties imposed. Such seems to be the current holding of the courts in this country. Yet, where there is serious doubt as to the facts alleged constituting a crime, it would seem best to leave the solution of the doubt to the forum appointed by the constitution directly and specifically for the trial of criminal

causes.

We regret that we are unable to throw light upon this much vexed live question of the hour. Following the correct principle and the weight of the modern American cases, in so far as we are able to ascertain the principle and the weight, we find no error in the modification of the injunction, and therefore it is affirmed.

TORTS

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR ACTS OF EMPLOYEES ACTS OF VIOLENCE DURING STRIKE-Shay v. American Iron and Steel Manufacturing Company, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 67 Atlantic Reporter, page 54.-Sallie E. Shay brought an action in the court of common pleas of Lebanon County to recover damages for injuries inflicted by employees of the company named during a strike. On hearing the court discharged the defendant, entering a compulsory nonsuit, which it refused to take off. An appeal was taken to the supreme court to secure the removal of the nonsuit, but failed. The supreme court adopted the opinion of the court below in full, which presents the facts, and from which the following is quoted:

The plaintiff is the owner of a house and a lot of ground, situated on Weidman street, in the city of Lebanon, and alleges that on September 20, 1902, several bullets were fired into her dwelling house by employees of the defendant company, damaging her house, and by reason whereof she was frightened and shocked, thereby causing her to be permanently injured.

From the testimony produced by the plaintiff it appears that at the time of the alleged injury a large number of the employees of the defendant company were on a strike, and that on the afternoon of September 20, 1902, a carload of colored men, who were engaged to work for defendant, arrived at Lebanon, and were taken to its works inside of the fence inclosing the said works. In taking said car with said colored men from the station to the works, they were followed by a crowd of men and boys, some of whom jumped on the platform of the car, opened the door, and called them vile names, to which no reply was made by anyone inside of the car. When the colored men left the car, at the works inside of the inclosure, the persons congregated on the outside commenced to throw stones and other missiles into the inclosure. A number of shots were then fired from the inside and also from the outside. During this time it is alleged, and sworn to by the plaintiff, that a bullet was fired through a secondstory window of her house at or near where she was standing, facing the defendant's works, and which was afterwards found embedded in the wall of the house and which produced the said fright and shock.

An attempt was also made by the plaintiff to prove that the men brought there that day were armed by the defendant company or at their direction, but failed. The evidence produced by the plaintiff shows that those of the men who had revolvers had them without the knowledge of the defendant company, and did the shooting that was done against the protest of the persons who had charge of them; that the colored men were not hired to protect the works or the property of the company, but to operate its works; and that the discharge of firearms was not in the course of their employment.

Assuming, for the purpose of this motion, that the bullets fired into the plaintiff's house were fired by employees of the defendant company, it does not follow that the defendant is liable in damages for injury done to her dwelling or injury caused to her person by fright and shock. The law is well settled that a master is only liable for injuries resulting from the willful conduct of his servants if inflicted within the scope of his authority or employment. (Railway Co. v. Donahue, 70 Pa. 119; Snodgrass v. Bradley, 2 Grant, Cas. 43; Pennsylvania Co. v. Toomey, 91 Pa. 256; Scanlon v. Suter, 158 Pa. 275, 27 Atl. 963; Rudgeair v. Traction Co., 180 Pa. 333, 36 Atl. 859.)

It is contended by the plaintiff's attorneys that the discharge of the firearms, by the defendant's employees, was malicious and the evidence produced by the plaintiff justifies the contention. Those who discharged the firearms at the plaintiff's house did so wantonly and recklessly, and were guilty of a criminal offense; and unless it was done within the scope of their employment or by the direction of the employer, and there is no evidence that it was done within the scope of their employment, or by the authority of the employer, the defendant can not be held liable in damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR, ENACTED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1904.

[The Tenth Special Report of this Bureau contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor, in force January 1, 1904. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin, beginning with Bulletin No. 57, the issue of March, 1905. A cumulative index of these later enactments is to be found on page 655 et seq. of this issue.]

ARIZONA.

ACTS OF 1907.

CHAPTER 13.-Employment of women and minors in saloons.

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for the owner of any saloon within the Territory of Arizona to permit any woman or minor, either for hire or otherwise, to sing, to recite, to dance, to play on any musical instrument, to give any theatrical or other exhibition, to drink, serve drinks or any other form of refreshment or viands, or to solicit for the purchase of [or] sale thereof; to engage in, or to take part in, any game of chance or amusement, or to loiter in any saloon or in any room or apartment, except the lobby of a legitimate hotel, opening from or into any saloon within the Territory

of Arizona.

SEC. 2. Any person who shall violate any provision of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than thirty days or more than one hundred and eighty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. Approved March 5, 1907.

CHAPTER 34.-Exemption of wages from garnishment.

SECTION 1. Paragraph 388 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona, 1901, is hereby amended to read as follows:

That one-half of the earnings for personal services rendered at any time within thirty days next preceding the service of the writ shall not be subject to garnishment when it shall be inade to appear by the affidavit of the debtor that such earnings are necessary for the support of his family, residing within this Territory, and supported wholly by his labor."

Approved March 14, 1907.

CHAPTER 67.-Employment of children-School attendance.

SECTION 2. Paragraph 2231, title 19, chapter 11, of the Revised Statutes, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

Paragraph 2231. No child under the age of fourteen years shall be employed by any person, persons, company or corporation during the school hours of any school day of the school term of the public school in the school district where such child resides, unless such child has been excused from attendance on instruction, as provided in this section. Every such employer shall require proof that such child has been excused from such attendance, and shall keep a record of such proof, which shall be open to the inspection of any peace officer or school trustee of the district. Any employer employing any child contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to a fine of not less than twenty-five ($25.00) dollars, nor more than one hundred ($100.00) dollars, to be placed to the credit of the school fund of the district. Every parent, guardian, or other person in the Territory of Arizona, having control of any child between the ages of eight and fourteen years (or of any child of the age of fourteen and under the age of sixteen, who is