advanced, &c. "and for money due and payable for interest upon and for the forbearance of divers sums of money due and payable, and by plaintiff forborne at the request of the defendant:"Held, that the special contract to pay interest was not sufficiently stated. Drake v. Harding, 364. An affidavit of debt which is bad in part is bad entirely. Id.

An affidavit of debt which is bad in part is bad altogether. Id.

An affidavit of debt for a sum due on a bill of exchange must expressly state for what sum the bill was drawn. Rackett v. Gye, 198.

An affidavit of debt, in which the deponent described himself as "late of Tyrone in the county of Tyrone in Ireland, but now in Dublin Castle," was held sufficient. Stuart v. Gavernan, 699.

An affidavit of debt, stating it to be for goods delivered by plaintiff and his late partner, is insufficient. Edgar v. Watt, 108.

An affidavit of debt, part of which was for interest, not stating expressly the contract on which the interest was payable, held good. White v. Sowerby, 213.

AGENT.

Quare, whether a factor who sells goods on credit without disclosing his principal, has authority to receive payment from the vendee before the period of credit has elapsed, so as to make such a payment without knowledge of the principal binding on him. Heish v. Carrington, 306.

Semble, that there is a custom to that effect in the London corn market. Id.

AGREEMENT.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT. PLEADING. STAMP. WARRANTY.

An agreement in writing entered into for the assignment of a public-house in the occupation of the party himself, together with several cottages in the occupation of tenants, does not necessarily import that actual possession of the cottages is to be given by turning the tenants out. Palmer v. Temple, 702.

Semble, that if a party in such a case insists on actual possession being given, he should state such intention early enough to enable the other party to comply with it. Id.

AMENDMENT.-See PRACTICE. SHeriff.

Where there has been a mistake of the clerk in entering up the judgment on a scire facias to obtain execution on a judgment in debt, by entering it in the form in assumpsit; quære, whether the Court can amend it in a subsequent term. Kloss v. Dodd, 342.

ANNUITY.

In ejectment an annuity deed was relied on; it was not inrolled, but it contained a declaration or covenant by the grantor, that the premises on which the annuity was secured "were of more than sufficient annual value to answer and pay the annuity over and above all charges:”— Held, that it was open to the grantor notwithstanding to give evidence that the premises were not of sufficient value to answer and pay the annuity, in order to avoid the deed. Doe d. Chandler and Wood v. Ford, 378.

Semble, that it is incumbent upon the grantee, who relies upon an annuity deed which has not tion of the statute. Id. been inrolled, to show that it is within the exemp

APOTHECARY.

It is not necessary to plead specially as a defence to an action on an apothecary's bill, that he has not a certificate to practise from the Society of Apothecaries, as that is part of the plaintiff's case. Morgan v. Ruddock, 505.

APPRENTICE.-See PLEADING. SETTLEMENT.

Where an apprentice is bound to two partners, on the death of one he becomes, in law, the apprentice of the survivor. Rex v. St. Martin, Exeter, 69.

A child of parents settled in and chargeable to a parish, might have been bound by the parish officers under 43 Eliz. c. 2, with the assent of two justices, though the child was resident in another parish at the time of the execution of the indenture. Rex v. St. George, Exeter, 372.

Under that statute a parish apprentice might be bound to a master who was not a parishioner. Id.

The consent of the apprentice is not requisite in the case of a parish apprentice. Id.

An indenture of apprenticeship executed in 1799, where no money consideration was given as a premium, requires the stamp of 10s. imposed by 27 Geo. 3, c. 111, and is not within section 3, by which deeds of apprenticeship, where a sum not exceeding 107. is given as a premium, are exempted from the additional duty imposed by that statute. Rex v. Mabe, 460.

An indenture of apprenticeship bore date in June, 1813, but was not in fact executed till two years afterwards :- Held, that this indenture was not, on that account, made void by the provisions of the 9 Anne, c. 9, ss. 35 and 39, and 5 Geo. 3, c. 46, s. 19, so as to prevent the apprentice from gaining a settlement, there being in neither statute any express provision that the omission to insert the true date should avoid the indenture. Rex v. Harrington, 747.

APPORTIONMENT.-See LANDLORD AND

TENANT.

ARBITRATION.

The Court will not set aside an award on the ground that the arbitrator has rejected certain evidence, that rejection not appearing on the face of the award. Armstrong v. Marshall, 643.

Where all matters in difference in the cause between the parties in an action against two defendants were referred to arbitration, and the arbitrator refused to hear evidence or adjudicate upon the subject of four checks drawn by one of the defendants alone, on the ground that it was not a matter in difference between the parties to the reference :-Held, that the award was not final and conclusive, and that it must be set aside. Samuel v. Cooper, 86.

Whilst an action was pending a submission to arbitration had been made, instead of being referred by order of a judge; after the award was published the submission was made a rule of Court, as agreed between the parties. The time limited by 9 & 10 W. 3, c. 15, for setting aside the award had expired. Rushworth v. Barron,

122.

Where a rule to set aside an award was drawn up, on reading the affidavit and the paper writing annexed, which was in fact a copy of the award, but it was not stated to be so:- Held, that the rule was bad, and could not be amended. Id.

A rule nisi to set aside an award under an order of nisi prius having been discharged on a mere technical objection:-Held not too late to move for a second rule after the first four days

of the term next after the award was made. Id.

Rule nisi to set aside an award on the ground of partiality refused, though it appeared that the umpire made the award with the assistance chiefly of one of the arbitrators, who omitted to take down part of the evidence in favour of one party, the other arbitrator interfering very little. Waltonshaw v. Marshall, 209.

The Court will not set aside an award on the ground that the arbitrator has made a mistake, where all the facts were placed before him, and he was competent from his occupation to judge of them, unless the Court can see clearly it was a mistake. Hardy v. Ringrose, 185.

Where a cause was agreed to be referred, but the agreement was not made a rule of Court; the Court refused to compel the payment of a sum awarded against the party who proposed the reference. Clarke v. Baker, 215.

Where a cause was referred at nisi prius to an

arbitrator, and after the award a rule was ob tained to refer it back to the arbitrator to reduce the damages, or enter a verdict for the defendant, on which the Court gave judgment that the verdict ought to be reduced:-Held, that the costs of this rule were properly taxed as costs in the cause. Goodall v. Ray, 333.

An action of trespass, to which the defendant had pleaded both a private and a public right of way, was referred at Nisi Prius to an arbitrator, together with all matters in difference in the cause between the parties. It was agreed, also, that the plea of a public right of way was to be withdrawn, but that the arbitrator was to decide as to the costs as if it remained. The arbitrator was also to award as to the future use of the road. The arbitrator found the private right of way for the defendant, and set out the way he should in future use, and he gave him the costs of the cause, including the costs on the issue of the public right of way:- Held, 1. That a motion to set aside the award might be made at any time during the term next after the publication of the award.-2. That a rule to set it aside, on the ground that the arbitrator had misapprehended the terms of the reference, or had exceeded his power, should state specifically the instances in which he had done so.

3. That the arbitrator had not, in fact, found a public and private right of way over the same spot.-4. That the award could not be set aside on the ground that there was evidence to support a public but not a private right of way.-5. That the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in giving the defendant the costs of the issue on the public right of way, having given him the verdict on the issue of the private right of way. Allenby v. Proudlock, 357.

On the trial of a cause respecting the right to use a watercourse, a nominal verdict for 1000l. was entered, subject to an award, and power was granted to the arbitrator to decide as to the future allowed the time for making the award to elapse use of the water. The arbitrator by accident without enlarging it. The Court then allowed the plaintiff to enter up judgment and issue execution, unless the defendant would consent to the time for making the award being enlarged. Wilkinson v. Time, 351.

An award declared that a yard and pump were the sole and exclusive property of the plaintiff, except that the defendant had a right to take water from the pump, and to have ingress and egress to and from the yard in which it stood for that purafter be considered as belonging to the plaintiff pose; and further, that the pump should thereand defendant jointly, and be repaired at their joint expense:-Held, that there was no objection to the award, on the ground that the direction as to the future enjoyment was inconsistent with the former part of the award; and that there was no excess of authority. Boodle v. Davies, 420.

Where by an agreement of reference after ac

tion brought, but before declaration, "all the costs are to abide the event of the award," the arbitrator has no power over the costs. Boodle v. Davies, 420.

The rule nisi to set aside an award must state in specific terms the grounds of objection. It is not enough to state generally that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority, or that the award is uncertain, or not final. Id.

By the terms of a submission a Chancery suit and all matters in difference between the parties were referred; and it was made an express matter of reference whether an agreement between the parties should be rescinded or not. The arbitrator merely decided as to the Chancery suit, that each party should pay his own costs; and gave no directions upon the subject of rescinding the agreement, but awarded specifically on every subjectmatter of the agreement:-Held, that the award was not sufficient; but quære, whether the award was not sufficiently final as regarded the adjudication upon the Chancery suit. Upperton v. Tribe,

280.

Matters in difference were referred to two arbitrators, one appointed by each party, and an umpire chosen before proceeding with the reference. The award was to be made by the three, or any two of them. They disagreed, and one of the arbitrators declined having any thing more to do with the matter; but the other two afterwards sent to him, for his opinion, a draft of an award. He objected to this, and stated his objections to both the others:- Held, that an award made by the two which differed from the one prepared, without considering the objections and without consultation or discussion with the arbitrator who had objected, was bad. Perring v. Kymer, 285.

Semble, that if the award had been made by the two immediately upon the third declining to act, and before they had again consulted him, it might have been good. Id.

A submission to arbitration referred the amount of loss by fire on "wool in the process of woolling, carding, scribbling, and spinning," but in other parts of the submission " raw wool" was spoken of. The arbitrator conceiving that he was not justified in taking into his consideration wool which had undergone a part of the process of manufacture, but was not at the time of the fire in any of the engines, refused to receive evidence applicable to that wool:- Held, that the arbitrator was justified in so doing; and the Court refused to disturb an award made on that principle. In re Hurst, 275.

ARREST.

The Court refused to interfere summarily to discharge a defendant out of custody, on the ground that the arrest was against good faith, in being made for the whole debt, after an engagement to receive the amount by instalments. Udall v. Nelson, 177.

A party may arrest a defendant without discontinuing a previous action commenced by serviceable process for the same cause, though within two days of the day for which the cause was set down for trial. Burdakin v. Smallwood, 187.

The Court will not discharge a defendant out of custody because it appears by the particulars of demand that the debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Pottier v. Macdonell, 189.

Where two bailiffs kept watching a defendant at a particular house, and had a warrant to arrest him, and in fact would have arrested him if he had endeavoured to get away, but did not produce the warrant or act on it :— Held, that it did not constitute an arrest; and that he might be afterwards arrested for the same debt without a judge's order. Hender v. Robins, 204.

Money given by a man to procure his liberation from an illegal arrest, may be recovered back, by an application to the Court, from the party who made the arrest who took it. Pitt v. Combs, 13.

Such an application should be made without delay; or if delay has occurred, it must be satisfactorily accounted for to the Court. Id.

ASSAULT.

If a collector of taxes has reason to believe, from threats used towards him by a person on whose goods he is about to distrain for payment of taxes, that resistance will be offered, he has a general right, from the nature of his office, to take a constable with him for his protection; and if such constable is assaulted under such circumstances, an indictment may be maintained, describing such assault as an assault on the constable in the execution of his duty. Rex v. Clarke, 252.

ASSUMPSIT.-See ACTION. BANKRupt.

The plaintiff demised a house to the defendant, who by the agreement of tenancy agreed to pay a yearly rent clear of all deductions for taxes and parochial rates; after occupying the premises some time, the defendant quitted them, leaving claims for poor's rate and land-tax unpaid, which the plaintiff as landlord was obliged to pay :- Held, that he could not recover the amount from the defendant in an action for money paid, because as there was no original liability on the defendant to pay, it could not be said to be money paid to his use. Spencer v. Parry, 179.

ATTACHMENT.

See BAIL. EVIDENCE. PLEADING. PRACTICE.

SHERIFF.

An attachment will not be granted for not obeying a judge's order which has not been made

a rule of Court, but by the same motion it may be made a rule of Court, and an attachment may be obtained for disobedience thereof. Hinchcliffe v. Jones, 337.

A motion for an attachment for not obeying a subpoena should be made at the earliest possible opportunity after the contempt has occurred. The Court, on the ground of delay, discharged a rule for an attachment for not obeying a subpoena to give evidence at a trial of an indictment for a misdemeanor on 11th Dec. when the application was not made until the following Trinity Term. Rex v. Stretch, 322.

Where there had not been personal service of the rule of Court and Master's allocatur, but copies had been left, and notice had been given of a call that would be made, the Court made a rule for an attachment against an attorney absolute, where on showing cause against the rule nisi he did not deny having received the papers and notice. Bottomley v. Belchamber, 362.

There must be personal service of the rule nisi for an attachment, though there has been personal service of the rule, for disobedience to which the rule nisi for the attachment issued. Birket v. Holmes, 659.

A rule to show cause why an attorney should not pay his client a sum of money, having been referred to the Master, who found a certain sum due, and made his allocatur accordingly, whereupon the rule was made absolute:- Held, that a rule for an attachment for the non-payment was not absolute in the first instance. Ryan v. Farnell, 641.

ATTORNEY.

The Court will take judicial notice who are attorneys of the Court. Ex parte Hoare, 211.

On a summary application against an attorney, it must appear upon the affidavits that he is an attorney of the Court. In re Becke, 417.

Draft of the articles of the clerkship to an attorney allowed to be inrolled, where the original was lost through the misconduct of the person who had them delivered to him to be inrolled. Ex parte Beckenden, 193.

If an attorney's clerk has been absent part of the five years with his master's consent, but has served on at the end of the five years, under the same articles, an equivalent additional time, he is entitled to be admitted. Ex parte Frost, 111.

master and clerk was omitted in the articles of clerkship, and the notice of intention to apply for admission described the parties by such second christian name, the Court allowed the admission on having an affidavit of the identity of the parties in addition to the usual affidavits. Er parte Croft, 375.

The notice for the admission of an attorney having been omitted to be given in the K. B. office, through inadvertence, the Court allowed fresh notice to be given for admission on the last day of the following term. Er parte Stonehurst,

517.

The notice for the admission of an attorney was, by the inadvertence of an agent's clerk, given in the books of the Chief Justice, but not in the books of the other judges of the Court; immediately on its being discovered the notices were given:-Held, that the party might be admitted on the last day of the term. Ex parte Woolright, 517.

Where a person wanted to go abroad to practise as an attorney, he was admitted without giving a full term's notice. Ex parte Hulme, 366.

Where a person put up the notices on the third day of term for his admission as an attorney on the last day of the same term, he was refused admission, though he stated particular reasons for not complying with the usual rule. Ex parte Pursons, 349.

Where on application for the re-admission of an attorney it was not stated that he had not practised since he last took out his certificate, the Court compelled him to pay a fine of 5l. besides the arrears of duty, on his re-admission. Er parte Stonecroft, 368.

Rule granted to re-admit an attorney without a term's notice, where the omission to take out the certificate for the current year was the act of the agent. Ex parte Ford, 192.

Where by some inadvertence the necessary affidavits could not be procured for the re-admission of an attorney on the last day of the term for which he had given notice, the Court, on application the first day of the following term, refused to admit him, but allowed the notices then to be

given for the last day of the same term. Er parte Mosley, 331.

If an attorney has practised after he ceased to take out his certificate, but has had the penalties remitted by the commissioners of stamps, he may be re-admitted on taking out his certificate for the current year. Ex parte Tufkin, 516.

An application to commit a person to prison under 22 Geo. 2, c. 46, s. 11, for having acted as an attorney not being qualified, must also be to strike the agent, through whom the business was transacted, off the rolls.

In re

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clerk lived, the names of both being on the door. The clerk was in the habit of attending a court of requests and before magistrates, as such clerk, but deriving a profit to himself therefrom: he also conducted an appeal in the name of his master, who allowed part of the bill to be paid by a suit of clothes made for the clerk. It also appeared that several suits, issued out of K. B., had been placed in the hands of an officer to be executed, having the master's name upon them, for part of which he paid, but referred the officer to the clerk for the remainder, saying, it was the clerk's business and not his; and that as an action carried on in K. B. in the name of the master, with his knowledge and concurrence, the clerk appeared and acted as the attorney, and after verdict obtained, claimed to have the costs paid to himself, and objected to have them paid to the master:-- Held, that this was a case within 22 Geo. 2, c. 46, s. 11; and the Court ordered the attorney to be struck off the rolls. In re Palmer, 55.

Where the London agent of an attorney residing in the country omitted for more than a year to take out a certificate for him, but afterwards a certificate was taken out but he was not re-admitted, and he continued to practise, and employed another person, ignorant of the omission regarding the certificate, as his London agent, but upon notice of the facts, and of his legal liability, ceased to act as an attorney, and in the next succeeding term applied to be re-admitted, and was re-admitted accordingly:--Held, that the new agent was not liable, under the 22 Geo. 2, c. 46, to be struck off the rolls for permitting an unqualified person to practise in his name; for though under the 37 Geo. 3, c. 91, s. 31, the omission by an attorney for a year to take out his certificate makes his admission null and void, it does not render him an unqualified person within the meaning of the 22 Geo. 2, c. 46. In re Hodgson and Ross, 265.

Held, also, that the country attorney was not, under the circumstances, liable to be imprisoned

under that statute. Id.

Attornies are not bound to sue in Courts of Request, although the attachment of privilege is taken away by the Uniformity of Process Act. Dyer v. Levi, 640.

It is no cause for striking an attorney off the rolls that he has commenced several qui tam actions for the purpose of revenge. Ex parte Warren, 113.

Where in a judge's order referring an attorney's bill to be taxed under stat. 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 23, the usual submission of the client to pay what is found due was omitted, the Court refused to refer it to the Master to tax the costs of the taxation, more than one-sixth having been taxed off, even though the attorney had submitted to the taxation, and a balance had been found due by him to the client. Howard v. Groom, 355.

On the taxation of an attorney's bill, very

nearly one-sixth was taxed off, and afterwards a rule to refer back the bill for taxation was discharged on the merits: no objection was however made to items being inserted in the bill of costs instead of the cash account, where, if they had been inserted, more than one-sixth would have been deducted :-The Court afterwards refused, on a fresh rule, to listen to that objection. Harrison v. Ward, 353.

Items of the costs taxed in two actions and paid by the attorney, and for which he had received no specific payment from his client, are properly inserted in the bill of costs, and need not be in the cash account. Id.

Where an attorney agreed to save a party harmless from all costs of some suits, on his being allowed to retain half of whatever sums were recovered, the Court nevertheless ordered him, on application of the party with whom the agreement was made, to deliver his bill of costs, for the purpose of having it taxed. In re Masters,

348.

A person who is the real plaintiff in a cause, but who is obliged to sue in the name of another, may apply to the Court to have his attorney's bill in the cause taxed. Id.

The Court has no power to refer an attorney's bill to taxation, at the prayer of a person who is not the original client, but who has ultimately paid the bill. Doe d. Palmer v. Roe, 339.

Where an action of ejectment was brought on the forfeiture of a lease by the breach of the covenants, and a compromise was come to, by which the old lease was to be surrendered and a new one granted, and the costs of the lessors of the plaintiff were to be paid, which was done, the Court refused afterwards to refer the bill of costs of the attorney to the lessors of the plaintiff for taxation. Id.

Where the attorney of the defendant in an ejectment went to the lessor of the plaintiff (a female) who had succeeded in the ejectment, and in the absence of her attorney obtained her signature to a paper, which he took away, though at the time she said she wished for time to consult her attorney, the Court ordered it to be given up to be cancelled. In re Ann Oliver, 79.

Where an attorney having the custody of certain papers has been ordered by the Court of Chancery, in which he has been made a party to a suit, to deliver them into the custody of the officer of that Court; the Court of King's Bench will not direct him to deliver them up, though on the application of a party interested in them, because it would render the attorney liable to an attachment for non-compliance with the order of the Court of Chancery. In re Walmesley, 88.

Where an agreement for a lease was in the hands of an attorney, and it was doubtful whether he