have been. Never, perhaps, was there an instance of more unfeigned sorrow for sin, than appeared in Paul, after his conversion, on account of his persecuting conduct. Although he had obtained mercy of God, he seems never to have forgiven himself for the cruel part he had acted against the followers of Christ. Whenever he brought the subject to view, in his speeches, or his epistles, he spake of it as a matter of the deepest regret and regret and humilia tion. Yet, what can be more evident than that he considered the errour by which he was influenced in his acts of persecution, as in some degree extenuating his guilt? His words, "But I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly and in unbelief," were, perhaps, designed to imply, that had he done such things, knowing the character of Jesus, his guilt would never have been forgiven. Be this as it may, his words import, that there was less guilt in his conduct, than if he had violated his conscience in those acts. How then can these things be reconciled? In the first place,What could Paul see in himself which should be a ground for self reproach and contrition, when, in fact, he had done what he, at the time of acting, "verily thought he ought to do?" Answer. On reflection he might see that he had been guilty of partiality in examining the question, whether Jesus was the Messiah; that he had not properly employed the means of information which were within his power; that he had too readily listened to the slanderous accusations of prejudiced or evil minded men, and suffered his own mind to become prepossessed against the Saviour prior to any honest inquiry; that he had been unduly influenced by the consideration, that he was on the popular side of the question; that he never had seriously reflected on the unreasonable nature of a persecuting or intolerant spirit; that while he was breathing out threatenings and slaughter, he was influenced by unholy and party passions, of which he had no suspicion at the time, and that the whole course of his persecuting conduct was inconsistent with the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." So, "when the commandment came, sin revived and he died," or felt self-condemned. . All these wrongs or evils might exist, and yet he might say, he verily thought he was doing what ought to be done. But when his eyes were opened, he might discover sufficient ground for the deepest sorrow of heart, although he could not say that he had violated his conscience. His saying, "I verily thought that I ought to do," is not equivalent to saying, I was influenced by love to God and my fel SECTION II. In the second place, why did Paul say, "But I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly and in unbelief?" low men, and not by any unrea account of any supposed errour sonable passions and prejudices. in their opinions. It would, indeed, have greatly aggravated his guilt, had he violated his conscience in those acts of persecution; but something more is requisite to constitute an action morally excellent, than acting according to our present opinion. The heart must be in the exercise of that love which is the fulfilling of the law, or the act is morally defective. In thousands of instances, men are so blinded by party passions and prejudices, as to imagine that they are doing right, while ill will reigns in their hearts, and sin has dominion over them. Nor is it, perhaps, at all uncommon for men to deceive themselves, as to their temper and motives. When under the • influence of passion and prejudice, with popular opinion in their favour, they very readily make themselves believe, that their temper and motives are unexceptionable, while regard to their own fame is the spring of their supposed good deeds. These persons, governed by a persecuting or intolerant spirit, can, like Jehu, say, in heart, "Come, see my zeal for the Lord." But true Christian zeal is the fervour of love; it disposes to acts of kindness, and not to acts of cruelty. Under its influence, a man will sooner lay down his own life for his brethren, than destroy them on . He said this on the same principle that candid men of different sects excuse the conduct of each other, while each believes that the other would act differently, were it not for an unfortunate errour in his opinions. When a candid Protestant attends the meetings of Roman Catholicks, he may observe many things which appear to him very wrong; but he cannot attach so much blame, as he would if he thought the Catholicks violated their own consciences in the things which he disapproves. If he should hear a Catholick Bishop denounce, as the enemies of Christ, all who are not of his communion, he might discover evidence of a wrong temper and great arrogance and blindness. Still, he would make some allowance on the ground of the Bishop's education, and the influence of erroneous opinions. He would not accuse him of sinning against his own conscience. Y On the same principle, reasonable parents conduct in the government of their children.They often see their children, under the influence of passion and prejudice, doing or saying things which are very improper; but which the children, at the time, think to be right. While the parent blames his child for the ill temper manifested towards some unoffending fellow creature, he may pity him on account of the errour of opinion which occasioned his passion. He may perceive, that the child had been misinformed, and that this had been the occasion of prejudice, passion, and abuse. Upon the child's being convinced of his errour, and the unreasonableness of the temper he had indulged, he may say, I verily thought I was doing right, but now I see that I did wrong. In whatever way a person may imbibe erroneous opinions, and however much his own evil passions, or the evil passions of others, may have been concerned in producing the errour, the errour, itself, is a misfortune and not a crime--and, like other misfortunes, it should excite pity, and not anger. If we have evidence, that a criminal inattention to means of information, or any bad passions have been the occasion of his present errour; for this let him be blamed... But we should ever remember, that the causes or occasions of errour are distinct from the effect. By criminal imprudence and ungoverned passions a man may be placed on a sick bed; but his fever is not a crime, although it may have been the effect of criminal conduct, It ought, also, to be understood and remembered, that even the causes of errour are not always of a criminal nature. Many of the errours of mankind result from the imperfection of the natural senses of seeing, hearing, &c. These errours may have influence on our passions, volitions, and conduct. Many errours result from bodily diseases; both the cause and the immediate effect may be innocent; yet the errour may prove the occasion of conduct both criminal and fatal. Errour in religion and morals is often the fruit of education, and derived from father to son, not only naturally, but necessarily. "Honour thy father and thy mother," is the command of God; and that respect which a child owes to his parent, will expose him to imbibe many of the errours of the parent, prior to his being capable of judging for himself. Children of different countries, and of different sects, are, of course, differently educated; and, in ten thousand instances, they derive erroneous opinions from their parents, as innocently as they derive their complexions, their features, or even their existence. It would be wicked in a child to reject, as falsehood, the erroneous opinions inculcated by his parents, prior to his being able to examine them, or to discover solid reasons why they should be rejected. It would be a direct violation of the command, "Honour thy father and thy mother;" and it would be so regarded by parents of any sect whatever, in respect, to their own children. Moreover, it often happens, that children never possess the means of discovering the errours of their parents. In such cases the children necessarily remain in the errours they derived from their education, as long as they live, unless they wantonly and wickedly reject them, without perceiving any just reason for so doing. SECTION III. From what has been said, we are, however, not to infer, that the causes of errour are never of a criminal nature; nor that children are always blameless in retaining the errours which they innocently derived from their parents. As soon as they are capable, and have the means of examining for themselves, they should do it with care and uprightness. It ought to be understood by all, that knowledge is not virtue, and that ignorance is not sin; yet knowledge may be the means of virtue, and ignorance the occasion of vice. Correct opinions are of the nature of knowledge, and erroneous opinions are of the nature of ignorance; and every man's opinions are according to the knowledge he possesses specting the subjects on which his opinions are formed. A man may profess to believe, but no man can really believe contrary to the convictions of his own re mind, or the dictates of his own understanding. The people of one sect wonder at the supposed blindness or perverseness of their brethren of another sect, and thus the business of wondering goes round the world; while few, perhaps, are aware how far their own opinions, or the opinions of others, are the genuine fruits of education, early prejudices, and unpropitious circumstances. On the principles which have been advanced in this article, I can believe that many good men in former ages were concerned in the horrid business of persecution, in tormenting and burning one another for differences in opinion. Bewildered by education and popular custom, like Paul, they "verily thought they ought to do many things," which a mind, properly enlightened, cannot but regard with horrour. On the same principles I can believe, that many good men have been agents in war, or advocates for this bloody and barbarous custom. But if no allowance is to be made for the influence of unfortunate education, erroneous opinions and popular customs, every man in Christendom, who has been deliberately and voluntarily an agent in promoting either persecution or war, should be regarded as a murderer, or an instigator of murder, in the strictest sense of the terms. But if good men have been liable to be so misled by the influence of education and cus tom, as to adopt these bloody errours, and if this be generally admitted, is it not astonishing that any well informed person can regard any doctrine or rite, by which Christians of our country are divided into sects, as a test of piety and goodness! There is not, we may safely affirm, any popular errours or customs among either Mahometans or Pagans, which are more antichristian, or more destructive, than persecution and war. And if we ought charitably to believe, that many pious Christians have been so deluded by the influence of education, as to approve these sanguinary customs, is it not desirable that all should feel the propriety of exercising more candour, one towards another, in regard to the comparatively insignificant points which now divide the Christian world? If good men may have been in such errours, that they. could employ their influence for burning alive brethren who happened to dissent from their creed--if good men may have been so misled as to think it consistent with Christian meekness and love, to lead invading armies, and to spread distress, havock, and death among the innocent subjects of another government, shall it any longer be deemed "a thing incredible," that a good man should embrace the opinion, that "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," is a distinct being from his beloved Son? Or that good men may have embraced the opinions which have been denounced by the Synod of Phila delphia. REMARKS ON DR. BERKELEY'S IMMATERIAL SYSTEM. THIS system denies the existence of matter, or a material world. It supposes that houses, mountains, rivers, and all sensible objects, have no real exist ence but in the ideas of thinking spirits: that "the things we see and feel are but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense, and it is impossible, even in thought, to separate any of these from perception." pp. 38, 39. "Beside spirits, all that we know or conceive are our ideas." p. 250. The Dr., however, does not deny the reality of what he calls objects of sense. "I am not," he says "for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since these immediate objects of perception I take to be the things themselves."p. 318. Yet he maintains that the mind perceives nothing but its own ideas. In p. 318. Hylas asks, "Is it not your opinion that, by our senses, we perceive only the ideas existing in our |