it cannot be so said, yet, as a matter of fact, it ought to have been so found by the jury, and that their verdict to the contrary was a verdict against the evidence. Upon this we must not only see what the plaintiff says, but what he did, and we must see what Laming says and what he did. Laming says, "I use chloride of calcium, and I make it in a particular way, which produces oxide of iron" -and, in fact, he used the two combined. Therefore, what Laming did in practice, and what, in effect, he may be said to have stated, is that he used muriate of lime and hydrated oxide of iron mixed. The plaintiff claims the hydrated oxide of iron, but he shews how he makes and uses it. I will only mention one particular: he mixes sulphate of iron and lime. He gets, therefore, hydrated oxide of iron and sulphate of lime. It was said that the difference between the two was a colourable one, and that what the plaintiff in reality had done was to borrow Laming's use of hydrated oxide of iron, and that, if the plaintiff had used muriate of iron in the same way as Laming did in the preparation of the oxide, it would have stood thus-that Laming would have used, and said he used, muriate of lime and oxide of iron, whilst the plaintiff would have said, "I use oxide of iron;" and it would, in fact, have been the use of oxide of iron and muriate of lime, the difference being that the one puts the one thing first, and the other the other. It may be said, that putting sulphate of iron instead of muriate was a mere colourable variation. It is not necessary to say what would have been the case if the plaintiff, in fact, had used the muriate of iron. Even in that case he might have said, "I claim the use of hydrated oxide of iron, and I say it can be used separately from muriate of lime." It may be that even then he would have been the inventor, and it may be that he has, in effect,

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stated in his specification, "I carefully avoided Laming;
I knew that he used hydrated oxide with chloride of
calcium, and my object is to use hydrated oxide without
the chloride of calcium." All that may be, but it is not
necessary for us to deal with it. The plaintiff uses sul-
phate of lime, and it was sworn on his behalf, and not
contradicted, that the muriate of iron that Laming uses
produces a deliquescent substance, viz., chloride of cal-
cium, whereas the sulphate of lime is not deliquescent;
and whether that was or was not a colourable variation
was left to the jury. On the part of the plaintiff it
was sworn that it was not a colourable variation, that
there was an essential difference between the two, and
that the muriate could not be used on account of its deli-
quescence, whereas the sulphate could be and was used.
The question was left to the jury, and they have found
a verdict for the plaintiff. It undoubtedly may be that
the plaintiff was not aware of this benefit, because it is
remarkable that he used muriate of iron with inagnesia,
which would also produce a deliquescent substance; and
be therefore that when he specified for the sulphate
of iron he was specifying for a substance of which he did
not know the value. I do not mean to say that it was so;
but the question was left to the jury, and they found for
the plaintiff. And upon this, and upon the other matters,
I feel, for myself, that it is impossible to say that the verdict

it

may

was wrong.

The next objection was, that the plaintiff's specification was insufficient on this ground.—He says, "I use the hydrated or precipitated oxides." It was said that included all hydrated oxides, and inasmuch as some of the natural hydrated oxides would not do the plaintiff's specification was bad. Now, that question turns upon this.-If the

plaintiff in his specification means all the hydrated oxides, it is open to that objection; but if he means only those hydrated oxides which are also precipitated, that is the artificial hydrated oxides, it is not open to that objection. It may be said that the language is in any sense ungrammatical, and that hydrated or precipitated-the whole or the part-cannot be right. To say, "the works of Shakespeare, or Hamlet and King Lear," would obviously be an inaccuracy, which cannot be judged by the ordinary rules of grammar, and therefore we must endeavour to find out the proper meaning of this inaccurate expression. It appears to us, upon looking at the specification, that the plaintiff uses those as equivalent expressions, because he says "hydrated or precipitated," and that oxide of iron may be conveniently prepared for these purposes, and so on; and therefore it is obvious that when he uses that word hydrated he uses it as synonymous with precipitated; and consequently, when he speaks of using hydrated or precipitated oxides, he means such hydrated oxides as are precipitated. That is the construction we put upon the specification, and therefore we think that objection fails.

Then it is said that the mere application of the hydrated oxides to absorb the sulphuretted hydrogen from coal gas is not the subject of a patent, that property of it being previously well known. With that we do not agree. The answer is, that the question is not properly stated. The application of the hydrated oxide is the principle. If a man were to say, "I claim the use of hydrated oxide of iron for the purification of coal gas," without saying how it is to be applied, it is possible the objection might be well founded; but here the plaintiff says, "I claim it in the manufacture of gas in the way I have described," and

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he shews how it may be used. Therefore this objection fails.

So, in like manner, does the next, viz., that the renovation of the hydrated oxide of iron by exposure to the air, being well known previously, was not the subject of a patent-we deal with that in the same way.

Then the sixth objection is, that the title of the patent, as amended by the disclaimer by the plaintiff, is not such as to include the invention of the plaintiff as described in the specification so amended. I am not very sure that I have the faculty of fully appreciating that extremely subtle point. As well as I do understand it, it appears to me to be an unfounded one, and it was not much pressed in the argument. But I think that it really is within the title of "an improved mode of manufacturing gas." This is an improved mode of manufacturing gas, namely, by passing it through hydrated oxide of iron, and then renovating the oxide by exposure to the air.

The next objection is, that, having disclaimed that part of his title which related to the "obtaining certain substances applicable to the purification of gas," the plaintiff could not claim for the renovation of the purifying material as he has done. A similar remark may be made upon that. This objection also fails.

The result is, therefore, that we think the rule should be discharged, both as to a new trial, and as to entering a verdict for the defendant. I may say that the judgment I am now pronouncing, that the rule could not be made absolute to enter a verdict, is the judgment of the Lord Chief Baron, my brother Watson, my brother Channell and myself; and I am glad to say that we are able to give a unanimous judgment upon that matter. But the judgment that the rule should not be made absolute for a new trial,

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on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence, is the judgment of my brother Watson and myself. He and I and the Lord Chief Baron were the only Judges who heard the whole of the argument on that point. My LIGHT Co. brother Watson and I think that the rule ought to be discharged; but the Lord Chief Baron takes a different view.

Rule discharged.

WYATT v. WHITE.

Feb. 14.

a miller, saw a

paulin lying

on a quay
se. Seeing
alongside a
vessel.
his mark on

THE declaration in this case contained (amongst others) The defendant, the following count.-That the defendant, contriving and number of sacks maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff, appeared before with a tarone of the justices of our lady the Queen, assigned to keep the peace of our said lady the Queen in and for the county of Gloucester, and also to hear and determine divers felonies, trespasses, and other misdemeanours committed in the said county, and then and there falsely and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever, made a complaint before the said justices as follows, to wit, that he, the defendant, had cause to suspect, and did suspect,

one of the

sacks, he cut it open and found it contained pieces of sacks, some new and some

old. He removed the

tarpaulin and

saw some

sacks on which

was his mark, and on others it was cut away. Being informed that the sacks were about to be shipped by the plaintiff for the manufacture of paper, he laid an information before a magistrate that he had reason to suspect, and did suspect, that some sacks, his property, had been stolen and were then in the possession of the plaintiff. Thereupon the magistrate issued a warrant to search for the goods, and if they should be found, to bring them and the plaintiff before him, to be dealt with according to law. The plaintiff was accordingly apprehended and taken before the magistrate who dismissed the charge. In an action for maliciously causing the search warrant to be issued and the plaintiff apprehended,

Held:-First, that the magistrate was justified in issuing a warrant in that form, since the application for a search warrant involved an application to arrest.

Secondly, that there was no absence of reasonable and probable cause for the information, and consequently the defendant was not liable either in respect of the search warrant or arrest.