EASTER TERM, 23 VICT.

but the firm was not there. Pollock, C. B.-If one partner has authority to bind another by accepting bills of exchange, what does it signify whether a bill is addressed to the latter at the place of business or elsewhere? If the defendant accepted a bill addressed to him at any other place than where the partnership business was carried on, could there be any doubt that it would be binding?] The effect of the conversation between Crowe and the drawer was to create a special firm at Walworth, and the authority was to draw bills on that firm only. [Martin, B., referred to Kirk v. Blurton (a).]

C. Pollock, in support of the rule.-There was sufficient evidence of an authority to Crowe to bind the defendant by accepting bills for partnership purposes. [Bramwell, B.— Suppose the defendant had himself accepted the bill, would Crowe have been liable?] It is submitted that he would, the acceptance being in the partnership name, and for partnership purposes. A person may hold himself out as a partner by his acts. (He was then stopped by the Court).

BRAMWELL, B.—I am of opinion that the rule ought to be discharged. I still think that my ruling at the trial was right. The question of law is whether, when one partner gives another authority to bind him by accepting bills of exchange for partnership purposes, and he accepts a bill addressed to the firm at a different place from that where the partnership business is carried on, such a bill is binding. I think it is not. As a general principle, there is no doubt that a person may exercise any power which is conferred upon him. Another general principle is, that one partner has power to bind another by accepting bills of exchange in the name of the firm. Here there was evidence that the busi(a) 9 M. & W. 284.

1860.

STEPHENS

บ.

REYNOLDS.

ness was carried on in the name of "Reynolds," and therefore Crowe might bind the defendant by accepting bills in that name. But this bill was not directed to Reynolds at the place where the partnership business was carried on, but at a place where he alone carried on a different business. Then comes the question whether Crowe had authority to bind the defendant by accepting bills addressed to him at such a place. It seems to me irrelevant to inquire what the defendant himself might have done. The relevant inquiry is, what authority did he give Crowe to accept bills of exchange for him; was it merely an authority to accept them in the name of Reynolds, or to accept them in that name if addressed to the place of business? There is nothing on the face of this bill to indicate that it was drawn for partnership purposes; and for aught that appears it may have been drawn for a separate debt of the defendant. The matter is open to this difficulty: suppose the defendant had paid the bill, and then sought to charge the partnership with the amount, Crowe might say, "there is nothing on the face of the bill to shew that it was accepted on our account." For these reasons, I cannot help thinking that my ruling was right.

MARTIN, B.—I am of opinion that the rule ought to be absolute. I have always understood that the law was correctly laid down in the case of Kirk v. Blurton (a). It seems to me a much better way, in administering the law, to say that when persons carry on trade in partnership the law gives to each of them an authority to accept bills in the partnership name for goods supplied to the firm, instead of looking to an implied authority. I should regret if any doubt was cast upon it. It is competent for persons in partnership to carry on their business in any name they («) 9 M. & W. 284.

66

think fit, but it would be very inconvenient, when two or more partners carry on business in the name of one, to require all persons to have a knowledge of the law, and distinguish between the carrying on business as an individual and as a partner. Here the drawer of the bill was told that the business would be carried on in the name of 'Reynolds," and that was evidence for the jury that the name included the other partner. It cannot alter the case that the bill is addressed "Mr. B. Reynolds, Church St., Woolwich." It might as well be objected that the words "Mr. B." are added to "Reynolds." The substantial matter is, that the bill is drawn in the partnership name upon a man who was a partner. In Kirk v. Blurton (a), the defendants, Blurton and Habershon, carried on business in partnership under the name of "John Blurton," and Habershon drew the bill in the name of "John Blurton and Co." This Court held that as the bill was not drawn in the partnership name, it did not bind the defendant Blurton. I thought that a wrong application of the law, and that it was a question for the jury whether "John Blurton" and "John Blurton and Co." did not mean the same thing. But the principle was there laid down that each partner has authority by law to bind the firm by accepting bills in the partnership name, if bills are necessary for carrying on the partnership. Here the bill is drawn in the partnership name, "Reynolds," and the addition of "Mr. B." or "Church St., Woolwich," makes no difference. It is a bill drawn by a partner in the partnership name and for partnership purposes. As to the difficulty suggested by my brother Bramwell, it does not arise.

POLLOCK, C. B.-I am also of opinion that the rule ought to be absolute. There is no doubt that the drawer of the

(a) 9 M. & W. 284.

1860.

STEPHENS

v.

REYNOLDS.

1860.

STEPHENS

v.

REYNOLDS.

bill furnished the goods; that the goods were purchased for the benefit of the partnership, and that the business was carried on in the name of "Reynolds." Then the bill being drawn on the firm and accepted in the partnership name, for goods supplied to the firm, why is the plaintiff not entitled to recover? It is said that he cannot recover because the bill is not directed to the place where the partnership business was carried on, but to another place where the defendant alone carried on a different business. It seems to me not a matter of law, but of fact, whether the bill was drawn on the partnership firm or on the individual. To hold that this acceptance is not binding because of the address, would be to make things nominal prevail over things real. The bill being accepted in the name of the firm, and for goods supplied to the firm, the mere direction at a place other than their place of business does not vitiate it. With every respect for my brother Bramwell's opinion, I think that there must be a new trial (a).

Rule absolute.

April 27.

(a) The cause was again tried before Wilde, B., at the next sit

tings, and a verdict found for the plaintiff.

PAPILLON V. BRUNTON.

Between nine ACTION for rent.-Plea: Never indebted.

and ten o'clock on the 25th

At the trial, before Martin, B., at the Middlesex sittings March a tenant put into a in the present Term, it appeared that the defendant had post-office in London a letter containing a notice to quit on the following Michaelmas, and addressed to the place of business in London of his landlord's agent. The agent was at his place of business until between six and seven o'clock in the evening and did not receive the letter, but found it on the following morning. Held a sufficient notice to determine the tenancy, the jury having found that the letter was delivered on the 25th March, after the agent left.

occupied premises in Waterloo Place, London, as yearly tenant to the plaintiff, and that the action was brought to recover six months rent, alleged to be due on the 25th of March last. The plaintiff resided in the country, and the rent was received for him by his solicitor who had business chambers in Mitre Court, Temple, but resided elsewhere. The defendant, who was a witness, stated that between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of the 25th March, 1859, he posted a letter in London addressed to the plaintiff's solicitor at Mitre Court, Temple, and containing a notice to quit on the 29th September following. According to the usual course of the post, that letter would be delivered in the morning of the same day. The plaintiff's solicitor stated that he was at his chambers on that day until six or seven o'clock in the evening, when, business hours being over, he left; but the letter was not delivered at that time. On going to his chambers the next morning at the usual business hours, he found the letter.

The learned Judge left it to the jury to say whether the letter arrived at the chambers of the plaintiff's solicitor on the 25th March after business hours, or upon the morning of the 26th. The jury found that it arrived on the 25th after the plaintiff's solicitor left the chambers. They said they thought he ought to have had somebody there to receive it. Whereupon the learned Judge directed a verdict. for the defendant, reserving leave to the plaintiff to move to enter the verdict for him.

Hayes, Serjt., moved accordingly (April 26).—There was no sufficient notice to quit. The notice not being sent to the landlord, but to his agent's place of business, ought to have been delivered at the usual business hours. [Pollock, C. B.-If a notice to quit was left at the dwelling-house of a landlord and he was abroad, that would be sufficient to determine the tenancy. In the case of notice of dishonour

1860.

PAPILLON

v.

BRUNTON.