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jects of other countries? Can the island of Tobago pass
a law to bind the rights of the whole world? Would the
world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?" In Story's
Conflict of Laws, ss. 286 b. 376. 379. 380, many authorities
are cited to shew that the right and disposition of move-
ables is to be governed by the law of domicil of the owner.
[ Cockburn, C. J.—There is an exception where there is some
positive or customary law of the country, where the property
is situate, applicable to the case. In Story's Conflict of Laws,
sect. 383, it is said, "It follows as a natural consequence of
the rule we have been considering (that personal property
has no locality), that the laws of the owner's domicil should
in all case determine the validity of every transfer, aliena-
tion or disposition made by the owner, whether it be inter
vivos or post mortem. And this is regularly true unless
there is some positive or customary law of the country where
they are situate providing for special cases (as is sometimes
done)," &c. In sect. 384 it is said, "Subject to the ex-
ceptions of this and the like nature (such as the statutable
transfer of ships and of goods in the warehouses or in the
docks of a government, &c.) the general rule is that a
transfer of personal property, good by the law of the owner's
domicil, is valid, wherever else the property may be situate.
But it does not follow that a transfer made by the owner"
(to which I may add, or his agent) "according to the law
of the place of its actual situs would not as completely
devest his title."] The classes of property referred to by
Story are property either voluntarily placed by its owner,
or necessarily existing only, in the foreign country. The
instances he gives of goods in docks and warehouses, and
stock in the public funds, shew this. The rule would not
apply to property coming to a foreign country against the
will of the owner, as the cargo of a ship wrecked on its
coast. It was said by Lord Loughborough, in delivering

the judgment of the Court in Sill v. Worswick (a), that personal property is "subject to that law which governs the person of the owner. With respect to the disposition of it, with respect to the transmission of it either by succession or the act of the party, it follows the law of the person. The owner in any country may dispose of his personal property. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is, but the law of the country of which he was a subject, that will regulate the succession.

The condition of a bankrupt by the law of this country is that the law, upon the act of bankruptcy being committed, vests his property, and takes the administration of it by vesting it in the assignees, who apply that property to the just purpose of the equal payment of his debts. If the bankrupt happens to have property which lies out of the jurisdiction of the law of England, if the country in which it lies proceeds according to the principles of well regulated justice, there is no doubt but it will give effect to the title of the assignees. The determinations of the Courts of this country have been uniform to admit the title of foreign assignees." Clausen, the purchaser, whom the defendants represent, knew that he was dealing with the captain. The captain's authority depends on the presumed mandate, which must be regulated, not by the law of Norway, but by that of his own country: Lord Stair's Institutes, by Brodie, vol. 2, p. 956. [Crowder, J.-The effect of the auction is similar to that of a sale in market overt.] A sale in market overt may be good by the law of the place where the sale was held, but would have no extra-territorial effect in devesting the property of the true owners. Nor can the judgment of the Diocesan Court, which proceeds, not on the general law, but on the particular law of Norway, bind the property except in Norway. (a) 1 H. Black. 665. 690.

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The reasoning of Dr. Lushington throughout the case of The Segredo, otherwise The Eliza Cornish (a), is in point for the plaintiffs. At page 57 he says, "I know of no right which the purchaser of a ship in a foreign country, such ship not belonging to a subject of that country, has to call for the interposition of the lex loci contractus, save indeed in one case only, where the title is derived from the decree of a competent Court administering the law in its own jurisdiction, and by its decree conferring a title. Now, had the ship been purchased under the decree of a Court of Admiralty directing her to be sold, in a case within its jurisdiction, or the law of a Court resembling our own Court of Exchequer, I should have hesitated long before I disputed that title." It is incumbent on every person seeking to establish title under a sale by the master of a vessel to ascertain the extent of his authority. It is that which regulates the validity of bottomry bonds, of which Lord Stowell, in delivering judgment in The Nelson (b), says, "It is certainly the vital principle of this species of bonds, that they shall have been taken when the owner was known to have no credit; no resources for obtaining necessary supplies. It is that state of unprovided necessity that alone supports these bonds: the absence of that necessity is their undoing."

As to the effect of the judgment in the Court in Norway the following authorities were cited: Walker v. Witter (c), Robertson v. Struth (d), Messin v. Lord Massareene (e), Philips v. Hunter (f), Tarleton v. Tarleton (g), Novelli v. Rossi (h), Houlditch v. Marquis of Donegal (i), Don v. Lippman (k), Becquet v. MacCarthy (1), Reimers v.

(a) 1 Eccl. & Adm. 36.

(b) 1 Hagg. Adm. 169.175, 176.

(c) 1 Doug. 1.

(d) 5 Q. B. 941.

(e) 4 T. R. 493.

(f)2 H. Black. 402.

(g) 4 M. & Sel. 20.

(h) 2 B. & Ad. 757.

(i) 2 Cl. & F. 470. 477. 479.

(k) 5 Cl. & F. 120, 121.

(1) 2 B. & Ad. 951.

Druce (a), Bank of Australasia v. Nias (b), Ostell v. Le
Page (c), Westlake's Private International Law, sect. 385,
Pollard v. Bell (d).

Arguments for the defendants.-The first question is, by what law is the validity of the sale to be determined. The ship was a Prussian vessel, commanded by a Prussian master: the cargo was shipped in Russia by a Russian Company, and consigned to the order of English consignees. The vessel, in the course of her voyage to England, was wrecked on the coast of Norway, and whilst there the master, according to the law of Norway, sold the cargo. The argument for the plaintiffs must go to this extent no matter in what country the master acts, or in what ship the goods are carried, the law of England will follow the goods of English owners. [Cockburn, C. J.— Suppose the question had arisen between a Prussian carrier and a Prussian consignee, by what law would the rights and liabilities of the carrier be determined?] The law of the country in which the contract was made. If a bill of exchange is payable in France, notice of dishonour is regulated by the law of France: Rothschild v. Currie (e). This is not simply a question between the master and the consignees, but one affecting the rights of third parties. Suppose the goods had belonged to French consignees, and an English Court of justice was called upon to determine whether the master had exceeded his authority, could it be said that the question must be decided by the French law? In the case of a general ship, having on board goods consigned to Spain, Portugal and France, is a different law to prevail according to the country of the person to whom

(a) 23 Beav. 145. 150.

(b) 16 Q. B. 717.

(c) 2 De Gex, M'N. & G. 892. 895.

(d) 8 T. R. 434.
(e) 1 Q. B. 43.

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the goods are consigned? If so, is a purchaser in Norway bound to know which goods are consigned to a Spaniard, which to a Portuguese, and which to a Frenchman? The circumstances of this case do not give rise to the application of the law of England as to whether the master was justified in selling the cargo. If the law of that country is to prevail to which the person belongs who owns the goods, a foreign carrier would have different liabilities and authority according to the law of the country to which the goods were consigned. In the case of a general ship the authority of the master must be determined either by the law of the country to which the ship belongs, or of the country in which the master acts. To say that the law of the country to which the goods are consigned determines the mandate of the master would be to make a different law for every bale of goods. A purchaser would have no secure title, and consequently a fair price would not be obtained. [Cockburn, C. J.-The authority of an English master is determined by the English law; but, suppose he goes to a place beyond the scope of the English law, must not his authority be determined by the law of the country in which he is? Here the authority of the master must primâ facie be determined either by the law of Russia, the country in which the cargo was shipped, or by the law of Prussia, the country to which the vessel belonged; but then the vessel comes to Norway, and if the law of that country is different from that of Russia or Prussia it would prevail. The English law does not attach because the master has met with an accident.] By the law of Norway, if a ship is wrecked and there is no one present on behalf of the owner of the cargo, the master may sell it. He may be a wrongdoer as regards the owner, but the purchaser obtains a good title. The operation or effect of foreign laws in relation to the capacity of persons is thus stated in Story's Conflict of