に cause was shewn to the rule to quash, and it became absolute on default merely, and the council were no parties to the action of trespass. F. Osler, contra. The council, in passing this by-law, are interfering in a dispute between private parties. A side road, which was opened by by-law, has existed between the lots in question since 1851, and there is no public necessity for opening a new road. This is not a proper exercise of the discretion of the council. If the applicant is really enclosing a part of the side road, he can be indicted, and the question ascertained in that way. The Court has already quashed a similar by-law, and the question has been fairly tried between the parties really interested, and it is apparent that the real object of the council in passing this by-law is not so much to open the road as to assist one man at the expense of another. Conceding that the council has power to open any side road, they can only declare that the original allowance for road shall be opened; they have clearly exceeded their power in enacting that a road, as defined by metes and bounds by any particular surveyor, shall be the side road. From the peculiar language of sec. 205, the applicant may be embarrassed in any suit he may bring against the council for anything done under the by-law, unless it is quashed. He referred to Burritt v. Corporation of Marlborough, 29 U. C. R. 119. HAGARTY, C. J.-It is impossible to try the question on a motion of this character. The question before us is not whether the bylaw was a wise or proper exercise of corporate powers, but whether it is legal. If the by-law confined itself merely to declaring that the road should be opened, giving Springer's metes and bounds, by way of description, I think we could not interfere. The defendants had a clear right to open an original allowance, and in so doing they must, at their peril, be correct as to its true position. We cannot, I think, accede to either of the two first objections. It is not altogether void on its face. It affects to give a description by certain fixed boundaries in accordance with posts put down by Springer. These may be right or they may be wrong. When the defendants attempt to enforce it, that question may be determined. Mr. Osler's argument was in effect that, as a bond fide contest was existing as to the true boundary, the corporation could not adopt one side or the other. The answer seems to be, that the by-law merely carries out a clear statutable power. It authorizes the opening of the original allowance; but it in no way makes the boundaries to be as Mr. Springer places them, unless the latter gentleman be correct, which is a matter to be proved, if questioned. It seems to me that the very reason which prevents this Court holding this by-law to be illegal, is that which should have prevented the defendants from exercising their statutable power, viz, the uncertainty as to the true boundary. If it were shewn to us clearly that the proposed boundaries would force the road through a man's property, unquestionably protected by statute law or exemption, that might be a ground for interference. Here the by-law is right (however indiscreetly adopted), if Springer's survey be right. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to try a boundary case, with much conflicting testimony on affidavits, we must not wholly set aside this by-law. The by-law is to open the original allowance, and cannot, as we think, authorize a trespass on any land shewn not to be part of such allowance. The case of Ex rel. Burritt v. Corporation of Marlborough (29 U. C 119), differs widely from the present. There the by-law was to open an original allowance, as to the true position of which there seemed to be no dispute. For sixty years a conventional road had been used in lieu thereof, and there was strong evidence to shew that the proprietors had given this latter road, without compensation, instead of the original allowance. Richards, C.J., says: "The question is, whether these proprietors, if they, or those under whom they claim, opened the road without receiving compensation therefor, and being in possession of the concession road, are not entitled thereto in lieu of the road laid out; and, if they are, can they be deprived of the same by a by law directing it to be opened as an original allowance, * * * In my view, I do not think we should permit a by-law to stand which assumes to dispose of the rights of these parties as if they had no claim whatever to this road allowance, and for that reason, if for no other, we should quash the by-law if we are satisfied that the facts bring the party seeking to quash it within the provisions of the statute." But I agree in holding that we should not allow any part of the by-law to stand which declares that the particular boundaries there given shall constitute the true original allowance. We do not question the right to open the allowance, nor do we interfere with any descrip❤ tion they choose to give. But we think we must not embarrass any property owner in the fair trial of his rights, by leaving the by-law with & quasi-legislative declaration as to its operation. The present state of the statute law as to the possible effect of a by-law not quashed by the Court, is a strong reason for removing this clause. My brother Gwynne has pointed out the words which we think must be expunged. I think there should be no costs on either side. The relator only partially succeeds, and three-fourths of the voluminous evidence produced bears wholly on the survey question, with which we do not think we can interfere. give no costs. We GWYNNE, J.-The by-law appears to partake of the vice of the former one, in so far as it purports to declare and enact that the side road, as set out by metes and bounds, and described in the by-law, shall be and is thereby declared to be the side road between the said lots 8 and 9 in the 2nd and 3rd concessions of the Longwood Road in the township of Caradoo. If the limits assigned be not the true limits of the side road, as originally surveyed, the council has no jurisdiction to enact and declare that they shall be; and whether the declaratory enactment have any validity or not, a person bona fide contesting the true site of the road, has, I think, reason to complain of such a clause being inserted in the by-law, as calculated to expose him to difficulties at any rate, if not to prejudice him in the conduot of any litigation which he may institute for the purpose of bringing the point in difference up for judicial enquiry; but, in enacting that the original road allowance shall be opened, although describing that road by metes and bounds, I do not see that the applicant can be prejudiced, for in any litigation arising upon the point, it would, I apprehend, in such a case, be necessary to establish that the metes and bounds assumed to be are in fact the true limits of the original allowance. The first clause of the bylaw will have, therefore, to be quashed, which will be effected by expunging all between the words "township of Caradoc," in the first enacting clause, and the words that the said side road," in the second. Judgment accordingly. COMMON LAW CHAMBERS. JAMESON AND CARROLL v. KERR, 'GALLEY V. KERR. Replevin-Assignee in insolvency-Con. Stat. U. C. cap. 29, sec. 2-Insolvent Act, 1869, sec. 50. Goods are repleviable out of the hands of a guardian in insolvency, notwithstanding Con. Stat. U. C. cap, 29, • sec. 2. [Chambers, Feb. 8, 1872.-Mr. Dalton and Gwynne, J.] J. H. Macdonald for Jameson and Carroll, and Clarke for Galley, moved before Mr. Dalton for orders to replevy certain bricks which had been seized by the Sheriff of the County of York, under an attachment in insolvency against one Moran, and handed over by the sheriff to Mr. Kerr, an official assignee, as guardian. The applicants claimed these bricks as their property, having purchased them from Moran. Mr. Dalton refused to grant orders for writs of replevin on the ground that section 2 of the Replevin Act precluded replevin under such circumstances. From this decision the applicants appealed to a judge. The matter was then argued before Mr. Justice Gwynne, who, reversing the decision of Mr. Dalton, ordered writs of replevin to issue. The further facts of the case appear in the following judgment of GWYNNE, J.-These were two summonses by way of appeal from two orders made by Mr. Dalton in these cases, whereby he discharged two several summonses asking for writs of replevin to issue in these suits, and refused to grant the writs of replevin upon the ground that the goods sought to be replevied were in the custody of Mr. Kerr, an official assignee, as guardian, under a delivery to him, by the sheriff, of the goods in question, seized under a writ of attachment issued from the County Court in compulsory liquidation against one Moran, an insolvent. The evidence offered upon affidavits by the applicants is strong to show, and conclusive, if not contradicted, that the goods in question, namely divers kilns of bricks, were the property respectively of the applicants. No affidavits are offered in opposition to the title set up by them; it may be that Mr. Kerr, being official assignee, can admit nothing. The case, therefore, stands thus: that the evidence of title offered by the applicants, although not admitted, is not denied; the property seized is shown to be of that nature that, having regard to the business of the respective applicants, namely that of builders, they may be exposed to very serious injury if the property should not be restored to them, which any damages which they might recover in actions of trespass would not reimburse them for, and Mr. Dalton, I am informed by himself, felt this so strongly that he would have granted the writs without besitation, if he had not considered himself fettered by the language of the second section of the Replevin Act, Consolidated Statute U. C. ch. 29. By that section it is provided that "the provisions herein contained shall not authorize the replevying of or taking out of the custody of any sheriff or other officer any personal property seized by him, under any process, issued out of any court of record for Upper Canada." The section is consolidated from 18 Vict. ch. 118. In order to put a correct construction upon this section, it will be necessary to consider what was the law before the passing of the Act from which this section is taken, for the purpose of consolidation, and what was the object of the Act. Although it was held in England in the cases collected and cited in Harling v. Mayville, 21 C. P. 499, that replevin lay for any wrongful taking of property from the possession of the true owner, still it never lay where the taking was in execution under a judgment of a superior court, and the reason is given by Parke, B., in George v. Chambers, 11 M. & W. 160, citing Chief Baron Gilbert's treatise on Replevin, p. 138, as his authority, where it is said, "If a superior court award an execution, it seems that no replevin lies for goods taken by the sheriff by virtue of the execution; and if any person shall pretend to take out a replevin and execute it, the court of justice would commit him for contempt of their jurisdiction, because by every execution the goods are in the custody of the law, and the law ought to guard them, and it would be troubling the execution awarded, if the party upon whom the money was to be levied should fetch back the goods by replevin, and therefore they construe such endeavour to be a contempt of their jurisdiction, and upon that account commit the offender; that is, if a person attempt to defeat the execution of the court, they will treat it as a contempt, and punish it by attachment of the sheriff." In Rex v. Monkhouse, 2 Str. 1184, the court granted an attachment against a sheriff for granting a replevin of goods distrained on a conviction for deer stealing, for the reason that the conviction was conclusive and its legality could not be questioned in replevin; and in Earl Radnor v. Reeve, 2 Bos. & Pul. 391, the court said that it had been determined that when a statute provides that the judgment of commissiouers appointed thereby shall be final, their decision is conclusive, and cannot be questioned in any collateral way; and so not in replevin. In Pritchard v. Stephens, 6 T. R. 522, where goods taken under a warrant of distress granted by commissioners of sewers were replevied, and the proceedings in replevin moved into the King's Bench, the court refused to quash the proceedings, leaving it to the defendant in re 66 plevin to put his objection in a formal manner on the record. In that case Callis is cited, p. 200, where he says, If upon a judgment given in the King's Court, or upon a decree made in the court of sewers, a writ or warrant of distringas ad reparationem or of that nature be awarded, and the party's goods be thereby taken, these goods ought not to be delivered to be taken either out of this court or out of any other court of the King, because it is an execution out of a judgment," and it is said there, citing another passage of Callis, p. 197, that there is a distinction between those goods that remain in the custody of the officer under the seizure and those that afterwards come into the hands of a purchaser, saying that the former are not repleviable; however, the court refused to quash the proceedings, leaving the defendant to raise his defence upon the record, although the goods were replevied out of the hands of the officer acting under the decree and warrant of the court of sewers. Thus, then, the law stood in England, that for any wrongful taking a replevin lay except where the taking was in execution under a judgment of a superior court, or of an inferior tribunal whose judgment was by statute made final and conclusive, to which may be added the further exception where the taking was in order to a condemnation under the revenue laws: Cawthorne v. Camp, 1 Anst. 212, or for a duty due to the crown: Rex v. Oliver, Bun. 14, and the reason of the law that goods taken in execution could not be replevied was that it could not be endured that the cause of justice should be frustrated by permitting the party, upon whom the money was to be levied, in satisfaction of a judgment of a superior court, or of a judgment or conviction made final by a statute, to fetch back the goods by replevin, and so delay the plaintiff in his recovery of the fruits of his judgment. The reason then given for the courts in England holding it to be a contempt of court for a party to proceed, and consequently for their not permitting him to proceed by replevin, in respect of a seizure under an execution issued out of a superior court, applies only to the case of a replevin brought or attempted to be brought by him against whom the execution issued. While adopting the same principle, there have been, in the supreme court of the State of New York, several cases of replevin being maintained even against a sheriff in respect of goods taken in execution. In Clark v. Skinner, 20 Johnson, 465, it was held that replevin lies at the suit of the owner of a chattel against a sheriff, constable, or other officer who has taken it from the owner's servant or agent while employed in the owner's business, by virtue of an execution against such servant or agent, the actual possession of the property in such case being considered as remaining in the owner, and not in the defendant in the execution. Platt, J., giving judgment says, "Suppose John Clark (against whom the execution was and from whom the goods were taken) had taken the horse and sleigh as a trespasser himself, would they be in the custody of the law as to the true owner, because the constable happened to find them in the hands of a person against whom he had an execution? If I leave my watch to be repaired, or my horse to be 66 shod, and it be taken on a fi. fa. against the watchmaker or blacksmith, shall I not have replevin? If the owner put his goods on board a vessel to be transported, shall he not have this remedy, if they are taken on execution, against the master of the vessel? It seems to me indispensable for the due protection of personal property. In many cases it would be mockery to say to the owner-Bring an action of trespass or trover against the man who has despoiled you. Insolvency would be both a sword and a shield for trespassers. Besides, there are many cases where the possession of chattels is of more value to the owner than the estimated value in money, and the action of detinue is so slow and uncertain, as a specific remedy, that it has become nearly obsolete." The rule," he proceeds, "I believe is without exception, that wherever trespass will lie the injured party may maintain replevin. Baron Comyns says, Replevin lies of all goods and chattels unlawfully taken,' (6 Com. Dig. Replevin A) Though,' he says, (Replevin D) replevin does not lie for goods taken in execution. This last proposition,' he adds, is certainly not true without important qualifications. It is untrue as to goods taken in execution where the fi. fu. is against A. and the goods are taken from the possession of B, (being the property of the latter, is plainly intended). By goods," he proceeds, "taken in execution, I understand goods rightfully taken in obedience to the writ, but if, through design or mistake, the officer takes goods which are not the property of the defendant in the execution, he is a trespasser, and such goods never were taken in execution, in the true sense of the rule laid down by Baron Comyns." 66 In Thompson v. Button, 14 Johnson, 84, it is laid down that goods taken in execution by a sheriff out of the possession of the defendant in the execution, being in the custody of the law, cannot be replevied, but if the officer having an execution against A. undertakes to execute it on goods in the possession of B., the latter may bring replevin for them. The chief justice in giving judgment says, "As a general principle, it is undoubtedly true that goods taken in execution are in the custody of the law, and it would be repugnant to sound principles to permit them to be taken out of such custody, when the officer has found them in and taken them out of the possession of the defendant in the execution." This judgment is in precise accord with the law of England, as I understand it. In Hall v. Tuttle, 2 Wend. 476, the law is laid down in precisely the same language. The court, in giving judgment, adds, "The sheriff levies at his peril, if the property does not belong to the defendant in the execution." In Dunham v. Wyckoff, 3 Wend. 279, the case came up on demurrer, which admitted that the property in the goods seized under execution was in the plaintiff in replevin, although when seized they were in the possession of the person against whom the judgment and execution was had. Judgment was given for the plaintiff on the demurrer, as the pleadings admitted the property to be his. A similar point was decided on error in Acker v. Campbell, 33 Wend. 372. The principle upon which these cases proceed seems to be in accord with that stated by Chief Baron Gilbert as the principle upon which the courts in England refused to permit replevin to be brought in respect of goods seized under an execution issued upon a judgment recovered in the superior courts. Our law of replevin in this country would seem to have its foundation in 4 Wm. IV. cap 7; for the sheriff in this country, having no county court, it is difficult to see how the action could have been brought before that statute. (See Hutt v. Keith, 1 U. C. Q. B. 478). By that Act, the remedy seems to have been limited to the case of a wrongful distress, probably because of there having been an opinion prevalent that it was only in such case that replevin lay in England." The Act provides that any person complaining of a wrongful distress in a case in which by the law of England replevin might be made, may, on filing a precipe, obtain from the crown office a writ of replevin in a form given by the statute. This law was amended by 14 & 15 Vic. cap. 64, A.D. 1851, whereby it was enacted "that whenever any goods, chattels, deeds, &c., valuable securities or other personal property or effects have been or shall be wrongfully distrained or otherwise wrongfully taken, or have been or shall be wrongfully detained, the owner, or person or corporation who by law can now maintain an action of trespass or trover for personal property, shall have and may bring an action of replevin for the recovery of such goods, chattels or other personal property aforesaid, and for the recovery of damages sustained by reason of such unlawful caption and detention, or of such unlawful detention, in like manner as actions are now by law brought and maintained by any person complaining of an unlawful distress " The writ was to be obtained only upon an affidavit of the claimant, his servant or agent, that the person claiming is the owner of the property claimed, describing it. The effect of this Act was to introduce the law as existing in England, namely, to authorize replevin to be brought for any wrongful taking, with this further addition, that it should also lie wherever trover lay. ་ It happily seldom occurs that a sheriff or his officer, under a writ of execution against B., wantonly and vexatiously, and without any reasonable excuse, takes from A. his goods, of which he is in actual visible possession as undi puted owner. Consequently, we do not find that, to redress such a wrong, any person required to avail themselves of the privileges of the Act by bringing replevin. But cases of persons not being in actual possession, but claiming to be the owners, by virtue of some contract with an execution debtor, of goods taken under an execution from the actual visible possession of an execution debtor as apparent owner, are cases which do frequently occur in practice. In such cases as last mentioned the action of replevin did not lie according to the law of England. That remedy was only available when goods were taken from and out of the possession of the plaintiff in replevin, who also claimed to be the true owner, and therefore entitled to retain the possession and enjoyment of the goods taken. Replevin being the re delivery of the goods taken to the person from whose actual possession they were taken, upon pledges given by him to prosecute his claim of right to retain such possession. Although, according to the law of England, the real owner of goods taken under execution from the actual possession of an execution debtor as apparent owner, could not maintain replevin, nevertheless, upon the construction put upon 14 & 15 Vic. cap. 61, such persons were permitted in this Province to bring replevin against the sheriff, and to have his right tried in that form of action. Of such class of actions, Short v. Ruttan (Sheriff), 12 U. C. Q B. 79, is an example. The words of the Act authorizing the owner to bring replevin in all cases wherein he could maintain trespass or trover, seemed to authorize him to bring an action of replevin, although the goods were never taken out of his actual possession, and although according to the law of England replevin in such a case could not be maintained. Doubts, however, were entertained whether it could have been the intention of the Legislature to place the remedy by replevin upon a footing so different from that upon which ex vi termini, and according to the law of England, it stood in England. Accordingly, to remove these doubts, the Act 18 Vic. cap. 118, appears to have been passed. The preamble of that Act recited that, "Whereas doubts have arisen whether by the provisions of a certain Act of the Parliament of this Province, passed in the fourteenth and fifteenth years of Her Majesty's reign, entitled, An Act to amend and extend the law relative to the remedy by replevin in Upper Canada,' when any goods and chattels or other personal property and effects in the said Act mentioned have been seized and taken in execution, or by attachment or otherwise, under process from any Court of Record in Upper Canada, the same can be replevied and taken out of the hands and custody of the sheriff or other officer to whom the execution of such process of right belongs; and whereas it is expedient to remove such doubts."-and the Act declared that the said Act did not authorize, and shall not be construed to have authorized and permitted, or to authorize and permit, the replevying and taking out of the hands and custody of any sheriff or other officer, as aforesaid, any such goods and chattels which such sheriff or other officer shall have seized and taken, and shall have in his lawful keeping under and by virtue of any process whatsoever issued out of Her Majesty's Courts of Record in Upper Canada. Upon the passing of this Act it was held, in accordance with the law as it was always understood in England, that a person out of possession could not maintain replevin in respect of goods seized and taken in execution from and out of the possession of the execution debtor: Calcutt v. Ruttan, 13 U.C. 146. That decision is what would have been decided if the remedy by replevin had existed in this Province precisely as it existed in England, and the 14 & 15 Vict. cap. 64, had never been passed. In so far as goods taken in execution were concerned, the object and effect of the Act 18 Vic. seems to have been to place the law in this Province upon the same footing as in like cases it was in England; but the Act went further, and extended to goods seized under an attachment against absconding debtors the like protection from the remedy by replevin, and, as it seems to me, only the like protection as by the law of England surrounded goods taken in execution. And there appears to be some reason for this, although the writ of attachment is not By preceded by a judgment, as an execution is; because by the Act respecting absconding debtors in force at the time of the passing of 18 Vict. ch. 118, namely, 2 Wm. 4, ch. 5, sec. 4, provision was made, more effectual than replevin, and the like provision now exists under Consolidated Statute 22 Vict. c. 25, for superseding the attachment and obtaining restoration of his goods upon the application of the defendant in the suit on his giving bail in respect of the action in which the attachment issued: The language of the Act 18 Vict. ch.118, namely, "any such goods and chattels which such sheriff or other officer shall have seized and taken, and shall have in his lawful keeping under and by virtue of any process, &c., seems to me to accord precisely with the judgment of Platt, J., in Clark v. Skinner, 20 Johnsons' Report, supra, wherein he says: goods taken in execution I understand goods rightfully taken in obedience to the writ," but if through design or mistake the officer "takes from A. goods which are not the property of, nor, I add, in the possession of the defendant in the execution when taken, he is a trespasser, and such goods never were taken in execution in the true sense of the rule laid down by Baron Comyns"-goods of which the defendant is in possession when seized under and by virtue of any process against him authorizing the seizure of his goods and chattels are in the lawful keeping of the officer, under and by virtue of the process, because the possession of goo is prima facie implies property-but if a sheriff or his bailiff, or the bailiff of a division court, (for 23 Vic. ch. 45. sec. 8, places goods seized by him under any process issued out of a division court in precisely the same position, as to the action of replevin, as 18 Vict. ch. 118 did goods seized by a sheriff under process from any court of record,) wantonly and causelessly, and, it may be, maliciously, takes from the actual and undisputed possession of the real owner his goods under colour and pretence of an execution or other process which he has for execution upon the goods of another, shall the person upon whom such wanton wrong may be committed, be held to be deprived of a right, recognized by the law of England, of availing himself of the only remedy which in the given case may be competent to secure him any adequate redress? The second section of Con. Stat. U. C. c. 29, is expressed in briefer language than 18 Vict. c. 118, but the substance and effect of both is the same, and both must receive the same construction. Now, certain of the goods of a judgment debtor are by law specially exempted from all liability under any execution issued upon the julgment: as, for example, the bed, bedding and bedsteads in ordinary use by the debtor; the necessary and ordinary wearing apparel of himself and his family; the tools of his trade, to a certain amount. If, then, a sheriff's bailiff, or the bailiff of a division court, although the right of exemption should be claimed, should vexatiously and wantonly seize these exempted articles; or if a sheriff's bailiff, or the bailiff of a division court, without any pretence of right, should vexatiously and wantonly enter the house of A., and strip it of all his household furniture in his actual use, merely because the bailiff has in his hands an execution or other process against the goods of B.; or if a sheriff's bailiff, under like circumstances, should seize a raft of timber belonging to A. and in his possession, on its way for delivery to C., under a contract which A. is bound under heavy penalties to fulfil, and should so cause a breach of the contract; or if, under like circumstances, and it may be by fraudulent collusion with B, the execution debtor, or with his creditor, the sheriff should seize a steamship belonging to A and in his pos session, freighted with goods and passengers, at the moment of its departure from port on its voyage, and so prevent the voyage altogethercan any of these goods so wrongfully seized be, with any propriety of language, said to be in the lawful keeping of the sheriff or bailiff, under and by virtue of a process which neither directs nor warrants any such service. Or shall it be said that a judge, when invoked to permit the party so wronged to seek redress in the only form of action which can give him any relief, shall have no jurisdiction to do so? Similar instances without number, of wanton injury, might be enumerated, where the goods of an utter stranger to the process in the bailiff's hands, and to the person against whom it has issued, may be wrongfully and vexatiously seized by the officer; wherein, if a judge, upon hearing the parties, and being satisfied that the seizure is utterly inexcusable, cannot sanction the issuing of the writ of replevin, the hands of justice must be admitted to be most cruelly tied. I am not aware of any case which has held that justice is so crippled. In this case I am not called upon, however, to rest my decision upon the ground that in answer to the application for the writs there is no denial of what is plainly asserted on oath, namely, that the goods seized were the property of and in the possession of the claimants when seized, and that they were wrongfully seized without any process authorising such seizure; for I am of opinion that the goods now being in the possession of the official assignee are not in the custody of the sheriff or other officer under the process, within the meaning of section 2 of 22 Vic. c 29, even though that section could protect the goods in the hands of the sheriff from being reached by a writ of replevin. The execution of all process coming out of courts of record to be executed. belongs to the sheriff of the county to whom it is addressed, except when the sheriff is himself a party, when it belongs to the coroner to execute it. The term, then, "sheriff or other officer," in 18 Vict cap. 118, and in 22 Vict. cap. 29, sec. 2, as indeed is plainly expressed in 18 Vict., means a sheriff or other like officer, as his deputy, bailiff, or a coroner, "to whom the execution of such process of right belongs;" and what is declared not to have been authorised is the replevying the goods which such sheriff or other officer shall have seized under or by virtue of the process out of his hands. Now, when the sheriff has transferred the goods seized under an attachment in insolvency, in discharge of his duty under the process placed in his hands, to the official assignee in insolvency, they came into his hands and could only be detained therein as and if they are the property of the insolvent. In no other event can the officia! assignee retain the goods. He becomes liable to the true owner, from whom they were wrongfully taken, not by reason of the original wrongful taking, but by reason of |