Pleading-verification by agent - reasons. 1. The verification of a pleading, when made by an attorney or agent of the party, must, under the provisions of § 5654 of Snyder's Compiled Laws, set forth why it is not made by the party himself; that is, some showing must be made that the facts are within the personal knowledge of the agent or attorney, or that, if the party is a plaintiff, he is an infant, or of unsound mind, or imprisoned, or that the pleading to be verified is founded upon a written instrument for the payment of money only, and that such instrument is in the possession of the agent or attorney, or that the party is not a resident of or is absent from the state. [See note on this question beginning on page 4.] ERROR to the Woodward County Court (Wyand, J.) to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and overruling a motion for new trial, in an action of forcible entry and detainer. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the Commissioner's opinion. error. Mr. C. W. Herod for defendant in error. Wilson, C., filed the following opinion: This action was commenced in a justice of the peace court in Woodward county by the defendant in error, as plaintiff, against the plaintiff in error, as defendant, by filing with the justice of the peace a complaint which was verified as follows, omitting the jurat: State of Oklahoma, Woodward County ss.: E. M. McCune, being first duly sworn, on oath says that he is the agent of said plaintiff, that he has read the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true. E. M. McCune. court, where the motion and demurrer were refiled by leave of court, in their proper order, and overruled and exceptions saved. Upon defendant's motion to quash and demurrer being overruled by the court he refiled his answer, and in due course of time a trial was had, over his objection to the introduction of evidence, and, a judgment being rendered against him and his motion for a new trial being overruled, he appealed to this court by filing herein a petition in error, with a case made attached. Plaintiff in error, in his brief, submits his case on two propositions: First, that the court erred in not sustaining his motion to quash the summons in the case because the complaint was not properly verified, alleging that there was no reason shown in the affidavit why the complaint was not verified by the plaintiff instead of his agent; and, second, he challenges the competency and sufficiency of the evidence sub Upon the complaint being filed summons was issued and served, whereupon the defendant, in due course of time, appeared specially,mitted on behalf of the plaintiff. and moved the court to quash and hold for naught the pretended summons, for the reasons, among others: First, "that at the time said alleged and pretended summons was issued in said cause the same was void, for the reason that no complaint or bill of particulars had been filed under oath as required by law;" and, second, "that no sufficient showing was made by the plaintiff for having said complaint verified by agent instead of personally by plaintiff, as required by law." This motion was overruled, and an exception saved, and a demurrer to the complaint filed for the same reasons, among others, which demurrer was overruled and an exception to the ruling of the court saved by the defendant, whereupon an answer was filed and a trial had in due course of time, which resulted in a judgment for the defendant, and the case was appealed to the county The first contention of the plaintiff in error raises the question whether the verification of the complaint conformed to the statute governing the verification of pleadings by attorneys and agents, a question which seems to have been fully settled in this jurisdiction adversely to plaintiff in error's contention. Section 6433 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute (Snyder's), under which this action was commenced in the justice court, provides that "the summons shall not issue herein until the plaintiff shall have filed his complaint in writing under oath, with the justice. . . Section 5654, Snyder's Compiled Laws, provides that "where the affidavit [verifying a pleading] is made by the agent or attorney, it must set forth the reason why it is not made by the party himself. It can be made by the agent or attorney only: (1) When the facts are (54 Okla. 154, 153 Pac. 664.) within the personal knowledge of the agent or attorney. (2) When the plaintiff is an infant, or of unsound mind, or imprisoned. (3) When the pleading to be verified is founded upon a written instrument for the payment of Pleading verification by money only, and agent-reasons. such instrument is in the possession of the agent or attorney. (4) When the party is not a resident of, or is absent from the county." The section last quoted was one of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure at the time of the commencement of this section, but § 6455 of Snyder's Compiled Laws, in force at the time, provides: "The provisions of an act entitled 'An Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure,' which are, in their nature, applicable to the jurisdiction and proceedings before justices, and in respect to which no special provision is made by statute, are applicable to proceedings before justices of the peace." See also Gibson v. Shorb, 7 Kan. App. 732, 52 Pac. 579. In the case of Garfield County v. Isenberg, 10 Okla. 378, 61 Pac. 1067, the supreme court of the then territory of Oklahoma, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Irwin, after quoting § 3992 of the Statutes of 1893, that being the same as § 5654 of Snyder's Compiled Laws, said: "Now it seems to us that a fair construction of this section would mean that some reason must be given by said affidavit why it was not signed by the party or the proper officer; that is, some showing should be made that this affidavit falls within one or the other of the four classes set forth in the section, because, unless it does, the agent or attorney has no authority to verify such an affidavit." Again, in the case of the Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 19 Okla. 579, 101 Pac. 850, the supreme court of the territory expressed the same opinion by quoting its formerly expressed language in the Isenberg Case. The language used by both the Kansas and Oklahoma courts in con Keeping in mind the above-quoted provisions of the statute, the question for determination is: Was the pleading in question properly veri-struing the section of the statute fied? We think it was. Section 5654 of Snyder's Compiled Laws was adopted by our state from the Kansas statute, and the court of appeals of that state, passing on a question similar to the one involved here, in the case of Johnson v. Woodbury Trust Co. 8 Kan. App. 860, 57 Pac. 134, held that an affidavit very similar to the one in this case sufficiently complied with the statute. In that case the affidavit read as follows: "John W. Roberts, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys and agent for the defendant herein; that he is familiar with all the facts set out in the above and foregoing answer, and knows the contents thereof; and all the facts and allegations and matters in said answer contained and alleged are true and correct, as I verily believe." here under consideration clearly contemplates that, where an affidavit of an attorney or agent, verifying a pleading of his principal, sets forth facts which show that his authority to do so is warranted by either of the four classes set forth in said section, a sufficient reason is thereby set forth why the party himself did not verify the pleading. The verifying affidavit in this case recited that E. M. McCune was the agent of the plaintiff, that he had read the petition and knew the contents thereof, and that the facts herein stated were true. This, we believe, brought the allegations of the affidavit sufficiently within the first class of cases in which an agent is authorized to verify a pleading for his principal by § 5654 of Snyder's Compiled Laws to justify the verification being made by such agent, and such verification was, on authority of the cases above cited, a suffi cient verification of the complaint in question. On the trial of the case the only proof of the service of the three days' notice required by the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute was the testimony of one Werline, to the effect that he was present at the trial of the case before the justice of the peace and heard the defendant testify that on the 3d day of January, 1911, he was served with a notice to vacate the premises. The plaintiff in error contends that this evidence was not competent, but in that contention he is mistaken, because any statement made by Evidenceadverse statements. a party to an action which is against his own interest in the case is always competent to be put in evidence against him in that action. ANNOTATION. Sufficiency of verification of pleading by person other than party to action. II. d-continued. 4. Husband and wife: (a) Several interest, 38. e. Guardian ad litem, 39. III. Formal sufficiency of verification: 2. In action for injunction, 49. b. Facts within knowledge of af fiant: 1. In general, 51. 2. Statement of grounds of in formation or belief: (a) Majority rule, 62. (b) Minority rule, 70. c. Action on written instrument for payment of money: 1. In general, 70. 2. Rule in New York, 72. 3. Rule in North Carolina, 74. 4. Rule in Wisconsin, 74. d. Absence of party from county, 76. IV. Miscellaneous, 78. porate officer to verify for the corporation, and the right of a public officer to verify for a public body. In considering the sufficiency of a verification, both the right of an agent or The right of an agent or attorney to verify pleadings is generally given by statute, and exists to the extent and under the conditions which the statutes of each jurisdiction prescribe. United States.-Marion Phosphate Co. v. Cummer (1894) 9 C. C. A. 279, 13 U. S. App. 604, 60 Fed. 873; Re Glass, 119 Fed. 509. Alabama.-Guyton v. Terrell (1901) 132 Ala. 66, 31 So. 83. Georgia.-Sirmans v. Folsom & T. Hardware Co. (1916) 18 Ga. App. 586, 89 S. E. 1103; Poullain v. Pigg (1878) 60 Ga. 263; Fort v. West (1875) 53 Ga. 584; Coffee v. McCaskey Register Co. (1909) 7 Ga. App. 425, 66 S. E. 1032; Plant v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1893) 92 Ga. 636, 19 S. E. 719; Misenheimer v. Gainey (1912) 11 Ga. App. 509, 75 S. E. 844. Iowa.-Wright v. Parks (1860) 10 Iowa, 342; Kerr v. Hedge (1861) 12 Iowa, 426. Kansas.-Mercer v. Ringer (1888) 40 Kan. 189, 19 Pac. 670. See also Kauter v. Fritz (1897) 5 Kan. App. 756. Missouri.-Knapp, S. & Co. v. Standley (1891) 45 Mo. App. 264; Taylor v. White (1901) 86 Mo. App. 526; O'Brien v. Yare (1901) 88 Mo. App. 489. Nevada. Heintzelman v. L'Amoroux (1867) 3 Nev. 377. New Jersey.-Lyons v. Allen (1908) 76 N. J. L. 391, 69 Atl. 642. New York.-Imlay v. New York & H. R. Co. (1848) 1 N. Y. Code Rep. 94, 1 Sandf. 732; Treadwell v. Fassett (1854) 10 How. Pr. 184; Smith v. Rosenthall (1858) 11 How. Pr. 442; Betts v. Kridell (1887) 20 Abb. N. C. 1. Ohio.-Jirava v. Brieska (1878) 4 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 296. Oklahoma.—ALDRED V. RAY (reported herewith) ante, 1. Pennsylvania. Reid v. Christy (1856) 2 Phila. 144; Kinografen v. Henius (1914) 23 Pa. Dist. R. 980. South Carolina.-Hecht v. Friesleben (1887) 28 S. C. 181, 5 S. E. 475; Armstrong, C. & Co. v. Friesleben (1888) 28 S. C. 605, 5 S. E. 479. Tennessee. Klepper Powell (1871) 6 Heisk. 503. See also Carter v. Vaulx (1853) 2 Swan, 639. V. Washington.-Cady v. Case (1895) 11 Wash. 124, 39 Pac. 375. Thus, in Klepper v. Powell (Tenn.) supra, it was held that a plea in abatement may be verified by the party or by his agent or attorney, and that when the plea is verified by an agent, the fact of agency need not be stated in the affidavit, the court saying: "While pleas may be sworn to by the party himself, his agent or attorney, we do not know of any rule requiring the fact of agency to be stated in the affidavit. We see the fact that the party has done that for another that an agent might well do, and as he has assumed to act as agent in the stead of that other, we can see no good reason why the complainant shall object, while the party for whom the act was done does not repudiate, but, on the contrary, adopts it. The essential requirement of the law is that the truth of the plea shall be verified by someone who is willing to swear that it is true." In Heintzelman V. L'Amoroux (1867) 3 Nev. 377, it was stated that, by direct provision of statute (Practice Act, § 55), a pleading may be verified by an attorney where the party is absent from the county in which the attorney resides, or is, from some cause, unable to verify it, or where |