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a conclusive bar to a prosecution for single acts of sale previous to the filing of the
complaint, upon which the conviction for being a common seller was had. State v.
Nutt, 598.

3. A complaint before a justice that the respondent "did become a common seller
of, and at divers times sell, furnish or give away intoxicating liquor," &c., is to be
treated as a complaint under the 5th section of the act of 1852, to prevent the traffic
in intoxicating liquor; and, upon such a complaint, the justice is empowered, by
the 18th section, to adjudge the respondent guilty of being a common seller, and
impose the fine specified in the 9th section of said act. Ib.





1. The plaintiffs agreed to take jobs of work, and work together, each to be
allowed for the time he worked on any particular job, and to hire, as near as possi.
ble, equal amounts of help, the profit of which was to be divided between them.
The work in question was contracted for, by one of the plaintiffs, with reference to
this agreement; and he informed the defendant that he was in partnership, or con-
nected in business with the other plaintiff. Held, that it was properly charged, and
that a recovery thereof could be had in the name of the plaintiffs jointly. Sawyer
et al. v. Worthington, 733.




1. A confession of judgment before a justice of the peace, in pursuance of section
4 of chap. 115, Comp. Stat., operates as a merger of the original cause of action ;-
and the suit could not, before the act of 1855, (Laws of 1855, p. 13,) thereafter pro-
ceed against persons summoned as trustees, even though it was expressly understood
that the plaintiff should not be thereby prejudiced in pursuing the trustees. Barnes
v. Lapham & Tr., 307.


1. A justice has jurisdiction in an action of assumpsit where neither the ad dam-
num or the amount claimed exceeds $100, though the amount claimed is the balance
of an account upon which an action on book might have been sustained, the debtor
side of which exceeds $100. Bank of Rutland v. Cramton, 330.

2. A court will obtain jurisdiction as to both of two defendants, if they both ap-
pear by attorney and answer to the action, though the writ was served upon but one
of them, and a non est return was made as to the other. Blood v Crandall, 396.

3. The county court has original jurisdiction in actions of assumpsit, and for the
use and occupation of real estate, brought in good faith, where the largest sum of
principal, which the plaintiff could have expected to recover, was less, but with in-
terest to the time of trial, amounted to more than one hundred dollars.

Hall v.
Wadsworth, 410.

4. A party having a claim in assumpsit for over $100, may abandon a portion of

it or reduce it to a sum less than $100, and thus be enabled to commence and sustain an action before a justice of the peace for its recovery. Danforth v. Streeter, 490.

5. An artiele sold conditionally, to be returned if it did not suit the purchaser and which was so returned, may, though it was regularly charged on the plaintiff's book at the time of its delivery and credited at the time of its return, be wholly omitted from the account; and, if so omitted, will not be treated as a part of the account for the purpose of placing it beyond the jurisdiction of a justice. Paige v. Morgan, 565.

6. It is optional with the plaintiff whether or not to claim interest upon an account to which he is fairly entitled; and the jurisdiction of a justice will not be affected by any just claim which he might, but does not make; or which, having made, on the mistaken ground that the justice's jurisdiction would not be exceeded, he abandons. 16.

7. The county court has jurisdiction of an action on the case against an officer for not keeping property attached by him so as to be levied on, though the judgment obtained be for less than one hundred dollars, if the damages demanded and actually recovered, including interest to the time of trial, exceeds that sum. Mc K Ormsby v. Morris, 711.



1. The judgment of a justice cannot be set aside by audita querela on account of his having refused to continue the cause when the defendant was sick and unable to attend a trial. Amidon v. Aiken, 440.

2. An action pending, and on trial by a jury, on the 30th day of November, before a justice of the peace whose term of office expired on that day, was proceeded with, by the agreement of the parties, until 6 o'clock on the mornțng of the 1st of December, when the jury failed to agree; and the ex-justice took no further cogni. zance of the cause, and neither party caused a new justice to be substituted in his place. Held, that the defendant therein could not maintain an action against the plaintiff for the taxable costs to which he had been subjected in his defense of the suit. Johnson y. Kingsbury et al, 486.

3. A party having a claim in assumpsit for over $100, may abandon a portion of it or reduce it to a sum less than $100, and thus be enabled to commence and sustain an action before a justice of the peace for its recovery. Danforth y. Streeter, 490.

4. A justice of the peace after deciding, upon the motion of the defendant, to continue a cause pending before him, may, at the same sitting, permit the plaintiff to discontinue the suit. Flint v. Whitton, 557.

5. The supreme court will not ordinarily interfere by writ of quo warranto, or otherwise, to prevent a person from holding the office and exercising the powers of a justice of the peace while he has the appointment of, and is acting as a postmaster. State v. Fisher, 714.

6. If they would, the present proceeding could not be sustained, there being no proof that the respondent has acted as postmaster during the year for which he has been elected a justice. 16.

7. The alteration of the return day of a justice writ, so as to make it returnable at a later day than the one appointed at the time the writ was signed, will not extend

the previous authorization of an indifferent person to serve the writ beyond the time within which it should have been originally served, if such alteration is made with out the concurrence of the justice. Carr v. Tyler, 783.




1. Lands bounded on Lake Champlain extend to the edge of the water at low water mark. The same rule applied, in this case, to lands near the lake bounded on a creek emptying into, and the waters of which ordinarily maintain the same level, and ise and fall with those of the lake; there being no claim made that the boundary should extend to the centre of the creek. Fletcher v. Phelps, 257.


1. The lessor of a farm, who stipulates in his lease that the crops shall be consumed on the place and remain his property until certain conditions are performed, may, if a portion of the crops are sold by the lessee, and removed from the farm in violation of the stipulation, sustain an action of trespass against the lessee and the purchaser who removed them. Gray v. Stevens et al., 1.

2. The purchaser, though he acts innocently, and in ignorance of the lessor's rights, will be equally liable with the lessee. The lessee stands in no such relation that he can convey any greater right to the property than he himself possesses. 10.

3. The rule of damages in such case is the value of the property removed. Ib.

4. Held, upon the facts found by the referee, that the tenancy of the defendant in the present case was a tenancy from year to year. Hall v. Wadsworth, 410.

6. In a tenancy from year to year, the tenant cannot quit at pleasure, without notice, and deprive the landlord of accruing rent. The landlord's right to notice is, to some extent, at least, reciprocal to that of the tenant's. Ib.

6. The defendant leased of the plaintiff on the 27th of November, 1849, a dwellinghouse, and occupied it thereafter as tenant, from year to year, until the 10th of November, 1852, when he quit, having given only two weeks previous notice of his intention to do so. Held, that he was liable for the rent to the Įst of April thereafter, the plaintiff making no claim for it beyond that time. Ib.

7. A conveyance of real estate, with covenants of warranty, to a persor, his heirs and assigns, as long as wood grows and water runs, in the form of a lease, but reserving only a nominal rent if demanded, and without reserving any right of re-entry, is, in effect, a conveyance of the fee; and does not create such a tenancy as, upon a repudiation of it, would require notice to be given to the grantor. The object of a notice of the repudiation of a tenancy being required is to enable a landlord to protect his rights; but under such a conveyance, the conveyor would have no rights to protect. Propagation Society v. Sharon et als., 603.

8. A provision, in a lease of a farm upon shares, that the produce is to be at the control of the lessor until sold, will enable the lessor to hold the crops raised on the place against an attachment of them by a creditor of the lessee, until they are divided or sold, or all the stipulations on the part of the lessee are performed, for the security of which the provision was made. Esdon v. Colburn, 631.

9. If the rights of the lessee, under such a lease, to a part of the crops deposited

in the barn upon the farm occupied by him, are sold and transferred to the lessor,
upon a settlement between them, no removal of the property or change in its pos-
session will be necessary to perfect the lessor's right to it. Ib.

10. An agreement, by the tenant or occupant of a piece of land, that the owner
of the land, or one who has a right to it superior to his, shall own and be entitled to
the crops to be raised thereon, is valid, and will enable the landlord to maintain an
action of trover for them against an attaching creditor of the tenant, or one who
purchases them of him with notice of the landlord's right. Leland v. Sprague, 746.





1. To give a factor a lien upon goods consigned to, but not actually received by
him, the consignment must be to him in terms, and he must have made advances or
acceptances upon the faith of it. Davis & Aubin v. Bradley & Co., 118.

2. B. & H. B. delivered to the defendants, who were storage and forwarding
merchants, several sacks of wool, for which the defendants gave receipts, specifying
that they were for the plaintiffs, or to be forwarded to the plaintiffs. These receipts
were sent to the plaintiffs, and they, upon the credit of, and with reference to said
wool, accepted drafts drawn upon them by B. & H. B. Held, that the plaintiffs
thereby obtained the constructive possession of the wool, and had a lien upon it for
the amount of their aoceptances. Ib.


1. The statute of limitations does not commence running against a foreign cor-
poration until they have attachable property in this state, although, previous to that
time, there may be directors and stockholders of such corporation residing in the
state. Hall v. VI. & Mass. R. Company, 401.

2. If a partner, who is the agent of the firm for making disbursements, &c., make
a payment, as such agent, upon a promissory note previously given by the firm, it
will be presumed to have been made out of the partnership funds, and will prevent
the running of the statute of limitations against all the partners. Such a payment
is to be treated as a payment by all of the firm on their joint account, and not as
that of the paying partner only. Carlton et al. v. Ludlow W. Mill, 504.

3. An assurance given by the defendant, upon receiving a note from the plaintiff,
that it could be arranged by the taxes the defendant was owing him, and that with-
in the year for which the note was given they would get together and have it settled,
would, if given within six years, prevent the operation of the statute of limita-
tions. Bowman v. Downer, 532.

4. Neither the individual admissions of the members of a corporation, established
for public purposes and for the promotion of the private interests of the corpora-
tors, nor the personal admissions of its president, or of the individual members of
its executive committee, respecting a debt due from the corporation, will prevent the
operation of the statute of limitations upon it. Lyman v. Norwich University, 500.

6. An acknowledgment of an indebtedners must, to prevent the operation of the
statute of limitations, be unaccompanied with the expression of an unwillingness
and refusal to pay it. Aldrich v. Morse, 642.;

6. In the present case, the defendant paid one of two joint owners of the demand
a specified sum for his half, saying that was all he could afford to pay, and that he
would give the same for the other half, but would not give any more. Held, insuffi-
cient to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations. 10.

7. A mutual agreement between two persons that they will take no advantage of
the statute of limitations having run upon the other's claims, but that they will
thereafter settle without objection on that account, will prevent the operation of
that statute; and the expression of the opinion, by one of them, that there will not
be anything due from him on such a settlement, will have no effect. Noyes v. Estate
of Hall, 645.

8. Notes held by one party against the other, would be included under the term
" claims,

" in such an agreement. Ib.

9. The possession of land taken under a deed from a husband and wife, executed
while our statute required the acknowledgment by the wife to be made by her sepa-
rately from her husband, without a certificate of such an acknowledgment by the
wife, will not be adverse to her rights while she remains under coverture; and the
statute of limitations will commence running against her only from the death of
her husband. Pratt v. Battels, 685.

10. A declaration of the defendant that, if he owed the plaintiff anything he was
willing to pay him, held sufficient, upon the indebtedness being proved, to prevent
the operation of the statute of limitations, although the defendant, at the same
time, claimed that he did not owe the plaintiff anything, and that it was his impres-
sion that he had paid the demand in question; the claim, in connection with the
impression, evincing no unwillingness to remain liable, if the fact of payment should
be found against him. Steele v. Towne, 771.

11. Mere absence from the state will not prevent the operation of the statute of
limitations while the debtor retains a residence in it by which process may be
served upon him. Hall v. Nasmith, 791.

12. If the debtor has his fixed residence out of the state, all of his absences from
the state are to be deducted from the time during which the statute of limitations
would otherwise be running. Ib.

13. A replication, to a plea of the statute of limitations, that before the statute
had run to wit, from January 1, 1848, to the commencement of the suit, the defend-
ant was absent from and resided out of the state, does not assert a continuing ab-
Bence, or an absence, construing the averment against the pleader, for more than a
single day. Ib.

14. A rejoinder to such a replication that within the time mentioned the defendant
was frequently in this state to the knowledge of the plaintiff, held sufficient. Ib.


1. The terms maintenance and champerty not applicable to bona fide purchases of
rights of action ;-and, quære, whether these offences, as they existed at common
law, are recognized in this state. Danforth v. Streeter, 490.


1. The proper office of, and proceedings upon writs of certiorari and mandamus in
the nature of a procedendo considered. Woodstock v. Gallup, 687.

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