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the marriage, or of which she became seised afterwards, became (subject to the exceptions presently to be mentioned) by law vested in her husband and herself during the coverture; and the husband was entitled to the profits, and had the sole control and management (.), though he could not (save under the specific provisions of a statute) convey or charge the wife's freehold interest for any longer period than while the marriage continued (y). And if the wife was seised in actual possession at any time during the marriage of an estate of inheritance, (whether in fee simple or in fee tail,) and there was a child of the marriage born alive and capable of inheriting the property, then the husband, upon his wife's decease, became solely seised of such estate for his life; and was said in that case to be tenant by the curtesy of England (a). But, save to the extent of these limited rights of the husband, the freeholds of the wife were not affected by the marriage. As regards the alienation of the wife's freeholds, there was originally no mode by which they could, even with the husband's concurrence, be conveyed during the coverture; for the rigour of the antient law declared the wife incapable, in any case, of binding herself or her heirs in any direct mode of alienation. Indirect modes of alienation were, however, introduced at an early date ; and, for a long time, the ordinary mode was the fine, in the course of levying which the wife was privately examined as to whether her act was voluntary. The Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833, substituted for this mode of alienation a deed duly acknowledged by the wife, her husband concurring in, and not merely consenting to, the deed. The acknowledgment must be made before, and the wife privately examined by, a judge of the High Court, or one of the perpetual commissioners appointed

(e) 1 Wms. Saund. 253, n. 4; Robertson v. Norris (1845), 11 Q. B. 916.

(y) Bac. Ab. Leases (C.); 2 Saund. by Wms. 180, n. (q).

(a) Litt. s. 35.

for taking married women's acknowledgments, or a special commissioner (b).

As regards the leaseholds of which the wife was possessed at the time of her marriage, or which accrued to her during coverture, the husband (with the exceptions presently to be noticed) became by the common law and by force of the marriage possessed of them, in her right (c); and he was not only entitled to the profits and management. thereof during their joint lives, but he might also have disposed of them as he pleased, by any act during the coverture. They were even liable for his debts ; and, if he survived her, they were absolutely his own (d). But (if she survived him) he could not bequeath them by his will (e) ; for, on his death, they remained to her by virtue of her original title, and did not go to his executors or administrators. And the rights of the husband did not extend to property held by the wife in auter droit, as in the capacity of executrix (ƒ).

The personal chattels of the wife belonging to her at the time of the marriage, or accruing to her during coverture, became by the common law, with the exception of choses in action, the absolute property of the husband (7); but this again did not apply to property to which the wife was only entitled in auter droit (h). The wife's choses in action did not by the common law become the husband's until he recovered them by law, or reduced them into possession (¿); and if he died before doing so, they remained or survived to the wife surviving her husband. But if she should have predeceased her husband, then, as he was, by

(b) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 77--84; Conveyancing Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 39), s. 7.

(c) Co. Litt. 46 b, 351 a, 300 a; Rast. 655 a; Wallis v. Harrison (1839), 5 Mee. & W. 142.

(d) Com. Dig. Bar. & Feme, E. (e) Plowd. 418; Com. Dig. ubi sup.

(f) 1 Roll. Ab. 88.

(g) Co. Litt. 351 b; Ayling v. Whicher (1837), 1 Nev. & Per. 416; Carne V. Brice (1840),

7 Mee. & W. 183.

(h) Went. Off. Ex. 7.

(i) Co. Litt. 351 b.; Fitzgerald

v. Fitzgerald (1850), 8 C. B. 592.

the common law, entitled to obtain administration of her effects for his own benefit, he, upon becoming administrator of his wife's estate, became the owner of them in right of that title, and for his own benefit, subject only to the debts (if any) of the wife; and if he, having so survived, should have died before the choses were reduced into possession, then his legal personal representatives on taking out administration to the wife might have recovered them, for the benefit of the deceased husband's estate, subject only to the debts of the wife (k). If the wife's chose in action was reversionary, and therefore incapable of being reduced into possession, neither husband nor wife, nor both together, could have effectually disposed thereof during the coverture (1). The paraphernalia of the wife, that is, her apparel and ornaments suitable to her rank and degree, if not disposed of by the husband in his lifetime, remained to her, if she survived him, and did not pass to the husband's representatives; but they were liable for his debts (m).

The rules of the common law above stated have been largely modified and in great part abrogated by recent legislation; but a knowledge of them is still necessary to an understanding of this legislation, which we shall now consider.

(1.) By the Married Women's Reversionary Interests Act, 1857, commonly called Malins' Act (n), a married woman was enabled to dispose of her reversionary interests in personal estate, whether vested or contingent (unless restrained by the instrument under which she is entitled thereto, and unless they are secured to her by her own. marriage settlement) by any deed in which her husband

(k) Smart v. Tranter (1890), 43 Ch. D. 587; Waller v. Atkinson, [1898] 1 Ch. 637; Elliott v. North, [1901] 1 Ch. 424.

(1) Purdew v. Jackson (1823), 1 Russ. 1.

(m) 2 Bl. Com. 435.

(n) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, ss. 21, 25. See also 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 8; and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 44.

concurs, and which is duly acknowledged in the manner required by the Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833, with regard to her conveyance of real estate.

(2.) By s. 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, a wife judicially separated from her husband is to be considered as a feme sole for the purposes of property acquired subsequently to the separation; and a wife who obtains a protection order under sect. 21 of that Act, on the ground of desertion, is deemed, during the continuance of such order, to be, and during the desertion to have been, in the same position as if she had obtained a decree of judicial separation.

Under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women). Act, 1895 (0), a married woman whose husband has been convicted of an aggravated assault upon her within the meaning of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (p), or of such other assault as mentioned in the Act, or has deserted her, or by his persistent cruelty or neglect to provide maintenance for her and her infant children, has caused her to leave him, may obtain an order from a court of summary jurisdiction to the effect that she be no longer bound to cohabit with him; and such order while in force has all the effects of a decree of judicial separation on the ground of cruelty.

(3.) The greatest change in the law relating to married women's property has, however, been made by the Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 (). By the former of these Acts it was provided that where any freehold, copyhold, or customaryhold property should descend during the marriage upon any woman who was married after the passing of the Act (viz. 9th August, 1870) as heiress or co-heiress of an intestate, or where such woman should, during her marriage, become entitled to any personal property as next of kin or one of the next of

(0) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39, repealing and re-enacting with additions 41 & 42 Vict. c. 19, s. 4, and 49 & 50 Vict. c. 52.

(p) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100.

(q) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.

kin of an intestate, or to any sum of money not exceeding 2007. under any deed or will, the rents and profits of the real estate, and the absolute interest in the personal estate, should, subject and without prejudice to the trusts of any settlement affecting the same, belong to such woman "for “her separate use," and her receipts alone should be a good discharge for the same.

This Act is now superseded by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, under which, as from the 1st day of January, 1883, every woman who is married on or after that date is to hold as her separate property all real and personal property, either then already belonging to her or afterwards coming to her in any manner, including wages, earnings, and gains earned or made by her in any occupation which she carries on separately from her husband; and she may dispose by will or otherwise, of all such property in the same manner as if she were a feme sole. And any woman already married before the 1st day of January 1883, is to hold as her separate property and to have the like power of disposition over all property, real or personal, the title to which, whether vested or contingent, has accrued to her after that date (r), including such wages, earnings, and gains as aforesaid.

The Married Women's Property Act, 1882, has further provided, in continuation and amplification of the like provisions contained in the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, that a wife (whenever married) may effect an insurance upon her own or her husband's life "for her separate use" (s), and may also acquire property independently of her husband in such deposits as she shall have made in a savings bank, or other bank, or as she shall have invested in the funds, in a joint-stock company, or in an industrial, provident, friendly, benefit building, or loan society, provided always, that she shall not have used her husband's

(r) Reid v. Reid (1886),31 Ch. D. 402; Stockley v. Parsons (1890), 45 C. D. 51.

(s) Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 11.

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