malfeasance in converting to his own use the intestate's assets, was a breach of the clause of the condition "well and truly to administer" them, and that the sureties were liable for the amount of the assets misapplied a. It is not a sufficient answer to the assignment of a breach for not exhibiting an inventory on a certain day, “that there was no court on that day." The defendant must also plead that he was ready, &c.; for he must shew that he had done all that could be done on his side towards a perfect performance; and such a defence must be specially pleaded. Where the creditors of the intestate brought an action against the sureties, on the administration bond, without the permission of the archbishop, and upon oyer craved, the Ecclesiastical Court refused to give the bond to the plaintiffs; the court of Common Pleas refused an application that an authenticated copy of the bond, or the production of the bond itself in the Ecclesiastical Court to the attorney of the defendants, should be a sufficient oyer; as the granting of such an application would deprive the Ecclesiastical Court of its jurisdiction, on deciding whether the action should be brought or not, or of insisting on an indemnity d. a Canterbury (Archbishop of) v. Robertson, 1 C. & M. 691. 3 Tyr. 390. b Canterbury (Archbishop of) v. Willis, 1 Salk. 172. © Canterbury (Archbishop of) v. Robertson, supra. d Canterbury (Archbishop of) t. Tubb, MSS. C. P. E. T. 1837. OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATUTE 29 CAR. II. c. 3. THIS celebrated statute, the provisions of which have been the theme of much commendation a, is said to have been the joint * Lord Nottingham used to say of this statute, that "every line of it was worth a subsidy." Lord Keeper Guilford's Life, by R. North, p. 108. In Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 194, Lord Kenyon said that "it is one of the wisest laws in our statute book." See also Chater v. Becket, 7 T. R. 204. Roberts on the Statute of Frauds, Preface xix. Evans's Statutes, Part II. Chitty's Statutes, 366. production of Sir Mathew Hale, Lord Nottingham, Sir Leoline Jenkins, and the Lord Keeper Guilford a. The object of it is, the prevention of perjury, by requiring evidence in writing of the various contracts therein mentioned. It does not in any degree affect the nature of the contract, or dispense with any evidence of consideration which was previously required. It would be inconsistent with the object of this treatise to discuss the different clauses of this statute. Little more, therefore, is proposed, than to refer briefly to those provisions of the statute, and the various decisions thereon, which fall within the design of this work. SECTION II. SECTIONS 1 AND 2.-LEASES. Parol leases By sect. 1, for the prevention of many fraudulent practices, of interests which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and in land to be deemed leases at will. subornation of perjury, it is enacted, "that all leases, estates, interests of freehold, or term of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, to, or out of any messuages, manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing, and signed by the a This statute is said to have been drawn by Lord Hale, per Ld. Ellenborough, C. J., in Wain v. Warlter, 5 East, 17. But in Wyndham r. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 418, Lord Mansfield, expressed a doubt of this. And in Ruffhead's Edition of the Statutes, it is said, that it is scarcely probable that Lord Hale drew it, because the statute was not passed until after his death in 1676. b See Ash r. Abdy, 3 Swans. 664. See Wynn's Life of Sir Leol. Jenkins, Vol. I. p. 3. The Lord Keeper Guilford had also a great share in penning this statute, as well as Sir Matthew Hale, 1 Ch. Stat. 366. The language and composition of the act have certainly no claim to particu lar commendation. Next to those acts relating to the settlement of the poor, it has been productive of more litigation in settling its construction, than any in the whole range of the statutes. It was stated by Mr. Barrington, forty years ago, to be a common notion in Westminster Hall, that it had not been explained at a less expense than 100,000l. Id. parties so making or creating the same, or their agents, thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases, or estates only at will, and shall not, either in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect; any consideration for making any such parol leases, or estates, to the contrary notwithstanding." leases not exceeding the term Sect. 2. excepts from the operation of the preceding enact- Except ment, "all leases not exceeding the term of three years from the making thereof, whereupon the rent reserved to the landlord during such term shall amount unto two third parts, at the least, of the full improved value of the thing demised." of three years. An agreement for an ease ment is not within the statute. It has been held, that a parol agreement respecting an easement in the land of another, is not within the meaning of the first section; as where the defendant agreed, by parol, that the plaintiff should have the liberty of stacking coals upon a close belonging to him for seven years, and that during that period the plaintiff should have the sole use of that part of the close; held, that the agreement was binding, for as it was for an easement only, and not for an interest in land, it did not amount to a lease. The purchase of a standing crop of growing grass is Crop of not within the first section; for construing the first section by the growing second, it meant to vacate parol leases conveying a greater interest in land than for a term of three years, and upon which a rent is reserved Þ. grass. more than three years Though the statute says that interests of freehold, or terms A lease for for years created by parol, shall have the force and effect of leases, or estates at will only, yet it has been held that a lease will enure by parol, though for more than three years, will enure as a tenancy from year to year; the yearly tenancy commencing on year to Wood v. Lake, Say. 3. Webb . Paternoster, Palm. 71. But in Hewlins v. Shippam, 5 B. & C. 221, it was decided that a freehold easement in the land of another, could not be created without deed; and the court said, in reference to the above cases, that the objection that the right lay in grant, and therefore could not pass, was not taken. See also Fentiman v. Smith, 4 East, b Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, as a te nancy from year. From what the same day with the parol lease, and that it will require a regular notice to determine the interest, as in other similar holdings a. Where there was a parol agreement for a lease for seven years, the tenant to enter at Lady-day and quit at Candlemas; it was held, that the landlord could not eject him, except at Candlemas, for though by the statute the lease was void as to the period of its duration, yet it would regulate the terms on which the tenancy subsisted in other respects b. A lease for three years, to be valid without writing, must be day a parol computed from the day of the agreement, and not from a future day c. But a lease by parol, to commence at a future day, lease is to be computed. A verbal lease for two or three years is good. Agreement for less than three years from the time of making it, is good d. Thus a lease by parol for a year and an half, to commence after the expiration of a lease which wants a year of expiring, is good, for it does not exceed three years from the making. A verbal agreement to take ready furnished lodgings for two or three years is valid as a lease for not exceeding three years'. A letting, without reference to time, creates a strict tenancy at wills. Where a party enters under a mere agreement for a future for a future lease, he is a tenant at will only; if he pay a yearly rent he lease. Indorse ment on the draft of a lease, when sufficient. becomes a tenant from year to year, such tenancy being determinable on the execution of the lease according to the agreeAnd though no rent be paid, the relation of landlord and tenant subsists, the party having entered with a view to a lease, and not with a view to a purchase 1. ment. An indorsement on the draft of a lease, signed by the lessee, and requesting the lessor to let the premises to some other person, as it would be inconvenient for him, the lessee, to perform his agreement respecting them, was held sufficient to satisfy the statute, for it was a writing under his hand expressing that he had entered into the agreement, and it was not necessary |