not liable for losses sustained through the conduct of the mob during the riots in London in the year 1780. Where, in an action against an insurance company to recover a loss sustained by fire, the defence was, that the plaintiff had wilfully set fire to the premises, and the judge directed the jury, that in order to find a verdict against the plaintiff, they should be satisfied that the crime imputed to him was as fully and satisfactorily proved as would warrant them in finding him guilty on a criminal charge for the same offence; held, that such direction was right b. Landale v. Mason, Marsh. 793. 612. 1 Bing. 339. VII. What promise or acknowledgment will obviate this statute.. 1258 XI. By and to whom the promise or acknowledgment must be By the 21 Jac. I. c. 16. sec. 3. "all actions of trespass, of assault, battery, wounding, imprisonment, or any of them, shall be commenced and sued within four years next after the cause of such actions or suits, and not after; and all actions upon the case for words, within two years next after the words spoken, and not after; and all actions of trespass, detinue, trover, or replevin for goods; all actions of account, and on the case, other than actions concerning trade between merchants; and all actions of debt, grounded on any lending or contracts without specialty; and all actions of debt for arrearages of rent, within six years next after the cause of such actions or suit, and not after." By sec. 4, "after reversal of judgment for plaintiff in error, or arrest of judgment, or reversal of outlawry, the plaintiff, his heirs, executors, or administrators may commence a new action within a year." By sec. 7, "if any persons entitled to sue, be within the age of twenty-one years; feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned or beyond seas at the time the cause of action accrued, they may sue within the time limited after their coming of age, being discovert, of sane memory, at large, or returned from beyond the seas, as other persons having no such impediment might have done." SECTION II. TO WHAT CASES THE STATUTE EXTENDS. THIS statute extends to all actions upon an unsealed, written, or parol contract for the recovery of a debt or damages, whether the claim be made in a court of law or equity a. It extends to an action on a bill of exchange b; or by an attorney for his fees. It extends to defences of set-off, as well as to actions, and if a debt barred by the statute be set-off, the plaintiff may reply the statuted. The statute does not destroy the debt, it only bars the remedy; therefore if the creditor possesses property of the debtor, on which he has a lien, he may enforce his lien, though the demand in respect of which it arises is barred by the statute e. A debt barred by the statute will not support a commission of bankruptcy; nor can it be proved under it. But if the six years have not elapsed before the fiat was issued, the creditor's claim is not barred; for the statute does not run in that case 3. The king not being named in the statute, is not barred thereby b. The statute is a good defence to an action by a landlord for rent against one who had once been his tenant from year to year, but who had not within the last six years occupied the premises, paid rent, or done any act from which a tenancy could be inferred, although the tenancy had not been determined by a notice to quit c. SECTION III. WHEN THE STATUTE BEGINS TO RUN. begins to run from the time that the tion ac crued. PAGE 1. In cases of torts and con tracts. 3. When any of the parties is ...... ...... PAGE 1247 2. Bills and notes .......... 1246 4. Merchants' accounts...... 1249 The statute 1.-In cases of torts and contracts.] THE statute begins to run from the time that the right of action has accrued; that is, from the day on which the plaintiff might have an action for cause of ac- the recovery of his demand, although the plaintiff may not then know that he has a cause of action, provided no fraud be practised by the defendant, to prevent him from obtaining knowledge of his right of action; therefore, it has been held that the statute was a bar to an action of trover, commenced more than six years after the conversion, although the plaintiff did not know of the conversion until a period within the six years d So in an action of assumpsit, for not laying out the plaintiff's money in an annuity on a good and sufficient security, which the defendant promised to do; held, that the statute of limitations was a good bar to the plaintiff's recovery, as the promise of the defendant was the gist of the action, although it was commenced within the period of six years from the time it was discovered that the security was invalid, and the defendant knew it to be so at the time the annuity was granted. So where a declaration in assumpsit against an attorney, assigned for breach that he did not make diligent inquiry at the Bank, to ascertain whether stock was standing in the names of certain persons there; held, that the cause of action arose on the breach of duty by the defendant, and .not on its discovery by the plaintiff, and that the statute began to run from the time of the breach b. So, in an action on the case for negligence, where the declaration alleged a breach of duty, and a special consequential damage, it was held that the cause of action was the breach of duty, and not the consequential damage; and that the statute of limitations began to run from the time when the breach of duty was committed, and not from the time when the consequential damage accrued c. bill. Where a client employs an attorney to conduct a suit, it is an Attorney's entire contract to carry on the suit to its termination, and determinable only on reasonable notice; and where no such notice has been given, the statute of limitations is no bar to that part of the demand which is for business done more than six years before the commencement of an action by the attorney for business done in the suit, which was not brought to a termination till within six years of the commencement of the action d. Where a personal representative having found among the papers of the deceased a mortgage deed, and having assigned it more than six years before the action, for the mortgage money, affirming and reciting in the deed of assignment, that it was a mortgage deed, made or mentioned to have been made between |