ment. I take it to be perfectly clear that in order to create an equitable assignment, the obligation must be to deliver a particular chattel, not to deliver any chattel. It may be true that there may be in equity a bill for specific performance to deliver some chattel, as for instance, in Wellesley v. Wellesley. I apprehend it could not there have been treated as an equitable assignment of any particular chattel, though he had entered into an obligation to settle a sum of money upon any estate or any property of which he might become possessed. That would create an obligation upon him, which could be enforced in the Court of Chancery to make some settlement upon his property; but it could hardly be maintained that if after this general obligation he sold any property to a person who had notice of it, he could not convey any title to that property. Supposing he had sold a horse or any other chattel, could it be said that it was subject to an equitable lien, for that he had actually charged it. It is perfectly true that a bill might be filed against him to make him fulfil his contract to settle a sum of money upon his estate, or upon some portion of his personal property; but it would not, I conceive, create a lien upon any particular part of his personal property, even with notice of that general covenant on his part. But, in this case, though the contract was, I think, uncertain till the 29th of September, it appears that on the 29th of September there was a positive engagement that the bills of lading of these cargoes which had been put on board the l'erene and the Christiana, should be transmitted to Dresser, and though Dresser refused to accept the particular bill that was drawn upon them, I think it may be well considered as an appropriation of those two cargoes to him, which would constitute an equitable lien on them in his favour. Then comes the question whether, this lien existing, there was such a notice of it to Hoare & Co. as any mercantile man would act upon. Now, when we come to look at the notice which is alleged to have been given of the equitable charge, it seems to me so loose and unsatisfactory, that it ought not to be considered such a notice as any mercantile man would act upon. An account is given of what passed in the early part of the day on the 24th of October. (His Lordship read Dresser's statement.) Was that communication merely to the clerk, without anything more, to show that a man really meant to insist upon his having an equitable claim to these cargoes? If he had intended to insist upon the lien, would not he, in the regular course of business, have written a letter to Hoare & Co., to inform them that he had a lien, and to state that it was in respect of advances of such an amount that he had made upon the cargo? I think the affairs of commerce could not go on if it is to be considered that an equitable claim can HOARE t. DRESSER. [ *325 ] [· *326 ] be set up in this loose manner. But it does not stop there, because, I am perfectly satisfied with the argument of my noble and learned friends, that after this Hoare & Co. were led to believe, by the letter which they received from Dresser, that they would certainly have a security either upon the cargo itself, or upon the bill of exchange that was sent. It was tantamount to saying, after this loose statement had been made in respect of the claim, I give you notice that if you give me up the bills of lading, I will give you either these bills of lading back again, or the bill of exchange. And I think, being in that situation, knowing certainly that they should have the one remedy or the other, they were perfectly right in accepting the bills of exchange drawn upon them, and parting with them out of their possession. It cannot be said that this equitable lien is to prevail after Dresser has so conducted himself; his conduct amounts to saying, "On my part I have stated my objection to your claim, but I am quite satisfied that you must have either the bill of exchange, or the bills of lading." That was quite enough to justify Hoare & Co. in accepting the bills of exchange. I think, therefore, on the whole, that although there was in this case an equitable claim on the part of Dresser, yet that he did not give notice of it in the first instance, in a way in which any mercantile man would give notice of a claim upon which he really meant to insist. But, after he had made his claim in this loose way, he then gave an opportunity to Hoare & Co. to take their choice, by either having the bill of exchange, or the bills of lading, admitting that they must have the one or the other, and that as, *under these circumstances, they accepted the bills drawn upon them, they were perfectly justified either in retaining the bill, or in insisting upon having back the goods. LORD KINGSDOWN: I must always entertain great distrust of my own opinion when it differs from that of the LORDS JUSTICES; but after the best consideration I have been able to give to the case, I think that the view taken of the rights of the parties by the Vice-Chancellor KINDERSLEY is the correct one. It may be assumed, for the purposes of the present decision, that Hoare & Co. had incurred no liability for Norrbom before the evening of the 24th of October, 1853, that Dresser on that day might, if he had so pleased, have established by a suit in Chancery an equitable lien on the cargoes in question for the amount of his advances to Norrbom, and that such notice of his claim was conveyed to Hoare & Co. by the conversation of their clerk with Dresser on the morning of the 24th of October, as would have affected Hoare & Co. if Dresser had proceeded with due diligence to assert his lien. But it by no means follows, that because Dresser had or supposed he had such right, he would necessarily insist upon it. He might very possibly deem it more to his advantage to take peaceable possession of the goods, on the terms of accepting Norrbom's bill in favour of Hoare & Co. than to assert his equitable right by means of a Chancery suit against the legal title of Hoare & Co. under the bills of lading. Notice, therefore, of the existence of his adverse title, or of his belief in such adverse title was by no means notice that he meant to insist upon it. And the real question in this case, as it seems to me, is this, whether what passed between Dresser and Hoare & Co., *subsequently to the interview on the morning of the 24th of October did not authorise Hoare & Co. to act on the assumption that Dresser would not insist on such title to their prejudice. At this interview, it is clear that Dresser had not decided on the course which he should take. If he determined to rely on his previous equitable title, he would, of course, refuse acceptance of the bill in favour of Hoare & Co. He desired to have time allowed to examine the invoices which had been delivered to him, and to consider after such examination, whether he would give his acceptance or not. It might depend upon the value of the goods as appearing upon those invoices, and upon the state of the accounts between them and Norrbom, whether it would be more for his interest to comply with the terms of Norrbom, however unjust and unreasonable, and thus obtain possession of the bills of lading, and, by means of the bills, immediate and quiet possession of the goods. on their arrival in England, or to reject those terms, refuse acceptance of the draft of Norrbom, and proceed by a bill in Chancery. It appears, that he did examine these invoices, but the invoices alone would afford no assurance, that the goods mentioned in them were actually loaded on board the vessels to which the invoices referred. This could appear only by the bills of lading. And for the purpose, or with the pretext of comparing the invoices with the bills of lading, he wrote the letter on the afternoon of the 24th of October, upon which, it seems to me, that his case must depend. In that letter, he requests the loan of the bills of lading, charter, specification of the cargo, &c., and assigns as a reason for borrowing them, that he may "examine the invoices with the above documents." And he distinctly engages to return the documents to Hoare & Co. if, from any cause, he does not accept the bill for 1,312l. 18. 9d. * Hoare & Co. might reasonably infer that, if the bills of lading were found to confirm the invoices, as, in fact, they did, Dresser would accept the bill. For what other purpose could he desire to compare the documents? That this was the intention of Dresser is plain, from the explanation of the transaction which he gave in the letter of the 26th of October, in this passage, "We then wrote a letter to you, requesting you to send us the shipping documents for the purpose of comparing with the invoices that we might accept the bill; and if, from any cause, we did not accept it, we would return the papers. We received the shipping documents accordingly, found them to agree, and accepted the bill." In this state of circumstances, on the evening of the 24th of October, Hoare & Co. came under an engagement to answer the drafts of Norrbom, and when, on the following day, they received the acceptance of Dresser, they had already given full value for it. Hoare & Co. acted, as they had a right to act, on the assurance that Dresser would either return the papers, or give his acceptance. It was in the option of Dresser which alternative he should adopt, and he adopted the latter. It is said that, if instead of accepting the bill he had returned the papers, he might still, by means of a suit in equity, have established his title against Hoare & Co. Whether that would have been so or not, it is unnecessary to consider, for he did not adopt that course. He proceeded in the manner which he thought most for his own interest by availing himself of the legal title under the bills *of lading, which he could use only on the condition of giving his acceptance of Norrbom's bill. It is hardly disputed by the respondent, that if the acceptance, instead of the conditional promise to accept, had been given before Messrs. Hoare & Co. incurred their liabilities, they would have been entitled to indemnify themselves out of the proceeds of Dresser's acceptance. In my opinion, they must be considered in the events. which have happened, to stand in the same position as if the acceptance had been given at the time when they received the conditional promise to accept. It is very possible that Dresser may have over-reached himself in this transaction; and, in attempting to obtain an unfair advantage, may have lost an advantage to which he was justly entitled. But this is the consequence of his own conduct, a consequence, perhaps, for the sake of mercantile fairness and good faith, not much to be regretted; at all events, not one from which he is entitled to be relieved at the expense of those whom that conduct has misled. Orders reversed, and cause remitted, with a declaration. EWART v. GRAHAM (1). (7 H. L. C. 331-349; S. C. 29 L. J. Ex. 88; 5 Jur. N. S. 773; 33 L. T. O. S. 349; 7 W. R. 621.) The right of hunting, shooting, &c., is an interest in the realty, and a grant of it is a licence of a profit à prendre. This right was in the owner of a manor. There was no right of free warren in the manor. An Act of Parliament, reciting that there is within and parcel of the said manor a certain stinted pasture, called Bailey Hope," that J. G., as lord of the manor, was owner of the soil thereof, and was "entitled to all mines and minerals within and under the same, and to other rights, royalties, liberties, and privileges in and over the same," that he and all the owners of tenements thereon, were entitled to cattle-gates, and rights of turbary thereon; and that for the purposes of improvement it was desirable to allot the stinted pasture, in severalty, among the persons entitled to the cattle-gates, enacted that it should be so allotted; and made each allotment freehold to all intents and purposes," but, provided that nothing therein contained, shall prejudice, &c., the rights, &c., of J. G., his heirs and assigns, lords of the manor of N., to any seignories, &c. belonging to such manor: 'but that the said J. G., his heirs and assigns, shall, and may at all times hereafter enjoy all rents, services, &c., and also all right of hunting, shooting, fishing and fowling, on, through, and over the said stinted pasture, and every part and allotment thereof, and all other seignories, royalties and privileges to the lord of the said manor of N., for the time being, incident or *belonging (other than those declared to be barred by this Act), in as full a manner as if this Act had not been passed: Held, that this proviso did not apply to mere manorial rights, but that the exclusive right of hunting and shooting over the allotments was thereby reserved to J. G. Greathead v. Morley (2) questioned. In this case an action had been brought by Sir J. Robert Graham, Bart., against William Ewart, and by the order of Mr. Justice CROWDER, the questions between the parties being questions of law were stated in a special case for the opinion of the Court. The facts thus stated were these: The plaintiff is son of Sir James Graham, Bart., deceased, who, at the time of the passing of the Bailey Hope Inclosure Act, 51 Geo. III. c. x., was lord of the manor of Nicholforest, in the county of Northumberland, and the plaintiff is now the lord of that manor. The defendant is the owner of certain premises in the same manor, called Clint allotment and Woodside allotment. The tenements held of the manor are customary estates, alienable by deed, surrender, and admittance, and descendable from ancestor to heir, as of the hereditary right of the tenants, called tenant right, held of the lord of the manor for the time being, as of his manor, by rents, fines, heriots, and services, according to the custom, the soil and freehold of the manor being in the lord. 29 L. T. 370, 31 L. T. 309; Devonshire At the time of the passing of that Act (which is to form part of the case) (3), there was within and parcel of the manor *a tract of (1) Leconfield v. Dixon (1867) L. R. 2 Ex. 202, L. R. 3 Ex. 30, 34, 37 L. J. Ex. 33, 17 L. T. 288; Musgrave v. Forster (1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 590, 596, 40 L. J. Q. B. 207, 24 L. T. 614; Sowerby v. Smith (1873––1874) L. R. 8 C. P. 514, 517, L. R. 9 C. P. 524, 532, 42 L. J. C. P. 233, 43 L. J. C. P. 290, R.R.-VOL. CXV. (2) 60 R. R. 479 (3 Man. & G. 139). (3) The Act recites, "that Sir James Graham, Bart., is lord of the manor of Nicholforest, &c., and there is within and parcel of the said manor a certain 12 1859. July 4, 5. Lord CAMPBELL, L.C. Lord BROUGHAM. Lord CRANWORTH. Lord The following attended: WIGHTMAN, J. WILLIAMS, J. WILLES, J. WATSON, B. [ *332 ] [ *333 ] |