COMPANY v. LAND TAX HERTFORD. [ *144 ] NEW RIVER redeemed, and it was agreed by Mr. Hugh Hill that this was to be taken to be so, except we were informed to the contrary. We have not been so informed; and assuming, therefore, that the SIONERS FOR land tax has *been redeemed, we think the Governor and Company are not liable in respect of the springs, as we consider the redemption relieves the land and all its natural production and profits from further tax, although it may be that it was not known at the time of the redemption that they existed. The case of The Charing Cross Bridge Company v. Mitchell (1) is clearly distinguishable. The hereditament there was an entirely new one, created by an Act of Parliament, and not any part of the natural production and profit of the soil. [ *145] As to the first question it was contended, that upon the true construction of the Act, the land tax should, in the first instance, be imposed upon the land covered with water belonging to the corporation of the Governor and Company, and that the counties. of Hertford and Middlesex, through which the New River runs, were entitled to have the tax paid, in respect of the lands therein respectively, towards the contribution imposed upon them, and that the 57th section was applicable only to the net profits of the undertaking which were ultimately to be divided amongst the shareholders. To this it was answered, that no instance could be shown of two assessments to the land tax in respect of the same property, and that the meaning and intention of the Legislature was, that the entire land tax payable in respect of the New River property should be paid under the provisions of the 57th section; that in all probability these provisions were inserted by agreement between the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer and the New River Company and the various other public bodies mentioned in it, and that the contemporaneous usage, continued without interruption for nearly sixty years, was very strong evidence. that this was so. That no *injustice whatever was done to Hertfordshire or Middlesex, as the sums imposed upon them were no doubt proportionably reduced, and that upon London increased, by reason of the New River land tax being payable exclusively there. We think the latter argument by much the more cogent, and that it ought to prevail; and that, according to the true. construction of the Act, no other land tax is payable upon the property of the New River Company, as it existed in 1798, than that imposed by the 57th section. We think the most express and clear words would be necessary to justify us in disturbing a system of taxation which has existed for so (1) 99 R. R. 609 (4 El. & Bl. 549). COMPANY v. LAND TAX HERTFORD. long a period, unquestioned and acquiesced in by all parties NEW RIVER interested; and it is certain that no words of this character are to be found in the Act. As to the second question, we think that the land tax is SIONERS FOR payable in respect of land subsequently purchased by the New River Company. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that the New River Company, by purchasing land in Hertfordshire, could withdraw it from its liability to contribute to the land tax imposed upon that county; it would be most unjust that such should be the consequence, and we think it was not so intended, and that land purchased by the New River Company, subsequently to the passing of the Act in 1798, remains in their hands subject to contribution to the Hertfordshire land tax, in like manner as when it was in the possession of the vendors. Our answer to the questions proposed to us therefore is, that the taxation of the property of the New River Company, as it existed in 1798, is to be made exclusively under the 57th section. That as to newly purchased property it remains taxable as before; and that, as to the wells, the land tax is redeemed by the redemption of the land out of which they issue. GREEN v. STEVENS (1). (2 H. & N. 146-148; S. C. 5 W. R. 497.) In an interpleader issue to try whether certain goods were the property of the plaintiff as against the defendant, the execution creditor; it was proved that the goods were, at the time of the seizure, in the possession of the execution debtor to whom they had been let by the plaintiff. The goods were in fact the property of W., who had lent them to the plaintiff, who was his agent, allowing her to let them as owner to whom she would: Held, that the plaintiff had sustained her claim. THIS was an interpleader issue, in which the question was whether certain goods which had been seized in execution by the sheriff upon a judgment in a case of Stevens v. Seaton were "the property of the plaintiff Mary Green, as against the defendant," the execution creditor. At the trial before the learned assessor, at the Court of Passage for the borough of Liverpool, it appeared that the goods in question consisted of the furniture of a house in which they were seized. The goods and house were in the possession of Jane Seaton, the defendant in the former suit, who was a prostitute. In the year 1856, these goods had been let with. the house, by the claimant Mary Green, to Jane Seaton; Green receiving the rent. But it appeared that the real owner of the house and goods was a man named Williams, and that Green was merely his agent, and dealt with the property for him, he (1) Richards v. Jenkins (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 344, 56 L. J. Q. B. 293. 1857. April 20. [146] not wishing his name to appear. The learned assessor told the jury that the question really was, whether the furniture was the property of the judgment debtor, Jane Seaton, and that if not, the sheriff had no right to seize it; and if they thought that the furniture was the property of Williams, but that he had lent it to Green, and allowed her to let it as owner to whom she would, they ought to find for the plaintiff. Brett moved for a new trial: The goods were in the actual possession of Jane Seaton, the execution debtor. The claimant, Mary Green, not being in actual possession, was bound to show a title to the property in herself. (POLLOCK, C. B.: The issue in the present case is, *not whether the goods were the property of Mary Green absolutely, but whether they were hers as against the defendant. My impression is, that this form of issue has been adopted for the express purpose of enabling any person lawfully entitled to possession to sustain his claim.) In Gadsden v. Barrow (1) it was held that it was competent to the execution creditor to defeat the title of the claimant, who alleged that he was entitled under a bill of sale, by proving a prior bill of sale to a third party. It was said that the plaintiff had no right to set up a claim unless the goods were his property. (BRAMWELL, B.: Is not the question whether the claimant has such a title as would enable her to maintain an action against the sheriff ?) In Green v. Rogers (2) CRESSWELL, J., said, that no one had any right to interfere with the seizure except a person who had the property in the goods, and that the sole question therefore was, whether the goods were the property of the claimant. Chase v. Goble (3) confirms this doctrine. Here Williams, the party really interested, should have been the claimant. (MARTIN, B.: Green being lawfully entitled to the possession of these goods, by the permission of Williams, it matters not, for the purpose of this issue, that Williams might have taken the goods from her.) POLLOCK, C. B.: I am of opinion that the Judge was right, and there will therefore be no rule. MARTIN, B., concurred. BRAMWELL, B.: In an interpleader issue the plaintiff must make out his title, but he may do so by showing that *he has such a right to the goods that they cannot be taken from him by the execution creditor. In the present case the Judge appears to have said that it was not necessary to show that the goods were absolutely the property of the claimant if they were hers in any sense. I think that this was a just remark, and that if a claimant has any sort of title it must be taken that he has a right to defend it until the contrary is shown. If it is shown that he has a lawful title to the possession, that is enough. Thus, if a person lends a horse to a friend, who leaves it at a livery stable, and the horse is seized under an execution, the bailee may establish his claim to the possession in an interpleader issue. But if a butler were to lend his master's plate he could not sustain a claim to it in an interpleader, though the execution debtor had not any right to take it. I think that the decision. in the case of Gadsden v. Barrow (1) was correct. CHANNELL, B.: The I agree that there ought to be no rule in this case. evidence showed that the judgment debtor, who was in possession of the goods, had no title as against Mary Green. It is said that Mary Green had no title under the loan by Williams to her. But she obtained possession, and gave it over to the judgment debtor, and the question is, not whether Williams had a right to the goods, but whether the property was in Mary Green, as against the judgment debtor, to whom she had delivered them. GREEN V. STEVENS. [ *148 ] Rule refused. IN RE WILLIAM DAVIS (2). (2 H. & N. 149-150; S. C. 26 L. J. M. C. 178; 5 W. R. 522.) A commitment under the 4th section of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 Geo. IV c. 83, stated that the prisoner being a suspected person, on &c., at the railway station in the parish of &c., the same being at the time a place of public resort, did frequent the platform of the said station with intent to commit felony Held sufficient. THIS was an application for a writ of habeas corpus, to bring up the body of William Davis, who was committed to the house of correction at Swaffham, in the county of Norfolk, under the following warrant of commitment. "Whereas William Davis was this day duly convicted before 1857. April 24. [ 149 ] In re DAVIS. [150] me J. R. T., one of the justices for the county of Norfolk, as a rogue and vagabond: For that he, the said William Davis, being a suspected person, on the 3rd day of March, A.D. 1857, at the railway station in the parish of Downham Market, in the said county, the same being, at the time, a place of public resort, did frequent the platform of the said station with intent to commit felony, contrary to the form of the statute, &c. ; and was by me adjudged to be committed for his said offence to the house of correction, to be kept to hard labour for the space of three calendar months. These are therefore to command you," &c. Langford now moved accordingly: The commitment is bad. It purports to be made under the 4th section of the Vagrant Act, 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, which enacts, "that every suspected person or reputed thief, frequenting any river, canal or navigable stream, dock or basin, or any quay, wharf, or warehouse near or adjoining thereto, or any street, highway, or avenue leading thereto, or any place of public resort, or any avenue leading thereto, or any street, highway, or place adjacent, with intent to commit felony," &c., "shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond." Therefore it ought to appear, on the face of the commitment, that the place *frequented was one of those specified. This commitment, however, merely states that the prisoner frequented the platform of the railway station. The Court will not take judicial notice of a platform of a railway station, and the commitment should have averred that it was a place of public resort. Where a commitment stated that the prisoner, being a suspected person, did unlawfully frequent a certain street, to wit Regent Street, with intent to commit felony, that was held bad, for not showing that Regent Street was a place of public resort, or adjacent to one: In re Jones (1). (POLLOCK, C. B.: Here it is stated, that at a railway station, being a public place, the prisoner frequented a particular part of it.) It is not every part of a railway station which is public, and this might have been a private part of the platform. In Webster's Dictionary nine definitions are given of the word "platform," and the Court cannot tell in which sense it is here used. (BRAMWELL, B.: If the commitment had merely stated that the prisoner frequented a "platform," that would have been bad, but it states that he frequented the platform of the said station," and that is stated to be a place of public resort. (1) 7 Ex. 586. |