farm but had not received wages. The case for the plaintiff was, that there was further a bargain for wages at 4s. a week; but for the defendant the case was, that there was no mention of wages. MARTIN, B.: The question is, whether there was a bargain for wages; because if work is done and there is no bargain for payment, either express or to be implied from such circumstances as show an understanding on both sides that payment shall be made, an action cannot be maintained for remuneration merely because it may appear to be reasonable. Verdict for the plaintiff. SPENCELEY v. GREENWOOD. (1 F. & F. 297-299.) Taking a bill from a new firm does not per se discharge the old firm, and it is a question for the jury whether it was taken in satisfaction and discharge. The new firm have not authority to bind the old firm, without the authority of the retiring members, by acceptances in its name, for the debts of the old firm; but when such an acceptance has been given in renewal of a bill given by the old firm, the liability of the retiring members on the old bill remains. ACTION on three bills of exchange-3rd April, 1857, for 541.; 16th May, 1857, for 4971.; and the 15th July, 1857, for 5291., accepted by the defendants Greenwood, Airey, and Fearnley Pleas as to all the bills: exoneration, and other bills given in satisfaction; set-off and payment. To the third bill it was pleaded, that it was given and taken in satisfaction of the first, and also that the defendants did not accept it. The defendant Fearnley pleaded bankruptcy, and a nolli prosequi was entered. E. James and Prentice for the plaintiff. Pigott, Serjt., and J. Brown, for the defendants. The defendants had been in partnership, and bills wer accepted by them for goods consigned to them by th plaintiff. On the 25th June, 1857, the partnership was dissolved, a on the 3rd July gazetted. A correspondence had taken place, whence it appeared t Fearnley was to remain and carry on the business with Abbott, the other defendants retiring. The plaintiff asser to this change on the 3rd August, and took a bill for 34 drawn by him on and accepted in the name of "Fearnley .. v. [ *298 ] Abbott," but which it appeared had been *accepted by Fearnley SPENCELEY without the authority of Abbott, who had never actually joined GREENWOOD. him in partnership. The plaintiff complained of this when he discovered it; and on the 6th of August, the bill of 3rd April coming due, he took the bill of the 15th July, drawn upon and accepted in the name of Greenwood & Co., but accepted by Fearnley in that name, without any express authority from the retiring members. The letter of 16th May was admitted to have been renewed. The plaintiff admitted that he held consignments to a large amount, but not covering all the bills, including that for 3381. Pigott, Serjt., proposed to make this evidence a set-off. Sed per CROWDER, J.: The plaintiff has a lien upon the goods to the total amount of his unsatisfied claims, and there is no case for set-off. E. James proposed to put in the correspondence as to the bill for 3381. Pigott, Serjt., objected that it was irrelevant. Sed per CROWDER, J.: It is admissible as explaining the transactions, and as evidence that the plaintiff could not have meant to take the bill of the 15th July in satisfaction of the bill of April. Pigott, Serjt.: The plaintiff cannot recover either on the bill of April or of July. The bill of July was accepted by the members of a new firm without the authority of the old, and after it was dissolved. It did not bind the retiring members, but it bound Fearnley, and it satisfied the former bill. CROWDER, J. (to the jury): The mere taking of the bill would not satisfy the former one, unless it was meant to give up the former one; and the question for you is, whether *that was intended by the plaintiff. It may be taken, that Fearnley had no authority to accept a bill in the name of the old firm after the partnership was dissolved, even for a debt of the old firm. But if he had not such authority, then the bill so given having been drawn upon the old firm and not accepted by them, it was not the bill which the plaintiff intended to take at all, and therefore hardly a bill which he would have taken in satisfaction. Verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of the R.R.-VOL. CXV. 58 1858. [317] [318] OSBORN v. VEITCH. (1 F. & F. 317–318.) A threat to shoot a person, coupled with the act of presenting a loaded fire-arm at him, although it is at "half-cock," is in law an assault. And a charge of an attempt to shoot may justify a policeman in arresting (1). TRESPASS and assault. Pleas: Not guilty, and son assault demesne. Issue. Shee, Serjt., and Hawkins, for the plaintiffs. Edwin James and F. J. Smith for the defendants. The plaintiffs were owners of a field in which the defendants were walking with loaded guns at half-cock in their hands. The plaintiffs desired them to withdraw and give their names, and on their refusal advanced towards them apparently as if to apprehend them. The defendants *half raised their guns, which they pointed towards them, and threatened to shoot them. The plaintiffs (one of whom was a constable) then gave them in charge to a policeman for shooting with intent, and he, with their assistance, seized and handcuffed them. E. James submitted that there was no assault; as the guns were only at half-cock, there was no "present ability" to execute the threat. Sed per WILLes, J.: Pointing a loaded gun at a person is in law an assault. It is immaterial that it is at half-cock; cocking it is an instantaneous act, and there is a "present ability " of doing the act threatened, for it can be done in an instant. E. James: The assault was in self-defence; the defendants were only trespassers, and there was an attempt to apprehend them, and excess is not even assigned. WILLES, J.: It was not necessary that it should be. To shoot a man is not a lawful way of repelling an assault. No doubt the charge of shooting with intent was idle, and the assault was only a misdemeanor. The handcuffing was utterly unlawful. Verdict for the plaintiffs, damages one farthing. (1) The latter part of this head-note does not seem to represent anything laid down by Willes, J. It must not be assumed that presenting even an unloaded fire-arm could not in any circumstances be an assault.-F. P. COOKSON v. FRYER. (1 F. & F. 328-330.) An assignment from the sheriff under a fi. fa. on a judgment obtained by a friendly creditor, with intent to preserve the use of the property to the debtor and defeat another execution, although the transaction will be of no greater force than an assignment from the debtor, will be valid, provided there was a real debt, and the assignment by the sheriff was bonâ fide. INTERPLEADER issue between claimant and execution creditor. Montague Chambers and Hawkins for the defendant. The plaintiff was an attorney and had a claim for costs against one T., for which he got judgment and issued execution. He had taken a bill of sale of the furniture of T. from the sheriff, and avowed that his object in issuing execution, (which was put in pending the action,) was to secure the furniture against the defendant's execution, and secure the use of it to the family of T., who had since remained in possession. The plaintiff's writ of summons *issued on the 9th June, a day or two before judgment signed in the action by defendant, and the writ of fi. fa. was on the 11th, the day defendant signed judgment. The under-sheriff's deputy proved the bill of sale, and stated that the seal had been affixed to it by him according to long practice and usage in the office. * WILLES, J. (to the jury): It is as though T. had, instead of letting judgment be recovered against him, assigned the goods to the plaintiff, it being intended to vest the property in him, in the belief that he would permit the debtor's family to enjoy its use; that might be perfectly valid, but the judgment would have no greater effect than a bill of sale under such circumstances. Under an execution the judgment creditor may take an assignment of the goods on a fair valuation; if it were unfair the transaction would be set aside; and if there was no debt, and the transaction was merely a sham, then it would not stand. Although the *object was to defeat the defendant's execution, the proceeding would be valid. 1858. [328] [ *329 ] [ *330 ] Verdict for the plaintiff. COLEMAN v. RAWLINSON. (1 F. & F. 330.) The sheriff's assignment of a term is sufficient, without an actual seizure of the lease. EJECTMENT for a term by assignee of the sheriff under a writ of fi. fa. 1858. [330] COLEMAN c. RAWLINSON. 1858. [331] [ *332 ] The judgment, writ and assignment having been proved, Woollett, for the defendant, objected that there was no proof of an actual seizure of the lease or of the property. WILLES, J.: That is unnecessary; the assignment is sufficient evidence of the seizure. The sheriff, under the fi. fa., could not enter on the land; he could only seize the lease, and that need not be seized to give validity to an assignment. Verdict for the plaintiff. WOOD v. KEEP. (1 F. & F. 331-332.) In an action upon a contract to purchase leasehold premises, sold by auction on the terms of a prospectus overstating the rental, the false statement, even notwithstanding the usual provision against errors of description, will vitiate the contract, either under a plea of fraud, or a traverse of readiness and willingness. ACTION on an agreement to purchase leasehold property. Breach non-payment of the purchase-money. General averment of performance, readiness and willingness, &c. Plea: fraud. Hawkins and Malcolm for the plaintiff. Montague Chambers for the defendant. The plaintiff had sold under a prospectus in these terms: "Leasehold premises to be sold by auction, the whole being held at the extremely low rent of 52l. 10s. per annum, now let at the yearly rent of 100l., leaving a net annual rental of 471. 10s. per annum." They were held on a term of which a short residue was unexpired. The prospectus was placed before the bidders in the auction-room. The defendant agreed to purchase for 521., but the whole rental was only 60l. a year, so that the profit rent was only 81. It contained the usual provision, "that no error of description of the property, or of the vendor's interest therein, should vitiate the sale." This was relied on for the defendant, and it was also insisted *that there should be proof of the scienter, and that the misdescription was wilful. Sed per WILLES, J.: This is not a mere misdescription, and even if it were by mistake, it is one of those gross mistakes, to the advantage of the party making it, which in law vitiates a contract. The only question is, whether the description was false; but to support it, it must be proved that the rental was 100l. a year. The defendant was bound to know what it was as he professed to state it, |