emies' property even though those enemies be rebels against the gov-
ernment and, therefore, guilty of treason. The Confiscation Cases, 221
14. Congress has power to legislate for the enforcement of any right
granted by the constitution; but the power must be exercised ac-
cording to the nature of the grant or guaranty. If it only be that
congress or the legislature of a state shall not pass laws for abridg.
ing the right, it is a guaranty against acts of the government only,
state or federal, and not against the acts of individuals; and in such
case congress has not power to legislate over the subject generally;
but only to provide remedies or redress in case the legislature or con-
gress itself (as the case may be) should violate the prohibition. The
fourteenth amendment of the constitution does not change the power
of congress in this respect. The United States v. Cruikshank, 308
15. The thirteenth amendment confers upon congress full power to legis-
late on the subject of slavery, and to pass all laws it may deem prop-
er for its entire eradication in every form. The civil rights act of
1866 was within this power.
Ib.
16. The fifteenth amendment does not confer upon congress the power to
regulate the right to vote generally; but only to provide against dis-
crimination on account of race, color or previous condition of servi-
tude. Congress, therefore, cannot legislate in reference to any inter-
ference with the right to vote, which does not proceed from that
cause, unless in elections of senators or representatives. A conspir-
acy to prevent a colored person from voting is no more a United
States offense than a conspiracy to prevent a white person from
voting, unless entered into by reason of the voter's race, color or pre-
vious condition of servitude.
Ib.
17. An act of the legislature of Texas whereby a railroad company was
incorporated and a grant of lands made on certain conditions to be
performed by the company is a contract between the state and the
company within the meaning of section 10, article I of the constitu-
tion of the United States. Gray v. Davis,
420
18. A provision of the constitution of Texas adopted subsequently to the
passage of such an act, annulling it, impairs the obligation of the
contract, and is therefore void.
Ib.
19. The state of Texas granted lands to a railroad company on certain cou-
ditions which the company performed. A provision in a new con-
stitution of the state purported to annul the grant, and the governor
commenced signing patents to private parties for lands included in
the grant: Held, that a bill in equity filed against "Edmund J.
Davis, Governor of Texas" to restrain him from issuing patents for
lands included in the grant, is not a suit against the state of Texas
within the meaning of article XI of amendments to the constitution
of the United States.
Io.
20. The fact, that when the state of Georgia applied for readmission to the
Union, under the constitution of 1868, congress imposed certain con-
ditions, does not make that constitution an act of congress, or tanta-
mount to such an act. Marsh et al v. Burroughs et al.,
21. A state can no more pass a law violating a contract by means of a
convention, than it can by means of a legislature; and a constitution
adopted by a state, with a view to its admission or readmission, or
after its admission into the Union, must be regarded as a law of the
state, and amenable to the prohibitory clauses of the constitution.
Ib.
22. The final portion of art. V, sec. XVI, subdivision 1 of the constitution
of Georgia, of 1868, which throws the burden of proof on the plaintiff
to show that bills sued on have never been used in aid of the rebel
lion, if only the defendant swears that he has reason to believe tha
they were so used, is not constitutional.
Ib
23 The act of the legislature of Georgia, approved October 13, 1870, which
provided that in all suits brought in any court of the state, founded
on any debt or contract made before June 1, 1865, or in renewal there
of, the plaintiff should not have verdict or judgment unless the court
was satisfied that all taxes upon said debt or contract had been paid
for each year since the incurring or making thereof, and that in every
trial upon such debt or contract, the fact that the same had been
legally returned for taxes, and the taxes paid thereon, should be a
condition precedent to a recovery; impairs the obligation of contracts
and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Lathrop v. Brown, 474
24. Where a charge of misconduct is made against an officer, whether
amounting to an indictable offense, or only to his discredit as such
officer, which might furnish grounds for his removal or impeach-
ment, he is not bound to be a witness against himself. The United
States v. Collins,
499
25. An inquisitorial examination, under oath, of a party charged with an
offense or misconduct, would infringe the spirit if not the letter of
the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and
would be repugnant to the principles of personal liberty embodied
in the common law.
Ib.
26. A statute of Georgia which took effect March 16, 1869, and which de-
clares that all actions upon contracts, etc., which accrued prior to June
1, 1865, shall be brought before January 1, 1870, or both the right and
right of action shall be barred, does not impair the obligation of con-
tracts and is not unconstitutional. Samples v. The Bank,
27. The marriage relation between white persons and persons of African
descent is prohibited, and declared null and void by the law of
Georgia: Held, that marriage laws are under the control of the states
and that the law named is not annulled or affected by the civil rights
bill of congress or the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States. Ex rel. Hobbs and Johnson,
537
28. A law or ordinance which revives a claim already barred by the statute
of limitations interferes with vested rights, and is unconstitutional.
Lockhart o. Horn.
See STATUTES CONSTRUED, 13, 14, 15.
CONTEMPT. See PRACTICE IN EQUITY, 71, 72.
1. Where parties are in treaty by letter and telegraph to make a contract,
there must be a distinct offer on one hand and an acceptance of it on
the other, showing a concurrence of the minds of the parties upon all
the terms of the contract before either party is bound. Deshon v. Fos-
dick & Co.,
286
2. A., in Boston, was in correspondence with B., in New Orleans, in
reference to the chartering of a ship to B. to carry freights from New
Orleans to Europe, and represented that the ship would sail from
Boston for New Orleans on a day certain. Held, that the represen-
tation amounted to a warranty that the ship would sail on that day.
The ship did not sail for two days after the time fixed; therefore, B.
was not bound.
16.
3. A mariner having repeatedly asked for his wages without receiving
them, and being in a strange land, in great need of money, agreed to
take one-third the amount due him in full payment, and release the
ship and owners, and on payment of one-third the amount due,
signed a receipt in full: Held, that the agreement to take less than the
whole amount due was nudum pactum, and the receipt no bar to a re-
covery for the balance due. Savin v. The Juno,
300
4. The owners of a steamer entered into a contract for the carriage of 70.000
staves, in which was this stipulation: we agree to forfeit $1,000 if
we fail to carry out this contract." The contract was partly per-
formed by the carriage of 57,000 staves, and the part performance ac-
cepted. Held, that the contract provided for a penalty to cover actual
damages, and did not provide for liquidated damages, and as no actual
damage was shown, none was allowed: Taylor v. Steamer Marcella, 302
5. A contract for the purchase of cotton made during the late war of the
rebellion, by a subject of the king of Norway and Sweden, domiciled
in the city of New York, with a citizen of the state of Texas, actu-
ally residing therein at the date of the contract, was void as against
public policy and the laws of war and the spirit of the legislation of
congress. Habricht v. Alexander's Executor,
413
6. The obligation of a contract is what the parties intended by it when
they entered into it. To ascertain the meaning of a contract, the
courts are authorized to consider the circumstances cf the parties at
the time they made it. Van Epps v. Walsh et al,
See ATTACHMENT. ACTION AT LAW, 2. COMMON CARRIERS, 15, 16, 17.
COMPROMISE. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26.
CONTRIBUTION. See AVERAGE.
1. The ownership of stock does not give the stockholder any legal estate
in the property of the corporation. Morgan v. The Railroad Co. et al.,
2. The appropriate party to sue for an injury done or threatened to a
corporation is the corporation itself, acting by its legal officers and
managers, and not the stockholders.
Ib.
8. A corporate body created by the laws of one state may maintain an ac-
tion in the state or federal courts of another state. The Insurance Co.
v. The "C. D. Jr.,"
4. Unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock of a company are corporate
property, constituting a trust fund which can be reached by the
creditors in a court of equity. Marsh et al v. Burroughs et al., 463
5. The amount subscribed, and not the sums actually paid in, is the capital
stock of the company.
Ib.
Sce BANKRUPTCY, 31. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 11, 12. CITIZENSHIP, 4.
JURISDICTION, 12, 18. STATUTES CONSTRUED, 8. STOCKHOLDER.
1. The correspondence between a district attorney, representing the United
States, and the attorney general, is confidential in its nature and can-
not be cited by third persons. United States v. Six Lots of Ground, 234
2. When parties are in treaty by letter and telegraph to make a contract
there must be a distinct offer on one hand and an acceptance of it or
the other, showing a concurrence of the minds of the parties upon al1
the terms of the contract, before either party is bound. Deshon v. Fos
dick & Co.,
COTTON-BALE TIE. See PATENTS, 6, 9, 10, 23, 24, 25.
CREDITORS. See BANKRUPTCY, 27, 29.
CROSS LIBEL. See ADMIRALTY, 3.
CUSTOM. See COMMON CARRIERS, 7, 8, 16, 18.
DAMAGES. See ACTION AT LAW, 2.
ADMIRALTY, 1, 12, 21, 24. AT.
TACHMENT. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. MERGER, 3.
1. By the exception "dangers of the sea," as used in bills of lading, is
meant all unavoidable accidents from which common carriers by the
general law are not excused unless they arise from the act of God.
Dibble &. Seligson v. Morgan,
2. A loss which might have been avoided by proper foresight and pru-
dence cannot be attributed to "dangers of the sea," and to relieve
the carrier from liability for such loss, he must show that due dili-
gence and proper skill were used to avoid the accident, and that it
was unavoidable.
Ib.
DEBT, ACTION OF. See ACTION AT LAW, 4.
DECISIONS OF STATE COURTS, WHEN BINDING ON FEDERAL
1. The decision of the state courts of Georgia that the statute passed in 1826,
and reenacted in 1831, by which the surety or indorser of a promis
sory note, after it has become due, may require the holder to proceed
to collect the same, and if he does not proceed so to do within three
months after such requisition, the indorser or surety shall be no
longer liable, does not apply where the principal does not reside in
the state - that he cannot be compelled to go out of the state_to sue
the principal, is binding on the federal courts in Georgia. Davie v.
Hatcher, Ex'x,
456
2. In passing upon questions of general commercial law the federal courts
are not bound by the decisions of the courts of the state where the
contract in question was made or is sought to be enforced. Jewett v.
Hone,
DELIVERY. See COMMON CARRIERS, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
DEPUTY CLERK. See JURISDICTION, 5. STATUTES CONSTRUED, 4.
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY. See BANKRUPTCY, 6, 9, 25.
DISCOVERY. See PRACTICE IN EQUITY, 7, 8, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53.
DISTRICT COURT. See PRACTICE at Law, 7.
DUTIES. See STATUTES CONSTRUED, 2.
A soldier is bound to obey only the lawful orders of his superior offi
cers. United States v. Carr,
480
1. A tax payer, who is liable to be assessed for the public taxes that will be
necessary to pay the state debt and interest thereon, cannot maintain
a private suit against the state officers to prevent them from executing
and issuing bouds which the legislature has unconstitutionally au-
thorized and required to be issued. Morgan v. Graham,
124
2. It is a general rule that an individual cannot maintain a private suit for
an injury which he sustains in common with every other citizen. Ib.
3. The proper administration of the government in its several departments
cannot be enforced by private actions brought by any tax payer or
voter interested in the good government of the country.
4. A bill in equity against a board of levee commissioners to obtain, by
means of the enforcement of the levy and collection of a tax by
them, payment of money due on bonds, which they had issued under
authority of an act of the legislature, and which directed them to
levy an annual tax to pay the interest, and to create a sinking fund
for the payment of the principal of the bonds, cannot be maintained
as a bill to enforce the specific performance of a contract. Heine v.
The Levee Commissioners,
5. Nor can such a bill brought by the holders of the bonds against the
board of levee commissioners be maintained as a bill for an account. Ib.
6. A court of equity has general jurisdiction of liens, inasmuch as a court
of law cannot, except by execution, order a sale of the property
which is subject to the lien, and cannot conveniently distribute the
proceeds to those who may be entitled thereto.
7. A bill praying that a board of levee commissioners, the state district
judge or a receiver or commissioner to be appointed by the court, be
required to levy a tax for the purpose of raising the money alleged
to be due to complainants, in a case where no judgment has been
obtained, cannot be maintained.
Ib.
8. Courts of equity will not grant relief against a judgment at law except
when the injured party has had a verdict or judgment rendered
against him in consequence of accident or mistake or fraud of the
other party without any fault of his own, and has no remedy, or has
without fault lost his remedy at law. Railroad Co. v. Neal, 353
9. Where a motion had been made on the law side of the court to set aside
a verdict and judgment and grant a new trial, and had been overruled:
upon a bill in equity filed for relief against the judgment, on the
ground that it was unjust, and there was a good defense, that the de
fendant in the case at law had been surprised on the trial, and that
he did not have a full and fair hearing on the motion for a new trial
in consequence of the indisposition of his counsel, this court sitting
in equity refused the relief and dismissed the bill.
Ib
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