sumed authority to contract for him in those matters which are entrusted to her management. 2. If the husband refuses to maintain her, unless for a sufficient cause, she becomes invested by law with an authority to supply herself with necessaries upon his credit. 1. A wife, during cohabitation with her husband, has a pre- Authority sumptive authority to contract for her husband in all matters from co presumed which are usually entrusted to a wife, as for the supply of habitation. goods for the use of herself and household suitable to the condition in which they live (a). Similarly, a woman living with a man, as his wife, and represented by him to be his wife, though they are not married, is presumed to have authority to bind him by her contracts for articles suitable to that station which he permits her to assume (b). A wife who is permitted by her husband to remain the mistress of his establishment, though he has separated from her, has the same authority (c). rity. The authority of the wife arising from mere cohabitation Revocation may be revoked by the husband; and it is sufficient if such of autho revocation is notified to the wife without notice of it reaching the party dealing with her (d). The existence of the authority of the wife during cohabitation is a question of fact for the jury to decide; but there is a presumption in favour of the authority in the absence of evidence to the contrary (e). procure ne 2. A wife may also have authority to bind her husband Authority from necessity. This necessity arises where the husband fails of wife to in his duty to maintain his wife, and she has no funds to cessaries. maintain herself. A husband is bound by law to maintain his wife in a manner suitable to his station in life (ƒ); and if he fails to supply such maintenance, except under certain (a) Montague v. Benedict, 2 Smith, L. C., 5th ed. 408; Seaton v. Benedict, ib. 415; Lane v. Ironmonger, 13 M. & W. 368; Reid v. Teakle, 13 C. B. 627; Renaux v. Teakle, 8 Ex. 680; Jewsbury v. Newbold, 26 L. J. Ex. 247. (b) Munro v. De Chemant, 4 Camp. 215; Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167; and see Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460. (c) Norton v. Fazan, 1 Bos. & P. 226; explained by Willes, J., Cooper (d) Jolly v. Rees, 15 C. B. N. S. (e) See the cases cited above. (f) See the first resolution agreed by all the judges in Manby v. Scott, 2 Smith's L. C., 5th ed. 375. Where wife has suffi cient funds. circumstances which justify him in withholding it, his wife has an authority to pledge his credit to procure it, which is based upon necessity (a). As long as the husband is able and willing to maintain his wife in his own house, there is no necessity for her seeking maintenance elsewhere, and she has no authority to pledge his credit to obtain it (b). Where the conduct of the husband is such as to compel the wife to leave his house, it is equivalent to a refusal on his part to maintain her there; and, unless she is provided. with a sufficient maintenance, she is entitled to pledge his credit for necessaries elsewhere (c). Thus, where she leaves the husband's house under a reasonable apprehension of personal violence, she is so entitled (d); and it seems that the husband, by living in adultery with another woman in the house, would justify his wife leaving it, and entitle her to pledge his credit for necessaries (e). Where the husband was unable himself to maintain his wife, by reason of being confined in a lunatic asylum, it was held she had an authority to pledge his credit for necessaries (ƒ). The authority of the wife, arising from the refusal of the husband to maintain her, to provide herself with necessaries upon his credit cannot be revoked or extinguished by the husband, even by an express notice to the person who supplies her with necessaries (g). The wife is under no necessity, and has no authority in law to pledge her husband's credit, if she has in fact sufficient funds to provide for herself necessaries suitable to her condition in life (h). A decree for alimony obtained by the (a) Manby v. Scott, 1st resolution supra; Read v. Legard, 6 Ex. 636; 20 L. J. Ex. 309; Johnson v. Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261; 27 L. J. Ex. 341. (b) Child v. Hardyman, 2 Str. 875; Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200; Johnson v. Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261, 266; 27 L.J. Ex. 341, 344. (c) Per Lord Kenyon, Hodges v. Hodges, 1 Esp. 441; Boulton v. Prentice, 2 Str. 1214; S. C. Selwyn's N. P. 12th ed. 334. (d) Houliston v. Smyth, 3 Bing. 127. (e) Ib. 130; dissenting from Hor wood v. Heffer, 3 Taunt. 421. (f) Read v. Legard, 6 Ex. 636; and see Davidson v. Wood, 32 L. J. C. 400. (g) Boulton v. Prentice, 2 Str. 1214; Selw. N. P. 12th ed. 334; and see Etherington v. Parrot, 1 Salk. 118; per Lord Campbell, L.C., Jenner v. Morris, 3 De G. F. & J. 45, 51; 30 L. J. C. 361, 362. (h) Hodgkinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70; Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 82; Holt v. Brien, 4 B. & Ald. 252; Mizen v. Pick, 3 M. & W. 481; Johnson v. Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261; 27 L. J. Ex. 341. wife is held to be primâ facie evidence that the sum is sufficient in amount, the decree being founded on proof given to the Court of the situation in life of the parties (a). An agreement made between the husband and wife, upon a separation by mutual consent, as to the amount of her allowance is prima facie evidence of its sufficiency; and the husband cannot be charged without proof of its insufliciency (b). But if the alimony under the decree, or the allowance under the agreement, is not paid, the wife is under a necessity to pledge her husband's credit for her maintenance, and has authority to do so (r). Where a husband on separation from his wife transferred property to trustees for her separate use, but it did not appear that the trustees had accepted the property, or that the wife had received any of it, the husband was held liable for necessaries supplied to her (d); and where the wife's separate property is not sufficient to afford her proper maintenance, the husband is bound to contribute (e). wife. A husband is not bound to maintain his wife after she has Adultery of committed adultery (f); and if he refuses to maintain her, she has no authority in law to pledge his credit for her maintenance (g). of wife must be Where the wife is living separate from her husband, Necessity there is no presumption that she has authority to bind him, even for necessaries; and it lies upon the party seek- proved. ing to charge the husband for necessaries supplied to her to prove that she has not in fact sufficient means to provide herself with necessaries, and is living apart from her husband under such circumstances as entitle her to render him liable (h). (a) Willson v. Smyth, 1 B. & Ad. 801. (b) Johnson v. Sumner, 3 II. & N. 261; 27 L. J. Ex. 341. (c) Nurse v. Craig, 2 B. & P. N. R. 148; Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 5 Bing. 550; and see Keegan v. Smith, 5 B. & C. 375. (d) Burrett v. Booty, 8 Taunt. 343. (e) See Davidson v. Wood, 32 L. J. C. 400. (f) R. v. Flintan, 1 B. & Ad. 227; see Hope v. Hope, 27 L. J. P. & M. 43. (h) Per Abbott, C.J., Mainwaring What are necessaries. Ratifica tion by Where a wife is entitled to procure her necessary maintenance at her husband's expense, the question may arise as to what are necessaries for which he may be charged, and is one of fact to be decided by the jury (a). Furniture for a house may be necessary for a wife in a station of life requiring her to live in a furnished house (b). Where it became necessary for a wife to exhibit articles of the peace against her husband, it was held that he was liable for the costs of an attorney employed by her on that occasion (e); and that an allowance made to her for maintenance could not be considered as applicable to that purpose (d). A prosecution of the husband for an assault on his wife was held to be a matter for which the husband could not be made liable to pay the cost (e). The costs of a proctor, employed by a wife in prosecuting a suit against her husband for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, may be recovered as a necessary, if there was reasonable cause for the suit (ƒ). A husband is not liable at law for money lent to his wife, though it was borrowed, and afterwards applied by her for the purpose of paying debts previously contracted for necessaries, or for the purpose of procuring necessaries for which she might have pledged his credit (g). A wife was requested by her husband to join him abroad, and borrowed money to enable her to pay her passage, which she did; it was held that the lender could not recover the amount from the husband (h). But in Equity, if a person lends money to a wife, being then entitled to charge her husband for necessaries, and she expends it in necessaries; or if a person pays money in discharge of the debts for necessaries supplied to the wife, he is entitled to charge the husband with the amount so lent or paid (i). A husband may become liable upon contracts made by his wife's con tracts. wife, in excess of her authority, if he subsequently ratifies husband of them (a). Thus, the husband may become liable to pay for articles ordered by his wife, without his authority, if he sanctions the use of them; and a husband may be taken to have sanctioned the use of, and so become liable for articles of dress or jewellery which his wife has ordered upon his credit, by seeing her wear them without disapprobation (b). So, where he has control over the goods improperly ordered by his wife, and does not return them (c). The husband may ratify the contract conditionally; and he then becomes liable only upon fulfilment of the condition; as, where goods had been supplied to his wife without his authority, and he subsequently promised to pay for them if he was not arrested, it was held that the creditor could charge him only subject to the condition as to the arrest (d). Contracts with persons in a state of insanity. A person may be afflicted with mental insanity to such a Insanity. degree as to render him incapable of understanding the matter of an agreement; but he is presumed by law to be of sound mind and capable of understanding an agreement until the contrary appears. Hence, every person, in his dealings with another, is entitled to consider him of sound mind, and capable of contracting, until he has notice to the contrary. But if a person enters into an agreement with another, knowing him to be at the time of unsound mind, and thereby incapable of understanding the agreement, he cannot enforce such agreement; if he brings an action upon it, the defendant may avoid its effect by pleading that he was insane at the time of making the agreement, and thereby incapable of understanding it, to the knowledge of the plaintiff (e). A lunatic may be charged upon his contracts for neces (a) See post, p. 268. (b) See Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631; Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28; 2 Smith, L. C. 5th ed. 408, 415. (c) Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp. 120. (d) Holt v. Brien, 4 B. & Ald. 252. (e) Sentance v. Poole, 3 C. & P. 1; |