contract being void, the pawnbroker's lien on the goods for the amount of the loan is void also (a).-The statute 17 Geo. III. c. 42, ss. 1, 2 enacted that bricks shall be made of a certain size, and imposed a penalty for default; the plaintiff having sold and delivered bricks which were under the statutable size, it was held that he could not recover the price (b).-The statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. ci. s. 3 enacted that upon a sale of coals delivered within twenty-five miles of the general post office, the seller should deliver to the purchaser a ticket in a certain form, and in default of so doing should be liable to a penalty of £20; it was held that a seller of coals, having neglected to deliver a ticket with certain coals sold and delivered, could not recover the price (c).—The statute 36 Geo. III. c. 86, s. 3 enacted that every farmer, etc., shall pack butter for sale in vessels marked and branded as required by the Act, under a penalty of £5 for every default; it was held that the Act prohibited the sale of butter in vessels not properly marked, and a farmer having sold butter in such vessels, the sale was void, and he could not recover the price (d).-By the statute commonly called the Tippling Act, 24 Geo. II. c. 40, s. 1, amended by 25 & 26 Vict. c. 38, the sale on credit of spirits in quantities of less value than twenty shillings to be consumed on the premises is prohibited; consequently, a debt for spirits sold contrary to the Act is void and cannot be recovered (e).-By 9 Geo. IV. c. 61, s. 18, the sale of exciseable liquors sold by retail to be consumed on the premises can only be carried on upon premises duly licensed; consequently, a sale of such liquors upon unlicensed premises is void (ƒ).—By the statute 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 63, s. 3, regulating the imperial standard of weights and measures for the sale of goods, the use of weights and measures different from the imperial standard is prohibited; consequently, contracts for the sale of goods by weights and measures contrary to the statute are void (g). -A printer cannot recover the price of printing a book unless he has complied with the provisions of the statute 39 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 27, by affixing his name to it (a); nor can he recover the price for printing unless his printing press is duly registered as required by statute (b).-The sale of game is regulated by 1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. 32, and a contract made contrary to the provisions of that statute is void (c). Persons carrying on certain trades and businesses are regulated by special statutes; and the contracts made by them. in those trades and businesses, without conforming to such statutes, are illegal and void, of which the following are examples:-By the statute 6 Anne, c. 16, it is required that all brokers within the City of London shall be duly licensed; and if a person exercises the business of a broker without being licensed according to the statute, he cannot maintain an action for his services and commission (d).—The statute 46 Geo. III. c. 43, s. 5, enacts that no person shall exercise the calling of an appraiser or act as such without taking out a license; consequently, it is held that if a person acts as an appraiser without being licensed as required by the statute he cannot recover the remuneration for his services (e).—A manufacturer of and dealer in tobacco, not duly licensed as required by the statute 6 Geo. IV. c. 81, cannot recover the price of tobacco sold by him (ƒ).—The Medical Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 32, enacts that no person shall be entitled to recover any charge for medical or surgical advice, attendance or medicine, unless he shall prove upon the trial that he is registered under that Act. This enactment does not render the contract by an unregistered practitioner void, but only requires him to register and prove his registration at the trial; if he can prove this, it is no objection to his claim, that he was not registered at the time of giving his attendance and advice, or even when he issued the writ in the action (). (a) Bensley v. Bignold, 5 B. & Ald. 335. (b) Day v. Hemming, 9 W. R. Q. (c) Porritt v. Baker, 10 Ex. 759. 395; 27 L. J. C. P. 196, 335. (e) Palk v. Force, 12 Q. B. 666. (f) Smith v. Mawhood, 14 M. & W. 452; and see Johnson v. Hudson, 11 East, 180. (g) Turner v. Reynall, 14 C. B. N. S. 328; 32 L. J. C. P. 164. By the statutes regulating the practice of attorneys, they are required to be admitted and enrolled as attorneys and to take out a stamped certificate; and if a person acts or does business as an attorney, without having qualified himself according to those statutes, he is not entitled to recover any fee or reward for the services rendered or the business done (a). By the Act for consolidating and amending the laws relating to attorneys and solicitors (b), an attorney who permits his name to be used for the profit of an unqualified person, or does any act to enable an unqualified person to act as an attorney, is liable to be struck off the roll; by virtue of this enactment it is held that an agreement by an attorney to take into partnership in the business a person not admitted as an attorney is void on the ground of illegality (c). The statute 44 Geo. III. c. 98, s. 14, imposes a penalty upon persons drawing conveyances or deeds, except those who are properly qualified by law for that purpose; it was held that a person not properly qualified could not recover for his services in drawing and preparing conveyances and deeds (d). with an Trading with an enemy without the license of the Crown Trading is illegal; and the contracts made with an enemy during war are void (e). A policy of insurance on ships or goods of an enemy is illegal (ƒ). So, a policy of insurance on goods bought by a British subject in an enemy's country, and shipped from a port of that country in a neutral ship, was held illegal and void (g). A contract of insurance on a foreign ship or goods against British capture is illegal; and every in enemy. (a) See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, ss. 2, 26, 35; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 26. (b) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 32, reenacting 22 Geo. II. c. 46, s. 11. (c) Williams v. Jones, 5 B. & C. 108. (d) Taylor v. Crowland Gas Co., 10 Ex. 293. (e) Potts v. Bell, 8 T. R. 548; Willison v. Patteson, 7 Taunt. 439; and see per Gibbs, C.J., Antoine v. Morshead, Taunt. 237, 239; Cle mentson v. Blessig, 11 Ex. 135, 141, (f) Bristow v. Towers, 6 T. R. 35; Trading with an enemy. surance on a foreign ship or goods impliedly excepts such capture (a). A contract made by an agent in this country on behalf of a foreign enemy is illegal; and the agent cannot recover upon it, though it was made in his own name, and though the principal was indebted to him in a greater amount than the value of the contract (b). A British subject, or the subject of a neutral state, voluntarily residing in a hostile country and trading there, is in the same position, in this respect, as an alien enemy, and contracts made with him are illegal (c). A prisoner of war detained in a hostile country is not in the same position, and has been held liable on a bill accepted by him whilst a prisoner (d). A prisoner of war in this country was held entitled to recover upon a contract for services rendered by him whilst a prisoner (e). A British subject, domiciled in a foreign neutral state, is so far assimilated to a subject of that state that he may lawfully trade with another foreign state, though the latter state is at war with this country; and his contracts made in the course of such trade will be recognized here (ƒ); and it seems that, if domiciled in a hostile state, he may lawfully trade with a neutral state (g). A ransom bill given to an enemy to redeem a ship or goods captured in war was valid, and an action might be brought upon it after the return of peace, until the passing of a statute by which such contracts were rendered illegal and void, unless in the case of extreme necessity to be allowed by the Court of Admiralty (h). It is a rule of law that an enemy cannot sue in the courts (a) Furtado v. Rodgers, 3 B. & P. 191; Kellner v. Le Mesurier, 4 East, 396; Gamba v. Le Mesurier, 4 East, 407. Whether the insurer is liable for capture by the government of the foreigner insured, see Conway v. Gray, 10 East, 536; Aubert v. Gray, 3 B. & S. 163, 169; 32 L. J. Q. B. 50. (b) Brandon v. Nesbitt, 6 T. R. 23. (c) Willison v. Patteson, 7 Taunt. 439; M'Connell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113; O'Mealey v. Wilson, 1 Camp. 482; and see Roberts v. Hardy, 3 M. & S. 533; Albretcht v. Sussman, 2 V. with an of this country during the continuance of war (a), except by Trading license from the Crown (b); therefore, an enemy, during enemy. war, cannot commence an action on a contract entered into before the war began, nor continue an action commenced before the war began (c). The plea that the plaintiff has become an enemy since the making of the contract is not a plea in bar, but only a plea in abatement of the action, showing the disability of the plaintiff to sue during the continuance of the war (d). Upon this principle, an enemy was admitted to prove a debt under a bankruptcy, the dividend being reserved (e). The plea, that the plaintiff was an enemy at the time of making the contract, is a plea in bar, because a contract with an enemy is illegal and void (ƒ) ; and a contract made with an enemy during war does not become valid upon the return of peace (g). The declaration of war may make the performance of a previous contract illegal, and so discharge the contract; thus, a charterparty to load a cargo at a foreign port was held to be discharged by a declaration of war, because it became impossible for the charterer to provide the cargo without trading with the enemy (h). The defendant undertook to pay for goods to be shipped by the plaintiff to a subject of a foreign country, with which country war was subsequently declared, but by an order in council the shipping of goods to that country was allowed for six months after the declaration of war, within which time the plaintiff shipped the goods; it was held that there was no illegality in performing the contract and that the defendant was liable to pay for the goods shipped (i). L. J. C. P. 140. (e) Ex p. Boussmaker, 13 Ves. 71. (f) Ante, p. 395; Brandon v. Nesbitt, 6 T. R. 23. (g) Willison v. Patteson, 7 Taunt. 439. (h) Esposito v. Bowden, 4 E. & B. 963; 7 ib. 763; 24 L. J. Q. B. 210; 27 ib. 17; and see Reid v. Hoskins, 5 E. & B. 729; 6 E. & B. 253; 25 L. J. Q. B. 55; 26 ib. 5. (i) Clementson v. Blessig, 11 Ex. 135. |