Restraint of mar riage. A charterparty was made for the carriage of goods from a port of this country to a foreign port, and before sailing an embargo was laid by the government of this country on shipping proceeding to the foreign port until further order of council; it was held that the embargo only suspended, and did not dissolve the contract; and that when the embargo was removed the validity of the contract was restored (a). An insurance on foreign ships or goods is rendered illegal and void, as against British capture, by a declaration of war with the foreign country (b). Restrictions on the freedom of marriage are contrary to public policy, and agreements creating such restrictions are void. A covenant not to marry with any person besides the covenantee, there being no promise to marry the covenantee, nor any reciprocal promise to marry on the part of the covenantee, was held void upon this ground (c). A bond given by a widow, conditioned to pay a sum of money in case she should marry again, was held void (d). A wager made by a person that he would not marry within six years was held to be void, on the ground that it operated in restraint of marriage (e). But a restriction against marriage with one specified person is not illegal (ƒ). A contract to procure, or bring about a marriage is void; accordingly, a bond conditioned to pay £500 within three months after the obligor should be married to a certain lady of fortune, being made for the purpose of procuring such marriage, was decreed in equity to be void (g). A deed made in order to provide for the future separation of husband and wife is illegal (h); but a deed made upon the occasion of an actual separation, providing for the (a) Hadley v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 259. (b) Furtado v. Rodgers, 3 B. & P. (c) Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225. (e) Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22; (f) Topham v. Duke of Portland, 32 L. J. C. 81, 92; and see further as to contracts in restraint of marriage, Atkins v. Farr, 1 Atk. 287; Woodhouse v. Shipley, 2 Atk. 535; Box v. Day, 1 Wils. 59; Cock v. Richards, 10 Ves. 437. (g) Hall v. Potter, 3 Lev. 411. (h) Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200. rights and liabilities of husband and wife living separately, is not illegal (a). The Court of Chancery will decree specific performance of an agreement to execute a lawful deed of separation (b), and will enforce the covenants in such separation deed (c). A covenant by the husband not to sue for the restitution of conjugal rights is a lawful and usual covenant in such deed (d), and will be enforced in equity by injunction (e). But in the Divorce Court, following the law of the Ecclesiastical Courts, deeds providing for husband and wife living separately are held illegal, and are not recognized (ƒ); and an agreement to live separate is no answer to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights (g); but an agreement not to institute proceedings in the Divorce Court is a bar to a suit for divorce in respect of previous misconduct (h). The compromise of a suit for a divorce in consideration of a sum of money to be paid to the petitioner by the corespondent is against public policy; and the Court of Chancery will not entertain a bill for the specific performance of such a contract (i). contracts. Agreements concerning certain matters have been held Immoral void, as being contrary to the rules of morality; thus, a promise made by a man to a woman in consideration of future illicit cohabitation is void (j). A promise made in consideration of the cessation of illicit cohabitation is void. for want of consideration (k); so also, a promise made in consideration of past illicit cohabitation, or as a compensation for past seduction (1). In the two latter cases the promises (a) Jones v. Waite, 5 Bing. N. C. 341; Wilson v. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad. 743; Randle v. Gould, 8 E. & B. 457; 27 L. J. Q. B. 57; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547. (b) Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H. L. C. 40; 23 L. J. C. 697. (c) Sanders v. Rodway, 16 Beav. 207; 22 L. J. C. 230; Webster v. Webster, 4 De G. M. & G. 437; 22 L. J. C. 837. (d) Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H. L. C. 40; 23 L. J. C. 697. (e) Hunt v. Hunt, 31 L. J. C. 161. made for an pose. are void, not on account of the illegality of the consideration, but on account of the absence of all consideration; therefore a bond given under similar circumstances would be valid (a). A bond given by the father of illegitimate children to the mother to secure her an annuity, in consideration of her giving up the care and custody of the children, was held to be founded on a valid consideration, and not to be a voluntary bond (b). Upon similar grounds a printseller cannot recover the price of libellous and immoral publications sold by him (c);· and a printer cannot recover the price of printing a libellous and immoral work (d). Contracts An agreement in which no illegality appears and of which illegal pur- neither the consideration nor the promise in itself imports any illegality, may, nevertheless, be made for an illegal purpose; and the agreement, though unobjectionable in its terms, is then rendered void by the illegality of the purpose for which it is made. There must be a participation in the illegal purpose for which the agreement is made in order to deprive a party of the benefit of it; but a knowledge of the illegal purpose is, in general, a sufficient ground to infer such participation, and it is not necessary that he should have stipulated for a share of the profits, or for payment out of the profits to be made in carrying out the illegal purpose (e). If goods are sold for the purpose of being used in an unlawful manner the contract of sale is void, and the seller cannot recover the price. A druggist who had sold and delivered to a brewer certain articles to be used in the manufacture of beer contrary to the statute 42 Geo. III. c. 38, was held not to be entitled to recover the price (ƒ). So, (a) Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. (c) Fores v. Johnes, 4 Esp. 97. (e) Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 B. & P. 551, 557; Pearce v. Brooks, L. Rep. 1 Ex. 213; 35 L. J. Ex. 134; and see Bowry v. Bennet, 1 Camp. 348; Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B. & P. 340; Smith v. White, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 626; 35 L. J. C. 454. (f) Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593. the price of goods sold for the purpose of being used in the business of a brothel (a), or the price of goods sold or let to a prostitute for the purpose of carrying on her trade, cannot be recovered (b). A contract for the sale of goods made for the purpose of smuggling them from abroad into this country in contravention of the revenue laws is void, and the price cannot be recovered (c) ; but it is said to be a principle of law that no country takes notice of the revenue laws of another, and accordingly it has been held that if a sale of goods is made abroad for the purpose of smuggling them into this country, the seller may sue in this country for the price (d); unless he is an actual participator in the act of smuggling, as where the seller packed the goods in a particular manner required for that purpose (e). A bond was held void which. had been given to secure the price of goods sold for the purpose of sending them to a foreign port and there reshipping them for trade to the East Indies, without the license of the East India Company required by law for such trade (ƒ). An action of covenant for the rent of premises was held not maintainable, because the premises were demised for the express purpose of being used for an illegal object (g). So, a guarantee for rent of premises, let for the purpose of retailing excisable liquors without license, was held void (h). If lodgings be let for the purpose of enabling a prostitute to carry on her trade, an action cannot be maintained for the rent (i). A lessee having assigned his lease absolutely, knowing that the assignee intended to use the house as a brothel, was held not entitled to recover, on a covenant of indemnity contained in the assignment, the amount which he had been compelled to pay for dilapidations at the expiration of the lease (j). An action of covenant for pay (a) Hamilton v. Grainger, 5 H. & N. 40; Bowry v. Bennet, 1 Camp. 348; Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B. & P. 340. (b) Pearce v. Brooks, L. Rep. 1 Ex. 213; 35 L. J. Ex. 134. (c) Biggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454. (d) Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp.341; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C. M. & R. 311. (e) Waymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599. (f) Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 B. & P. 551; Paxton v. Popham, 9 East, 408. (g) Gaslight Co. v. Turner, 5 Bing. N. C. 666; Flight v. Clarke, 13 M. & W. 155. (h) Ritchie v. Smith, 6 C. B. 462. (i) Girardy v. Richardson, 1 Esp. 13, and see Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B. & P. 340; Appleton v. Campbell, 2 C. & P. 347; Jennings v. Throgmorton, Ry. & M. 251. (j) Smith v. White, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 626; 35 L. J. C. 454. made for Contracts ment of money was held to be met by a plea, that the illegal pur. money was the purchase-money of land sold to the defendant for the purpose of being resold by the latter in an illegal lottery (a). poses. Contracts in fraud of a third party. Upon the same principle money lent for an illegal purpose cannot be recovered; as, money lent for the purpose of carrying on an unlicensed theatre (b); money lent for the purpose of settling losses on illegal stock-jobbing transactions (c); money lent for the purpose of playing at ar illegal game (d); but money lent to pay bets or losses at gaming lost to a third person, other than the lender, may be recovered (e). If the loan is void by reason of the illegal purpose, so that the money cannot be recovered on the contract of loan, a bond or other security given for the loan is also void (ƒ). Money paid by the plaintiff at the request of the defendant in execution of an illegal purpose cannot be recovered (g). Money paid at the request of the defendant in execution of wagering contracts void under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, but not otherwise illegal, may be recovered (h). If the purpose of the agreement is to defraud or injure a third party, it is illegal and void. The plaintiff had contracted with Government to keep horses for the army, and the defendant had contracted with Government to supply them with forage; it was then agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that in consideration of the plaintiff not drawing the forage, the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff a certain sum for every ration of forage so left; the contract was held void, the consideration being illegal as a mode of cheating the Government (i). (a) Bridges v. Fisher, 3 E. & B. 642; 23 L. J. Q. B. 276. (b) De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107; and see Levy v. Yates, 8 A. & E. 129. (c) Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; and see Mortimer v. Gell, 4 C. B. 543. (d) M'Kinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434. (e) Hill v. Fox, 4 H. & N. 359. (f) Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179, 185. (g) Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; M Kinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434. (h) See ante, p. 377; Jessop v. Lutwyche, 10 Ex. 614; Knight v. Cambers, 15 C. B. 562; Rosewarne v. Billing, 15 C. B. N. S. 316; 33 L. J. C. P. 55. (i) Willis v. Baldwin, 2 Doug. 450. |