transferred from the credit of his own account to that of his creditor, it was held to be a good payment, though the banker failed the next day and before the creditor received notice of the transfer (a). Though no special directions are given about the mode of payment, if it is made in the usual way of business, the debtor is discharged (b). An order or authority given by a creditor to his debtor to pay the debt to a third person, if acted upon, operates as a payment of the debt; but the order alone does not affect the right of the creditor to sue for the debt (c). creditor. A written receipt or admission by the creditor of the pay- Receipt ment of the money is prima facie evidence against the creditor given by that the amount stated in it was paid; but, unless it is executed with the formality of a deed, it is not conclusive evidence, and it is competent for the creditor to adduce other evidence to contradict, or explain it, and to show that the money was not in fact paid (d). Accordingly, it was held that a receipt on the back of a bill of exchange might be explained by evidence showing that the payment acknowledged was made not in discharge of the bill, but as the purchase money for it, so that it remained negotiable (e). In an action brought by two co-trustees for the recovery of money, for which the defendant produced a receipt signed by one of the plaintiffs, it was held that this was not conclusive, and that evidence was properly admitted to show that the giving of the receipt was a fraud on the cestui que trust, and that the money had not in fact been paid (f). In an action by partners brought to recover a debt, they are not concluded by a receipt signed by one of them, but may give evidence to show that the receipt was given by the one in fraud of the others (g). So, where two persons were charged with money upon a receipt signed by both, it was held to be competent for one of them (a) Eyles v. Ellis, 4 Bing. 112; and see per Alderson, B., Kaye v. Brett, 5 Ex. 269, 273. (b) Per Lord Kenyon, Warwicke v. Noakes, Peake, 67; and see Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W. 596. "As (c) Cochrane v. Green, 9 C. B. N. S. 448; 30 L. J. C. P. 97; and see signment of contracts." Chap. VI. (d) Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313, 318 (a); Foster v. Dawber, 6 Ex. 839. (e) Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313. (f) Skaife v. Jackson, 3 B. & C. 421. (g) Farrar v. Hutchinson, 9 A. & E. 641; Henderson v. Wild, 2 Camp. 561. Receipt given by creditor. to discharge himself by showing that the other in fact received all the money (a). The plaintiff, in order to protect his goods from his creditors, made a colourable sale of them to the defendant by delivering to him possession together with a priced invoice and a receipt for the price; it was held that he was not afterwards concluded by these documents as against the defendant, but might show the real nature of the transaction and recover his goods (b). The usual formal acknowledgment in a policy of marine insurance of the receipt of the premium is conclusive on the underwriter as against the assured, because in the recognized course of business between underwriters and brokers a running account is kept, in which the underwriter accepts the broker as his debtor, and the assured is authorized to give credit to the broker upon the faith of such receipt; the broker is entitled to recover from the assured the amount of the premiums for which he is debited by the underwriter, although there has been no actual payment; but as between the broker and the underwriter, the same receipt may be disputed (c). And in general, if the creditor gives an agent of the debtor a receipt for money due from the debtor, on the faith of which he deals differently with his agent, the debtor is discharged, though the creditor was not actually paid in money (d). By the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59 a stamp-duty of 1d. is charged upon a "receipt or discharge given for or upon the payment of money amounting to £2 or upwards," and by the 43 Geo. III. c. 126, s. 5, a person who shall have paid a debt may require the receiver to give a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the money upon a stamped receipt, and demand payment of the amount of the stamp duty, under a penalty of £10 for refusing (e). By the Stamp Acts a receipt liable to the duty cannot be given in evidence, or admitted to be good or available in law, or equity, unless pro (a) Straton v. Rastall, 2 T. R. 366. (b) Bowes v. Foster, 2 H. & N. 779; 27 L. J. Ex. 262; overruling Alner v. George, 1 Camp. 392. (c) Dalzell v. Mair, 1 Camp. 532, 534 (a); Foy v. Bell, 3 Taunt. 493; Jenkins v. Power, 6 M. & S. 282, 287; Power v. Butcher, 10 B. & C. 329; Anderson v. Thornton, 8 Ex. 425, 428. (d) Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford, 3 East, 147. (e) See ante, p. 459. perly stamped; but the payment may be proved by other evidence, notwithstanding an unstamped receipt in writing was given; and the unstamped receipt may be used to refresh the memory of a witness who is called to prove the payment (a). under seal. A receipt, or acknowledgment of payment, made under Receipt seal and with the formalities of a deed operates as an estoppel in law on the party executing it, that is, it is conclusive according to the terms of the deed, and cannot be contradicted by other evidence (b). A deed contained a recital that it had been agreed to pay a certain sum of money, and subsequently contained an acknowledgment "of the said sum being now so paid as hereinbefore is mentioned;" it was held that the acknowledgment was qualified by the recital to which it referred and which stated only an agreement to pay, and not an actual payment of the sum, and that evidence was admissible to show that in fact it never had been paid (c). Upon the execution of a deed of purchase, acknowledging the receipt of the consideration money, it was agreed that payment should be made by the delivery of goods or the doing of work instead of the money; it was held that, though the payment acknowledged in the deed could not be disputed, yet that the agreement might be supported by considering it as equivalent to a return of the money so acknowledged to have been paid in consideration of the goods agreed to be delivered, or the work agreed to be done, and that such agreement not being inconsistent with the deed, was admissible in evidence (d). The receipt of money which is usually indorsed on the back of a deed involving a money consideration, not being executed as part of the deed, does not operate as an estoppel; it is a receipt or admission in writing not under seal, which is prima facie evidence of payment, but the truth of which may be disputed (e). (a) Rambert v. Cohen, 4 Esp. 213; Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East, 460; Maugham v. Hubbard, 8 B. & C. 14. (b) Rowntree v. Jacob, 2 Taunt. 141. (c) Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Ald. 606. (d) Baker v. Dewey, 1 B. & C. 704 ; Smith v. Battams, 26 L. J. Ex. 232. (e) Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Ald. 606; and see as to the effect in equity of the receipt in the deed, and the receipt usually indorsed upon it, Hayes' Conveyancing, 5th ed. v. 2, p. 21, n. (28); Davidson's Prec. Conv. 2nd ed. v. 1, p. 65. Payment to one of joint creditors. Payment in satisfaction, or accord and satisfaction, made to one of several joint creditors discharges the debt at law against all, because it is a rule of law that if one of the plaintiff's is barred he cannot recover jointly with the others in rescission of his own act (a); and where the creditor who had accepted the payment had died, it was held that the surviving joint creditor was not entitled to sue after his death (b). It is immaterial at law, in this respect, that the joint creditors are trustees of the money to be paid (c). It is a general rule in equity that a debtor, having notice of a trust affecting the money, cannot discharge himself by payment otherwise than to the persons beneficially entitled; but trustees may be expressly or impliedly invested with power to give receipts, with the effect of discharging the debtor from seeing to the application of the money, so that persons claiming beneficially under such trusts must claim subject to the receipts so given. The receipts of trustees, in order to discharge the debtor, must be in accordance with the power with which the trustees are invested («). Payment of a debt due to a partnership to one of the partners discharges the debt, because each partner is a general agent for the others in all matters within the scope of the partnership (e). Payment to one of several executors, or administrators, of a debt due to the estate discharges the debtor, because each has authority to collect and receive debts(f). Payment to one of the assignees of a bankrupt's estate of a debt due to the estate is a good discharge in law (g); but Lord Hardwicke held it not to be a discharge in equity, because the assignees are joint trustees (h). Where money has been deposited in a bank on a joint account, the (a) Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. (c) Husband v. Davis, supra. ed. 310; Davidson's Prec. Conv. 2nd ed. v. 3, p. 162. (e) See Henderson v. Wild, 2 Camp. 561; Porter v. Taylor, 6 M. & S. 156; Gordon v. Eilis, 7 M. & G. 607; Dixon on Partnership, p. 245. (f) See Can v. Read, 3 Atk. 695; Dyer, 23b; Jacomb v. Harwood, 2 Ves. 265; 2 Wms. Ex. 5th ed. 851. (g) Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., Smith v. Jameson, 1 Esp 114; Williams v. Walsby, 4 Esp. 220. (h) Can v. Read, 3 Atk. 695. banker is not discharged by payment to one of the depositors, without the authority of the others (a); but, after such payment to one, an action could not be maintained against the banker by all the depositors jointly, because the one who had received the money would be disqualified from suing; the bankers, however, might be proceeded against in equity as trustees for all the depositors, and would be liable for the breach of their trust (b). one of joint Where several debtors are liable in respect of the same Payment by debt, whether jointly or severally, payment of the debt by debtors. one discharges all (c); thus, payment by one of joint makers of a promissory note discharges the other joint makers (d). Where the creditor sued one of two joint debtors and, upon payment of a part of the debt by him, stayed proceedings in that action, it was held that the creditor might nevertheless sue the other joint debtor for the residue of the debt (e). A payment by one of several parties liable for the same debt of part of the debt, or of interest, was formerly so far a payment for all that it took the debt out of the Statute of Limitation as against all (f); but by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 14, it was enacted in reference to the Statutes of Limitation that "no co-contractor or co-debtor, executor or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the said enactments, so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of payment of any principal, interest, or other money, by any other or others of such cocontractors or co-debtors, executors or administrators" (g). Payment by an agent properly appointed for that purpose Payment is equivalent to payment by the debtor, and discharges the by an debt (h). agent. Payment by a stranger of the debt of another, purporting Payment by to be made on behalf of the debtor and subsequently adopted a stranger. (a) Per Lord Tenterden, C.J., Innes v. Stephenson, 1 M. & Rob. 145; and see per Maule, J., Husband v. Davis, 10 C. B. 645, 650. (b) See Brandon v. Scott, 7 E. & B. 234; 26 L. J. Q. B. 163. (c) Beaumont v. Greathead, 2 C. B. 494. (d) Ib.; Thorne v. Smith, 10 C. B. (e) Watters v. Smith, 2 B. & Ad. (f) Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. (h) Read v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86; |