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"the Companies Act, 1862," (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, s. 75) repealing the former Act, has enacted to the same effect (a). An action for tolls payable under a statute by the owners of shipping passing a harbour was held to be an action on a specialty within the above section, which might be brought at any time within twenty years (b).

By the statute 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 5, "all actions for any forfeiture upon any penal statute made or to be made, the benefit and suit whereof is or shall be by the said statute limited to the Queen, her heirs or successors, and to any other which shall prosecute in that behalf, shall be had, brought, sued, or commenced, by any person that may lawfully pursue for the same as aforesaid, within one year next after the offence committed or to be committed against the said statute." This statute is held to apply to actions given to informers for the benefit of themselves alone, as well as to actions by informers qui tam, the benefit whereof is limited to the Queen and to the informer (c). Actions for penalties, damages, or sums of money given to the party grieved by any statute must be commenced within two years after the cause of such actions under the above cited enactment of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, s. 3.

An action of debt for a penalty due under a bye-law made by virtue of a charter is held to be an action grounded upon a contract without specialty, and is barred by 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3, if not commenced within six years after the penalty becomes payable (d). An action for calls by a company established under a statute of a colonial legislature is an action on a simple contract (e).

By the statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 4, and the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 42, s. 6, with respect to the causes of action to which they respectively refer, it is enacted to the effect that if in any of such actions judgment for the plaintiff is reversed in error, or judgment arrested after verdict for

(a) See Robinson's case, 3 Sm. & Giff. 272; 6 De G. M. & G. 572; 26 L. J. C. 95; ante, p. 96.

(b) Shepherd v. Hills, 11 Ex. 55; 25 L. J. Ex. 6.

(c) Dyer v. Best, L. Rep. 1 Ex.

152; 35 L. J. Ex. 105.

(d) Tobacco Pipe Makers Co. v. Loder, 16 Q. B. 765; 20 L. J. Q. B.

414.

(e) Welland Ry. Co. v. Blake, 6 H. & N. 410; 30 L. J. Ex. 161.

Penalties.

Disabilities excepted

by the sta

tutes,affecting

plaintiffs.

the plaintiff, the plaintiff may commence a new action within a year, and not after.

There are some special circumstances occasioning a disability in the plaintiff or defendant of suing or being sued at the time when the cause of action accrues, which the Statutes of Limitation have excepted from their general operation.

As regards the plaintiff:--By the statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16, (cited above as limiting actions founded upon simple contracts), s. 7, it is provided "that if any person or persons that is or shall be entitled to any such actions (enumerating them) be or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action given or accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the seas, then such person or persons shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, so as they take the same within such times as are before limited, after their coming to or being of full age, discovert, of sane memory, at large, or returned from beyond the seas, as other persons having no such impediments should have done." Actions on the case on assumpsit, which are included in the limiting clause, are not mentioned in the enumeration of the actions in the above saving clause; they are, nevertheless, held by judicial decisions to be within it (a).

By the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, (cited above as limiting actions founded upon contracts by specialty), s. 4, the same circumstances of disability as those above mentioned in the statute of James, with the exception of imprisonment, are, in similar terms, excepted from the limiting operation of the statute.

By the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 98, s. 10, the privilege under the above statutes of a plaintiff who is imprisoned, or beyond seas, of being exempt from their operation is taken away, and it is enacted that no person or persons who shall be entitled to any action, with respect to which the period of limitation is fixed by the above statutes, "shall be entitled to any time within which to commence and sue such action or suit beyond the period so fixed

(a) Chandler v. Vilett, 2 Wms. Saund, 120; Piggott v. Rush, 4 A. & E. 912.

or the same by the enactments aforesaid, by reason only of such person, or some one or more of such persons, being at the time of such cause of action or suit accrued beyond the seas, or imprisoned."

As regards the defendant :-By the statute 4 Anne, c. 16, Disabilities s. 19, it is enacted "that if any person or persons against defendants. affecting whom there is or shall be any cause of action (amongst others) of account, or upon the case, or of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty, of debt for arrearages of rent (which causes of action are specified in the above statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3), shall be at the time of any such cause or suit or action given or accrued, beyond the seas, then such person or persons who shall be entitled to any such suit or action shall be at liberty to bring the said actions against such person or persons after their return from beyond the seas, so as they take the same after their return from beyond the seas within such times as are respectively limited for the bringing of the said actions by the said Act made in the 21 Jac. I." The 4th section of the 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, contains a similar provision with respect to actions on specialties accruing against persons beyond the seas.

With reference to the expression "beyond the seas" used in the above statutes, the 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, s. 7, enacts "that no part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, nor of the Islands of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, and Sark, nor any islands adjacent to any of them, being part of the dominions of his Majesty, shall be deemed to be beyond the seas within the meaning of this Act, or the Act passed in the twenty-first year of the reign of King James the First, intituled "An Act for Limitation of Actions and for Avoiding of Suits in Law." And by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, (above cited) s. 12, the same definition is enacted respecting the expression "beyond the seas" as used in the above statute of Anne and that Act (a).

Under the above statute of Anne, s. 19, it was held that,

(a) See Lane v. Bennett, 1 M. & W. 70.

When the

if one of several joint debtors was beyond seas at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, the Statutes of Limitation did not begin to run until his return, though the others remained within the jurisdiction (a). But by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. s. 11, it is enacted, with respect to the causes of action which are subject to the limitations of the above enactments, to the effect that, in the case of joint debtors, the statute shall operate as to such as are not beyond the seas, but shall not operate as to such as are beyond the seas; and, in order to prevent the remedy of the creditor against a debtor who is beyond the seas being barred by a judgment against a joint debtor who is not beyond the seas, it is provided to the effect that he shall not be barred from suing the joint debtor who was beyond seas at the time the cause of action accrued, after his return, by reason only that judgment was already recovered against a joint debtor who was not beyond seas at the time aforesaid.

The exception from the operation of the Statutes of Limition by reason of the disabilities above mentioned is confined to the cases in which the disability exists at the time the cause of action first accrues; where the statute has once begun to operate upon a right of action no subsequently supervening disability will suspend its operation (b). So, it is no answer to a plea of the Statute of Limitation that after the statute had begun to run, the debtor within the six years died, and that an executor of his will was not appointed until after the expiration of six years, and that the action was commenced within a reasonable time after probate was granted to the defendant (c); nor is there any relief in equity under such circumstances (d).

The Statutes of Limitation begin to run from the time Statutes of when the cause of action first accrues and the action might be commenced, subject to the above provisions in the sta

Limitation

begin to

run.

(a) Fannin v. Anderson, 7 Q. B.811. (b) Rhodes v. Smethurst, 6 M. & W. 351; Homfray v. Scroope, 13 Q. B. 509, 512.

(c) Rhodes v. Smethurst, 4 M. & W. 42; 6 M. & W. 351.

(d) Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 My. & Cr. 499.

tutes respecting disabilities. This time is fixed, in the case of actions founded upon contracts, by the breach of the contract which creates the cause of action.

In the case of a single bond the cause of action is complete from the time of execution, and the action must be brought within twenty years from that date but not after. In the case of a bond subject to a condition the cause of action accrues when the condition is first broken, and the statute does not begin to run until that date (a); and where there are several conditions in a bond, or several covenants in the same instrument to do various things, every distinct breach gives a new cause of action, against which the statute begins to run from the date of the breach on which it is founded (b). In the case of a simple contract to pay a sum of money by instalments, and upon default in payment of one instalment the whole to become due as if all the periods had expired, it was held that upon the first default a cause of action accrued for all that then remained due of the whole debt, and that after six years from that date no action could be brought for any part of the debt (c).

Upon a bill of exchange or other mercantile instrument of that kind, the cause of action accrues when the instrument is due and unpaid; and the statute, in general, runs from that time. A promissory note payable on demand being a present debt due and payable at once without demand, the Statute of Limitation runs from the date of the note (); but where a promissory note payable on demand was given as a security for future advances upon a banking account, it was held that the statute did not begin to run until the account was closed and the credit determined (e). The holder of a bill of exchange upon default in acceptance acquires an immediate right of action against the drawer, and does not acquire a fresh right of action on the non-payment of the bill when due; the Statute of Limitation, therefore, begins to run against him from the former, and not from the latter

(a) Sanders v. Coward, 15 M. & W. 48; Tuckey v. Hawkins, 4 C. B. 655.

(b) Sanders v. Coward, 15 M. & W. 48; Blair v. Ormond, 17 Q. B. 423, 438; 20 L. J. Q. B. 444, 453.

(c) Hemp v. Garland, 4 Q. B. 519. (d) Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461; see ante, p. 337.

(e) Hartland v. Jukes, 1 H. & C. 667; 32 L. J. Ex. 162.

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