of a ship upon the shipment of goods for carriage, acknowledging the receipt of the goods, and undertaking to deliver them to the consignee, or his assigns, upon payment of freight as stipulated for in the document. By the common law the assignment of the bill of lading transfers the property in the goods to the assignee (a); but the contract expressed in the bill of lading was not assignable at common law, so that the assignee or indorsee of the bill of lading could not sue the master of the ship upon it (b); nor could the assignee or indorsee of the bill of lading, as such, be sued upon the contract contained in it. If the assignee of the bill of lading claimed and accepted the goods under it, such acceptance of the goods would be evidence of a contract by him to pay freight and other charges according to the terms of it (e); and if the bill of lading expressed that the freight or other charges should be payable "as per charterparty," the assignee receiving the goods under the bill of lading might become bound by the charterparty, so far as it was incorporated by reference in the bill of lading (d). dorsement. By the statute 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111, for amending the law Contract in relating to bills of lading, it is now enacted, s. 1, that bill of lading assign. every consignee of goods named in a bill of lading, and able by inevery indorsee of a bill of lading to whom the property in the goods therein mentioned shall pass, upon or by reason of such consignment or indorsement, shall have transferred to and vested in him all rights of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods as if the contract contained in the bill of lading had been made with himself." By s. 2, it is enacted that "nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect any right of stoppage in transitu, (a) Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63; 6 East, 21; 1 Smith, L.C., 5th ed. 681 until complete delivery of the goods, Meyerstein v. Barber, L. R. 2 C. P. 38. (b) Ib.; Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 403; Howard v. Shepherd, 9 C. B. 297. (c) Jesson v. Solly, 4 Taunt. 52; Stindt v. Roberts, 5 D. & L. 460; 17 L. J. Q. B. 166; Moller v. Young, 5 E. & B. 755; 25 L. J. Q. B. 94; (d) Sanders v. Vanzeller, 4 Q. B. Title of indorsee of bill of lading. Bail bond. Replevin bond. or any right to claim freight against the original shipper or owner, or any liability of the consignee or indorsee, by reason or in consequence of his being such consignee or indorsee, or of his receipt of the goods by reason or in consequence of such consignment or indorsement." The indorsee of a bill of lading, taking it bona fide and without notice, becomes entitled to the goods, freed from the right of stoppage in transitu, and all other rights and charges against the goods, or in respect of the carriage, except those specified in the bill of lading (a). The rights and liabilities of the indorsee under the bill of lading continue only so long as he is the holder, and cease upon indorsement of the bill to another (b). But the original shipper does not get rid of his liability to pay freight by indorsement of the bill of lading (c); unless the shipowner accepts an indorsement conditional upon discharging him (d). It seems that the indorsement of a bill of lading will pass to the indorsee the right of action for a breach of the contract contained in the bill of lading which has occurred before the indorsement (e). A bail bond taken in an action is assignable by the statute 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 20, enacting that the sheriff or officer taking bail, at the request and costs of the plaintiff in such action, shall assign to him the bail-bond by indorsing the same; and the assignee may bring an action and suit thereupon in his own name. Formerly replevin bonds were given to the sheriff, who granted replevins; and, if it became necessary to put the bond in suit, the sheriff assigned the bond to the other party to the replevin under the statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19, s. 23. But since the Act 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108 (amending the County Courts Acts), s. 63-66, the authority to grant replevins is transferred to the registrar of the county courts, and the replevin bond is given to the other party in (a) Lickbarrow v. Mason, supra; (c) Fox v. Nott, 6 H. & N. 630; 30 L. J. Ex. 259. (1) Lewis v. M Kee, 36 L. J. Ex. 6; L. Rep. 2 Ex. 37. (e) Short v. Simpson. L. Rep. 1 C. P. 248; 35 L. J. C. P. 147. the action or proceeding (s. 70). The registrar is required to approve of the bond, but is no party to it; and; therefore, no assignment in necessary. tration Administration bonds given to the judge of the Court of Adminis Probate under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, s. 81, are bond. made assignable upon breach by order of the Court to some person named in such order, who may sue on the bond in his own name both at law and equity as trustee for all persons interested (a). CHAP. VI. SECT. II. COVENANTS ANNEXED TO ESTATES IN annexed to, or running COVENANTS of a certain kind may be annexed to estates in Covenants land, so that the benefit or the burden of the covenant passes to an assignee of the estate; the covenants are then said to with estates run with the land. in land. owner or In general, if a covenant of this kind is made with the Covenants owner of an estate in land, the benefit of it passes by as- made with signment with the estate of the covenantee (1). It is not estate. necessary to this result that the covenantor should have conveyed the land to the covenantee, or should have had any connection with the land; he may be a stranger to the land, except through the covenant (c); but it is essential that the covenantee should be the owner of the estate in order that the covenant may become annexed to it (‹7). It seems that the burden of a covenant of this kind made by the owner of real estate does not pass with the estate to (a) See s. 83; Sandrey v. Michell, 3 B. & S. 405; 32 L. J. Q. B. 100; and see 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95, s. 15; Young v. Hughes, 4 H. & N. 76; 28 L. J. Ex. 161. (b) Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503; Campbell v. Lewis, 3 B. & Ald. 392. (c) See Spencer's case, 1 Smith's L. C. 5th ed. 43, 60; Sharp v. Waterhouse, 7 E. & B. 816; 27 L. J. Q. B. 70. (d) Co. Lit. 385 a; Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393; 1 Smith's L. C. 5th ed. 62. Assignee with notice bound in equity. the assignee, except in the case of covenants in leases (a). The proprietor of a theatre covenanted with the plaintiff to allow him to have the free use of two of the boxes at the theatre for a certain period, and afterwards assigned his estate in the theatre to the defendant; it was held that the covenant was merely a personal covenant and did not run with the estate, as it did not pass an interest in any specific part of the theatre, or a licence to enter and continue on any specific part (b). But the assignee of property, taking it with notice that the assignor has entered into covenants affecting the property, may be held bound by those covenants in equity. Thus, the purchaser of land with notice that the vendor had entered into restrictive covenants as to building, or carrying on trades, or the mode of using or enjoying the land, will be restrained from infringing such covenants, at the suit of the parties with whom, or for whose benefit, they were made (c). So, where a person contracted to purchase land and afterwards obtained notice that the vendor had previously covenanted not to build upon it, it was held that he could not be compelled to specific performance of his contract, because, if he took the land, he would be bound by the covenant (d). Where land is sold in plots for building, and the vendor grants each plot subject to a covenant by the purchaser of that plot restrictive of the mode of building upon it, equity will enforce the covenant in favour of and against the assignee of any of the plots (e). Constructive notice is sufficient to charge the purchaser of land with the burden of covenants affecting it; and, in general, a purchaser of freehold or of leasehold estates is bound to inquire into the title of his vendor, and will be affected with notice of what appears upon the title, if he (a) See 1 Smith's L. C., 5th ed, p. 6374, where the point is discussed and the authorities collected; and see In re Drew's estate, L. R. 2 Eq. 206; 35 L. J. C. 845. (b) Flight v. Glossopp, 2 Bing. N. C. 125. (c) Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Sim. 196; Tulk v. Moxhay, 11 Beav. 571; 2 Ph. 774; 18 L. J. C. 83; Coles v. Sims, 5 De G. M. & G. 1; 23 L. J. C. 258; Eastwood v. Lever, 33 L. J. C. 355; Clements v. Welles, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 200; 35 L. J. C. 265. (d) Bristow v. Wood, 1 Coll. 480. (e) Western v. M'Dermot, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 499; 35 L. J. C. 190; 36 ib. 76; Eastwood v. Lever, supra. does not so inquire; and this rule applies to a tenant taking a term of years, or a tenancy from year to year (a). between By the common law covenants of a kind capable of Covenants running with the land, made between lessor and lessee of lessor and land, pass to the assignee of the term, so that he is liable to lessee. be sued and entitled to sue upon such covenants (b). But according to the better opinion, such covenants in leases by the common law were not assignable with the reversion; and to remedy the inconveniences arising from this state of the law the statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34 was passed, by which such covenants between lessor and lessee were also made or declared to be assignable with the reversion, so that the benefit and the burden of them pass to the assignee of the reversion (c). statute. By that statute, after reciting "that by the common law Annexed to no stranger to any covenant could take advantage thereof, reversion by but only such as were parties or privies thereto," it is enacted, (s. 1) to the effect that all persons, being grantees, or assignees of any reversion, shall have like advantage against the lessees, their executors, administrators, and assigns, by entry for non-payment of the rent, or for doing waste, or other forfeiture, and by action only, for not performing other conditions, covenants, or agreements, expressed in the indentures of leases, as the said lessors and grantors might have had. And by s. 2, it is enacted to the effect that all lessees and grantees of lands or other hereditaments for terms of years, life, or lives, their executors, administrators, or assigns, shall have like action and remedy against all persons having any gift or grant of the reversion of the lands and hereditaments so letten, or any parcel thereof, for any condition or covenant expressed in the indentures of their leases, as the same lessees might have had against the said lessors and grantors. This statute applies only to leases by deed (d); and it applies only to covenants of the kind which may run with the land (e). (a) Wilson v. Hart, L. Rep. 1 Ch. Ap. 463; 35 L. J. C. 569; Clements v. Welles, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 200; 35 L. J. C. 265. (b) Campbell v. Lewis, 3 B. & Ald. 392. (c) See Bickford v. Parson, 5 C. B. (d) Brydges v. Lewis, 3 Q. B. 603; |