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AIKEN et ux. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF
BRIDGEPORT. (No. 8700.)

(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Ft. Worth.
June 23, 1917. Rehearing Denied
Oct. 13, 1917.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE 152-DISA BIILTIES OF
WIFE-STATUTES.

Under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 4621, 4622, 4624, as to the separate property of the husband and wife and the husband's liability for the debts of the wife, no general power is given to married women to bind themselves personally or their separate estates by

notes or other contracts.

Error from District Court, Wise County; F. O. McKinsey, Judge.

Action by the First National Bank of Bridgeport against W. J. Aiken and wife. Judgment by default for plaintiff, and Nellie P. Aiken brings error. Reformed and affirmed.

Bumpass & Crumbaugh, of Terrell, for plaintiff in error. McMurray & Gettys, of Decatur, and H. E. Lobdell, of Bridgeport, for defendant in error.

BUCK, J. The First National Bank of Bridgeport, Tex., sued W. J. Aiken and Nellie P. Aiken upon the latter's joint note executed to plaintiff for $500, dated December 2, 1914, due October 1, 1915, and secured by deed of trust on two certain tracts of land in Wise county, Tex. Plaintiff prayed for a judgment against both defendants on said note, and for foreclosure of its lien. Judgment was had by default for the amount of the note, interest, and attorney's fees, and for foreclosure of the deed of trust lien on the land mentioned. Nellie P. Aiken prosecutes her writ of error.

rule obtains in the case of a review under a direct appeal, as presented in the case now before us.

While the petition, as before stated, in this case does not disclose the coverture, of Mrs. Aiken nor her relation to her codefendant, W. J. Aiken, yet the statement of facts herein filed containing the evidence introduced under the default judgment discloses such coverture and such relationship. Such statement of facts recites:

ed by defendant W. J. Aiken and wife, Nellie P. "Plaintiff introduced the note sued on, executAiken, given to the plaintiff, First National Bank of Bridgeport," etc.

Also:

"Plaintiff introduced the deed of trust executed by defendants W. J. Aiken and wife, Mrs. Nellie P. Aiken," etc.

This deed of trust is shown by the statement of facts to have been duly acknowledged by Mrs. Aiken "in the manner and form as required by law." Therefore it is apparent that the coverture of Mrs. Aiken was fully disclosed in the court below. There was neither pleading nor proof that the note sued on was given for the benefit of Nellie P. Aiken's separate estate, nor, in fact, was there any proof as to the purpose in, or consideration for, the giving of such note and deed of trust. The judgment appealed from provides for a general judgment against both defendants, as well as a foreclosure against the land as to both defendants, and further provides that in the event the land shall not sell for enough to pay off and satisfy said judgment, then the "officer shall make the balance due as under execution." This, of course, makes the judgment a personal one against Mrs. Aiken, and such feature conThe cause was before this court under an- stitutes the basis of plaintiff in error's comother phase and under the same style, No. plaint as shown by his single assignment of 8587, on March 31, 1917. See 194 S. W. 610, error. It has been repeatedly held under the Advance Sheets. The appeal in that case law as it existed prior to the amendment by was from a judgment and order of the dis- the Thirty-Third Legislature, 1913 (Acts 33d trict court dissolving a temporary injunction Leg. c. 32), of articles now numbered 4621, theretofore granted, which restrained the 4622, and 4624, Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil appellee and the sheriff of Wise county from Statutes, that a married woman is not liable selling certain lands, other than the lands for a debt, or under a contract unless the covered by the deed of trust heretofore men- pleadings and proof show that such debt tioned, alleged to be the separate property was incurred, or contract made, for necesof Mrs. Aiken, in satisfaction of the judgment saries for herself or children, or for the rendered in this cause. The judgment from benefit of her separate estate. Trimble v. which the appeal was taken in the former Miller, 24 Tex. 215; Covington v. Burleson, case was one dissolving the temporary in- 28 Tex. 368. If the pleadings and proof do junction, and the original judgment render- not disclose the conditions under which she ed,.from which the writ of error is prosecut- may be held liable, a judgment rendered ed in this case, being by default, and the pe- against a married woman, under such cirtition in the original suit failing to disclose cumstances, would be erroneous and subject the coverture of Mrs. Nellie P. Aiken, and to be set aside by proper review. Red River the attack on the judgment being collateral, National Bank v. Ferguson, 192 S. W. 1088, we held in the former case that the door of and cases there cited. We are of the opininquiry was closed, under such collateral at-ion that no general power is given to a martack, as to any irregularities or defects in ried woman to bind herself personally, or the original judgment, not apparent on the her separate estate, by a note or other conface of the record. Hence we affirmed the tract by reason of the amendment to the judgment of the trial court. But a different three articles of the several statutes here

tofore mentioned. Article 4624 prior to the 1913 amendment provided that the wife might | GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO. v. SCHELcontract debts for necessaries furnished herLING et al. (No. 232.) self or her children, and for all expenses (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. which might have been incurred by the wife for the benefit of her separate property; but no such power is expressly vested in the wife under the amended article. As noted in Red

River Nat. Bank v. Ferguson, supra, the bill as originally passed amending article 4624 contained the following language immediately preceding the language contained in the present amended article, to wit:

"The wife may make any contract which she would be authorized to make but for her marriage, except those herein or elsewhere forbidden, and her coverture shall never be a defense in any suit or action based on such contract, but suits may be brought thereon in the manner prescribed by articles 1840 and 1841."

By a concurrent resolution the bill was re

Oct. 27, 1917.)

1. EMINENT DOMAIN

Beaumont.

202(1)—ADMISSIBILI

TY OF EVIDENCE INTENDED USE OF PROP-
ERTY.

In a suit to condemn a strip 18 feet wide adjoining the right of way of a railroad already in operation, from a tract of 36 acres, evidence that the owners intended later to use such tract as a homestead was inadmissible, it being rented 2. EMINENT DOMAIN 202(1)-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE INTENDED USE OF PROPERTY.

at the time of the suit.

--

Evidence that such tract was formerly the homestead of the owners' father, and that the owners were born and raised there, was inadmissible, as it could serve no purpose except to appeal to the sympathy of the jury. 3. EMINENT DOMAIN 262(5) · HARMLESS ERROR.

· APPEAL

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formerly the family homestead, that the owners
The admission of evidence that the tract was
were born and raised there, and that they in-
tended later to use it as a homestead was preju-
dicial, where the damages awarded for the land
not taken were apparently excessive.
4. EVIDENCE

5431⁄2-OPINION EVIDENCEQUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS.

In a suit to condemn a strip constituting part of a larger tract, a farmer living a mile and a half from the property, who did not pretend to be a real estate expert, and had not bought or sold land in that neighborhood except on one occasion about six years before when he bought land and sold it again, was not qualified to testify as to the damage to the land not taken from the taking of such strip. 5. EVIDENCE 543-OPINION EVIDENCEQUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS.

called from the Governor (House Journal, pp. 1254 and 1351), and the bill finally passed in its present form. It is thus shown that it was the intention of the Legislature to refrain from conferring general power on the wife to bind herself by her contracts. Since by the caption of this act it is shown that it was the intention and purpose of the Legislature to repeal article 4625 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1911, which authorized the court, when it appeared to the satis faction of such court and the jury that the debts so contracted and expenses so incurred were for the purposes enumerated in article 4624, as it was prior to the amendment, and that the debts so contracted, or expenses In such suit the proprietor of a beer joint so incurred, were reasonable and proper, to and amusement park, who was not a real estate decree that execution might be levied upon used as a park between four and five years ago, expert, but who testified that he bought the land either the common property or the separate that he knew the value of lands in the neighborproperty of the wife at the discretion of the hood and knew of sales that had been made, and plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the evi- had always lived in the neighborhood and heard sales discussed and prices offered, was not qualident legislative intent was not to confer gen-fied to testify as to the damage to the land not eral capacity on the wife to bind herself or her separate estate by reason of contracts made or debts incurred. Indeed, there seems to be now no positive statutory declaration authorizing the wife to bind herself or her separate estate for debts contracted, or expenses incurred, for the benefit of such separate estate, and it would appear that the courts are only authorized to read into this statute, by way of implication, such a provision, in order that the wife, in the control and management of her separate estate, may have the means of protecting such separate estate from waste or loss. Article 4621, Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes.

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taken.

6. EMINENT DOMAIN

EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.

150-COMPENSATION—

18 feet wide and about 1,000 feet long adjoinIn a suit to condemn a strip of land 17 or ing the right of way of a railroad in operation and constituting part of a tract of 36 acres, an award of $900 as damages to the balance of the tract, in addition to an award for the land taken of which no complaint was made, was excessive so as to indicate passion or prejudice.

Appeal from Harris County Court; Clark C. Wren, Judge.

Condemnation suit by the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company against August Schelling and others. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood and Lane, Wolters & Story, all of Houston, for appellant. J. V. Meek, of Houston, for appellees.

BROOKE, J. This is a suit instituted by the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Railway Company against August Schelling, Mrs. F. H. Schelling, Ernest G. Schelling, Henry Schelling, Lena Schelling Yantz and husband, H. A. Yantz, to condemn a certain strip of land 1,069.6 feet long and approximately from 17 to 18 feet wide, containing .44 of an acre, and lying adjacent to this plaintiff's right of way between Harrisburg and Stella, and belonging to the parties above named. A trial of the case by jury resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiff for the land upon payment of $220 as the value of the land taken, and $900 damages to the balance of the tract. Plaintiff's petition is in the usual form. Plaintiff duly made motion for a new trial, and thereafter filed an amended motion, which was by the court overruled, to which plaintiff duly excepted and gave notice of appeal to this court, and thereafter duly perfected the appeal as required by law. As all of the assignments of error in this case are based upon the ruling of the court on admission of evidence, we do not deem it necessary to set forth any further statement of the case. Inasmuch as the first, second, third, and fourth assignments relate, practically, to the same matter, they will be considered together in this brief. These assignments are as follows:

"(1) The court erred in admitting in evidence over the objection of plaintiff the testimony of the defendants August Schelling, H. F. Schelling, and Ernest G. Schelling to the effect that they intended using the piece of property in question as a home, as is shown by bill of exception No. 1.

(2) The court erred in admitting in evidence, over the objection of plaintiff, the testimony of August Schelling, Ernest G. Schelling, and H. F. Schelling to the effect that they were born and raised on this place, and for what use the property had been put to during that time, for the reason that the property was not then being used as a home, but was rented, and had not been used as a home for several years prior to the time of the trial, as is fully shown by bill of exception No. 4.

(3) The court erred in permitting, over the objection of plaintiff, the witness Bob Tuffly to testify as to how long the property in question had been occupied as a home, for the reason that the same was not occupied as a home at the time of the trial, nor had been for several years, but the same was rented, said evidence being wholly immaterial and prejudicial, as is more fully shown by bill of exception No. 3.

(4) The court erred in refusing to strike out all of the evidence that the property was and had been the homestead of defendants, because the undisputed evidence showed that it was not then being used as a homestead, but was being rented, as is fully shown by bill of exception No. 2."

that the defendants August Schelling et al. did not then live on the land, and had not occupied it as a homestead for a number of years, their testimony that they were reared on this land and had occupied it with their father and mother as a home until they were grown was immaterial, and in its nature highly prejudicial, and the court erred in admitting it over appellant's objections.

"(c) The undisputed evidence having disclosed that the defendants August Schelling et al. did not then live on the land, and had not lived on the land for a number of years, the testimony of the witness Bob Tuffly that they were reared on this land and had occupied it with their father and mother for a number of years was immaterial, and in its nature highly prejudicial, and the court erred in admitting it over appellant's objection.

"(d) The undisputed evidence having developed the fact that defendants did not then live on the occupancy of the property as a home was immaland in controversy, any evidence of a former terial, and in its nature highly prejudicial, and the court should have sustained appellant's motion to strike out this testimony, given by varilings had used the property for a number of ous witnesses concerning the fact that the Schelyears as a homestead."

It will not be necessary, in considering these assignments, to set out at length the testimony of the various parties, about the admission of whose testimony objection is made, and which objection was by the court overruled, but it will be essential that in some respects the testimony of these parties showing, in our opinion, what largely influ. enced them, and which, it might be said, somewhat influenced the jury, was the fact testified to concerning the former place of residence of the Schellings being their former home, and to which, necessarily, they were more or less attached.

It is well to remember that in reading this record this court had in mind, among other things, the fact that for perhaps 50 years a railroad track had been in operation within 17 or 18 feet of the tract now sought to be condemned; that the testimony is undisputed by all the witnesses that over this railroad track there were operated, at the time in question, as many as 27 trains a day. It is, perhaps, also well that it should be read with the fact in mind that quite a number of people living near there at that time were about to sue the railroad company, and perhaps some of them had sued the railroad company for a large amount of alleged injuries, owing to the fact that the trains were operated over the road to such an extent that the noise of operation interfered with a great many of the people, about

The propositions presented under these as- which they were largely complaining, and, signments are:

"(a) The undisputed evidence having shown that the defendants August Schelling, Ernest G. Schelling, and H. F. Schelling did not then live on the land, and that they had not lived on the land for some 15 or 16 years, and there being no showing made that they had any plans for the immediate future, or any definite time in the futare to use the land as a home, the court erred in admitting the testimony of their alleged intention to use the property as a home.

as has been said, about which at least some of them were now pursuing or about to pursue the matter of alleged damage to their comfort, being near the railroad, on account of said extensive operation of trains over the same.

As we have said, not an extended, but a short, résumé of the testimony of the witnesses will indicate the controlling apparent

mony as presented to the court upon the boys have; not me. I have not authorized Judge trial below.

T. J. Collins testified:

"I have been in Harrisburg 49 years. I knew the place from the time Mr. Schelling moved there till he died. I knew him before he moved there; before he married. As a whole, that Schelling tract ought to be sold for $500 or $600 an acre, $500 anyway, as a whole. That including everything. The front part of that tract, the nearest to the railroad or the county road-that's a very hard question to say what that land would be worth, because I consider it ruins the market value half when you put two tracks in there. I unfortunately live down there where there's two tracks now; it damages half the value of the property with two tracks the way the railroads run in there and blow the whistle, that is, for home purposes; for other propositions it would be all right, but not for home propositions. I own 300 acres below there, right in close to it. I have sold land all around it for years; I used to own the Street place, the place across from this, and lots of other stuff."

With reference to drainage he says: "The Ross land is about the same kind of land as this Schelling land, only the Schelling land has a flat next to the railroad; where that ravine drains down there used to be a gulley, until the railroad fixed it up three or four feet high until it couldn't get through. I believe they cut a ditch there the last three or four years, but old Schelling didn't seem to have any trouble getting rid of that water. There is a low flat running right down in there next to the railroad. Down in that flat couldn't have been in cultivation. All from the edge of the timber out, it was in cultivation for years; all from the edge of the timber out was always in cultivation. I have known where the Schelling home is for years. I suppose that is 150 to 200 feet from the railroad, maybe 300 feet, or 400 feet; it is 300 feet anyway. I don't think it is as far as 600 feet, it may be 400. I don't think it is over 700 feet; it's been a long time since I was up there; I shouldn't think it was far but I have seen Schelling cultivate right up to the railroad from the edge of the timber out for years. I haven't been by there lately. I used to own the Street property right up adjoining it for years, sold it to Street myself, 20 years ago; 15 or 20 years ago. I reckon it is worth more now than it was; the way he talks you would think it was, if you ask him what it's worth. Mr. Street paid me $20 an acre for it. I only asked $50. George McLelland was with him and they holloed pretty loud. * I think that strip 18 feet wide and 1,000 feet long right next to the railroad is easily worth $1,000, because it depreciates the value of the other property. If it was mine. I wouldn't want to do it. If you were down there and get as much of it as I do, you would think there's 40. I am down there about 400 yards from the track. I am 300 yards exactly from the track and you would think you were about 10 the way those mountain engines blow down there, at all times of the night. I told the headman of the Southern Pacific, I called him up and told him, I thought I lost all my hair and teeth by that. I am not suing them right now. They are suing me. You are suing me to take my land away from me that I worked in the hayfield on for 40 years. My boy, after they killed his cattle, put the fence within two feet of the railroad ties, and they come down there at night with four or five cops and mashed it down, and then they brought suit against me. I never fenced it, never thought of doing it, but the boy fenced it up within two feet of it, because they were killing his stuff and wouldn't pay for it. I have not brought suit against the railroad companies for damages on account of that noise; one of my

Tod to bring the suit for me. I have got two boys there that's in that fight. I haven't employed Lovejoy & Ewing to bring the suit, but I am going to employ them. I am going to employ them and I am going to go after the railroad for damages for the trouble they gave me. I haven't employed Judge Tod, that's my son, T. J. Collins, Jr., not me. I am going to get Lovejoy & Ewing. The right of way suit is the suit that is suing me and my son House Collins and T. J. Collins, Jr., the three of them, but the Southern Pacific is suing us three; not me; I never brought any suit; neither one; one of the boys brought it. The Southern Pacific brought the suit to condemn the property and take the right of way from us that we had for 40 years. They abandoned that property years ago. They pulled up part of the track. I can produce the man that did it. I got Judge Tod to write to Governor Hogg and they put the track back since and didn't run a train over it for nearly a year. That is the main track, running out, that they are trying to take away from me now. They took up all that track, but I am the cause of it being there to-day. I can produce the man. He is right here in town now. The first one that came in there after they put the engines on that track. They started to take up that track, they did take a big lot of it; they took up that spur that run across from the yard and put it back and they took it all up down to about the bayou. I think there was 200 men fighting one another. The Southern Pacific and the International & Great Northern were both trying to get it. They run a barge in there and just saved the Southern Pacific's time, or the International & Great Northern would have got it. There was 200 men fighting one another down there on that right of way near the bayou. My recollection is there are about 50 acres in the Schelling tract. I don't recollect; it's been a long time. The entire tract is worth $500 an acre. The strip of land is worth $1,000 or double what one acre of the other land is worth. I think it impaired its value more than that." A. Yantz, the next witness for defendant, testified:

"I am in the park business. I have the park there. I have bought and sold lands myself. Thirty years ago I bought that park and then the city came too close to me and then about 20 years ago, 18 years ago, I bought another place, and now I am on the track. bought this present place out there near Schellings four years ago. I did not marry one of the Schellings. I am not a brother-in-law of the Schellings or related to them I bought this last tract between four and five years ago. I bought only four acres. I would have bought it all, but I couldn't get it. I said I would buy the whole 13 acres but I couldn't get it. Mr. Hamilton, the brewery man, said he could speculate with his own land, four acres was enough for me, so I only got four acres there. I know the value of lands in that neighborhood. I know of all the sales that's been made right there. I have always lived in that neighborhood. I have heard the sales discussed there in that neighborhood; heard prices offered and seen people refuse. I feel able to give this court and this jury my opinion as to the value. In my opinion it is worth $600 per acre. The track runs 75 feet from my land. There's a county road between me and the track. I am on the off side of the track. Schelling is on one side and I am on the other side of the track. I know where they proposed to take this 18 feet off down there. In my judgment, if those 18 feet are taken off there for railroad purposes, it will injure the balance of the tract of land for homestead purposes; lessen its value. In my judgment to take off this 18-foot strip and devote it to railroad purposes and uses or any purposes that they see fit to use it, that will decrease the value

of the balance of the property over half. When they put a double track on there. I have sued the railroad myself and no dead man cannot even live there; they wake him up; that's the honest truth. It is no more residence property forever; mine isn't; I must leave there; this is no story. This Schelling land along next to the railroad is a desirable place for one to live; they built a farm and they are healthy people and they are nice boys, that been raised on the land; that's a nice piece of ground. That next to the railroad is just as good as that back part of that 30-acre tract where they were born and raised. Mr. Collins knows how far that house is from the railroad; I haven't measured it. It's a little bit more than 300 feet; 300 to 400, I think; it could be easily stepped off and find out. My idea of the distance from that house to the railroad is about 400, I judge between 300 and 400, I couldn't tell exactly. I am just as correct in this distance as I am in estimating the value of this land. H. A. Yantz is my son. He married one of the Schellings, Miss Lena Schelling. I believe my son is a party to this suit; I didn't pay much attention to that. When that double track is built, that will decrease that property in half. The track is injured that property right now; some other properties too. Of course if they put some more trains on it that will be worse. I am suing the railroad company out there. I am going to dismiss that and sue for $14,000, so soon as possible. That is because you want to condemn Schelling's land, that makes it so much worse. I am going to sue for $10,000 more; that is no story; you will find that out, too. I used to be friendly disposed toward the railroad, a little bit; when I get too old that I shall leave my property and move somewhere else, then I can't live no more there; the whole night I can't sleep. The running of those trains does not interfere with the conduct of my store there; just that sleeping business; I must be the whole night through awake. I don't want to be disturbed; 26 or 27 trains there with the whistles. I have no boarding house or hotel there. It is a park; just a little open field. I run that all night. As to whether it is a good thing for my business to keep my customers awake, why I attend to that."

George Kuhlman, witness for defendant, testified:

"I live on Brays bayou. I have lived in that neighborhood pretty near all my life, with the exception of two or three years that I was away. I am 68 years old. I am acquainted with the Schelling land that is in dispute here, and have been ever since I have been able to paddle over it when I was a boy; that used to be our hunting grounds. That place has been improved and occupied as a home for some time, since '75, somewhere along in there, '80 or '85, I reckon; I don't know the year; the south side of Shipman's Island, we used to call it; the ford used to be there. That's across the bayou. Old man Schelling died there; he raised his family there. I have not bought and sold land out there in that neighborhood. I have not known of sales; not much has been transferred to my knowing lately. Some years ago I heard of offers for land, trading and trafficking and the prices fixed for land, but not now in the last three or five years. I own lands there myself. I don't see how I could know the reasonable, fair value of the Schelling land. There is a nice graveled road in front of this land. That adds to the value of country lands; that same road runs in front of my door; past my door. It seems to me that the building of nice graveled roads by the county enhances the value of lands. That Schelling land is fine land to be tilled or farmed; most of it; down in the wooded part, there's a little sluice, a few acres west of mine, that runs through one corner. During the old gentlemen's lifetime, he cultivated that

place. These boys and the older boys were raised there. One corner of the land down there next to the railroad is low and flat; but not all of it. There is 150 yards of it to my estimation that is low and flat; something like that. I know how far the Schelling house is from the railroad. I haven't measured it, but I judge it to be a block and a half or two blocks. * * * It might be about 500 feet. I have had no occasion to measure it. I haven't passed that land lately; I did in the spring; there's generally somebody on there cultivating it. I do not remember how many acres there are in the tract. The whole south or west end of that land has been cultivated lately; south I call it; it's all been in cultivation. None of the Schellings live there now to my knowledge. Somebody lives on the tract. I haven't been there now in a week or two to see. I think it's been cultivated, all that's in fence, for a couple of years. In the lower part towards Harrisburg, or north part of it I call it, is timber and hasn't been cultivated. There is not just about one-half of that tract covered with timber; I wouldn't think, not in the length of it, how it lies; it might be wider at this end; would make the timber cover half, maybe about two-thirds, of it cultivated and onethird in woods. The land next to the county road ought to be more valuable than back in there where the house is. The railroad is first and then the county road. The railroad runs with the county road and that homestead piece fenced all the way up and the railroad between. If I see right, it cuts Schelling's piece of land off that he bought next to the railroad on this side; this east side is where his home is and that county road runs between both of them where it goes and the rest of it is on the east side; on the sun-rising side. It would be on the right as you leave Harrisburg and go west." Bob Tuffly, witness for defendants, testified:

"I live a half a mile south of Brays bayou; about a mile and a half southwest from the

I am now

I have

Schelling tract. I have been living in that neighborhood practically all my life. 58. I am acquainted with the Schelling tract. I have known them ever since I have been there. I guess I have known them some 45 or 50 years. I have been over this land frequently in my lifetime. I guess it has been used as a home by the Schellings some 40 or 45 years. It was cultivated at that time. I have not bought and sold any lands in that neighborhood. heard of some sales and the prices asked, the offers made and the prices refused, and so forth; I feel that I know the value of lands in that neighborhood. The sale close to me was along about three years ago, I guess. The property that was sold and my property was about the same distance from the Schelling property. My business is farmer. I have never engaged in the real estate business. I am not an expert in real estate values. I do not make any pretense of being an expert in real estate values. I have bought and sold land for a business. I guess it must be some six years ago. I bought 640 acres about six years ago, might have been seven years ago, and sold it again. That was the extent of my buying and selling. I know of the sales that have been made in that neighborhood. I have heard of offers made and offers refused. I think I am posted and know the values of lands about my neighborhood. I profess I think I know the values of lands in Mr. Schelling's neighborhood. I know what it ought to be worth. I do know what it is actually worth by judging it by Brookline. Brookline is a townsite about 200 yards from the Schelling property. It now has a big school down there and it is on the interurban. The Schelling land is worth $600 an acre; I think they have 50 acres there. I mean on both sides of the road. That town of

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