lative authority must be given to deal with a case summarily; (1) although, as we have also seen, the justices may proceed summarily, where, owing to some omission in the statute, the power of summary trial and conviction is not given expressly, if from the rest of the statute it may be reasonably implied that such jurisdiction was intended to be given to them. (2)

The adjudication is confined within the limits of the information or complaint. (subject however to the provisions of Article 847. relating to variances between the information and the evidence adduced). Thus, where on an application for sureties to keep the peace, an assault as well as a threat was proved and the justices not only ordered the defendant to find sureties, but also, notwithstanding the protest of the complainant, convicted the defendant of the assault, a certiorari was granted to quash the conviction. (3)

After the evidence has been adduced and the case heard and closed, the justices may adjourn the adjudication and determination of the charge; but in that case they should name a day for delivering their judgment. For, the defendant is entitled to be present at the rendering of the judgment, in order to protect his rights.

In a case tried in Nova Scotia under the Liquor License Act, the magistrate, at the close of the evidence, adjourned the case for judgment, without fixing any particular day. On a subsequent day, he gave notice in open court that he would give judgment on the next day. The defendant appeared on the day so named for judgment, and was convicted after being called and examined as to a previous conviction; his attorney not being present. Held, that the conviction was illegal, because the case having been closed, there could be no adjournment for the adduction of further evidence, and also because the defendant should have been first found guilty of the offence under consideration, before being questioned as to the previous conviction. (4)

(1) See Ayard v. Cavendish, Saville, 134, and other authorities cited at p. 21, ante.

(2) See Cullen v. Trimble, and other authorities cited at p. 21, ante. And for full comments and authorities as to the general powers, duties and responsibilities of justices and police magistrates. see chap. III, pp. 18-57 ante. (3) R. v. Deny, 20 L. J. M. C. 189. And see R. v. Soper, 3 B. & C. 857. (4) R. v. Gough, 22 N. S. R. 516.

The adjournment for delivering judgment is not, like adjournments, before or during the trial, limited to eight days; but may be for a longer period. (1)

859. Form of Conviction.-If the justice convicts or makes an order against the defendant, a minute or memorandum thereof shall THEN be made, for which no fee shall be paid.—and the conviction or order shall afterwards be drawn up by the justice, on parchment or paper, under his hand and seal, in such one of the forms of conviction or of order from VV, to AAA, inclusive, in SCHEDULE ONE of the Code. (2) as is applicable to the case, or to the like effect.

The minute or memorandum of the conviction or order, as the case may be, is here required to be made, at once, that is, immediately upon the judgment pronouncing the conviction or order being rendered; and this minute or memorandum should state, in substance, the whole of the adjudication of the justice, as to the punishment inflicted, or the fine or penalty, or the amount of money ordered to be paid or the thing ordered to be done, and the mode of enforcing it, whether by distress or imprisonment. (3) For, the conviction or order, which is the formal record, is to be based upon the minute. It is merely a short statement in writing in any form of words, such as the following: "I find the defendant guilty of the assault herein charged against him, and adjudge him to pay a fine of ten dollars, together with costs to the amount of four dollars, and that in default of payment he be imprisoned for one month."

The defendant is entitled, under the above Article, to the minute or memorandum of the conviction or order, without any fee.

The judgment in case of a conviction consists of two parts namely, the adjudication of conviction, and the sentence or award of punishment.

Where the magistrate imposes a fine and fixes an imprisonment which are within his discretion and power, the formal conviction

(1) R. v. Hall, 12 P. R. 142; R. v. Alexander, 18 Out. R. 169.

(2) For Forms VV, to AAA, see pp. 375-381, post.

(3) R. v. Perley, 25 S. C. N. B. 43.

must correspond with the adjudication as contained in the minute or memorandum required to be made at the rendering of the judgment; because it must be according to the fact, and the fact is as shown by the minute or memorandum. (1)

Article 982 of the Code declares that the several forms in schedule one thereto, varied to suit the case, or forms to the like effect. shall be deemed good, valid, and sufficient in law.

The conviction must show the place for which the justice acts; and it must also show either that the offence, of which the offender is convicted was committed within the limits of the justices' jurisdiction or that there are special facts,-which must be mentioned,—giving jurisdiction beyond those limits. (2) For instance, in cases of jurisdiction given, to justices of the territorial division in which the offender is found, over an offence committed in another territorial division, it will be necessary to mention where the offence was committed and the fact of the person accused of the offence being found within the limits of the convicting justices' jurisdiction. (3) For, an Act which declares that," an offence or a cause of complaint shall be deemed to have been committed or to have arisen either in the place where the same was actually committed or arose, or in any place in which the person charged or complained against is found or happens to be," does not give justices jurisdiction to convict a person summoned from beyond their jurisdiction. for an offence that has taken place out of their jurisdiction; for such person by appearing in answer to their summons is not found and does not happen to be at such place and within their jurisdiction. (4)

Where the offenders were taken on board a smuggling boat within the harbor of Folkestone,-which had an exclusive local jurisdiction,—and were afterwards taken. with the boat, to the port of Dover, and convicted before two justices of that port and town, the conviction, which merely stated that the offenders had been found in a boat in the harbor of Folkestone, was held to be

(1) R. v. Hartley, 20 Ont. R. 485.

(2) R. v. Young. 5 Ont. R. 400.

(3) Re Peerless, 1 Q. B. 143, 154.

(4) Johnson v. Colam, L. R. 10 Q. B. 544; 44 L. J. M. C. 185.

bad, as not showing jurisdiction. The justices of Folkestone alone. had authority to convict, they being the justices of the first port or place into which the vessel was carried. (1)

If the law under which the proceedings are taken is directed against a particular description of persons, the conviction, in setting out the offence, must show that the defendant is within the description of persons against whom the law is directed. So that, where, under the by-laws of a town, no transient trader or other person, occupying a place of business in the town for a temporary period of less than a year and not duly entered on the assessment roll for the current year, was allowed to offer goods for sale within the limits of the town, without having a license, it was held, upon a conviction obtained under this by-law, that the omission in the conviction of an allegation that the defendant was a transient trader not duly entered on the assessment roll for the current year was fatal. (2)

A conviction for trading as a hawker and pedlar without a license was held not to be supported by evidence of a single act of selling a parcel of silk handkerchiefs to a particular person; for the bare act of sale, it was held, did not show the defendant to have been such a person as by law is required to take out a license. (3)

We have seen. by Article 846, ante, that a conviction is not to be deemed insufficient for not containing the name of the person injured, nor for omitting to state who is the owner of any property therein mentioned, nor for omitting to specify the means by which the offence has been committed, nor that it does not name or describe any person or thing with precision. The time when the offence was committed ought to be stated. But the precise day need not be named; and it will be sufficiently certain if the fact be alleged to have happened between such a day and such a day. provided the last of the days specified be within the limited time. Thus, where the information charged the offence to have been committed on the 4th of October and on divers other days and times between that day and the 16th of November, and the conviction stated the offence to have been committed on the 8th of

(1) Kite & Lane's Caɛe, 1 B. & C. 101. See also R. v. Nunn, 8 B. & C. 644. (2) R. v. Caton, 16 Ont. R. 11.

(3) R. v. Little, 1 Burr. 610.

November, it was held to be valid. (1) And where, in a convietion, under the Canada Temperance Act. there was a statement alleging that the offence was committed between the thirtieth of June and the thirty-first of July, it was held to be a sufficiently certain statement of the time. (2) And a conviction for keeping a house of ill-fame on the eleventh of October and on other days and times before that day was also held sufficiently certain as to time; the only offence charged by these words being the keeping and maintaining of a house of ill-fame; and the fact that the parties accused kept such a house on the eleventh of October and on other days before that day did not constitute a distinct and separate offence against them upon each of those days. (3)

When the summons alleges the offence to have been committed on a certain day, and at the hearing it is proved to have been, in fact, committed on some other day, the justices should amend the summons by altering the date. (4)

Under the second clause of Article 847, supra. any variance between the information and the evidence adduced, at the summary trial thereof, as to the time at which such offence is alleged to have been committed is not to be deemed material, if it is proved that the information was in fact laid within the time limited by law for laying it.

Before proceeding to a conviction, the justices should have evidence which is reasonably sufficient to show that the offence charged has been committed. Where, in a case under the Canada Temperance Act, the defendant swore at the trial that he did not sell any intoxicating liquor on the day charged, and there was no other evidence showing positively that the liquor sold was INTOXICATING liquor, the evidence for the Crown being merely that it RESEMBLED intoxicating liquor, it was held that, under these circumstances, there was no evidence on which to found a conviction for selling intoxicating liquor. (5)

(1) Onley v, Gee, 30 L. J. M. C. 222.

(2) R. v. Wallace, 4 Ont. R. 127.

(3) R. v. Williams, 37 U. C. Q. B. 540.

(4) Mayor of Exeter v. Heaman, 37 L. T. 584.

(5) R. v. Bennett, 1 Ont. R. 445.