solicitor or agent(a); stating the cause of action (b) and the Ontario. Court (c), and indorsed with the name of the person (d) intending to sue and his abode (e), and indorsed with the name and abode or place of business of the solicitor or agent (if notice served by same) (f).

TIME AND PLACE (g).

PLEADING OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE.

By s. 15 the defendant may plead not guilty by statute. The objection must be taken at trial (h), not afterwards. Notice may be waived (i).

C. S. N. B. 1903, c. 65, s. 9, differs from the Ontario statute New in that name and place of abode of the attorney apparently must Brunswick. be indorsed thereon.

"It is laid down by numerous authorities that in such cases

(a) See Kemble v. McGarry, 6 O. S. 570, signature by attorney; McKenzie v. Mewburn, 6 O. S. 486, action brought by different attorney.

(b) See p. 127, supra. Cause of action: By s. 1 the act complained of must be done maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. The notice ought to allege this: Howell v. Armour, 7 O. R. 363. Minor mistakes or variances will not affect: Higson v. Ward, 8 U. C. R. 502. See Gillespie v. Wright, 14 U. C. R. 52, and Upper v. McFarland, 5 U. C. R. 101, for allegation of conversion. Trespass: see Connolly v. Adams, 11 U. C. R. 327; McGuiness v. Dafoe, 27 O. R. 117; 23 A. R. 704. Allegations too wide: Spring v. Aude, 23 U. C. C. P. 152. The proof must be confined to matters stated in notice: Obernier v. Robertson, 14 P. R. 553; but it is not necessary to prove all the allegations: Byrnes v. Wild, 7 U. C. R. 104.

(c) Court: see Armstrong v. Bowes, 16 U. C. C. P. 539; Buck v. Hunter, 20 U. C. R. 436; Bross v. Huber, 18 U. C. R. 282; Nevill v. Township of Ross, 22 U. C. C. P. 487; Crum v. Foley, 6 P. R. 164; Wadsworth v. Mewburn, 6 O. S. 432.

(d) The defendant need not be described: Haacke v. Adamson, 14 U. C. C. P. 201.

(e) Where plaintiff's name was signed,

and the name of his attorney indorsed,
held insufficient: Moran v. Palmer, 13
U. C. C. P. 528; not followed in Jones
v. Grace, 17 Q. R. at p. 688 (1889).

(f) See p. 129, supra. Where name
and residence of attorney not indorsed,
but added inside at foot of notice, held
sufficient Bross v. Huber, 15 U. C. R.
625. Residence of attorney see Bates
v. Walsh, 6 U. C. R. 498; Gillespie v.
Wright, 14 U. C. R. 52; Armstrong v.
Bowes, 16 U. C. C. P. 539.

(g) P. 128, supra.
See Friel v. Fer-
guson, 15 U. C. C. P. 584; Oliphant v.
Leslie, 24 U. C. R. 398; Parkyn v.
Staples, 19, U. C. C. P. 240; Spring v.
Aude, 23 U. C. C. P. 152; Kemble v.
Mc Garry, 6 O. S. 570; Moore v. Gidley,
32 U. C. R. 233; Langford v. Kirk-
patrick, 2 A. R. 513; Bond v. Conmee,
15 O. R. 716; 16 A. R. 398; Madden v.
Shewer, 2 U. C. R. 115; Connolly v.
Adams, 11 U. C. R. 327; Alderich v.
Humphrey and Young, 29 O. R. 427;
Cronkhite v. Sommerville, 3 U. C. R.
129.

(h) Armstrong v. Bowes, 12 U. C. C. P.
539; Moran v. Palmer, 13 U. C. C. P.
528. See also Verratt v. McAulay, 5
O. R. 313; McKay v. Cummings, 6
O. R. 400; Davis v. Moore, 4 U. C. R.
209.

(i). Donaldson v. Haley, 13 U. C. C. P. 87.

New

the protection afforded by the notices of action is only for those Brunswick. who honestly believe in the existence of a state of facts which, if it existed, would justify the act complained of. And this is always a question for the jury, unless there is no evidence to submit to them of anything upon which any such belief could be based" (a). The reasonableness of the belief is not material (b).

Nova
Scotia.

Ontario.

The notice to be given under R. S. N. B. 1900, c. 40, s. 12, is similar to that under the Ontario statute, except that the names and abodes may be entered upon the notice, not necessarily indorsed "upon the back thereof."

Where the plaintiff's notice set out the "maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause," but the statement of claim was drawn on the theory that the justice had jurisdiction, the plaintiff was held down to the exact terms of his notice. In the notice he alleged that the warrant was issued without authority. But the warrant was properly issued, the real question being whether it could be enforced after the debt was paid, and this was not covered by the notice (c).

WHO ENTITLED TO NOTICE.

Under the circumstances of the particular cases the following classes of public officers have been held entitled to notice:Arbitrator (d).

Constable (e).

County Crown Attorney (f).
Division Court Bailiff (g).
Justice of Peace (h).
Licence Commissioner (i).

(a) White v. Hamm, 36 N, B. R. 237 (1903).

(b) Ibid.

(c) Hennessey v. Farquhar, 35 N. S. R. 22 (1902). This case admirably illustrates the ingenious technicality to which this statute gives play. See further Mott v. Milne, 31 N. S. R. 372 (1898).

(d) Kennedy v. Burness, 15 U. C. R. 487; Hughes v. Pake, 25 U. C. R. 95.

(e) Scott v. Reburn, 25 0. R. 450; Sage v. Duffy, 11 U. C. R. 30, special constable; Alderich v. Humphrey, 29 O. R. 427, warrant lacking indorsation. (f) McDougall v. Peterson, 40 U. C. R. 95.

(g) Lough v. Coleman, 29 U. C. R. 367, where bailiff indemnified; Sander. son v. Coleman, 4 U. C. R. 119; Mc Cance

v. Bateman, 12 U. C. C. P. 469; Dale v. Cool, 4 U. C. C. P. 460; Pearson v. Ruttan, 15 U. C. C. P. 79, bailiff and sureties; Anderson v. Grace, unsealed warrant. See also Stephens v. Stapleton, 40 U. C. R. 353; Mc Martin v. Hurlburt, 2 A. R. 146; Pardee v. Glass, 11 O. R. 275; Hanns v. Johnston, 3 O. R. 100.

(h) Haacke v. Adamson, 14 U. C. C. P. 201; Bross v. Huber, 18 U. C. R. 283, no jurisdiction; Sinden v. Brown, 17 A. R. 173; McGuiness v. Dafoe, 27 O. R. 117; 23 A. R. 704; Friel v. Ferguson, 15 U. C. C. P. 584, invalid warrant; Carswell v. Huffman, 1 U. C. R. 381, when jury find that J.P. acting as such; Marsh v. Boulton, 4 U. C. R. 354.

(i) Leeson v. Licence Commissioners of Dufferin, 19 O. R. 67.

The following (under the circumstances) have been held not Ontario. entitled to notice :

Division Court Bailiff (m).
Division Court Clerk (n).
Execution Creditor (o).
Justice of the Peace (p).

Ontario.

Alberta and

Saskatche

wan.

Nova

Scotia.

Ontario.

Municipal Corporation (a).
Municipal Councillors (b).
Official Assignee (c).

Post Office Inspector (d).
Registrar of Deeds (e).
Returning Officer (ƒ).
Sheriff (g).

Surveyor of Streets (h).

Inland Revenue Officer (k).

NOTICE UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS (1).

The formal requirements of notice under the Workmen's Compensation for Injuries Acts are less stringent than under the Acts protecting public officers (m). There is more stringency in the mode of objecting to the notice (n).

Notice of injury may be dispensed with under ss. 9, 13, and 14 of the Act where there is reasonable excuse for the want of it. What constitutes reasonable excuse must depend on the

circumstances of the case.

The notoriety of an accident and the Ontario. knowledge of the employers that the injury had resulted in death, and that a claim had been made by deceased's representative, was considered sufficient (a).

NOTICE UNDER MUNICIPAL ACT.

Under the Consolidated Municipal Act (3 Edw. VII. c. 19), Ontario. s. 606 (3), notice of accident has to be given (b).

Where the plaintiff gave notice to the municipality of the accident as having happened on May 7th, when it actually happened May 6th, but describing the circumstances and also that he had sought the aid of a neighbour whom he named, held sufficient within s. 606, sub-s. 3, of the Municipal Act (c).

The state of disrepair into which a street has fallen may be so patent that notice to the corporation of the defect will be assumed (d); but not where the appearance of the defect is inconspicuous (e).

REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR WANT OF NOTICE.

What constitutes reasonable excuse is not defined, and must depend very much upon actual knowledge, or verbal notice may be an element of the excuse, but the accident must be accompanied by some disabling circumstance other than mere ignorance of the law (f).

(a) Armstrong v. Canada Atlantic R. W. Co. (1902), 4 O. L. R. 560.

(b) See McQuillan v. Town of St. Mary's, 31 O. R. 401, defective sidewalk; cf. City of St. John v. Christie, 21 S. C. R. 1. See also cases in Denton

on Municipal Negligence.

(c) McInnes v. Township of Egremont (1903), 5 O. L. R. 713.

(d) McGarr V. Town of Prescott (1902), 4 O. L. R. 280.

(e) McNiroy v. Town of Bracebridge (1905), 10 O. L. R. 360.

(f) O'Connor v. City of Hamilton (1905), 10 O. L. R. 529; Armstrong v. Canada Atlantic R. W. Co. (1902), 4 O. L. R. 560, referred to.