Ontario. Ontario. Ontario. New STATUTORY LIMITATION AS TO FIRE (a). 14 Geo. III. c. 78, s. 86 (which is an extension of 6 Anne, c. 31, ss. 6, 7), is in force in Ontario as part of the law of England introduced by the Constitutional Act (31 Geo. III. c. 31). It has no application to relieve a person from legal liability as a consequence of negligence (b). PROJECTIONS OVER HIGHWAY (c). Where a cornice overhanging the sidewalk being loosened by ordinary decay fell and injured the plaintiff, the owner was held liable without proof of knowledge on his part of the dangerous condition of the cornice, the defect being one that could have been ascertained by him by reasonable inspection (d). PROJECTING ICE OR SNOW. A number of cases have arisen where action has been brought because of injuries by snow or ice falling from a roof. The head-notes to these cases seem to require, as a condition precedent to a valid claim, a by-law of the municipality requiring citizens to keep their roofs clear of ice and snow (e). If this were so, a collection ought to be made of municipal by-laws establishing torts as between citizen and citizen. But a perusal of these cases will show that the importance of the by-law is as evidence. of faulty construction or notice to the defendant of the dangerous state of his roof. In erecting a building the owner may adopt any style Brunswick. of architecture he pleases, provided he does not create a nuisance or violate any law or municipal ordinance; therefore the construction of a roof with projecting eaves which cause an accumulation of ice and snow is not per se evidence of negli gence, although it may impose upon the owner a greater degree of watchfulness and care in order to prevent accidents (ƒ). Ontario. HORSE ON HIGHWAY (g). The same rule as in the English decisions has been applied that, in the absence of proof of knowledge of vicious propensity, the owner is not liable (h). NATURAL PROPENSITIES OF DOGS (a). Proof of knowledge by the defendant of the vicious propensities Ontario. of a dog attacking a person is necessary to found an action (b). Sheep are better protected than mere humanity, as statutes intervene to do away with the necessity for proof of scienter or propensity (c). The larceny of dogs (d) is punishable under the Criminal Code of Canada, R. S. C. 1906, c. 146, s. 370. VIS MAJOR: FLOODS (e). Where the sudden rising of a navigable river made a jam of Canada. the defendant's logs to the injury of the plaintiff's bridge, it was held negligence, not vis major (ƒ). Where one vessel was moored to another and, an extraordinary British storm arising, bumped the other and damaged her :-Held, that it Columbia. was not shown that such mooring was per se negligence, and that the defence of vis major was valid (g). BOARDING-HOUSE KEEPER (h). It is well in considering a case of loss of boarder's goods to examine if the facts come within any provincial statute. The following are similar enactments : R. S. O. 1897, c. 187 (An Act respecting Innkeepers). C. O. N. W. T. 1898, c. 56 (The Hotel Keepers Ordinance). R. S. B. C. 1897, c. 98 (The Innkeepers Act). Ontario. Alberta British R. S. M. 1902, c. 75 (An Act respecting Hotel and Boarding- Manitoba. house Keepers). There is a distinction for some purposes (i) between the relation of innkeeper and guest and that of boarding-house keeper and boarder (k). It is possible that the decision in Scarborough and Wife v. Cosgrove (1) is broad enough to bring a Ontario. British Ontario. British Canada. boarding-house keeper within the interpretation of an innkeeper or hotel keeper in the above statutes. VEHICLES AND DRIVING (a). The method of alighting from a carriage preparatory to fastening the horse is discussed in Sullivan v. Melilliam (b), where the horse bolted just after the driver alighted. The duties and rights of the driver of a sleigh overtaken and overturned are considered in Derlin v. Bain (c). COLLISIONS BY SHIPS (d). Where a vessel is at anchor or made fast to a wharf, the onus is on the other ship colliding, and the "collision regulations " do not apply (e). INVITATION-PERSONS COMING ON BUSINESS (A). The invitation may be somewhat indirect, and the interest of the owner in the business may be second hand. Thus, in the "merry-go-round" case (g) the plaintiff was hurt on one of the "attractions" of the annual fair, which broke owing to a defect. The defendants charged a fee for general admission and a licence fee to the owners of attractions, who charged a further fee-Held, that these owners were licensees (h), not lessees, and the defendants had a right of supervision, which they were negligent in not exercising, and liable to the plaintiff for holding out an invitation to use a negligently constructed merry-go-round." 66 BARE LICENSEES (i). Where the engineer allowed N., who had a bridging contract on the road, to ride on the locomotive, it was held that N. was a bare licensee, with no right of action unless injured by the dolus as distinguished from the culpa of the carrier (k). TRESPASSER (1). Among the many privileges enjoyed in this country by an overholding tenant is that, though in some respects a trespasser A PERSON who causes another to injure himself is, under certain circumstances, liable for the injury to the same extent as though he had directly inflicted it. One way in which a person may cause another to injure himself is by making a false representation to such person, whereby he, acting upon the faith of the representation being true, suffers damage (a). The inquiry as to the circumstances under which an action for damages for an injury so inflicted, commonly called an action of deceit, will lie, forms the subject of the present chapter. In the first place the misrepresentation which is necessary to The represenfound an action of deceit must be a representation as to a past or existing fact. tation must be of a past or existing fact. Misrepresen intention. It has been sometimes stated that a misrepresentation as to a person's intention will not suffice, but that view seems to be tation of mistaken. "The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else" (b). Therefore, where directors issued a prospectus inviting subscriptions for debentures, stating that the object of the loan was to enable them to enlarge their trade premises and purchase (a) Another way of causing persons to injure themselves, namely, that of negligently creating a source of danger, with which such persons in ignorance of the danger bring themselves into contact to their damage, has already been dealt with in the preceding chapter. In connection with that class of injury the action for negligence and that for deceit (b) Per Bowen, L.J., Edgington v. additional plant, whereas in fact the object was to enable them to meet pressing liabilities, it was held that the misstatement of the purpose to which they intended to devote the money was sufficient to found an action of deceit (a). The great difficulty of proving what the defendant's actual intention was at the time of the statement made has indeed caused the criminal Courts to hesitate to treat a misstatement of intention as sufficiently a statement of fact to found an indictment for false pretences (b), though they have in recent times gone a long way in the direction of holding that it is so (c). The Companies Act, 1900 (d), alike defines and enhances the responsibilities of promoters and directors for false and fraudulent statements made in relation to companies, it being a misdemeanour punishable either summarily or by indictment for any person wilfully to make a statement, false in any material particular, knowing the same to be false, respecting any balance sheet, return, report, certificate, or other document relating to the affairs of a company (e). It is also a misdemeanour, within s. 84 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (ƒ), punishable, as a maximum, with seven years' penal servitude, for any director, manager, or public officer of a company, to issue or concur in issuing any written statement or account (including a balance sheet) with intent to deceive or defraud shareholders (g). To the rule, however, that a misstatement of intention will be (a) Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 459. In Jorden v. Money, (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185, the obligee of a bond having represented to the obligor that it was her intention not to enforce payment of it, she in fact having that intention at the time that she made the representation, the obligor on the faith of such representation entered into engagements which altered his position. The obligee subsequently changed her mind and sought to enforce her claim. The obligor then sued for an injunction to restrain her from so doing, but the House of Lords dismissed the bill on the ground that the representation of intention did not amount to a contract, and that there had been no misrepresentation of fact which could create an estoppel. And see Chadwick v. Manning, (1896) A. C. 231, P. C. at p. 238. (b) Rex v. Goodhall, (1821) R. & R. 461. (c) Reg. v. Cooper, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 510. And in Reg. v. Gordon, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. p. 360, Wills, J., expressed himself to be unable to see why a misrepresentation as to a person's intention should not be capable of supporting an indictment, though it was unnecessary in that case to decide the point. (d) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 48. (e) The doctrine of non-contribution between tort-feasors is expressly avoided by statutory enactment in the case of liabilities incurred, by the directors of companies, through making fraudulently untrue statements (Gerson v. Simpson, (1903) 2 K. B. 197, C. A.). (f) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. (g) Rer v. Whitaker Wright, (1904) Times Newspaper, Jan. 27th. |