In re BLAKE. [ *37 ] [*38] the part of Blake in this case are, that he had a lien upon the mortgaged estates, beyond the 1,6267. 11s. 7d., for a sum of 3,000l. or 4,000l. for costs, which (though he afterwards lost his lien) would have enabled him to satisfy Beevirs's claim; that Beevirs gave no notice of his claim to the Court of Chancery or the Encumbered Estates Court; from which he wishes it to be inferred that Beevirs relied chiefly, if not entirely, on his (Blake's) personal security; and that, down to May, 1856, Blake could at any time, at a week or ten days' notice, have repaid Beevirs the 1,000l., if he had pressed for it. Blake also states that when, subsequently, in May, 1856, he found his affairs embarrassed, he prepared and engrossed *a mortgage to Beevirs for the amount of his debt, on property (the Matlock Bath Estate) which he then thought was of ample value. Beevirs's assent was never obtained to this mortgage; in fact, he never knew anything of it; and it was not executed, in consequence, as Blake states, of his being obliged by the pressure of his affairs to leave London suddenly. But the fact remains totally unanswered, that Blake did, in August, 1852, receive from the Encumbered Estates Court 1,626l. 11s. 7d. (Beevirs's lien for 1,000l., or at least 700l., being still unsatisfied), entirely without the knowledge, and retained it without the assent, of Beevirs; and that, in consequence, upon Blake's insolvency. in 1856, Beevirs lost the whole amount of his debt. It further appeared from the Master's report that Blake, having become insolvent in 1856, filed a petition in the Insolvent Court on 28th February, 1859, and was afterwards remanded by the Court for two years, on the ground of this and other fraudulent debts. Dowdeswell now showed cause, and cited Stephens V. Hill (1). Garth was heard in support of the rule, and cited In re King (2). The nature of the arguments sufficiently appears from the judgments of the COURT. COCKBURN, Ch. J.: I am of opinion that Blake is amenable to the summary jurisdiction of this Court, although the misconduct of which he has been guilty *did not arise in a matter strictly between attorney and client, but out of a simple loan transaction. I proceed on the general ground that, where an attorney is shown to have been guilty of gross fraud, although the fraud is neither such (1) 62 R. R. 517 (10 M. & W. 28). (2) 70 R. R. 436 (8 Q. B. 129). as renders him liable to an indictment, nor was committed by him while the relation of attorney and client was subsisting between him and the person defrauded, or in his character as an attorney, this Court will not allow suitors to be exposed to gross fraud and dishonesty at the hands of one of its officers. Upon this principle the present attorney, Blake, must be held responsible, under the circumstances of gross fraud which have been proved against him. Although Beevirs did, in the first instance, apply to him as an attorney, I think that the transaction ultimately resolved itself into one of a mere loan between them as individuals. Beevirs, having a sum of money to invest, applied to Blake, whom he had known as an attorney, to obtain an investment for him. Thereupon Blake offered to borrow the money himself, on the security of his promissory note and the deposit of a mortgage deed of some Irish property, in the charge on which he had a share. The property in question having afterwards got into the Irish Encumbered Estates Court, Blake borrowed the deed of Beevirs for the purpose, as he alleged, of supporting his claim before that Court. Beevirs, whose station in life was such that he was not likely to be conversant with matters of this kind, gave up the deed. There is nothing to show that the true state of things was explained to him; on the contrary, it may be inferred that Blake concealed from him two important facts: one, that by means of the temporary possession of the deed he, Blake, would be enabled to receive the money secured to him by it, when the estate was sold by the direction of the Irish Court; the other, that Beevirs might himself intervene, if he thought fit, and get back his money at the same time. Had this information been given to Beevirs, he, no doubt, would not have parted, as he did, with the deed unconditionally; for we find that, on a subsequent occasion, he refused to part with it in order to enable Blake to raise a further loan. Blake, however, having got possession of the deed, and being fully aware that Beevirs considered it to be a valid subsisting security, obtained by its means the money secured to him, and appropriated the whole amount to his own purposes: and for several years afterwards he kept Beevirs in entire ignorance of the facts; and, by continuing to pay him interest on his loan, led Beevirs to believe that the deed was still a valid and subsisting security. It was urged in extenuation, and may be true, that Blake, at the time he borrowed the deed and obtained the money thereby secured to him, was, and continued for several years to be, able to repay Beevirs at any time, on a very short notice; that, however, is the kind of excuse which is constantly made in cases of embezzlement, and it cannot prevail with us. These In re BLAKE. [ *39 ] In re BLAKE. [ *40 ] [ 41 ] being the facts, we are bound so to deal with the attorney as to hold his case out as a warning, and to show our vigilance in protecting persons who may have similar dealings with other attorneys. Although, therefore, we shall not take the extreme course of striking him off the roll, we must visit him with a punishment adequate to his offence, by suspending his certificate for two years from 28th February last. WIGHTMAN, J.: I am of the same opinion. It is of the greatest importance that transactions to which attorneys are parties should be uberrimæ fidei, and that the conduct of those who are accredited as officers of the Court should be above suspicion. Now, the facts of the present case are that Beevirs first knew Blake as an attorney and solicitor, and employed him as such. After wards, having some money for investment, he lent it to Blake, not on his mere personal security, but also on that of the deposit of a mortgage deed. That Beevirs relied upon this deed as a security is shown by his subsequent refusal to let Blake have it for the purpose of raising more money upon it. Blake had previously induced Beevirs to lend it him for the simple purpose, as he falsely stated, of enabling him to make out his claim in the Encumbered Estates Court. Having by this means been enabled to obtain, and having obtained, payment of the money secured to him by the deed, he said not a word to Beevirs about what he had done; but, by continuing to pay him interest on his loan, led him to believe that matters remained on their old footing. This was a transaction so fraudulent as to demand our summary interference. CROMPTON, J.: 146, The law as to the summary jurisdiction of the Court over attorneys, as its officers, as laid down in the books of practice, is of wider extent than Mr. Dowdeswell is ready to admit. Thus, in Chitty's Archbold's Practice (ed. 11, by Prentice), p. it is stated that "The Court will, in general, interfere in this summary way and strike an attorney off the roll, or otherwise punish him, for gross misconduct, not only in cases where the misconduct has arisen in the course of a suit, or other regular and ordinary business of an attorney, but where it has arisen. in any other matter so connected with his professional character as to afford a fair presumption that he was employed in or entrusted with it in consequence of that character." So, in Lush's Practice (ed. 2, by Stephen), p. 218, it is laid down that "For any gross misconduct, whether in the course of his professional practice, or otherwise, the Court will expunge the name of the attorney from the roll." In the present case, I cannot say that Blake's fraud was not committed in a matter connected with his professional character. If he did not act in it as an attorney, he at all events took advantage of his professional position to deceive Beevirs. BLACKBURN, J.: The Court has a jurisdiction, in such cases as the present, to ascertain whether a person accredited as one of its officers is unfit to be so accredited. It is not necessary, in order to induce the Court to interfere in a summary manner, that the misconduct charged should either amount to an indictable offence or arise out of a transaction in which the relation of attorney and client subsists between the attorney and the person against whom he has been guilty of misconduct. Thus, in Stephens v. Hill (1), ALDERSON, B. says, "The question in this case is, whether the attorney has so misconducted himself in his character of an attorney as to be an unfit person to remain on the roll." "If persons are to be accredited by the Court, it is our duty to watch. over and control their conduct." And, in Rex v. Southerton (2), after the COURT had held that the facts charged against the defendant, an attorney, did not amount to an indictable offence, Lord ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J. said "that enough appeared to the Court to satisfy them that the defendant *was a very im proper person to remain as an attorney on the rolls of the Court; " and he was accordingly struck off, his counsel admitting that he could not resist it. Rule absolute to suspend Blake from practising as REG. v. SADDLERS' COMPANY. (3 El. & El. 42—71; S. C. 30 L. J. Q. B. 186; 6 Jur. N. S. 1113; 2 L. T. N. S. 503.) IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. REG. v. SADDLERS' COMPANY. (3 El. & El. 72-88; S. C. 30 L. J. Q. B. 186; 7 Jur. N. S. 138; 4 L. T. N. S. 54; 9 W. R. 281.) [Judgment of the Exchequer Chamber reversed, and judgment of the Queen's Bench affirmed, in the House of Lords, as reported 10 H. L. C. 404.] (1) 62 R. R. 517, 523 (10 M. & W. 28, 34). (2) 8 R. R. 428, 433 (6 East, 126, 143). In re BLAKE [ 42 ] 1860. June 29 1860. R.R.-VOL. CXXII. 39 1860. June 6, 9. [ 89 ] [ *90 ] IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH. OVERSEERS OF ST. BOTOLPH, ALDGATE v. BOARD (3 El. & El. 89-107; S. C. 29 L. J. M. C. 228; 6 Jur. N. S. 1073; By the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 158, every metropolitan district board is, by order under its seal, to require the overseers of the several parishes in the district to levy and pay over to the board the sums which it requires for defraying the expenses of the execution of the Act; distinguishing, in such order, the sums required for sewerage expenses from those required for other expenses under the Act. By seet. 159, if it appears to the board that all or part of the expenses for defraying which the order is made have been incurred for the special benefit of part, or not for the equal benefit of the whole, of the district, the order may direct the sums, or part of them, required to be levied, to be levied in the part of the district specially benefited, or may exempt any part of the district from the levy, or require a less rate to be levied thereon, as the circumstances may require; and if in the judgment of the board an entire parish is entitled to exemption, no order need be made on such parish : Held, that the effect of the Act is to substitute districts for the parishes of which they are composed, for all purposes of management, taxation and expenditure; not for purposes of management only. That the rates leviable in the component parishes under the orders of a district board, are raised for the benefit of the whole district, though apportioned between the parishes. That, prima facie, the rates ought to be apportioned between the parishes according to their respective rateable value, and not according to the outlay in them respectively; subject to allowances, at the discretion of the board, in cases falling within sect. 159. That an order of a district board on a parish, distinguishing between the sums required for sewerage and for other expenses, is good under sect. 158, and is final, if made by the board after an impartial exercise of the discretion given to it by sect. 159; the decision of the board, so arrived at, as to the amount proper to be required from a parish, being, even if erroneous, conclusive. CASE stated by a metropolitan police magistrate, under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. On 17th February, 1858, the said overseers, the appellants, were summoned to appear on 24th February, 1858, before the magistrate, at the police court, Arbour Square, in the county of Middlesex, and within the Metropolitan Police District: For that the board of works for the Whitechapel district, by an order under their seal, bearing date 2nd March, 1857, directed to Henry Grant Baker and Charles McLachlan, did require them, as the overseers *of the parish of St. Botolph without Aldgate, in the county of Middlesex, to levy and pay over to the treasurer of the said board the sum of 5641. 1s., upon the days and by the instalments therein mentioned. And for that default had been made in payment of the said several sums in manner directed by such order. The said complaint was made under the provisions of stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120. (The case then set out a copy of the order of 2nd March, 1857, which contained a notice that the sum of |