REG.

OF PUTNEY,

the case, that the rateable value of the portion of the Company's apparatus which is within the parish of Putney had been ascer- OVERSEERS tained by first taking the rateable value of the whole apparatus in the several parishes in which it is situated, then subdividing the amount among the said several parishes according to the quantity of land occupied by the apparatus in each parish. If that principle be correct, the rate was, by agreement, to be amended, and was to stand for the sum of 2,8001. If that principle be not correct, then the rate was, by agreement, to be amended, and to stand for the sum of 2,0001.

The question, therefore, for the opinion of the Court was, Whether the rate, when amended, ought to stand for the sum of 2,800l., or for the sum of 2,000l.

Bovill, for the appellants:

The principle of first taking the rateable value of the whole of the Company's apparatus in the several parishes in which it is situate, and then subdividing the amount among the several parishes, according to the quantity of land occupied by the apparatus in each parish, is erroneous. The Company derive. no profit in Putney from the parts of the whole apparatus locally situate there, which are parts directly earning nothing, but indirectly conducing to earnings elsewhere. Their local rateable. value in Putney is, therefore, the sum which would pay the rent of the land, taken by itself, which they occupy in Putney, and the profit on fixed capital invested therein: Reg. v. Overseers of Mile End Old Town (1), Reg. v. West Middlesex Waterworks (2). With this the value of the Company's apparatus situate elsewhere has nothing to do. (He was then stopped.)

T. Jones (Northern Circuit), for the respondents:

The decision in Reg. v. West Middlesex Waterworks (2) proceeded upon the particular facts there involved, and does not conflict with the general rule applicable to all such cases as the present, laid down in Reg. v. The Cambridge Gas Light Company (3), namely, that the rateable value of the land occupied by the apparatus, pipes, &c., of the Company in the different parishes, is the sum which a tenant would pay yearly for them, less certain deductions; and that such value is to be distributed among the assessments of the several parishes in proportion to the quantity of land occupied by the apparatus, &c., in each parish. The Company are rateable to the extent of the increased value of the land in Putney, in consequence of its being

(1) 74 R. R. 268 (10 Q. B. 208).
(2) 117 R. R. 420 (1 El. & El. 716).

(3) 47 R. R. 490 (8 Ad. & El. 73).

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[ *113]

used by them for the purpose of conveying the water: Rex v. Brighton Gas Light Company (1).

Bovill, in reply:

In Reg. v. The Cambridge Gas Light Company (2) the question was how to distribute the rateable value of the Company's apparatus among the assessments of parishes in each of which the Company supplied gas. That case, therefore, is not in point. The present case is not distinguishable in principle from Reg. v. West Middlesex Waterworks (3). Rex v. The New River Company (4), Reg. v. Hammersmith Bridge Company (5), Reg. v. Great Western Railway Company (6), Mayor, &c. of Liverpool v. Overseers of West Derby (7), are also in favour of the appellants. Whatever difficulty there may be in determining the true principle of assessment, that adopted in this case was clearly wrong, and the appellants are, on that ground, entitled to the judgment of the Court.

Cur. adv. vult.

BLACKBURN, J. now delivered the judgment of the COURT (8):

In this case, on appeal by the Chelsea Waterworks Company against a rate made on them by the parish of Putney, for the relief of the poor of the parish, the Quarter Sessions refer to this Court only one question. *If the principle stated in the 16th paragraph of the case is correct, the rate is to be amended, and stand for 2,800l. If that principle be not correct, then the rate is to be amended, and stand for 2,000l. The general question as to the principle on which the rateable value of such property should be apportioned is one of great difficulty and importance, which has recently been the subject of much consideration; but in this case we are not asked nor authorized to say what is the correct principle, but only to determine whether this particular principle is right. Now that principle is, that the rateable value of the whole apparatus of the Company in all the parishes in which it is situate is to be ascertained, and then divided among the said several parishes according to the quantity of land occupied by the apparatus in each parish." If this principle be correct, every square foot of land occupied by the apparatus is to be rated at the same rate, without regard to the situation or nature of the land, whether it was originally part a barren heath, like Putney Heath, or part of the market ground of Fulham, and without regard to whether it be merely land

(1) 29 R. R. 290 (5 B. & C. 466).
(2) 47 R. R. 490 (8 Ad. & El. 73).
(3) 117 R. R. 420 (1 El. & El. 716).
(4) 14 R. R. 514 (1 M. & S. 503).
(5) 81 R. R. 629 (15 Q. B. 369).

of

occupied by pipes under the surface of the highway, or whether
it be land upon which expensive buildings have been erected for
the purpose of converting it into filtering beds or reservoirs. We
have no difficulty in saying that this principle is not correct;
we cannot sanction it; and therefore we must answer the only
question put to us by saying the rate must stand for 2,000l.
Judgment for the appellants.
amended to 2,000l.

REG. v. HERFORD.

The rate to be

(3 El. & El. 115–136; S. C. 29 L. J. Q. B. 249; 6 Jur. N. S. 750.) A coroner has no ex officio jurisdiction, at common law, to hold any other inquest than one on a dead body, super visum corporis. He cannot, therefore, hold an inquest to inquire into the origin of a fire by which no death has been occasioned.

Prohibition lies to a Court of criminal, no less than to one of civil, jurisdiction.

MELLISII had obtained a rule calling upon the defendant, the coroner for the city of Manchester, to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue, directed to him, to prohibit him from further holding an inquisition respecting the origin of a fire at the shop and premises of Levy Kreigsfeld, No. 3, Palatine Buildings, Hunt's Bank, in the said city of Manchester.

It appeared from the affidavits that the said Levy Kreigsfeld was a dealer in indiarubber and mackintosh goods, carrying on business on premises which were usually locked up at night. On the evening of 27th March last he locked up the premises and went home; shortly afterwards, a fire was discovered in the shop, and the chief constable of the city of Manchester suggested to the coroner the propriety of holding an inquest to ascertain, if possible, the origin of the fire. The coroner accordingly issued his precept to the chief constable to summon a jury, and proceeded to hold the inquest as had been suggested to him: acting solely upon that suggestion, and from a regard to his duty as coroner, and to the public interest involved in the discharge. of such duty. Levy Kreigsfeld was called upon to attend the inquest, and he did so, accompanied by counsel, who objected that the coroner had no power to hold an inquest concerning a fire. The coroner, nevertheless, entered upon and continued the inquiry for some hours, *during which time he examined Levy Kreigsfeld on oath, and then adjourned the inquest.

It further appeared that, in London, Lincoln, Doncaster and some other places, the coroners have of late years occasionally held inquests in cases of fire, when they were required to do so. After the adjournment of the inquest, Mellish obtained the present rule.

REG.

t.

HERFORD

[ *117 ]

Sir William Atherton, Solicitor-General, Wheeler and
Fonblanque now showed cause:

There are two points for consideration; First, whether prohibition is the proper course for raising the question involved; which is, Secondly, whether a coroner has, at common law, the jurisdiction which the defendant has assumed, of holding an inquest to inquire into the origin of a fire by which no death has been caused. Now, first, prohibition is not the proper mode of proceeding in criminal cases; and the present is a criminal, or, at all events, not a civil case. The jurisdiction which the defendant has assumed is of a similar character to that which he exercises in holding an inquest on a death; and is not civil. In Blackstone's Commentaries, Book III., c. vii., p. 112, the Courts to which a writ of prohibition may issue are enumerated; and none of them are Courts of criminal jurisdiction.

(CROMPTON, J.: In Com. Dig. tit. "Prohibition" (F. 6), instances are given of a prohibition, "If the suit be for a criminal matter.")

2 Inst. 600, there cited by Comyns, is a comment upon the statute of Edw. I., entitled "prohibitio formata de statuto articuli cleri"; the sole object of which was to prohibit the spiritual Courts from taking cognizance of felonies.

(CROMPTON, J.: The heading of the title in Comyns is in general terms. And *Goulson v. Wainwright (1), which he cites, shows that if articles ex officio, which require an answer upon oath, are exhibited in a spiritual Court against any person, for a criminal matter, such person may obtain a prohibition to that Court; though not if the matter is civil.)

Mellish, contrà:

In the Admiralty case (2) it appears to have been assumed that the prohibition, there refused upon another ground, would have lain to the Admiralty Court, for want of jurisdiction to take cognizance of a criminal offence not committed on the high It is true that the report says "if one be sued in the Admiralty Court," &c.; but it appears from the context that the

seas.

proceeding was for a criminal matter.

Sir William Atherton:

The suit in that case was clearly a civil one.

The Courts

to which prohibition will issue are enumerated also in Com. Dig. "Prohibition" (A. 1): and are, all of them, either civil or spiritual. Forms of the writ are given in Fitzherbert, de Nat.

(1) 1 Sid. 374.

(2) 12 Co. Rep. 77, 78.

Brev. tit. Prohibition "; but none of them are framed for a
criminal court. In Pomfraye's case (1), the main question in
which was whether an information under the Statute of Usury,
37 Hen. VIII. c. 9, was properly laid before justices in Sessions,
or ought to have been prosecuted in the superior Court, the
point whether prohibition would lie to the Court of Quarter
Sessions was also mooted; and seems to have given rise to a
difference of opinión, and to have been left undecided. Grant
v. Sir Charles Gould (2) is an instance of an application for a
prohibition to a court-martial; but there the objection that no
prohibition would lie to such a Court was not raised; and the
application was refused on another ground, namely, that as the
applicant had been in the receipt of pay as a soldier, the court-
martial had jurisdiction to try him, although he had assumed
the military character merely for recruiting purposes. Secondly,
the coroner has, at common law, the jurisdiction which the
defendant has assumed in the present case; and no statute has
put an end to it. The office of coroner is, as stated by Black-
stone, Commentaries, Book I., c. ix., p. 347, of equal antiquity
with that of sheriff. At the following page Blackstone gives a
description of its duties; and another is to be found in Hale's
P. C. pl. 2, c. 8, vol. 2, p. 56 (ed. 1800, by Dogherty). Neither
of these, it is true, includes the holding an inquest on the cause
of a fire among those duties; but neither of them is exhaustive.
On the other hand, this particular jurisdiction, if it existed at
common law, has not been taken away by any statute; although
many statutes, Magna Charta for instance, cap. 17, as is shown
by Lord Coke in his comment upon it in 2 Inst. 31, 32, have
deprived the coroner of certain of the powers anciently apper-
taining to his office. Notwithstanding those statutes, the
coroner's common law jurisdiction extends far beyond that which
is now popularly considered as its limit: namely, the holding
inquests super visum corporis. Nathaniel Bacon, in his His-
torical and Political Discourse of the Laws and Government of
England, cap. 23, sect. 2, p. 41, (ed. 4, of 1739), says that in
the Saxon kingdom the coroner's work "was to inquire upon
view of manslaughter, and by indictment of all felonies as done
contrà coronam, which formerly were only contrà pacem, and
triable only by appeal." The same author, in cap. 69, p. 179,
treating of the jurisdiction of coroners in the reigns of
*Henry III., Edward I. and Edward II., says that the Statute
of West. 1, c. 10, "holds " them "to the work of taking inquests
and appeals, by indenture between themselves and the sheriff:
and these were to be certified at the next coming of the justices.”
(1) 1 Litt. 163.
(2) 3 R. R. 342 (2 II. Bl. 69).
40

R.R.

-VOL. CXXII.

REG.

v.

HERFORD.

[*118]

[ *119 ]