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COMPANY.

REG. and the premises connected therewith, is a quantity of land, GLAMORGAN Separated from the canal only by the wharfs, and which is used SHIRE CANAL as mere land; the rateable value whereof, and of the other land in the immediate vicinity, was taken, for the purposes of the said appeal, at an average of 31. an acre per annum. Until the rate, the subject of appeal, was made, the Company had been rated by the said parish in respect of the said land under the canal and towing path, at the sum of 120l. per annum only, in respect of the lands and premises mentioned; and that sum was admitted, for the purposes of the said appeal, to be the ful! rateable value of the lands and premises taken and occupied by the Company under the said Acts, situate within the said parish, supposing the same to be assessed and rated at the average annual rateable value of the land, used as mere land, lying nearest thereto. By the present rate the appellants are rated for the bed of the canal and the towing paths in the same proportion as the lands and grounds lying near thereto are rated in the same assessment, and in the same proportion in which they would be rated in case they were the property of individuals in their natural capacity.

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At the Quarter Sessions the appellants confined their objections to the principles so adopted by the respondents and involved in the said assessment. They contended that, by the principle of rating so adopted by the parish, they were assessed at too high an amount in respect of the lands occupied by the bed of the canal and the towing paths, and also in respect of the lands and premises abutted upon by the wharfs and yards. They contended that under the provisions of the 67th section of the Act, they were only liable to be assessed, in respect of their lands and premises, at the rateable value of land adjoining thereto, if the same had remained mere land, and at the time of the rate was used only for purposes consistent with its retaining that character. The Court of Quarter Sessions found, for the purposes of this case, that the lands and grounds occupied by the appellants were not overrated, if the correct principle was to rate their lands and grounds in the same proportion as the lands and grounds lying near were rated, as occupied at the time of making the said rate, and as if the lands and grounds were the property of individuals. But that the appellants were overrated, if their lands and grounds should have been assessed as the lands and grounds lying near thereto would have been, if they had continued to be used as mere land.

The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the principle of assessment adopted by the respondents is based upon the correct construction of the provisions of the Act regu

REG. ".

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lating the rating of the Company's lands; and whether the said provisions, and the facts and circumstances disclosed in the case, GLAMORGANwarranted the order of the Court of Quarter Sessions. If the SHIRE CANAL COMPANY. Court should be of that opinion, then the order of *the Court of Quarter Sessions was to stand, and the rate to remain for the full sum at which the canal and premises had been assessed by the respondents. If the Court should be of the contrary opinion, then the rate was to be amended by reducing it to the amount of the former assessment.

Field and Bowen, for the respondents:

** It is not now contended, for the respondents, that either the applicability to building purposes of the land adjoining the appellant's property, or the rent which a lessee of it for a long term of years, for such purposes, would give, is to be taken into account. The respondents admit that the true criterion is the rent which a *tenant from year to year would give for the lands.

(WIGHTMAN, J.: Suppose that the whole of the lands were covered with buildings which produced a great increase of rental. Might the parish take the increase into account?)

Yes; so far as the value of the land was enhanced to a tenant from year to year, by being built upon.

(COCKBURN, Ch. J.: If your contention is right, the Company are exposed to great hardship, being rateable on the improved value of the land adjoining the canal, but without the power of increasing the value of their own land.)

The hardship, if any, results from the bargain made by the Company with the parish; which is embodied in and must be collected from the Act of Parliament. Moreover, the land taken by the Company is taken out of the hands of the parish.

Bovill, H. Giffard and G. B. Hughes, for the appellants: The rate is excessive. Even assuming that the appellants are rateable, under the 67th section of their Act, in the same proportion as the lands and grounds lying near the canal were rated at the time of making the rate, so much of the adjacent lands and grounds as were at that time covered with wharfs and Luildings are not "lands" within the meaning of the Act, which must refer to lands used merely as such. If the Court adopt the opposite construction of the enactment, the clause, which was intended to protect the Canal Company from an excessive impost, will, as has been pointed out by COCKBURN, Ch. J., become the means of inflicting upon them an increased burthen. The first

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REG. 1.

lands, left in their natural state, which are reached, after leaving the canal, are the lands the rateable value of which is to be SHIRE CANAL Considered for the purpose of rating the canal.

GLAMORGAN

COMPANY.

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(COCKBURN, Ch. J.: *In course of time the whole of the lands adjacent to the canal will probably be covered with buildings.) If so, the first uncovered land, beyond the buildings, would then become the "lands ""lying near "lying near" the canal, within the meaning

of the Act.

(COCKBURN, Ch. J.: That would strain the language of the Legislature very much.)

Reg. v. The Grand Junction Canal Company (1) is strongly in point to show that, even if the rateable value of the land immediately adjoining the canal is to be taken as the criterion of the rateability of the canal, that rateable value is the rent which a tenant from year to year would give for such land in its natural state; not that which a lessee of it for building purposes would give. That case was decided on the authority of Rex v. The Grand Junction Canal Company (2). * * *

Cur. adr. vult.

COCKBURN, Ch. J. now delivered the judgment of the COURT:
In this case the question turns upon the effect of a clause
in a Canal Act, whereby the proprietors are protected against
being rated in respect of the increased value of the land occupied
by the canal, by reason of its being so occupied, by a provision
that the Company shall be rated "in the same proportion as
other lands and grounds lying near the same are or shall be
rated." A state of things has arisen which evidently is very
different from that contemplated by the Legislature at the time
the Act passed. The object of the enactment was to give
immunity to the Canal Company against being *rated in respect
of the increased value of the land, resulting from its occupation
as a canal, as distinguished from its previous value, as used for
agricultural purposes. But, in the new state of things which has
arisen, the adjoining land, instead of being of inferior, has, by
its being used as wharfs and its application to building purposes,
become of greater value than the soil occupied by the canal. A
provision which was intended for the benefit of the Canal Com-
pany has thus become the means of casting an additional burden
upon them, and entails on them a considerable hardship. Never-
theless, we are of opinion that full effect must be given to the
enactment. Its language being clear and precise, it is not com-
petent to us to modify its provisions, in order to meet a state
(1) 113 R. R. 1024 (7 W. R. 597). (2) 19 R. R. 316 (1 B. & Ald. 289).

REG.

".

COMPANY.

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of things which, if it could have been contemplated by the Legislature at the time of passing the Act, would probably have GLAMORGANbeen provided against. Relief in such a case can only be sought SHIRE CANAL at the hands of the Legislature, whose province we should be usurping if we were to put a construction on the Act different from what its terms warrant, in order to meet the equity of the case. We have no hesitation, therefore, in rejecting the proposed construction, that we are to consider, not what is the rateable value of the land immediately adjoining the canal, but that of the nearest agricultural land, no matter how far removed, in order to give effect to what the Legislature had in view in passing this clause. The enactment is clear and unambiguous, that the lands occupied by the Company shall be rated in the same proportion as the adjoining lands. The Court cannot construe the enactment differently because the relative value of the land occupied by the canal and of the adjoining land have become changed. But a new *difficulty presents itself, from the circumstance that the adjoining lands are no longer rateable simply as land. They have become in many instances covered with buildings of a valuable description, and the value of the land becomes, as it were, merged in that of the buildings by which it is covered. It is possible, however, to ascertain the value of the land as applicable and subservient to building purposes, as distinguished from the joint value of land and buildings; but here a new difficulty presents itself. By the Parochial Assessment Act, property is to be rated according to the rent which a tenant from year to year might be expected to give for it. Now a tenant from year to year would not give for the land in question a rent equivalent to its value for building purposes; it is only in the hands of a lessee with a long term that the land would have this larger value. For this reason this Court, then consisting of my Lord CAMPBELL and ERLE, J., in the case of Reg. v. The Grand Junction Canal Company (1), held, on a provision similar to the present, that land occupied by a Canal Company was not liable. to be rated otherwise than as agricultural land, notwithstanding that the adjoining land was occupied as land covered with buildings. We cannot, upon consideration, bring ourselves to acquiesce in the propriety of that decision. It appears to us that, in applying the Parochial Assessment Act to such a case as the present, the criterion is not what a tenant from year to year would give for the land to be rated, that is, the land occupied by the Canal Company, but what such a tenant would give for the adjoining land, according to the rating of which the land in question is, by the provision of the enactment which we are called

(1) 113 R. R. 1024 (7 W. R. 597).

REG.

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GLAMORGAN

COMPANY,

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upon to construe, to be rated. Now the adjoining land, being built upon, is worth so much to a tenant from year to year, as SHIRE CANAL land built upon. In the yearly rent paid for a building, a certain proportion of the rent must be taken as paid in respect of the land occupied by the building. That proportion, larger, no doubt, than the value of the land if not applied to building purposes, is capable of being ascertained. It is, in our opinion, the rateable value of the adjoining land, and should be taken to be the proportion in which the lands and grounds lying near the cana in question are rated, within the 67th section of this Act of Parliament; and, consequently, as the proportion in which the land occupied by the canal is to be rated. To rate the latter according to what a tenant from year [to year] would give for it, independently of what such a tenant would give for the adjoining land, is, as it seems to us, to rate it independently of the rating of the adjoining land; in other words, to give no effect to the provision of the section according to which the rating is to be made. We hold, on these grounds, that the position taken by the argument of the appellants, that the whole of the land in question ought to be rated as mere land, is not tenable, as relates to the adjoining land when built upon or made into wharfs. But as, where the adjoining land has not been applied to such purposes, it must be treated as land under the Parochial Assessment Act, and cannot therefore be rated as land applicable to building purposes, at all events beyond what a tenant from year to year would give for it for such purpose, it appears to us that the true principle on which the rate should be made is, that the land covered with buildings, valued as we have already pointed out, should be brought into hotchpot with the land of the other *description, in each particular parish; and that the land occupied by the canal should be rated according to the aggregate value of the whole. This can, of course, be at best but a rough estimate; but it appears to us to be the only means of giving effect to the provisions of the various Acts of Parliament. The rate must therefore be amended accordingly.

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1860. June 22. July 7.

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Rate to be amended.

BLECH . BALLERAS.

(3 El. & El. 203-220; S. C. 29 L. J. Q. B. 261; 6 Jur. N. S. 1243.) Plaintiff, having chartered a steamer, agreed with defendants to take out some engines in her to Barcelona, it being known to both parties that the engines could not be shipped unless some alterations were made in her hatchways. The agreement contained the following conditions. First that plaintiff should lay the steamer on her berth at Liverpool for Barcelona. Secondly that she should not be required to lie on her berth longer than ten days. Thirdly that she should make the voyage from there to Barcelona for the lump sum of 650,

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