ber of the "Glory's' guns which could play on her own devoted stern, which negative advantage the "Glory" would, of course, in prosecuting her own unflinching object, allow her the benefit of for as short a time as possible, and her more effective steerage powers would enable her to displace the "Warrior" from the relative position far sooner than she herself had been displaced.

A maximum of the above negative advantage to the "Warrior" would, no doubt, accrue from her taking a position at right angles, and right across either the stern or the bows of the "Glory," for in those positions few, or none possibly, of the "Glory's" guns would bear on those two fatal extremities; but, as before, she could not hold such positions long, and if she could, "Complete protection," as compared with "Partial protection," would only the more fully exemplify the difference between them, by refusing to yield any positive advantage while holding such positions, beyond the opportunity of wasting shot or shell on such highly angled bows; or beyond a shot occasionally entering at a port, if lying across the stern.

The Plate as shewn was not intended to deprive the "Warrior" of the twelve guns in her extramural batteries, but, as it was desirable to exhibit the two entirely opposite Principles, as yet adopted by the one Nation and the other for their respective Iron-cased ships, it was thought best to distinguish as much as possible the unprotected from the protected portions by exhibiting the 13 protected guns only. The angular distance shewn in the diagram which the "Warrior" would have to come round" before the aftermost of her protected port guns would bear on the " Glory's" port quarter, is two points of the compass; but the curve of the ship's form has not been taken into account in angling the line of fire of the "Warrior's" guns, which if done would shew them to cover a somewhat greater portion of the "limits" within which she is exposed to fatal attack; but to which in truth she is more or less exposed, and at every distance within range of every gun, from that most fatal position shewn in figure 3, to the assumed one of right athwart bows or stern; and thus I have sketched as it were a skeleton of positions which any one may fill in according to fancy for himself; but which must always exhibit the fatal defects of "Partial protection." The distance shewn in the Plate between the two ships is 270 yards, or say twice the "Warrior's" length, as a convenient distance to avoid boarding, but I need not dwell on this perfectly speculative operation, for which no description of ship more than another is ever specially built. Neither need I notice the operation of "ramming," as it is jocosely named, for ships will require indeed a very special construction when such an operation, if at all possible, is provided for, and certainly "papier mâché" ends, like those of the "Warrior," won't be among the requirements.

But there are more "Glorys" and "Warriors" afloat than the two which have now been battling; let us add a consort on each side and try again. Alas! there will then be two unprotected bows and two unprotected sterns to be kept out of the way of two completely protected and hungry opponents, who by a little obvious combination will be able to secure the same fatal issue sooner than before. A double exposition of weakness affords no compensation or consolation for a more limited exposure; and no multiplication of false principles can ever produce a sound

one.

While to talk of such ships as the "Warrior" taking position "in

line of battle," with many enemies around, and all of far greater force than herself, is but to add insult to that which is sorrowful enough as it is.

But how about opponents of wood? With her superior speed, when with a clean bottom, the "Warrior" would no doubt be in safety in presence of a 12-knot 90-gun ship; and, at long balls, might do her injury; but, if within range herself of those 45 guns, she must expect, with a mizenmast and foremast again to mark her weak points, to get quite as much as she gave; and must give up any chance of advantage by getting into effective shell-range. On the other hand, her "Partial Protection" in such a presence would place her in a position so little more advantageous than that of a frigate of wood, that she must fall a prey, quite as certainly, and almost as soon, if by accident the "ship" should ever close within half range of her.

How, then, about a frigate of wood, an "Orlando," or "Emerald," with a 25-gun broadside to her own 21? Here her superior speed would give her the option to fight, which she could not refuse; and the amount of her protected guns would bear a far more favourable proportion to those of her adversary than in the former case. But, still, those terribly tender ends! and especially the after one. If, in close action, the frigate should succeed in taking the position shown in the figure 3, and could keep it long enough for a few well-delivered rounds from each of those 25 guns, then I to no powers of prophecy whereby to determine the issue.

presume

As I am specially judging the "Warrior" as the British exponent of what an Iron-cased frigate should and may be, in respect to her relative merits in action with ships of her own description, these two latter cases need not have been put at all, except that in casting down such a challenge as I am quite conscious that I now do, I desire to show that in all points the case of Principle I submit has been as closely examined as I am able. These two cases, however, enable me to point out that the battle with the "Glory" was purposely fought out with cold shot only; yet I am myself well convinced that plates, whenever proved-with many more 8ths added to them-will be found perfectly penetrable by live conical shells, both time-fused and concussion, as well as by the contents of Martin's most formidable projectile.

The detail of all these cases of assumed contest will also, as I trust, have gone far to impress others with my own conviction, that no man will waste a blow where he knows it cannot take effect, in preference to directing it to where it must take the fullest effect he can wish for; or, in other words, that, except as a mistake, not a shot or shell from any opponent, whether of wood or iron, will ever be fired at the "Warrior's" armour plates, so long as at each end of those plates there exist fatal portions of the ship inviting to the fullest effect of almost every missile which can be fired into them. The conclusion is inevitable, that not in the central half, but in those two terminal quarter lengths, there will be the struggle; there the slaughter, there the final, but not dubious, issue determined; so completely self-destructive are all false Principles, whether wittingly or unwittingly adopted.

It is superfluous, after what has now been so fully put before you, for me to state my own evident and complete conviction that "Partial Protection" cannot be maintained against " Complete Protection;" and as high Authority has lately declared from Parliament the disparity in numbers of Iron-cased Ships between ourselves and France, so it is hoped to give deeper effect to

that important announcement by declaring from this humbler Arena, that the Principle adopted for the ships of England must render them incapable to support the honor of their Flag against those of France of equal force, except as his Country's honor was saved at Pavia by Francis the First.

Such, are the present prospects of success in this great game as opened by the players upon England's side: and, so far more prominently than ever before, are mental, rather than physical, efforts taking lead in these days in the inevitable decisions of Warfare.

IRON-CASED SHIPS.

The "Warrior's" Junior Sisters.-Proposal for a
Proof-ship.

DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION ON MONDAY,
JUNE 10TH, 1861.

CAPTAIN E. G. FISHBOURNE, R.N., C.B., in the Chair.

MR. CHAIRMAN and Gentlemen,

However painful it may have been in the prosecution of my task to bring structures, in many respects so noble as are the "Warrior" and "Black Prince," to the test of acknowledged principles, and find them fatally defective, a still deeper cause of lament arises on applying those same principles to their four smaller sisters. There appears no dispute that "Iron-cased Ships," of whatever size, must be most costly ones, and in such case it is reasonable to suppose that every study would be given to impart to them the highest qualities as Ships-of-war of which their size rendered them capable; it seems, therefore more than surprising to find the paramount quality of high speed not only not provided for, but actually provided against. For while it is quite possible, no doubt, perversely to give to the highest proportionate dimensions, even those of seven and eight times the breadth to the length, an abnormal and obstructive form for speed, we have seen that more than 16 years since it was found impossible to produce a speed-form out of proportions under six times the breadth to the length, as also that such impossibility had been both recognised and acted on in Admiralty designs, amongst others, in that of the "Warrior" herself; and it could therefore be only by deliberate choice, not error, that proportions but little more than five times their breadth to their length were selected for the "Resistance" and "Defence;" and, as if to make a low instead of a high speed, the object most obviously aimed at in these ships, this inferiority of their form has been further enhanced by providing them with a proportion of steam power inferior to that of any other ships of their class of equal size in the Navy. As in the "Warrior" and her sister, there are in these two juniors likewise the same proportion of unprotected ends covered only by the same fatal single plates, the proportion of guns thus unprotected being rather larger in these than in the elder ships. That proportion in the "Warrior

is 6 to 13 on the broadside; but in the "Resistance" and "Defence" it is 4 outside to 7 inside the "box;" the dimensions of the ships being 280 feet of length to a breadth of 54 feet, with a tonnage in round numbers of 3,700 tons, or rather more than one-third less than the "Warrior's," but with rather less than half the "Warrior's" power, or 600 horse-power only. Thus, every defect of the larger ships is sadly aggravated in these smaller ones, without the one redeeming point of high speed; and to place one of them in diagram before you in supposed action with an İroncased Ship of an equal force of 22 guns under Complete Protection, would be but a repetition of the "Warrior's" case, with this addition,— that the position of the "Glory" as shown in Plate 3 figure 3 must be still more fatal, there being no superior speed with which to break away from the death-grip, in hope of returning again to the fight with better fortune; so completely in these ships is the fatal effect of false Principle provided for, not only by the weakness of construction in their two terminal quarter-lengths, and by their larger proportion of unprotected guns; but by their inability to decline engagement, and their incapability of escape from the inevitable results of their weakness, when once closely engaged.

I am aware that this deliberate endowment of the "Defence" and "Resistance" with such serious disqualifications as Ships-of-war, is attributed to an intention to employ them as Coast defences; but for any such explanation to be valid, it would have to be shown that disqualifications which would be fatal in action out at sea, would cease to be so if engaged with the same enemy near the land; and if there be one quality more than another required in those vessels to whose safeguard is to be committed the defence of our immediate Coasts, and the enormous property which frequents them, it is that of superior speed, by which to succour with least delay every threatened point, and give surest account of any trespasser within the forbidden limits. Surely therefore in such ships as these it was only as a parody on the favorite project of one of our gallant Admirals that they were built at additional expense with a form of bow for that operation of running down other ships, or "ramming," as it is termed, in which high speed is the most essential requisite.

The very recent date at which the construction of the "Valiant" and her sister has been entered on, affords hope that the similar errors which they too embody may yet come to be reconsidered, and that their completion will not be persevered in up to that point when "expense of alteration" can be pleaded for inflicting on the Country another pair of "specimens," in which most assuredly the Country will never see cause of either pride or profit if finished according to the design they are now building on. In these the paramount quality of speed has been as deliberately provided against, both by inferior form and low proportion of Power, as in the "Resistance" and "Defence," their proportionate dimensions being even less than five times their breadth for their length, with engines of 800 horsepower; and there is also reason to believe that from deficient displacement their height of ports will exhibit no improvement upon those of the "Gloire." But with 30 guns in ships of 4,000 tons, their powers of offence are an improvement on their two immediate predecessors, and it is most gratifying to observe that their two fatal "box-ends," have approached so near to the hawse-holes at one extremity, and the cabin